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ABSTRACT
The subject of the thesis has been dealt with 
under ten chapters. In each of the chapters the Hindu law 
has been discussed in its various aspects, including the 
Smriti lav; on the subject, the views of the commentators, 
the judicial decisions and the position under the Anglo- 
•indu law, the present law under the Hindu Adoption and 
Maintenance Act 1956, and compared with the corresponding 
English and other laws on the subject. I have considered 
or referred to about seven hundred judicial decisions and 
also given my own views and suggestions wherever appropriate.
The first chapter deals, among other topics, with 
the object of adoption, and the sources and history of the 
Hindu and English adoption laws. The next few chapters 
deal with the comparative effects of adoption in the two 
legal systems in the child's natural and adoptive families 
and the adoptee's right to succeed to relations in the 
maternal and paternal families of the adoptive father.
Chapter Vi deals exhaustively v/ith the important question 
of the doctrine of 'relation back' from its inception to 
the latest Supreme Court decisions and the views of different 
writers on the subject and my own. Other topics- include 
ante-adoption agreements and the effect of adoption in forms, 
other than the dattaka.
I have shown the close similarity between the 
present day Hindu and English laws of adoption especially 
in so far as the effects of the institution are concerned 
as compared to many other countries where the laws are not
as strictly logical.
I have also discussed why the adoption of daughters
should have been recognised even under the pre-HAMA period.
In the concluding chapter I have discussed various
current problems especially the necessity of having an
adoption law in India for communities other than Hindus 
also, who at present have no legally recognised adoption 
law. I have suggested that there should be, for a period, 
a two-fold legal institution of adoption, one based upon 
the Sastra (the Dattaka form) and available to "indus and 
another of a purely secular kind available to all persons 
subject to Indian law in this regard, including the Hindus. 
This appears to me to be the most feasible course to be 
adopted under the present circumstances in India.
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Adoption is unique among the institutions of family law.
In his work entitled, L*Adoption dans les Legislations Modemes, 
M. Ancel opines that it is not an essential institution like
1 8*marriage and that it is essentially a luxury and not a necessity. 
With this view, however, the Hindu lawyers may not fully agree, 
who enjoin adoption by a sonless man to prevent his exclusion
1 Vt
from heaven.
Adoption may be distinguished from what it is not by
reviewing all the incidents of all systems of adoption and all
institutionalised customs approximating to adoption. Professor
1 cDerrett divides the definition of adoption in two parts, a 
major and a minor, the major part telling what it is, and the 
second telling the reason why it is, in any particular 
jurisdiction, what it manifests itself to be, thus:
(i) Adoption is the Juridical device by which a 
relationship similar to that between parent and 
legitimate child is created between persons who 
otherwise would not stand in that relationship
(ii) The degree of similarity between the relationship 
created by adoption and the relationship of a 
legitimate child to its parents depends upon the
1a. M. Ancel: L 1Adoption dans les Legislations Modernes. Paris 
194-3. op.eit. p. 29.
1b. See pages 4 to 7.
1a. Adoption: A Preliminary Study, by J.D.M. Derrett (S.O.A.S., 
University of London), pages 4 ff. Estudio Preliminar Sobre 
la.Adoption: Institute .de.De.recho Comparado, Barcelona, 1956.
2proportion in which the motives which jointly give 
rise to the device are experienced in the law-making 
body.
Adoption is a device, observes Derrett, because it is an 
organized pretence. It is juridical not merely because its 
application would be impossible and its organization futile unless 
the concept were a matter of law, but also because private acts 
will have no absolute validity without juridical recognition.
Its pecularity is that it is similar to a natural one which is
recognized everywhere, that between parent and legitimate child.
*1
Adoptions as grandparent, for example, are unknown. The 
adopting relationship is similar but not identical with the 
natural legitimate relationship. Its effects are not retrospective 
to birth; it cannot be revoked, in English law except by 
readoption, or if there is any interim adoption order. Adoption 
cannot be revoked under Hindu Law.
Though fostering and affiliations to the family of a 
restricted kind, such as testamentary gifts will perform 
severally the various objects of adoption, that is providing a 
secure background, maintenance and family affection to the child, 
only adoption will perform simultaneously more than one of them.
So also adoption is clearly distinguishable from 
wardship, and guardianship and custody orders underIthe 
Guardianship of Infants Acts, 1886-1971, now consolidated in 
The Guardianship of Minors Act, 1971, in that it is permanent 
and it extinguishes the parental rights and responsibilities of 
the natural parents.
1d. Adoption as sister in Assyrian Law is described by Driver & 
Miles: The Assyrian Laws, Oxford, 1935, p« 165, is really a 
sale of the right to give the girl in marriage and take her 
bride-price coupled with a duty to maintain and protect. It 
was an institution parallel to adoption but distinct from it 
. . as. rightly, observed by Derrett a.t footnote 16.
In a paper entitled Adoption of Children*; working
paper containing the provisional proposals of the Departmental
Committee on the Adoption of Children, 1970, adoption has been 
1 edefined as the complete severance of the legal relationship
1fbetween natural parents and child and the establishment of a
new one between the child and his adoptive parents.
A similar definition of adoption is of the Dattaka or 
Dattrima son in the Hindu law, which is defined by Manu as 
followss-
**That (boy) equal (by caste) whom his mother or his father 
affectionately gives (confirming the gift) with (a libation 
of water), in times of distress ( to a man) as his son, must
be considered as an adopted son (Dattrima).
It is clear from this definition and also from Manu
1 Vi
IX, 142} that in the case of the Dattrima adoption there is 
complete severance of the legal relationship between the natural 
parents and child and the establishment of a new one between the 
child and his adoptive parents, and incidently in this respect 
the definition propounded by the Departmental Committee on the 
Adoption of Children (London 1970) mentioned above conforms with 
this view.
Adoption survives as an institution because it serves 
perpetually recurring, if not universal needs. It is necessary 
therefore, to turn next to the motives which lead people to 
make adoptions.
1e. At Para 8.
1f. However in some countries the severance is not complete, 
especially in respect of matters of inheritance etc. See 
pages 161 ff.
1g. Manu IX, 168.
1h. See pages 56 ff for a discussion on Manu IX, 142.
4The object of adoption under Hindu law.
The importance of having sons (adoption being one of 
the means of obtaining sons) under the Hindu law is clearly 
brought out by the following text of Ya.inavalkya "Because 
continuity of the family in this world and the attainment of
heaven in the next are through sons, son’s sons and sonfs
1 igrandsons, therefore women should be loved and protected”
Thus under the Hindu law the object of adoption is two-fold,
one a temporal one for the continuity of the family in this
world and the other a spiritual one for the attainment of heaven
in the next. The Vedas and Smritis declare "Endless are the
worlds of those who have sons; there is no place for the man
who is destitute of male offspring”. "May our enemies be
destitute of offspring”. "0 Agni, may I obtain immortality 
2by offspring”. And Manu says "since the son delivers his 
father from the hell named Put he was, therefore, called Puttra 
by Brahma himself" •, and again, "By a son, a man obtains 
victory over all people; by a son’s son, he enjoys immortality; 
and, afterwards, by the son of that grandson, he reaches the
1i. Yajn., I, 78.
2. Rig Veda, 1,21,. 5 cited in Vas., XVII, 2-4; Vishnu, XV, 
45.
3. Manu IX, 138.
solar abode".  ^ The above eulogies in praise of sonship almost 
unanimously found in no less authorities than the Vedas and 
the Smritis cannot be mere verbiage and the view of Lord 
.ynford attributing the spiritual efficacy of the possession 
of a son to a superstition of the people^ does not seem to 
be correct.
According to the Vedas and Smritis an Aryan is
born burdened with three debts viz., the debts to the Rishis,
the Gchds and the ancestors. "He owes the study of the Veda
to the Rishis, sacrifices to the Gods, and a son to the manes”.
"He is free from debt who has offered sacrifices, who has
begotten a son and who has lived as a student (with a teache^" .
So also ITarada says "Lathers desire male offspring for their
own sake (reflecting) this son will redeem me from every debt
7
whatsoever due to superior and inferior beings”. "The debts 
of ancestors fall on the sons who are enjoined to pay them, 
for otherwise the merit of their devotions and sacrifices
o
will pass to the creditors”." So also Brihaspati says 
that the person who does not repay his debts is born as 
a servant or slave in his creditor's house. In the Vedas and 
Smritis, however, the emphasis was on the need for aurasa, or 
one's own legitimate sons and the irregular (secondary, or 
substitute) sons were not favoured. Lor the Veda says "0 Agni,
4. Hanu IX, 137-
5. Rutroogun Sutpatty v Sabitra Dye, (1835) 5 ■ .R. 109 (P.C.) ,
Also see Cowell' s Hindu law Vol. I., page 210. RlS o e^ v~r-€ci
t <* $ .  V 'C Y i  KO LtccTCA.*M c<.n  A  c l o | ? H 'o v i  a ^ c l  i v o u ) .
6. Taittriya - samhita VI, 3? 10, 5 cited in Vas. , XI, 48;
hanu, VI, 35-37, IX, 106, 107; XI, 66.
7. Colebrook's Dig. Vol. 1, p. 299*
8 . Col. Dig. Vol. I, p. 299* It is a characteristic Hindu ,,




no son is he who springs from others". "A son begotten of
another, though worthy of regard is not even to be contemplated
in the mind as fit for acceptance, for, verily he returns to
his house. Therefore let there come to us a son new born,
possessed of food and victorious over foes".^ Manu in this
connection says "Such advantage as a main would gain, who
should attempt to pass deep water in a boat made of woven
reeds, that father obtains, who passes the gloom of death,
leaving only contemptible sons, (who are the eleven, or at
least the six) last mentioned" Baijfehayana says "After death
the son belongs to the begetter; through carelessness a husband
12 -makes the procreation of a son useless". Apastamba cites
Vedic authority to the effect that the son belongs to the
begetter in the next world and condemns the Kshetraja and all
kinds of subsidiary sons and extols the possession of the
Aurasa or real legitimate son. Manu and other Smriti writers,
15however, sanction adoption of a son by a person in distress  ^
for the sake of preventing the failure of obsequies and for 
the continuity of his name.^ In another passage Manu says 
"Sages pronounce these eleven sons (beginning with the son of 
the wife and the rest) as specified to be substitutes of the
9* Rig Veda cited in J.C. Ghose, I, 639.
10. Rig Veda, VII, 5, 8.
11. Manu IX, 161 (Sir W. Jones*s translation edited by G.C. 
Haughton). The adopted son is however not among the last 
six sons mentioned by Manu.
12. Bandhayana II, 2, 3, 35-35; Sacred Books of the East XIV, 
p. 299. .
13. Manu IX, 168, 141, 142; D.M.I., 7*
14. Bat. Him. 1, 9* Manu also "A son of any description must 
be anxiously adopted by one who has none: for the sake
of the funeral cake, water, and solemn rites; and for 
the celebrity-of his name". ......... ...........
7real legitimate son, for the sake of preventing the failure 
of obsequies".1  ^ So also Brihaspati says "As in default of 
ghee, oil is admitted by the virtuous as a substitute at 
sacrifices, so are the eleven sons admitted as substitutes 
in default of a legitimate son of the body and of an appointed
A C. —  —  • —
daughter". The Dattaka Mimamsa goes so far as to say "By
the omission by a sonless man to adopt, an offence is incurred
17by him, resulting in his exclusion from heaven", quoting
Vasistha XVII, 2* "Heaven awaits not one destitute of a son... . • •
and further a son has been shown to be the cause of redemption * 
from debt. The Dattaka-Chandrika says that although by the 
production of a son, according to Manu, exemption from debt 
takes place, still on the death of such a son, for the sake of
17funeral rites, the affiliation of another son is indispensable.
The object of adoption under the English law:-
Viscount Simon, while sponsoring the Adoption of 
Children Act, 1949. laid down the following basic principles 
which, he said must always be the governing consideration 
"What is best for the child in each individual case. That 
comes in front of everything else".1^
Social agencies concerned with child care treat 
adoption as one of the best alternatives for improving the 
lot of the deprived child which feeling is summed up in the 
Curtis Report of 1Q4-6^Qon the care of children as follows
15* Manu IX, 180; Dat. Mim. 1, 33 •
16. Brihaspati XXV, 34•
17. Dat. Mim. 1, 5.
17a Dat. Chand.1.5 for a brief review of the Hindu law of Adoption. 
See Article by P. Bhattacharyyas Hindu Law of Adoption 
(1961) 2 S.C. J,J., 37.
17b Also referred to by Margaret Kormitzer's Child Adoption in 
the Modern World P. XII (1952 ed.).
17c. Care of Children, Committee Report 1946, Cmd 6922.
"We wish to emphasise the extreme seriousness of taking 
a child away from even an indifferent home. The aim must 
be to find something better - indeed much better - if it 
takes the responsibility of providing a substitute home.
The methods which should be available may be treated under 
three main heads of adoption, boarding out and residence in 
Communities. We have placed these in the order in which 
they seem to us to secure the welfare and happiness of the 
child"•
The causes of a child being deprived of a normal home life may 
be manifold. There are innumerable orphans, nameless urchins, 
cripples, homeless and abandoned children and innumerable 
children displaced by wak. So also are the children who are 
affected annually by the legal separation of their parents, the 
fact of easy divorce seems to threaten family life and the 
institution of marriage. The Curtis Report of 1946^** showed 
that even then 124,900 children were deprived of normal home 
life in England and Wales and the Clyde Report1 ^ gave the figure 
for Scotland as 17,607. Also one of the chief reasons why a 
child became maladjusted or "unwanted" was illegitimacy. It 
is this problem which it was hoped that adoption would help to 
solve•
Thus adoption under the English law seems to spring
from a different motive from that under the Hindu or the Roman
and Greek laws. Under the former the force that is at v/ork is
the force of the social conscience. As an English authority
on adoption has said, adoption "brings (inter', alia), the homeless
17echild to the childless home. Margaret Kormitzer remarks that 
adoption is far more than one more method of child care.
17c. Care of Children Committee Report, 1946. Cmd. 6922.
17d. Committee on Homeless Children (Scotland) Report, Cmd. 6911, 
42.
17e. Quoted by Margaret Kormitzer in "Child Adoption in the Modern 
World (1952) p.4.
J.A. Boyd Carpenter. M.P. described it as1a fundamental social
issue*and according to B. Janner, M.P. "Adoption Acts are
intended to normalise the lives of individuals." Bor example,
according to the figures ;quoted by T.E. James in 1962, there
were 16,894 adoption orders, of which 13,826 related to
18illegitimate children. Moreover, there is the fate of the
human soul at stake and also the fate of the community of which
he should be a better citizen. Good adoption, remarks
Kornitzer, is good both for souls and for citizenship. She
18amentions some reasons why adoption should be popular today.
In the first place, it salves ..public conscience in a number of 
ways and fills a public need and helps to solve the problem of 
dealing with some of 150,000 of England*s children who need 
care and protection and secondly it serves to fill the child- 
hungry homes of people of high quality but low fertility. She 
opines that people in England rarely adopt a child to have an 
heir to perpetuate an ancient name or to ensure that filial 
rites are performed over their bier but rather due to reasons 
arising out of conditions of modern life, i.e. enormous numbers 
of childless marriages and secondly the tender social conscience 
towards the unwanted child that has grown up during the past 
75 years. Love of children, says Margaret Kornitzer, is the 
key to good adoptions and advises people who do not like 
children in general to consider carefully before adopting a 
child in particular.
18. Children and the Law: I.E. James (1965) p. 19-




The Departmental Committee on Adoption of Children
has also observed in its report that although adoption is a
formal legal procedure it deals with very human problems. It
focusses primarily on the needs and well-being of individual
children for whom this peculiar form of substitute care is
considered appropriate. It also assures the mother and father
of an illegitimate child or a married couple, who because of
circumstances relinquish their child, that the child has
acquired the security of a normal life and secured for him a
better chance in life /$han they themselves could give. For
some childless couples, adoption can satisfy the basic
emotional need to create a family and to care for and rear
children. Above all the child is the focal point in adoption;
providing homes in the fullest sense for children who need them
is its primary purpose. The Committe observed that "there is
a continuing need for adoption by which we mean the permanent ,
legal transfer of parental responsibilities and rights.n In
England adoptions rose to a peak of 26,986 in 1968 and in 1969
180there were 26,049 adoptions. If adoptions continued at this
level about one million children would be adopted in the course
of 40 years. There will always be some children who for various
reasons cannot be brought up by their own parents or by relatives
and for whom the permanence and security of adoption offers the
best solution. It is thus clear, observes the Departmental 
18b
Committee that there is a continuing need for adoption. The
above observations of the Committee are to my mind absolutely
true and are supported by the increasing demand for adoption
18cof children as shown by statistics quoted above.
18b London 1970, pages 3 to 6.
18c Appendix B of the Dept. Committee on Adoption Report,
London, 1970.
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The various kinds of sons under the Hindu law
The ancient Institutes of the Hindus recognize a 
number of different kinds of sons. The several kinds of sons 
are enumerated and described by Manu^  thus:
1. The Aurasa - •Him, whom a man has begotten 
on his own wedded wife, let him know to be 
the first in rank, as the son of his body.
2. The Kshetra.ia - fHe, who was begotten, accor- 
ding to law, on the wife of a man deceased,
or impotent, or disordered after due authority 
given to her, is called the lawful son of 
the wife.
3* The Dattrima - 'That (boy) equal (by caste) 
whom his mother or his father affectionately 
gives (confirming the gift) with (a libation 
of) water, in times of distress^ (to a man) 
as his son, must be considered as an adopted 
son (Dattrima).
4. The Kritrima - 'He is considered as a son 
made (Kritrima), whom a man takes as his 
own son, the boy being equal in class, endued 
with filial virtues, acquainted with the 
merit of performing obsequies to his adopter, 
and with the sin of omitting them.
5* Gudhotpanna - 'If (a child) be born in a 
man's house and his father be not known, 
he is a son born secretly in the house 
(Gudhotpanna), and shall belong to him of 
whose wife he was born.
6. The Apaviddha - 'He whom (a man) receives as 
his son, (after he has been) deserted by his 
parents or by either of them is called a son 
cast off (Apaviddha).
19. Manu IX, 166-175 & 177-178; Also Yajn., II, 128-135;
Vishnu XV, 1-29; Vasis XVII, 12-39; Baudhayana II, 2, 
iii (14-30) - he mentions one more viz., the Nishada, 
akin to Parasava, with this difference that the element 
of lust is absent in the former. Same view of Jimutavahana- 
Dayabhaga IX, 24-28.
20. I.e. if the adopter has, according to Kulluka & Raghavananda 
no son, or if according to the commentator Harayana, the 
. . . adoptee'.s .parents are . in distress. .
7* The Kanina - 'A son whom a damsel secretly 
bears in the house of her father, one shall 
name the son of ah unmarried damsel (Kanina, 
and declare) such offspring of an unmarried 
girl (to belong) to him who weds here (after­
wards) .
8. Sahodha - 'If one marries either knowingly 
or unknowingly a pregnant (bride), the child 
in her womb belongs to him who wed her, and 
is called (a son) received with the bride 
(Sahodha).
9* Krltaka - 'If a man buys a (boy) whether 
equal or unequal (in good qualities), from 
his father and mother for the sake of having 
a son, that (child) is called a (son) bought 
(Kritaka)•
10* Paunarbhava - 'If a woman abandoned by her
husband, or a widow, of her own accord contracts 
a second marriage and bears (a son), he is 
called the son of a remarried woman (Paunar- 
bhava).
11. Swayamdatta - 'He who, having lost his parents 
or being abandoned (by them) without (Just) 
cause, gives himself to a (man), is called 
a son self-given (Swayamdatta).
Parasava - 'The son_whom a Brahmana, begets 
through lust on a Sudra female, is (though) 
alive (parayan), a corpse (sava) ,  ^and hence 
called a living corpse, the *Parasava'.
In the above list, the son of an appointed daughter
is not included. But Manu says elsewhere "He who has no son
may make his daughter in the following manner an appointed
daughter (Putrika), saying (to her husband) - 'The (male)
21child, born of her, shall perform my funeral rites'. And
later on, the sage lays down that the son of an appointed
22daughter is equal to a son's son.
21. Manu IX, 127.
22. Manu IX, 133 * 139* According to Yajnavalkya, the putrika
putra is equal to an Aurasa - Yajn. II, 128. In one
sutra, Vasi^ha calls the putrika herself as equal to
a son - Vasis. XVII, 13.
The ancient lawbooks of the Hindus assign the highest
rank to the legitimate Aurasa son, begotten by a man himself
on his lawfully married wife and the Putrika Putra or the son
23of the appointed daughter who is declared by Manu ^ as equal
to the son's son and by Yajnavalkya as equal to the Aurasa son
22
himself. But, besides the Aurasa son and the son of the
appointed daughter, there are (as we have seen) enumerated in
the Shastras several kinds of secondary sons. With reference
to these secondary sons, Brihaspati says:
"Of the thirteen sons mentioned in succession 
by Manu, the legitimate son of the body (Aurasa) 
and the son of the appointed daughter (Putrika) 
are the cause of lineage. ... As in default of 
ghee, oil is admitted by the virtuous as a sub­
stitute (at sacrifices) so are the eleven sons 
(admitted as substitutes), in default of a legi­
timate son of the body and that of an appointed 
daughter".23
Dr. Bhattacharya^a and Siromani^^ divide the eleven subsidiary 
sons into the following three classes:
(1) One class consisting of those who are legi­
timate sons, but are held in low estimation
on account of their mother being of a different 
caste or her being a twice married woman.
In this class are the Paunarbhava, the 
Parasava.
(2) The second class consisting of illegitimate 
sons of certain descriptions. These include 
the Kshetraja, the Gudhaja, the Kanina and 
the Sahodhaja.
(3) The third class consisting of sons acquired 
by gift, purchase etc. These are the five 
descriptions of sons by adoption. In two 
of the cases viz., the son given (dattaka) 
and the son bought (Ep&iaka) the boy was a
23* Brihaspati XXV, 33» 34-.
23a. Commentaries on Hindu Law by Jogendra Hath Bhattacharya^ 
(Third edn.),' Vol. I, pp. 321 to 329*
23b. Commentary on the Hindu Law by J.S.Siromani (1885)
pp. 107-112.
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minor and the right in him was given over 
by those who had dominion over him, and 
could be given over by no one else. In 
the case of the son made (Kritrima) the 
youth was of full age and therefore able 
to dispose of himself; and in the case of 
the son self-given (Svyamdatta) or cast off 
(apaviddha) he had been abandoned, or ill- 
treated by his parents or had lost them.
Their dominion had accordingly come to an 
end.2^ The difference between Kritrima and 
Svayamdatta being that in the case of the 
Kritrima or son made, the offer comes from 
the adopter, while in the case of the self­
given son the offer is made by him. An 
Apaviddha or deserted son is one who is
abandoned or disowned by his parents and
is adopted by a person as his son; this is 
like the appropriation by the finder of a 
thing without an owner.
As to the comparative excellence and inheriting
capacity of the several sons, we have in Manu:
"The legitimate son of the body, the son begotten
on the wife, the son adopted, the son made, the 
son secretly born and the son cast off (are) the 
six heirs and kinsmen)*. 'The son of an unmarried 
damsel, the son received with the wife, the son 
bought, the son begotten on a remarried woman, 
the son self-given and the son of a Sudra female, 
Tare) the six (who are) not heirs, (but) kinsmen 
(i.e. do not inherit collaterally)."
It should, however, be observed that the order of precedence
and inheriting capacity as thus assigned by Manu to the secon-
dary sons is not the same with all the ancient jurists. ^
As regards the position of the adopted son, about half of
the Smriti writers place him in the first list of heirs and
24. Bandhayana ii, 2 ^ 1 3 ,  14, 16, 19, 21; Vasis XVII, 17-20; 
Vishnu XV, 18-26; Manu IX, 168, 169, 174, 177* Similarly 
in Rome there were two sorts of adoption, adoptio properly 
so called of a child who was under the dominion of 
another and adrogatio, of a person who was sui juris.
25* For instance see Vasis. XVII, 12-39; Bandh. 11, 2, 3,
verses 31; 32; Narada XIII, 45-47, Gautama XXVIII, 32-33; 
Yajn II, 128-133-
kinsmen while the other half place him in the second list and
regard him merely as a kinsman and not an heir. Thus Manu,
u __ _ _ _
Bahdhayana, Gautama, the Brahma-Purana and the Kalika Purana
consider him as an heir and kinsmen while Vasistha, Vishnu,• « * 0 *
Yajnavalkya, Narada, Sankha and JPikhita, Harita, Dexala and 
Yama regard him as a kinsman but not an heir. So also in the 
case of the son made (the Kritrima) and the son cast off, whilst 
Manu, Gautama etc. regard them as heir and kinsmen, Yajnavalkya, 
Vasistha etc. regard him as a kinsman and not an heir. The 
various commentators have tried to harmonize the divergent 
points of view by. assigning different reasons which are dis­
cussed subsequently. The cardinal principle of Hindu law is
that whenever there is a difference between the Smriti-writers,*
the views of Manu are to be accepted, as Manu is stated to have 
a perfect knowledge of the import of the Vedas and to be the 
most competent to give a correct interpretation. According to 
the sages Brihaspati and Anglras, texts which conflict with 
Manu's are to be set aside, since Manu occupies the paramount 
position among Smriti writers. As is shown subsequently in 
this thesis, the Courts in India have held that the adopted 
son is entitled to inherit collaterally.
Brihaspati regards only two sons viz. the Aurasa 
(one*s own) son and that of the appointed daughter as entitled 
to inherit, the rest being merely kinsmen and so relegated to 
the second class adding ”The sons made in various ways by the 
ancient Eishes, the powerless modern people have not the power 
to make in the Kaliyuga (or the present age)” Further
26. 2 Big. 343*
27• Cited in Datt. Mim; I, 64.
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Brihaspati says "Ho one but a legitimate son of the body is 
declared to be heir of his father1s wealth. An appointed 
daughter is said to be equal to him. All the others are 
stated to have a claim to Maintenance (only)*. *The son 
given, the son cast off, the son bought, the son made, the 
son by a sudra wife, these, when pure by caste and irreproachable
po
as to their conduct are considered sons of middle rank”.
The Pattaka Mimamsa quotes Brihaspati*s text (XXIV, 1 4 ) ^  and
says that on account of this text of Brihaspati and because in
the passage "There is no adoption, as sons, of those, other
than the son given and the legitimate son etc.", other sons
are forbidden by Saunaka in the Kalijftge - the son given and
the legitimate son only are admitted. The author of Dattaka
Mimamsa further says^ "The term *given* is inclusive also of
the son made (Kritrima) , on account of a text of Parasara,
when treating of the law of Kal^Ase « "The son of the body
(Aurasa) and the son of the wife, also, the son given, the 
*50son made etc."^
Comparison of the various sons under Hindu law with the sons 
adopted under the Western Systems:
Modern authors in Hindu law, following decisions of
courts, maintain that t>£ the various kinds of sons * all; except
the legitimate and the adopted son, are long since obsolete.
They say that as days went on, and better order reigned in
society, the number of subsidiary sons mentioned above diminished
28. Brihas XXIV, 12-14; XXV, 33-35; 40.
29. P.M.I., 65.
30. This alleged feext of Paras'ara is, however, not found in 
Parasara*s works.
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with the increasing abhorrence to the sexual looseness which 
characterised the recognition of many of them. But, while, in 
the Eastern hemisphere the Aurasa and Dattaka assumed over­
whelming importance, we find that in the Western World, 
adoptions of children very much akin to the other kinds of 
sons we come across in Hindu law have become quite popular. 
According to Margaret Kornitzer approximately 2/3 of the
children adopted in England are illegitimate ones and most of
30athem are adopted by their natural mothers, generally in 
conjunction with their spouse whom they subsequently marry. 
Several marriages of pregnant brides take place in England and 
elsewhere among the putative parents resulting in legitimisation 
of their issue. These could very well be compared to the 
Kanina and the Sahodha sons tinder the old Hindu law. Adoption 
of cast off children is also not infrequent in the western 
hemisphere, akin to the Apaviddha or the son cast off. Again 
the 'son made* is common in some Western countries. We thus 
see that the adoptions made throughout the world even in 
modern times can be comprehensively classified according to 
the 11 kinds of sons known to Hindu law. Rules of Hindu law 
regarding the different kinds of sons could be studied with 
interest and possibly with advantage in Western societies with 
whom adoption is a comparatively new and a growing subject.
Thus the law laid down by Manu with respect to the Unmarried 
daughter’s sons (Kanina sons)^^ i.e.; that such offspring of 
an unmarried girl belongs to him who weds her (afterwards),
30a. Child Adoption in the Modern World (1952) by Margaret 
Kornitzer, pp. 12-13.
30b. Refer to Manu's definition of Kanina given on page/ £ above•
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appears to me to be a very wholesome provision especially from
the point of view of the child1s welfare. If this proposition
is incorporated into law the sitatus of such children in.public
esteem would be much improved and would go a long way in
abolishing the distinction between legitimate and illegitimate
children. Incidentally it may be mentioned here that the
Departmental Committee on Adoption of Children 1970, has
proposed that the legitimate and illegitimate children should
30c
be treated similarly in law, which is discussed subsequently 
and with which proposition I am in general agreement.
Adoptions - how far recognised in various countries of the world.
Adoption was a well-established institution in the 
ancient civilizations in India, Greece and Rome. The object 
of adoption in all these countries was the perpetuation of the 
family and the continuance of the religious, obsequial and 
family rites.
The practice of adoption found its way to Rome from
30c. See pages 46 to 47.
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Greece through the Decemvirs. The end and conditions of it
were in all main particulars the same as those in India.
The introduction of adoption into Athens is attributed to 
32Solon^ who travelled very widely in the early part of his
life. As little is known about his travels Mr. J.L. Kapur
poses the question whether the institution of adoption was
33imported by Solon, mediately or immediately from India?
In Rome adoption was a favourite institution and some of the
Roman emperors appointed their successors by adoption. Julius
cx
Caespr adopted his grand nephew Augustus (Octavianus) and also 
the great Roman Emperors Nerva, Trajan, Hadrian and Marcus 
Aurelius profited from this institution. As in the Hindu law, 
so also in the Roman law the adopted son took all the rights 
and obligations in his adoptive family which he would have had 
he been born in it. In the eye of law there existed no 
difference between him and those who became his adoptive 
brothers. Adoption was also admitted in C h i n a a n d  to a 
lesser extent in Babylon^ and Assyria. In China hsiad 'filial 
piety1 indirectly gave extremely wide powers to the lineal 
ancestor. The modern Chinese law, under the People's
31. I. Str. H.L. 103; The law of adoption in Indian and Burma: 
J.L. Kapur (1933 edn.) p. 637*
32. I. Str. H.L. p. 105.
33* J.L. Kapur: The law of adoption in India and Burma
(1933) p. 638.
34. Dr. Jamieson, Chinese Family and Commercial law, 1921,
pp. 3» 24; Derret: Adoption: A Preliminary Study, S.O.A.S.
35• Driver & Miles, The Babylonian Laws, Oxford 1932, pp. 383> 
385* Also by the same authors Assyrian Laws, Oxford 1935»
pp. 222-3; Derrett: Adoption: A Preliminary Study, S.O.A.S.
36. McAleavy: Certain aspects of Chinese Customary law (1955)
XVII, B.S.O.A.S. 534, 542; Derrett: Adoption: A Prelimi­
nary Study, S.O.A.S.
Republic of China, hardly recognises the religious motive,
V?it now views adoption rather from the secular angle, r Though
the Jewish Law knew of informal adoptions, in classical times
it refused to admit adoption since it would openly frustrate
certain divine commands, such as those relating to inheritance.
In Israel, however, despite the outlook of the Rabbinical law,
1lawfully adopted1 children were allowed to succeed.^ Prof.
Derrett in his ‘Adoption: A Preliminary study* remarks in
this connection
"Por continental and American Jews domiciled in 
Israel will not lightly cast away an institution 
useful to them personally and to a nation which 
has many orphans to care for. The shape of. the 
Israeli adoption law itself has yet to be adum­
brated” .
Israel has recently (in I960) legally recognised 
adoption. S. 13 of the Adoption of Children Law 5720-1960 
deals with the effects of adoption. It lays down that the 
adoption creates between the adopter and the adoptee the same 
duties and rights as exist between parents and their children 
and confers upon the adopter, in respect of the adoptee, the 
same powers as parents have in respect of their children, it 
terminates the duties and rights between his parents and other 
relatives and the powers they have in his respect; however
37- The code of 1930 and its amendments were not enforced 
throughout China. McAleavy, opin. cited., p. 535* It 
was only with the coming into existence of the present 
regime in 1949 that a real effort was made to enforce the 
reformed law. Under the code adoption was reformed so as 
to approximate more closely to the contemporary civil law 
pattern: Derfett: Adoption: A Preliminary Study, S.O.A.S.
Estudio preliminjn? sobre la adopcion: Instituto de Derecho
comparado: Barcelona, 1956.
38. Derrett: Adoption: A Preliminary Study, S.O.A.S. See
under Note 37 above.
38a. The Adoption of Children Law 5720-1960 - (Laws of the 
State of Israel Vol. 14, p. 93).
! *11.
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(1) a Court may restrict the said effects in the adoption order;
(2) the adoption diall not affect any legal prohibition or 
permission as to marriage or divorce.
As regards the various other countries of the world,
most of the countries of Continental Europe such as Austria,
Italy, Spain, Switzerland, Germany, France etc., have intro-
duced adoption laws during the past seventy years. J In Japan
also an adopted son gets the status of a legitimate son.^
Adoption also exists in the various provinces of
Canada, Australia, Hew Zealand, S. Afric$ etc. In the United
States in Louisiana, California and Texas adoption has always
existed being introduced via the French and the Spanish law.^
The States of North America were influenced by Louisiana and
Texas and the first adoption law was that of Massachusetts in
1851 but the remaining states followed slowly.
In England adoption was first legalized in 1926, its
effects were considerably enlarged in 194-9 and the law was
4-2consolidated in the Adoption Act of 1950. The Scots adoption 
law,2^  was according to Prof. Derrett,^ a travesty of adoption, 
giving no property rights to either party. 'It is very doubtful'
39* Civil Code of Austria 179-86; Italy 202-19; Spain 173-9; 
Switzerland 264-95; French 34-3-70; J.E. Kapur, Adoption 
Law (1935) P* 634.
40. Civil Code of Japan 837-78.
41 Sherman's Roman law Vol. I, Ss 263 and 309; see Sherman's 
Roman Law Vol. II, p. 86.
42. 16 and 17 G.V.C. 29.
43* Adoption of Children (Scotland) Act 1930 = 20 and 21 G.V.C. 
37 not materially improved by the Adoption Act 1950.
44. Derrett: Adoption, a Preliminary Study: S.O.A.S.
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observed Derrett, 'whether it is adoption al all, but since it
satisfies the motives of giving a child a settled affection
ijf probably qualifies as adoption'• The position has now been .
changed by Sections 23 and 24 of the Succession (Scotland) Act
1964 according to which for all purposes relating to the
succession of a deceased person (whether testate or intestate)
and the disposal of property by deed, an adopted person shall
be treated as the child of the adopter and not as the child of
45any other person. These sections apply to adoptions made 
whether before or after Sept. 10, 1964 but only to deeds 
executed or deaths occurring after that date.
Adoption under Muslim Law
Adoption is not recognised by the Islamic law. The
following tepts of the Koran deal with this subject:
"God hath not made for any man two hearts in 
his inside; nor has he made your wives - whom 
you back away from - your real mothers, nor has 
he made your adopted sons your real sons. That 
is what ye speak with your mouths, but God speaks 
the truth, and he guides to the path";
and
"Call them by their fathers' names; that is more 
just in God's sight; but if ye know not their 
fathers, then they are your brothers in religion 
and your clients".^'
A tradition of the prophet relates that he placed a curse on
those who should cease to acknowledge as father their real
43* Under S. 23(3) however, the property limited to devolve 
with a title of honour is an exception.
46. S. 23(4). Dicey: Conflict of laws: 8th edn. p. 471*
Also see Gloag and Henderson: Introduction to the Law
of Scotland (Seventh edn.) 1969, page 381 and pages 
691-692.
47. Korain XXXIII, 4 and XXVII (Palmers translation).
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fathers and should call others their fathers. Prof. Derrett
observes that the Islamic law, developing much later than the
last period in which the Corpus Juris was in vigour and in
regions where its influence had never been acknowledged
undiluted by local customs, was content with charity, with
acknowledgment of kinship and with oath-brotherhood, and that
the peremptory Quranic rules concerning inheritance did not
contemplate adoptive relationships.^ In Muhammad Allahdad
4 .0
Khan v Muhammad Ismail y Mahmood J. ohserved as follows:
"Where legitimacy cannot be established by direct 
proof of such a marriage, acknowledgment is recog­
nised by Mohammedan law as a means whereby marriage 
of the parents or legitimate descent may be estab­
lished as a matter of substantive law. Such 
acknowledgment always proceeds upon the hypothesis 
of a lawful union between the parents and the 
legitimate descent of the acknowledged person 
from the acknowledger, and there is nothing in 
Mohammedan law similar to adoption as recognised 
by the Roman and Hindu systems, or admitting of 
an affiliation which has no reference to consan- 
quinity or legitimate descent. A child whose 
illegitimacy is proved beyond doubt, by reason 
of the marriage of its parents being either 
disproved or found to be unlawful, cannot be 
legitimated by acknowledgment. Acknowledgment 
has only the effect of legitimation where either 
the fact of the marriage or its exact time, with 
respect to the legitimation of the child's birth, 
is a matter of uncertainty".
50In Mahomed Umar v Niazuddin^ their Lordships of the 
Privy Council observed that under the general Mahomedan law 
an adoption cannot be made, and even if it be made, can carry 
with it no right of inheritance. It was further observed that 
even if an adoption by a Mahomedan was permissible by any
48. The matter is summarised in the Appendix to Ancel's work; 
Derrett: Adoption: A preliminary study: S.O.A.S.
49. (1888) 1 L.R. 10 All. 289*
30. (1912) 1 L.R. 39 Cal. 418 (P.C.).
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valid custom in the Punjab, the Chief Court found that it had
not been proved that the parties to the suit belonged to a
family to which the Punjab Agricultural or other similar
restrictive customs must be presumed to apply. In Jeswant
51Sing-Jee v Jet Sing-Jee, a Mahomedan, by deed, declared that
he had adopted a son "who was to succeed to his property and
title". It was held, on appeal, to be inoperative and void,
either as a deed of gift, or as a testamentary disposition,
no delivery of possession and relinquishment by the donor or
seisin by the donee having taken place. Bai Machhbai v Bai 
52Hirabai, was a case of Girasias, Parmer Rajputs converted to 
Mahomedanism. Their Lordships of the Bombay High Court 
observed in this case, that on the question of adoption, the 
burden of proof lay in the first instance upon the appellant. 
His case was that the Girasias, when they became Mahomedan.s? , 
carried with them the law of inheritance and succession, and 
that, as part of that law, they also retained the Hindu law and 
custom of adoption. But their Lordships observed that adoption 
is not necessarily inheritance or succession, although it leads 
to inheritance or succession. The Mahomedan law does not 
recognise adoption. Hence where a Hindu is converted to 
Mahomedanism, their Lordships observed that the presumption 
is that as a necessary consequence of conversion the law of 
adoption recognised by Hindu law has been abandoned by him.
He who alleges that the usage and law in question had been 
retained must prove it.
51. (1844) 3 M.I.A. 245, 258.
0-
52. (1911) I.L.R. 35 Bom. 264 (Garasias, Parmer Rajputs).
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A similar decision was made by the Mysore High
53Court in Elia Sait v. Lharanayya. which was a case of Cutehi
Memons, converted to Mahomedanism. The Cutehi Memons were
governed by the Hindu law in matters of succession and
inheritance. But the scope of applicability of Hindu law to
Cutehi Memons, observed their Lordships, should be limited to
54.succession and inheritance. Their Lordships observed that 
under the general Mahomedan law, an adoption cannot be made.
The presumption was that as a necessary consequence of conversion 
to Mahomedanism the law of adoption recognized by Hindu law and 
usage had been abandoned by Cutehi Memons and those who 
alleged that the law of adoption had been retained by usage 
must prove it. It was held further that Cutehi Memons 
Mysore had not proved a custom of adoption among them.
In Sohan Lai v. A.Z. Makuin^ a it was observed (on 
appeal) by their Lordships of the Punjab High Court that 
Section 2 of the Indian Succession Act makes an exception 
in the case of a local law, ans so far as the Punjab, S.5,
Punjab Laws Act, does provide an exception. It was therefore
53* (1931) 10 Mys. L.J. 33 (Cutehi Memons).
54. Hazi 0osman v. Haroon Saleh Mahomed (1922) 47 I.L.R. Bom. 
369 and Advocate G-en. of Bom, v. Zimbabai (1915) 41 I-L.R. 
Bom. 181, referred to.
54a A.I.R. (1929) Lah., 230.
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open to a party to prove that according to the custom 
applicable to the parties, an Indian Christian in the Punjab 
was entitled to make a valid adoption so as to change the rule 
of succession laid down in the Indian Succession Act^^. In the 
opinion of their Lordships, even if it be permissible to the 
defendant to prove a custom of adoption applicable to the Indian
54b. See also article by Sivaramayya, B., Adoption: An
Anomaly under the Indian Succession Act, X1960) S.C.J. J, 
201, where the author observes that the literal 
construction of the Act and the trend of judicial decisions 
leave no doubt that an adopted child is not entitled to 
succeed on intestacy under the Indian Succession Act, 
suggests amendment of the law by the legislature in 
this respect.
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Christians generally the evidence produced was not sufficient
to establish such an important variation from the ordinary law
which governed the parties.
In Kassan v Samma, a case from Hissar in Punjab it
was held that a Muhammadan childless village land-holder had
54the power to adopt like Hindus.' Also an adoption by a 
Jagirdar was recognised by the Govt, of 3fndia, provided it 
was satisfied that the person adopted was the real choice of 
the Jagirdar and his family.^
Sources of Hindu law and the law of adoption
According to the original Hindu conception law
(Dharma) is not based upon the authority of Kings and Parliament
or on the authority of people at large. Morality, virtue and
law are based on the idea of the good. The few good and wise
men try to give expression to it and realize it in life. The
multitude are constrained, to follow their example. The Vedic
Rishis place law (Dharma) even above the divine sovereign.
The Upanishad declares "lav; (Dharma) is mightier than the Kings,
therefore there is nothing higher than the law. By its means
55even a weak man rules a s t r o n g e r " . T h e  sources of Dharma as 
mentioned by Manu are as follows: "The whole Veda is the first
source of the sacred law, next the Smritis and the virtuous 
conduct (shila) of those who know the Veda; further also the
54£-(lS74) F.R. Ho. 54; also Kapur: Adoption in India and
Burma. (1935) P* 44.
5 4oL jet ter Ho. 2158-1 dated Simla. June 1, 1885, from Hr. H.M. 
Durand, Secretary to the Government of the Punjab quoted 
in Kapur's: Adoption in India and Burma (1933) P* 44.
55- Brih. Aran. Up. I IV, 14.
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56customs of holy men, and finally self-satisfaction".'
Similar is the view of other Smriti-writers. According to
Bhrigu (Manu II, 7) "whatever Dharma has been expounded by
Manu has all been set forth in the Veda". The question
therefore may arise that when the Smriti itself only expounds
whatever is already set forth in the Veda, and is on that
account, based upon the Veda, then the Veda itself being
sufficient for all purposes, what is the use of the Smriti
or Dharmasastra? The Smriti Chandrika quotes Marlchi as
giving the answer to this question. "The requisite texts of
the Vedas are difficult to understand and are scattered about
in various places; and all these are collected and explained
56aby the Smritis". Thus next after the Vedas, and for all
practical purposes, the Smritis are the chief source of Dharma.
Among the Smritis, the Smriti of Manu occupies a pre-eminent
position. The Viramitrodaya quotes a text of Brihaspati
declaring that a Smriti opposed to Manu has no authority.
"Inasmuch as the Smriti of Manu is compiled on the basis of
what is laid down in the Veda, it is regarded as most important
and a Smriti that goes against what is laid down by Manu
56ashould never be accepted".'' According to Kumarila "Barring
56. Manu II, 12.
56a. G-. Jha: Hindu Law in its Soprces I, 17, 43, 44.
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the Smriti of Manu, all others are restricted in their * 1
authority”. The Mahabharata selects Manu for special mention
as one whose teachings should not he controverted. In the
Veda itself the pre-eminence of Manu is declared in these
terms "Whatever Manu says is medicine for mankind”."^
Brihaspati and Angiras declare that where there is a conflict
between the code of Manu and another Smriti the former is to
be accepted. The laws of Manu, according to Manu himself,
were taught to him at the beginning of creation by the
Creator Himself. "But He having composed these Institutes
(of the Sacred Law), himself taught them, according to the
rule, to me alone in the beginning. Next Iftaught them) to
57Marichi and other sages". A passage from the Rig Veda 
reads as follows "Do not take us far away from the ancient 
path prescribed by Manu which have come down to us from our
CO
fathers"." Thus the Manu Smriti is believed to be the
56b. Tai. Sam. II. Z./0.Z. referred to in Kane: History of
Dharmasastra Vol. I, p. 136.
57• Manu I , 58.
58. Rig Veda V//T. 30) 3- •
paramount authority next to the Vedas, the chief source of
Dharma. Next to the code of Manu, the Yajnavalkya Smriti
appears to have received the largest share of attention on
the part of mediaeval law-writers. 'The number of commentators
on Manu is large - more than six have already been published -
_ h__________________ _
Kulluka Bhatta, Medjatithi, Govindaraja being some of the
commentators. Similarly Yajnavalkya also has had several
commentators.
The 1 itakshara by Vijnanesvara had early become the 
standard work on law in the greater part of India and its 
influence on the administration of justice had been increased 
under the British rule. No third Smriti has had the honour of 
having so many commentators. In fact the only other Smritis 
known to have a real commentary are those of Parasara, on which 
we have the Parasaramadhava, and of Narada, Vasistha and visnu.7 I # * 4
The Smriti of Yajnavalkya gives a list of twenty sages as law­
givers and the Mitakshara explains that the enumeration is
gq
only illustrative. According to Manu " where two Shruti 
texts are mutually contradictory both are right i.e. the two
59- Manu II, 14.
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courses laid down are to be treated as optional alternatives.
According to Gautama where there is a conflict between Shruti
and Smriti the latter is to be rejected, so also where custom
conflicts with Smriti the former is rejected.
As to the third source of lav; viz., Sadaohara or the
practice (or custom) of the virtuous, VijnaneSvara and Kulluka
commenting on Yajnavalkya and state that Sadachara or
custom should not be opposed to the Vedas.
A perusal of the rules for proof of custom followed by
modern Indian Courts would show that in many instances, they
contradict each other. For instance in earlier cases it was
laid down that custom must be established by satisfactory
60evidence of instances which must be ancient and certain
60. Rhagvandas v. Rajmal (1873) 10 Bom. H.C.R. 241, Rama Hand 
v. Surgiani (1894) i.L.R. 16 All. 221; Vannia Kone v. 
Vannichi Animal (1927) 51 I.L.R. Mad. 1. Also in a case 
on proof of an ancient adoption it was held in L. Lebi 
Prasad v. Sint Tribeni Levi A.I.R. 1970 S.C. 1286 that 
in the case of a Hindu, long recognition as an adopted 
son raised a strong presumption in favour of the validity 
of his adoption, arising from the possibility of the loss 
of his rights in his own family by being adopted in another 
family. In the case of an ancient adoption evidence 
showing that the boy was treated by relatives, including 
the person who later on challenges the same*for a long 
time as the adopted son at a time when there was no 
controversy was sufficient to prove the adoption although 
evidence of actual giving and taking was not forthcoming.
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whilst in subsequent cases it was laid down that usage need not
be immemorial in the sense of the word used in English l a w ^ a
and in case of communities which do not follow Hindu law such
as Jainas etc., instances 20 or 30 years old raised a
61
presumption of antiquity. In Madhavrao v. Raghavendra Rao.
Kania Ag. C.J. and Gajendragadkar J. extended this rule to
a case between persons who were governed by Hindu law, the
62parties in this case being Brahmins. Again in some other 
cases it was held that even the evidence as to the existence 
of customs given by members of the family or the community, 
if not contradicted by other evidence should not be disregarded
60a. Subhani v. Hawab (1941) 43 Bom. L.R. 432.
61 . Chimanlal v. Hari Chand (1 9 1 3 )  40 I.A. 156; Parshottam v .
Venichand (1 9 2 1 )  I . I i . jR. 45 Bom. 75 4 .
62. A.I.R. 1946 Bom. 377. Both these Justices Kania and 
Ga;jendragadkar later rose to be Chief Justices of the 
Supreme Court of India.
6 3 . Ahmad Khan v. Channi Bibi (1 9 2 5 )  52 I.A. 379; A.iai Yerma v. 
Yijai Kumary (1 9 3 9 )  41 Bom. L.R. 700 (P#C.).
33.
The Sanskrit word for custom is sadachara or * custom of the
virtuous* or those learned in the vedas, A practice set up
by the vicious or ignorant which by lapse of centuries could
well claim to be 1 custom*, the *Durachar* origin of the rule
being forgotten but if such customs were enforced, it would
be no better than a case of the blind leading the blind. To
the Mimamsakas the fundamental basis of custom is that the
custom should not contradict the Smriti and if it does so, the♦ 7
custom is void and is set aside under the rule that it inter­
feres with the Smriti. Kumarila deals with this question 
specifically in one of his interpretations on Sutras 8 & $,
Pada iii, Adhyaya 1, l,Smriti is more authoritative than usage 
because it is baded directly upon the Veda; it leads directly 
to the inference of its corroborative text, while in the case 
of usage, the first necessary inference is that of the corro­
borative Smriti and it is in support of this inferred Smriti 
text that the corroborative Vedic text is inferred, so that 
the support of the Veda for usage is one step further removed 
than in support of the Smriti itself. Then again, the Smriti 
has been compiled by persons well known as steeped in Vedic 
lore which fact lends strength to that work. In the case of 
usage, on the other hand, its exact source is always indefinite 
and unascertainable which fact weakens its authority". This 
rule has therefore another basic principle underlying it. The 
sphere of custom is beyond the sphere of the Smritis. Custom 
begins its operation where Smritis do not speak. The Mimamsaka 
had to decide the question "Does this custom satisfy the
64. Ganganatha Jha - Purva Mimamsa in its sources pages 235- 
236. The topic is also discussed by Kane: History of
Dharmasastra Vol. 3 pages 825 et seq.
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Mimamsa
rule of not infringing the Smriti injunction?” If it
did not then the custom is valid. Again Kumarila says
’When we find that certain actions are performed 
by good men and we cannot attribute them to any 
such perceptible motives as greed and the like, 
they should be accepted as Dharma. Such actions 
as are performed either for the maintenance of 
the body or for one's mere pleasure or for some 
material gain are not considered by good people 
as Dharma. It is only men's actions that are 
held by the good people to be Dharma and are 
performed as such that are accepted as Dharma; 
because the persons that perform these are the 
same as those who perform the sacrifices in the 
Veda".6?
Thus, it is not that all acts of good men are taken 
as the basis of Dharma, but only such acts believed by them to 
be good and in accordance with the direct teaching of the Vedas 
that are taken as the basis of Dharma. The good people have 
from time immemorial acted in keeping with the scriptures and 
hence people coming to recognise the authoritative character 
of such practices take those practices as the basis of Dharma.
CC     » _____
Nataraja Ayyar compares the Mimamsa rule of Inter­
pretation and the rules of law adopted by modern courts in the 
administration of Hindu law
"The Mimamsa Rule of Interpretation may be com­
pared to the English rule where a custom must 
not be contrary to an Act of Parliament. In a 
broad sense we may compare the Smriti to an 
Act of Parliament. In the words of Coke, 'no 
custom or prescription can take away the force 
of an Act of Parliament'. By no length of des­
uetude can a statute become obsolete or inoper­
ative in law and by no length of contrary usage 
can its provisions be modified in the smallest 
particular. The common law will yield to 
immemorial custom but the enacted law stands 
for ever".
65. Kumarila's Vartika quoted by A.S. Nataraja Ayyar in his 
(Mimamsa Jurisprudence' pp. 49-50.
66. A.S. Nataraja Ayyar 'Mimamsa Jurisprudence* p. 62.
I think that this view appears to he nearer the original 
intention of the Smriti lawgivers as to the place of custom 
in Hindu law. Prof. Derrett, however observes that this will 
emasculate the function of custom. Freedom of religion - 
freedom of Jurisprudence is the attitude of the, courts, which 
mingle de .jure and de facto considerations.^ .
The Commentaries
The writing of the Smritis was followed by the writing 
of a large number of commentaries and digests based upon them. 
The two principal commentaries on which the modern Hindu law 
is based are the Mitakshara which is a running commentary on 
the code of Yajnavalkya and is said to have been written by 
Vijnanesvara in the 11th century A.D. and the Dayabhaga of 
Jimutavahana. not a commentary upon any code but purports
to be digest of all the codes, though it deals with the subject 
of partition and inheritance only. The Mitakshara ifi of supreme 
authority throughout the whole of India except Bengal. The 
Dayabhaga is of paramount authority in Bengal, Assam and 
Manipur. In Bengal also the Mitakshara is considered as a 
great authority in all matters in respect whereof there is no 
conflict between it and the Dayabhaga. Outside Bengal the 
Dayabhaga may also be consulted in matters &n which the 
Mitakshara is silent. Althoughthe authority of Mitakshara 
was recognised throughout the whole of India except Bengal, 
certain other treatises and commentaries subsequently came 
into the field which though generally accepting the Mitakshara 
interpretation of the Smritis differ from it on certain points.
67. Religion, Law and the State in India: J.D.M. Derrett.
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The following are the various sub-schools and the principal 
works of authority in the sub-schools.
1. Viramitrodaya 
(by Mitramisra)
1 • Benaras School - and
2• hirhay as indhu
(by Kamlakara Bhatta)
• •
1 • Vivada Chintamani
(by Vachaspati Misra)
2. Mithila School - _ and





3. Bombay or and
Maharashtra School - 2. Hirnay as indhu
(by‘Kamalakar Bhatta)
• •
1• Smriti Chandrika 
(by Bevanna Bhatta)
4. Madras School - and
2. Parasara Madhaviyam 
(by Madhavacharya)
In addition to the sources and authorities mentioned
above, two treatises viz., the I) at taka Mimamsa and the Dattaka-
Chandrika have been regarded as works of special authority on
the Hindu law of adoption. These two treatises were translated
and published by Mr. Sutherland in 1821. As the lawyers of
those times knew little of original books on Hindu law, these
two books, being the only two translated books on adoption,
came soon to be recognized as of para mount authority in India.
The Dattaka Mimamsa is by one Nanda Pandita. It appears to- ----- - # #
be written on purpose to invalidate the affiliation of a
daughter*s son and Golap Chandra Sarkar Sasti doubted whether
it was really by Nanda Pandita and said that *the biased and
• •
forced arguments advanced by its author in support of the 
innovations introduced by him, especially in the second section, 
give rise to a suspicion that it is similar to the Battaka - 
Chandrika as regards its origin. The character of the work
37.
has been judicially considered by a full bench of the Allahabad 
High Court presided, by Sir John Edge, the Chief Justice, who 
has in an elaborate and exhaustive judgment dealt with the 
natter and come to the conclusion that the innovations intro­
duced by handa Pandita should not be followed as binding rules. 
The majority of the judges have concurred in that, but the 
minority would follow the maxim communis error facit jus, 
and hold that the Dattaka-Himamsa is binding, because it has
several times been erroneously asserted, to be a, work of para-
6 8mount authority on questions of adoption. The Judicial
Committee of the Privy Council, however, have set aside the
view of the majority, and upheld that of the minority on grounds
69of stare decisis and, communis error facit jus. Justice Knox
who v/as a Sanskrit scholar held that their authority was open
to examination, explanation, criticism, adoption or rejection
like any scientific treatises on European jurisprudence. But
the Judicial Committee observed that their Lordships could not
concur with that learned judge because "such treatment would
not allow for the effect which long acceptance of written
opinions has upon social customs, and it would probably disturb
recognised law and settled arrangements''. Their Lordships
however add - "But as far as saying that caution is required
in accepting their glosses where they deviate from or add to
the Smritis, their Lordships are prepared to concur with the
70learned judge".
68. Bhagwan Singh v Bhagwan Sing (1895) I.L.E. 17 All 294 =
15' A.Zii7"l&7. — -------~
69. (1898) L. 5. 26 l. A.  153 = 3 C.W.F. 454 = 1 Bom. L.E. 311.
70. Sri Balusu v Sri Balusu (1898) L.E. 26 L .1. 113* 132
= 3 C.T.H. 422.
As for the Dattaka-Chandrika, many authors including 
Golapchandra Sarkar Sastri^ and J.C. Ghose^ consider it as
a literary forgery fabricated by one Raghumsuji a pundit of
Colebrooke t6 help the plaintiff in the famous case of Gopee
72
Krista v Radhakant (to lay down the rule that in case of Sudras
the adopted son takes equally with an after-born son). Prof.
J.D.M. Derrett considers the work to be genuine.
In his "Religion, Law and the State in India" Prof.
Derrett observes
"H.C. Sutherland has been blamed for having 
chosen the D.-C and the Dattaka Mimamsa, as 
if they were taken at random from a wide 
selection of texts on adoption in order to 
make his translations of original works on 
that subject. The truth may be that the 
Dattaka - Candrika was so highly regarded on 
its merits that any question regarding its 
authorship could be neglected. Two recent .-d 
editors of the text take it as genuine though 
nothing is known of the author, and the present 
writer is inclmned to think that the rumours 
in Calcutta were false. The Calcutta High™
Court acknowledged the works authenticity ' 
in 1917 and the Supreme Court of India has not 
reopened the question when opportunity to do 
so presented itself".72b
Judicial Decisions have played a considerable part in ascer­
taining and sometimes in developing and crystallizing Hindu 
law. Almost all the important points of Hindu law are now 
fou$d in the law reports and to this extent it may be said 
that the decisions on Hindu law have superseded the comment-
71. A treatise on Hindu law: G.S. Sastri - Chapter on
adoption. Yol -^ T edn^
72. Principles of Hindu law: J.C. Ghose/- Chapter on
adoption, p. 664. ,
v , tvi'aa ns MPJikLA/
72a. Asita Mohun/A.I.R. 1917 Cal. 292.
72b. Religion, Law and the State in India: J.D.M. Derrett
(1968) p. 256.
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aries. The decisions of the Privy Council and the Supreme 
Court are binding on all the Courts of India and these 
decisions immediately affect the parties to the suit but as 
precedents they are binding on the entire community. The view 
of law enunciated and expressed by the Privy Council and 
Supreme Court in particular cases serves as a guide in similar 
cases arising subsequently and is taken to have a binding 
force, but the decisions of any one of the High Courts are 
not binding on any other High Court, though they are binding 
on their respective subordinate courts.
Statutes of the legislature as a source of Hindu law
Enactments of the legislature declaring, abrogating 
or modifying rules of Hindu law are an additional and modern 
source. They have been an important factor in the development 
of ’modern Hindu law'. Most of them are in the direction of 
’reform of Hindu law’ and some of them supersede Hindu law in 
certain classes of cases. Fundamental and radical changes have 
been made very recently by the following enactments. The 
Hindu Marriage Act 1955; The Hindu Succession Act 1956; The 
Hindu Minority and Guardianship Act 1956 and The Hindu Adoption 
and Maintenance Act 1956. The Hindu law, had, prior to 1955 
been modified and supplemented in certain respects by various 
acts relating to marriage and Inheritance. Other enactments 
applied to all the communities in India in matters relating to 
contracts, transfer of property, evidence and criminal law.
Legal recognition of adoption in England
In England, legal recognition has been given to 
adoption only very recently in 1926. Before 1926 the law in
40
the United Kingdomw, did not recognize in any way rights of
people taking children permanently into their homes as members
of their family and there was a great clamour for legislation
prior to 1926 and also there was a militant desire to improve
the lot of unfortunate children. Prof. James observes that
the Adoption Act of 1926 envisaged legal adoption in the nature
of an experiment. Its objects were to prevent the natural
parents subsequently claiming the child and to secure for the
child a form of guardianship by the creation of an artificial
72 crelationship in another family. Within a quarter of a 
century, from the first passing of the Adoption Act, not only 
four separate Acts of Parliament governing adoptions in 
England and Wales were passed but also a host of changes in 
regulations affecting child welfare and child protection were 
passed. The public became conscious of the need to protect 
children against those who sought to hurt or make capital out 
of them. The approaches to adoption in Britain are well guarded 
and it is impossible to enter lightly into an adoption. The 
governing principle for adoption was laid down by Viscount Simon 
who sponsored the Adoption of Children Act, 1949 as ’What is
best for the child in each individual case. That comes in front
72e 7^of everything else”. According to Margaret K o r n i t z e r , ’The
72c. T.E. James: Children and the Law (1965) p.18.
72d. i.e.; Adoption of Children Act, 1926; Adoption of Children
(Scotland) Act, 1930; Adoption of Children (Regulation) Act 
1939 and Adoption of Children Act, 1949.
72e. Child Adoption in the Modern World: Margaret Kornitzer,
P. XII (1952). In Hindu law also most careful consideration 
is given to the destination of the child by laying down 
that no child is given or taken in adoption without mature 
consideration by both sides. See Kane: History of 
Dharmasastra (1946) Vol. Ill pp. 666-674. Also Derrett: 
Introduction to Modern Hindu Law (1963)9 pp. 96 to 111.
73. Child Adoption in the Modern World: Margaret Kornitzner,
P. XIII (1952).
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stable family relationship created by the Adoption Act is not
more than a generation old and is still on trial and we still
do not yet know a great deal about the long-term social value
of adoption by large numbers of people ••• Thus every adoption
is a great adventure, not only for the individuals concerned
but for the community at large. If they come to the task
with love they are unlikely to go badly wrong”. Also Professor
73aDerrett in his’Adoption in Hindu law* observes ’’England
very recently placed adoption upon a sound footing with a
thorough going statute,^ intended for the benefit of infants,
and in so doing unconsciously brought its law into the closest
analogy with the Hindu law of adoption, than which no other
system resembles it more remarkably so far as the effects of
the Institution are concerned”. Although, curiously, both an
English ;juclge and a bench of Indian judges agreed independently
that adoption in India (i.e., amongst Hindus) and adoption in
England were poles apart, yet the similarities, judged
comparatively, are more striking than the differences, however
75important the latter may be. Professor Derrett further 
makes the following observation regarding the Hindu law of 
adoptions J
”Alone of the ancient systems which found a use 
for adoption, the Hindu law provides us with a 
copious literature on the subject and protracts 
the developments and disputes of the remote and 
more recent past into the present, when the 
institution is currently (1955-6) passing through 
the fire of codification. India alone provides
73a. Zeits. fur. verg. R. 60 (1957) PP# 34 to 36.
74. Adoption Act 1950 = 14 0. VI. C. 26.
75. See Derrett Conflict of Laws: Adoption and a difficult
Bombay decision, (1966) 58 Bombay law Reports, 33 et seq.
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us with a sufficiently varied amount of information 
about the original introduction of the institution, 
its conflict with existing comparable institutions, 
and its eventual, triumph over them, for us to be 
able to view the process in a single glance; and 
India alone of all countries is struggling with the 
desire to reform an essentially archaic and 
utilitarian institution at a time when most countries 
have lost the belief that adoption can, or ought to, 
serve any object but a charitable one”.
As regards the observation of Prof. Derrett in the last 
few lines of the above quote to the effect that in most countries 
(other than India) the object of adoption is mainly a charitable 
one seems to be quite correct. Por example, in countries such 
as the United Kingdom the driving motive for adoption appears 
to spring more from a concern about children. As stated in 
the recent report of the Departmental Committee on the Adoption 
of Children, 1970,^ above all the child is the focal point in 
adoption; providing homes in the fullest sense for children who 
need them is its primary purpose.
Extending the range of Legal Provisions for the care of children: 
The Departmental Committee on the Adoption of Children 
(1970) has observed*^ that the existing range of legal 
provisions for the substitute care of children is incomplete, 
in that the law provides ho generally available means, short of 
adoption, whereby persons other than natural parents caring for 
a child may obtain legal recognition and security for their 
relationship to the child, without cutting his links with his 
natural family.
Apart from adoption, there are two kinds of legal 
proceedings under which legal rights in relation to a child may 
be sought by persons other than the childfs parents. These are 
guardianship and wardship.
76. At para. §.
77* At page ^3^ ^
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78As to the meaning of the term 1 guardian1 Bromley
observes that the term ‘guardian' is sufficiently wide to
include a parent, for parents are regarded at Common law as
the natural guardians of their children. But in sommon parlance
the concepts of parents and guardians are quite distinct, for
the rights and duties of the former arise automatically and
naturally on the birth of the child, whilst the latter
voluntarily places himself in loco parentis to his ward and his
rights and duties flow immediately from this act. As regards
Wardship, if an infant is made a Ward of Court, he remains
permanently Tinder the care and control of the Court. Although
a guardian will be appointed, he is more in the nature of an
agent or officer of the Court; he will be responsible for the
day to day supervision of the ward, but he must refer all major
decisions, for example, those relating to custody, education or
78
marriage to the Court • A guardian must also be distinguished
from a foster parent, who has de facto control and custody of
78
a child without being its legal guardian. So long as no one
else claims the custody of the child, the person who actually
has it will be entitled to retain it; if this is disputed, the
court must be guided by the child's welfare in determining in
79whose favour to make the order.
A person who has no established parental or legal 
relationship to a child cannot apply for appointment as the 
child's guardian unless
(i) the child has no parent, no guardian and no person having 
parental rights with respect to him or (ii) the Court exercises
78. Por a further discussion refer P.M. Bromley's Family Law, 
Third edition (1966) pages 369 to 386.
79. Guardianship of Infants Act, 1925> S.I.
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its power to appoint, in certain circumstances, a guardiah to 
act jointly with a surviving parent; it is only in these 
comparatively rare situations that relatives or foster parents 
caring for a child can apply for guardianship (See Adoption 
Committee 1970*s Report referred to above).
In certain situations though adoption remains available 
in law, guardianship would seem more appropriate both for 
relatives and for foster parents. Among such situations are 
the following mentioned by the Departmental Committee: where 
the chief motive of the applicants is to have security of care 
and legal status as the guardian of the child; where the natural 
parent wants to keep in touch and this is desirable; where 
there is an element of risk that the applicants may not be able 
indefinitely to continue as parents, e.g. because they are 
elderly or may not continue in good health; where there is a 
good chance that natural parents may eventually wish to be able 
to resume care of the child. There would however be no reason 
why guardians should not at a later date be able to apply for 
an adoption order if otherwise eligible. If a person fosters 
a child and pays for its education and food he would be justified 
in expecting better protection from the law and greater rights 
than he enjoys at present, although the paramount consideration 
should no doubt be the welfare of the child. As such the 
Departmental Committee on the Adoption of Children (1970) 
considers that guardianship should be made available by statute 
to foster parents and to relatives who are already caring for 
a child so as to safeguard their position. This provision 
appears to be a very wholesome one both from the point of view 
of the child*s welfare (who is likely to be looked after much 
better than in his natural home) and also from the point of 
view of the foster parents who deserve legal recognition and
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better protection from the law for all the care and trouble they
take and the sacrifice they make in the interests of child and
human welfare. In order to cut out wholly unjustified or
frivolous applications, the requirements in regard to care and
possession and in the case of foster parents, obtaining local
authority permission would be the same as for adoption. The
77Committee suggests* that irrespective of whether the child’s 
natural parents consent to guardianship: (a) foster parents :
should not be able to apply for guardianship until they have 
cared for their foster child for at least a year, and should 
have an unfettered right to apply to the Court if they have cared 
for the child for 5 years or more (para 108) (b) foster parents 
who have cared for a child for at least one year but less than 
5 years should be able to apply for guardianship only if the 
local authority consent (para 108) (c) Relatives and Poster 
parents who have cared for a child for more than 5 years, should 
be required to notify the local authority of their intention to 
apply for guardianship, and an order should not be made until at 
least 3 months have elapsed from the date of the notification 
(paras 108 and 109). Also the child’s parents and others 
interested should be made a party to guardianship applications 
with a right to be heard before the Court takes a decision 
(paras 110 and 111). The welfare of the child should be the 
first and paramount consideration in exercise of its powers by 
the -Court in respect of guardianship applications.
Since a guardianship order can be reviewed by the Court 
at any time; the Committee therefore felt that there would be 
no need of formal provisions for the giving of parental consent. 
This proposition appears to be a fair and reasonable one. While 
it is true that the best interests of a child are normally 
secured in his natural home, there are innumerable instances of
46
unscrupulous parents not caring for their own children. In 
such cases it would be justified for a Court to appoint a 
guardian of the child if in the opinion of the Court, the 
child*s welfare so demands it. Also, as the guardianship order 
does not make the ward a child of the guardian and can.be reviewed 
at any time by the Court, it would be justified to dispense 
with parental consent which may not normally be forthcoming 
from unscrupulous parents for reasons other than the welfare of 
the child.
The Committee felt that adoption should be retained as 
an alternative to guardianship for legitimate children. The 
Committee considers that if adoption is retained Guardianship 
should be accepted as the normal procedure and that adoption 
orders should be granted only in exceptional circumstances, where 
the Court is satisfied that it would be in the child*s interests.
A particular onus would rest with the local authority in their 
investigation of all the circumstances and on the Court in its 
final decision as to whether or not to grant an adoption order. 
This seems an excellent recommendation. Thus, adoption should 
be resorted to only after mature deliberation and full consider­
ations of the pros and cons, and that suitable alternatives, as 
suggested by the Committee should be made available to persons 
who fulfil the requirements laid down by the Committee.
The Committee also felt that legitimate and illegitimate 
children should be treated similarly in law. Few would disagree 
with the Committee*s proposition that legitimate and illegitimate 
children should be treated similarly in law. It may be pointed 
out here that the Hindu law recognises the relationship of an 
illegitimate child to his father and family and also gives him
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80substantial rights and it seems unreasonable that an illegitimate 
child should be deprived of rights which he would otherwise have 
obtained, for no fault of his.
The Committe is also of the view that allowances should 
be available in guardianship cases and that there might be a 
case for introducing subsidised adoption. By this means it 
is envisaged that more adoption homes might be found for such 
children (handicapped, mixed race, older children, families 
of children) if financial help were available,for instance with 
people who already have children and feel unable to assume 
an extra financial burden. Although this seems to be a . 
laudable proposition, it is however suggested that in such 
cases extra preeaustions and checks should be introduced and 
the Court should satisfy itself absolutely that such 
subsidized adoptions and guardianships are for the welfare 
of the child, for in such cases there is always present the 
danger of unscrupulous persons wishing to take over the extra 
responsibilities possibly lured by the additional income which 
may come their way by this means. Hence in case of 'subsidised 
adoption' a thorough system of checks and controls should be 
put in vogue.
The Departmental Committee on the Adoption of Children 
1970, has also proposed that the long-term welfare of the 
child should be the paramount consideration in resolving 
conflicts over adoptions. Much is made of parental consent
80. See the discussion at p. 92 ff. Also see Derrett:
Introduction to M o d e m  Hindu Law (1963), Paras 32-39,
407, 410, 526, 670, 757, 842 and 844. Also see Derrett's 
Article : Five doubtful cases in Hindu law from Madras ~
III - Inheritance by or from Illegitimates; 1963 1 M. 1. J., 
J, 1, 13 ff.
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both in the report on adoption in relation to guardianship and to
on
adoption . In an instructive article entitled ’Parental Consent 
82to Adoption*, Ian Saunders has reviewed the case law on the
point which would be useful to summarize here.
S.5. of the Adoption Act, 1958 lays down that a court
may dispense with a parent*s consent if he ”is withholding his
consent unreasonably.1 But as to what constitutes withholding
consent unreasonably there has been considerable conflict of
83opinion. In Hitchcock v. W.B. ^lord Goddard L.C.J. observed 
that ,!the mere fact that the adoption order will be for the 
benefit of the child does not answer the question whether
consent is being unreasonably withheld”. So also in Re
Jenkins I.J. giving the judgement of the Court said: ’’Prima 
facie it would seem eminently reasonable for any parent to 
withhold his or her consent to an order thus completely and 
irrevocably destroying the parental relationship. One can 
imagine cases short of such misconduct or dereliction of duty 
as is mentioned in S.3(l)(a) £a parent abandoning, neglecting 
or persistently ill-treating the child] in which a parent’s 
withholding of consent to an adoption might properly be held 
to be unreasonable, but such cases must, in our view, be 
exceptional.” Prom these two cases two principles were 
established, i.e.; that the Court was primarily to concern 
itself with the attitude of the parent, the child’s welfare 
being a subordinate matter in deciding whether the parent was
81. See also S.5. of the Adoption Act, 1958.
82. The Hew Law Journal, July, 15th, 1971» pp. 608 to 610.
83. [1952] 2 Q.B. 561.
84. [1955] 1 Q.B. 117.
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ureasonably withholding consent and secondly it was prima facie 
reasonable to refuse consent.
85However, in a later case in Re. L  ^Lord Denning 
stressed that in deciding whether or not a parent was acting 
unreasonably, the child's welfare was a very important factor, 
for ”a reasonable mother surely gives great weight to what is 
better for the child.” And in Re C(L)^  Diplock L.J.
88
propounded the following two irreconcilable tests (see Re B 
below) viz., ”Y/ould a reasonable parent regard a refusal to 
permit the adoption of his child as involving a serious risk 
of affecting the whole future happiness of the child?” Later 
he suggested the test "Does the withholding of the consent by 
the parent show a callous or self-indulgent indifference to 
the welfare of the child?”
Next we have two conflicting decisions of the Court 
of Appeal in 1970 in Re and Re B . ^  respectively. In 
Re the majority view of the Court of Appeal was that 
parental consent could only be dispensed with if there had 
been misconduct on the part of the parent. In the view of 
Sachs L.J. the parent should be guilty of conduct culpable 
to quite a high degree and in Cross L.J's opinion to dispense 
with parental consent, the conduct on the part of the parent 
must be such as to amount to the shutting of his eyes to a 
blameworthy degree to the obvious dangers to which he was 
exposing the child.
85. (1962) 106 Sol. JO. 611.
86. (1965) 2 Q.B. 449.
87., ri97Ql3 All. E.R. 990. 
88. £97<5 3 All. E.R. 1008.
SO
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However, in Be B a differently constituted Court of 
Appeal repudiated the view that culpable conduct by the parent 
was a necessary pre-condition to the Court’s dispensing with 
consent and stressed that the test should be one of reasonableness
Their Lordships approved the first of the two tests formulated
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by Diplock L.J. in Re C.(L) (see above) and rejected the second.
In the face of these conflicting opinions a decision
by the House of Lords became e ssential and in an appeal from
89the Court of Appeal in Re ¥ . , the House of Lords laid down
their interpretation of the law as to when refusal of consent 
to adoption by a parent was reasonable. The following were 
briefly the facts of the case. The mother, W, had two children 
by X. She later had a third child by Y. When the child was 
one week old, in April, 1968, he was placed with the applicants, 
a married couple who were registered foster parents. In 
January, 1969, the applicant sought an adoption order in respect 
of the boy. On February 11, 1969, W. Consented to an order 
being made; but withdrew her consent in March, 1969* At the 
time of the hearing neither X nor Y, lived with W, and there 
was no prospect of either doing so in the future. W was living 
with a female cousin and her two older children, relying on her 
cousin and public assistance for support. The County Court 
judge decided to dispense with W ’s consent on the ground it 
was being withheld unreasonably. The decision was reversed by 
the Court of Appeal for two reasons: first that the judge had
erred in law by basing his decision entirely on the assessment 
of the best interests of the child; secondly, if the judge had 
applied the correct test, he could not, in the opinion of the
89. (1971) 2 All. ER. 49.
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Court of Appeal, have held that the mother was acting 
unreasonably.
As stated above, the correct test was that culpable 
conduct by the parent was necessary to establish that the parent 
had acted unreasonably in withholding consent.
The House of lords, however, restored the decision of
the judge at first instance and rejected the view that the
judge decided the issue solely by reference to the child1s
welfare. In essence their Lordships returned to the view
85expressed by Lord Denning in Re.L.  ^when he said nIn considering 
the matter I quite agree that (i) the question whether she is 
unreasonably withholding her consent is to be judged at the 
date of the hearing; and (ii) the welfare of the child is not 
the sole consideration; and (iii) the one question is whether 
she is unreasonably withholding her consent. But I must say 
that in considering whether she is reasonable or unreasonable 
we must take into account the welfare of the child. A 
reasonable mother surely gives great weight to what is better 
for the child. Her anguish of mind is quite understandable.
But still it may be unreasonable for her to withhold consent •
We must look and see whether it is reasonable or unreasonable 
according to what a reasonable woman in her place would do in 
all the circumstances of the case.11 This statement of law was 
approved by all five Law Lords. The decision makes it clear 
that culpable conduct by a parent is not a-.necessg.ry pre­
requisite to dispensing with consent. Although welfare of the 
child is not to be the sole test the judgements seem to make 
it clear, that in any case where the welfare of the child 
clearly requires that he stay with the adopters, a parent
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withholding consent will be considered to be acting unreasonably. 
As observed by Lord Hailsham L.C. "Although welfare per se is 
not the test, the fact that a reasonable parent does pay 
regard to the welfare of the child must enter into the question 
of reasonableness as a relevant factor. It is relevant in all 
cases if and to the extent that a reasonable parent would take 
it into account. It is decisive in those cases where a 
reasonable parent must so regard it."
Ian Saunders poses the question whether we should go 
further and ensure that the childfs welfare is not just "an 
important factor” but, using the terminology of the Guardianship 
of Infants Act the "first and paramount consideration#, and 
suggests that such a step would do much to improve the law.
He, further suggests that the basic provision requiring parental 
consent should be retained while continuing to allow the Court 
to dispense with this consent in certain circumstances, including 
those where a parent is deemed to be "withholding his consent 
unreasonably". Also that in deciding whether or not a parent 
is acting unreasonably, the first and paramount consideration 
should be the child's welfare. Such a provision, opines 
Saunders, would provide some safeguard for the parents' 
interests while recognising that the Court's chief consideration 
must be for the welfare of the subject of the order, the child.
In this connection it will be instructive to compare
the corresponding Smriti law on the subject. The following 
text of Vasistha seems to stress that consent is essential.
"Man formed of uterine blood and virile seed proceeds from his 
mother and his father (as an effect) from its cause.
(Therefore) the father and the mother have power to give, to 
sell, and to abandon their (sons).”^  Hanu prescribes adoption
90. For rules on adoption see Vasis XVII, 26, 28-30, 39 > XV, 1-10.
See also J.C. Ghose: Hindu Law (2nd edn.) p.638. of Kapur's
Hindu Law of Adoption (1933) p.643.
91in times of distress, The term ’distress* has however not
been defined. The ’distress* may, therefore, either be of the
natural parents not being in a position to support the child
or it could possibly also refer to the child being in distress
i.e. when the welfare of the child so demands it; in which
case this view may well correspond closely to the statement
of law laid down by lord Hailsham L.C. (above). Reference may
also be made here to the story of adoption of Sunahsepa by
Visvamitra as an instance in which the T’edic Rishis regarded
the adoption as valid from the child’s welfare point of view
even though the natural father was not quite willing to part 
92with his son.
However, there appears to be a difference in the status
of a child in English and Hindu law as regards adoption. The
welfare of the child seems to be the primary or a very
93important concern of the law in England. ^  In Hindu law it
seems that the adopting parents interest predominates. It
thus follows that a contrast can be made between adoption in 
a sophisticated industrial society with a common law basis and 
a society based on religious laws despite the influence of 
the common law.
Furthermore, if (as I take it as normal) parents have 
children for their own (the parents’) sake, the English law 
still seems to accept the strength of the natural tie.
Similar is the position in Hindu law in this respect. Anyway, 
the study of the adoption law of a society conditioned by 
religion (as is the Hindu) might surely indicate some limits
91. See page 11 of the thesis.
92. Refer to page 579 of this thesis.
93. See Section 5 of the Adoption Act 1958 and the cases 
referred to in the above article.
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to the suggested move to make the child's welfare paramount.
For example* carried to its natural conclusion,- were this 
principle accepted, any child b o m  to parents of whom society 
does not approve could be placed in adoption.J This might be 
right but psychologically what would the result be? I suggest 
that many parents (however bad they are) need children to 
help them weather the storms of life and to give them purpose. 
The simpler the Society the more marked this need seems to be.
There is a final point of importance. The existence 
of children whether one's own or not (quite apart from giving 
the parents or adopting parents an heir) can (not always!) make 
them more humane, more sensitive and more considerate to others 
(in sum: better members of society). This may be what is 
aimed at in Hindu law today in adoption and in English law.
In this respect then both laws are directed at the same 
psychological end but the emphasis is different in the laws.
The reason for this difference is possibly due to the 
difference in the social patterns of the two countries, i.e., 
the smallness of one country with a more coherent law and 
more closely knit values' system as compared with a larger 
country and a more diffuse society such as the Hindu.
In conclusion I would like to suggest that in the 
case where parental consent for adoption is not forthcoming 
but the Court considers that the adoption will be in the 
interests of the child and as such the non-consent of such 
parent is unreasonable, the best solution is that in such 
cases the Court should make guardianship orders in the first 
instance. As suggested by the Departmental Committee on
94. Refer to the above cases and suggestions in the above 
article........................
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Adoption of Children, 1970 referred to above (with which I 
agree), guardianship should be accepted as the normal 
procedure and adoption orders should be granted only in 
exceptional circumstances where the Court is satisfied that 
it would be in the child*s interests.
5 6
CHAPTER II
L  E ( V X .Lj :JrF-vCT" Cl-JOFTICH CZ T ' - " -T1 UX ? U. IIY
(1) "Complete Severance" from natural family Adoption in the 
*Dattaka form' under Hindu Law before 1936
The basic text which lays down the effect of adoption
on the natural family of the adopted child is a text of IJanu
which runs thus "The adopted son is not to take away (with
him when he is passing from the family of his birth to that
of adoption) the Gotra (= family name) and the Riktha (= wealth)
of the progenitor: the linda (= oblation offered to deceased
ancestors) is follower of the Gotra and the Riktha, the
Swadha (= Finda) goes away absolutely from the giver".^
This text is translated by Sir Gilliam Jones,
followed by 7. IvIacJ'Tafehten and Colebrooke, as follows: "A
given son must never claim the family and estate of his
natural father. The funeral oblation follows the family and
estate; but of him, who has given away his son, the obsequies 
2
fail". But this version has been criticized by Golapchandra 
Sarkar Sastri as misleading, if not inaccurate, implying as it 
does future and not vested right.'
As the Hindu law as to the rights of an adoptee in 
his natural family is entirely based on this text of Manu, it 
would be helpful to study the explanations given by the various
1. 'anu IX, 14-2 (adapted from G.C. Sarkar Sastri: Treatise 
on Hindu law, 7th edition 1936 p. 190).
2. Sat. ’im. VI, 6 (vide Kapur: Law of Adoption 1933 P- 397)•




commentators on this text.
The author of the Dattaka Mimamsa explains thus,
"The given son is not to partake of the progenitor's gotra 
and riktha; likewise of him who gives the son, Swadha (Sraddha 
performed by the given son) goes away absolutely (i.e. ceases)".^ 
He then quotes the Smriti Chandrika as follows - The author 
of the (Smriti) Chandrika (says) - "By this (text of Manu) is 
declared that by the very act creating filial relation (to the 
adopter), the given son's proprietary right in the adopter's 
property and the status of being of the same gotra with him, 
arise; and on the other hand, through the extinction of the 
filial relation (to the giver) from the very act of giving 
(in adoption), the extinction of the given son's proprietary 
right in the giver's property, and the extinction of the 
giver's gotra take place
The Dattaka Chandrika explains it as follows "By this 
(text) it is declared that through the extinction of the filial 
relation (to the giver), from the very act of giving (in 
adoption) the extinction of the given son's proprietary right 
in the giver's property, and the extinction of the giver's 
gotra take place
The Vyavahara Mayukha, explaining this text of Manu 
says that in the case of a son given away the relationship 
with the natural family ceases as regards the offering of 
'Pindas* and the taking of the natural father's estate after 
the adoption, but he may inherit and give oblations if he is
4. Dat. Mim. VI, 6-9 - Translation from G.S. Sastri's Hindu 
Law 7th Edn. 1936, p. 253 and Sm. C (II. 289).




a dwy""amushyayana or a son of two fathers.
Kamalakara, the author of the Nirnayasindhu quoting 
Katyayana and LaKgaksI cited in the Pravaramavijari in support, 
states that Manu IX, 142 only applies when the natural father 
has a son or sons (other than the one given away). According 
to the Dharmasindhu when all the ceremonies including the cuda
are performed (by the adoptive father) the adopted boy has
✓
only the gotra of the adopter but when a boy of another gotra
is adopted affeer the performance of Upanayana in his natural
family or when only the Upanayana is performed by the adoptive
father, the adopted boy should repeat both gotras at the time
of bowing at the feet of elders or in Sraddha and other rites.^
The Smritis are, however, silent on the point and the story of
the adoption oj^  SunajisepipL by the illustrious Vedic sage Visva- 
7bmitra' would prove that there was no bar as to age or the.
performance of ceremonies in natural family for the adoption
text (IX 142)
of a child. Also Manu1s/clearly states that the adopted son 
is to give up the Gotra and Riktha of the progenitor, hence 
the above view of Pharmasindhu is questionable.
The commentators of Manu's code also hold the view 
that the adopted son's rights in the natural father's family 
become extinguished by adoption. And what is predicated with
6. V. Mayukha IV, v, 5 to 22.
7. Referred to in Kune: History of Dharmasastra Vol. Ill
(1946) p. 692. Nirn. SiMhue III, p. 389* Pharma Sindhu 
III, p. 161.
7b. For a brief account of the story of the adoption of
Sunahsepha refer to Hindu Law of adoption by G.S. Sastri 
(1891 edn) p. 181 et seq. It may be noted that as the 
story goes Sunahsep'^ had taken a prominent part in a 
ceremony which could only be done by a person upon whom 
the Upanayana rites had been performed.
! S9.
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respect to the progenitor applies to other natural relations 
as welljlas the adopted son ceases to be a member of the 
natural father's gotra or family.
Case Law on the point
In the case of Kali Komul Mozumdar v Uma Sunker
Q
Moitra the Privy Council accepted the principle of law laid 
down by Mitter J. in the full bench case^ that "an adojbted son 
occupies the same position, and has the same rights and privi­
leges in the family of the adopter as the legitimate son, 
except in a few specified instances. ... The theory of adoption 
depends upon the principle of complete severance of the child 
adopted from the family in which he is born, both in respect 
to the paternal and maternal line, and his complete substitution 
into the adopter's family as if he were born in it". This was 
cited with approval by the Privy Council in the cases of 
Nagindas v Bachoo^  and Raghura.i Chandra v Subhadra. ^  In the 
latter case"^ their Lordships of the Privy Council laid down 
that according to Hindu law, adoption operated as a rebirth 
for all purposes material to the question and that the natural 
brother was not "brother" within the meaning of Section 22 of
the Oudh Estates Act. In Chandra Kunwar v Chaudhri Harpat 
12Singh also the Judicial Committee held that an adopted son 
ceases by virtue of adoption to be regarded as the son of his
8. 10 I.A. 138 (P.C.).
9. (1881) l.L.R. 6 Cal.,257.
10. (1916) l.L.R. 40 Bom. 270 (P.C.).
11. (1928) l.L.R. 3 Luck. 76, 87 (P.O.).
12. (1907) l.L.R. 29 All. 184, 194 (P.C.).
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natural father, and becomes for the purpose of inheritance or
succession the son of his adoptive father. His obligation to
perform the funeral ceremonies for those of his family for
whom he would otherwise have offered oblations ceases and, as
observed by Sarkar and J.D. Mayne, he has not even to observe
pollution on the birth or death of any member in the family
of his birth. ^  The adopted son loses his rights in the
coparcenary property,^ he gives up the natural family and
15everything connected with it y and his natural family cannot
16inherit from him unless in his new relationship he is still 
a heritable relation.
The Pepsu High Court has held in Lekh Ram's case 
that an adoption under the Mitakshara has the effect of trans­
planting the adopted boy from his natural family into the family 
of the adoptive father and by such adoption the adoptee 
acquires the rights and privileges of a natural son in the
family of the adopter. He ceases to be a coparcener in the
16afamily of his birth from the time of adoption. In Vasant
v Dattoba the Bombay High Court held that as soon as the 
adoption ceremony is performed and the boy to be adopted is 
given over by the natural family to the adopting family, the
13. Sarkar, 'Adoption1, 2nd edn., 388; Dat. Mim. VIII, 2-4 
Mayne: Hindu Law, 11th edn., 248.
14. Kunwar Lallatjee v Ram Dayal (A.I.R. 1936 All. 77*
15. Dattatraya v Govind (1916) l.L.R. 40 Bom. 42.9.
16. Muthayya Rajagoipala Thevar v Minakshi Sundara Nachiar 
and others (1902) l.L.R. 25 Mad. 594; Raghura.i Chandra 
v Subhadra (1928) l.L.R. 3 Luck. 76, 87 (P.O.) (natural 
brother is not "brother" for the purpose of Succession 
to adopted son's estate in the adoptive family).
16a. A.I.R. 1951 Pepsu 99 (100).
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ties between the adopted son and the natural family are
severed and. fresh ties are created between the adopting family
and the adoptee. For all purposes (except as to prohibition
against marriage with a girl in the natural family whom he
could not have married and as to prohibition against adoption
of a boy from his natural family whom he could not have
adopted) he becomes as if he was born into the family in which
he is adopted."- So also the Punjab High Court held in Deoki
randan v Rikhi Ram that adoption once completed has the effect
of irrevocably transferring the adopted boy from his natural
family to the adoptive family and to confer upon the adoptee
the same rights and privileges in the family of the adopter as
the natural legitimate son, except in certain cases like those
relating to marriage, adoption etc., and that it was undoubtedly
open to the adopted son to renounce his right of inheritance
in the adoptive family, but his status as adopted son could
16cnever be renounced by him. In the case of adoption among
Jats of Amritsar District it has been held that the completely 
adopted son is transplanted into the adoptive family.^u' In 
Indar Singh v Kartar Singh, Dua, J. of the Punjab High Court
observed that the theory of adoption under the Hindu Law contem­
plates a complete severance of the adopted child from the family 
of his birth, both in respect of his paternal and maternal lines 
and his complete substitution into the adopter’s family as if 
he were born in it, except in certain limited respects. The
16b. A.I.R. 1956 Bom. 4-9 (52).
16c. A.I.R. I960 Punj . 54-2 (54-5).
16d. Te ju v Kesar Singh A.I.R. 1954- Punj. 30, 31.
16e. A.I. A 1966 Punjab 258.
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adoption had the effect of transferring the adoptee from his 
natural family into that of his adopter conferring on him 
thereby the same rights and privileges in the adopter's family 
as a legitimate son except in matters of marriage, adoption 
and ^perhaps in regard to the share on partition between the 
adopted and after born son*. The adoptee loses all the rights 
of a son in his natural family. Broadly put, adoption under 
the Hindu law is the admissibility of a stranger by birth to 
the privileges of a child by a legally recognised form of 
affiliation and in contemplation of Hindu Law, an adopted 
child is deemed to be begotten by the father who adopts him 
or for and on behalf of whom he is adopted. Thus 'taking of 
a son' is a substitute for failure of male issue and its object 
is two-fold (i) to secure the performance of the funeral 
rights of the person to whom adoption is made and (ii) to 
preserve the continuance of his lineage. His Lordfehip held 
that the right of pre-emption conferred by Section 15(1)(a) 
of the Punjab Pre-emption Act on the father's brother or 
father's brother's son of the vendor is available even if the 
relationship is created by adoption or appointment of an heir. 
In view of Sections 2(54) and 2(18) of the Punjab General 
Clauses Act and 5(20) and (57) of the General Clauses Act, 
the words "father" and "son" in the Punjab Pre-emption Act 
include the adoptive father and adoptive son. The position 
appears to have been made clearer still, observed His Lordship, 
by Section 12 of the Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act which 
lays down that an adopted child shall be deemed to be the 
child of his or her adoptive father or mother for all purposes 
with effect from the date of the adoption and from such date 
all the ties of the child in the family of his or her birth
shall be deemed to be severed and replaced by those created 
by the adoption in the adoptive family.
Rights of the pre-adoption sons of adoptee in natural family.
The natural father loses all power over the son from
17the moment he is adopted. { Where the adopted son left a son
of his own in the natural family it has been held that he was
entitled to give that son in adoption. But as suggested by 
17aDerrett ' the better view seems to be that the substitution 
of families is so complete that he can neither give such son 
in adoption"*-^  nor affect the status of that son when he himself 
separates.^0
In Babarao v Baburao, the Nagpur High Court held that 
a Hindu, on his birth acquires an interest in the joint family 
property of his grandfather and this right is not extinguished 
when his natural father is adopted by the latter's uncle as his 
son. The natural father's personal status as his father's son 
is completely destroyed, but that does not affect the status of 
his pre-adoption son. His pre-ddoption son continues to be the 
grandson of his grandfather and his right to a partition in 
that branch is not in any way affected. The fact that the 
adoption of the natural father was in the same coparcenary 
makes no difference to the applicability of the aforesaid
17* Krishnamurthi Ayyar v Krishnamurthi Ayyar & another 
(19£7) 50 I.t.E. Mad.
17a. Derrett: Modern Hindu Law (1963 edn.) 173*
17b. Sharadchandra v Shantabai, A.I.R. 194-4 Nag. 266;
L1944-] Nag. 344 (F-B)T
17c. Babarao v Baburao A.I.R. 1956 Nag. 98; [19553 Nag. 903*
) 64-
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principle, and consequently the grandson*s right to claim a
17cpartition in the branch of his grandfather cannot be negatived.
So also where an unmarried, divorced or widowed woman
adopts a child, the adoptive mother, or failing her, other
relations in the adoptive family would be guardians in marriage
of the child and not the natural father (Section 12 of the
Hindu Adoption and Maintenance Act) as rightly pointed out by 
17dDerrett. r The guardianship rights of the natural parents
cease with the adoption for all purposes, although they may
be preferred to be appointed as guardians where the adoptive
parent is temporarily incapable of acting as guardian. The ^
connection of the adopted son with relations in his natural
family becomes extinguished unless they he also his relations
by adoption through the adoptive father and in this way mutual
rights of inheritance might still exist.
In Lekh Ham's case the Pepsu High Court held that
the transplantation is restricted and confined to the adoptee
and his wife and does not extend to his sons born before he
was taken in adoption. Such sons do not acquire the status of
coparceners in the family in which their father was adopted
and they do not acquire the gotra and right of inheritance in
17ethe family in which their father has been adopted. ' In Desa 
v Kumbha, a case of Jats in the former State of Bikaner, the 
Rajasthan High Court held that where a married person is given 
in adoption and such person has a son at the date of adoption, 
the son does not, like his father, lose the gotra and right of 
inheritance in the family of his birth, and does not acquire
17d. See Derrett: Modern Hindu Law (1963 edn.) $  1?2.
17©* A.I.R. 1951 Pepsu 99 (100).
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the gotra and right of inheritance in the family into which 
his father is adopted. This rule of Hindu law applies in the 
case of Jats in the former state of Bikaner. A custom dero­
gating from such law, according to which when a father is 
adopted, his sons who had been born before the adoption also
went along with the father into the adoptive family, had not
17fbeen proved ;tt> prevail among the jats in the Area. *
Prohibitions for marriage in Natural family
On the question as to whether the adopted son would 
be free to marry a girl within the prohibited relationship in 
the natural family, some modern authors like Mayne and others 
maintain, on the authority of the commentaries on adoption, 
that the tie of blood with its attendant disabilities is never 
extinguished and therefore, he cannot, after adoption marry
IQ
anyone whom he could not have married before adoption. In
Madhavrao v Raghavendrarao%^  Kania (C.J.), and Gajendragadkar, 
20J., of the Bombay High Court held that on the basis of custom 
a Hindu may marry a girl belonging to his natural father*s 
gotra after she is adopted into a different gotra. The salient 
points of this case are briefly discussed below.
The first defendant in this case belonged to the 
*Bharadwaja gotra* and having lost his first wife, married
17f. A.I.R. 1958 Raj. 186 (187, 188).
18. Hayne's: Hindu Law; Eleventh Edition p. 248 where he 
refers to Dat. Mim. YI, 10; Dat-Chand, IV, 8; V. May, 
IV, 5. S. 30; Mootia v Uppon (1858) Mad. S.D.A. 117-
19. A.I.R. (1946) 33 Bom. 377.
20. Both these judges later became Chief Justices of the 
Supreme Court of India.
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another woman originally belonging to the same gotra as his 
own. This latter woman had however been taken in adoption 
by one 'K* who was of a different gotra a day before her 
marriage to the first defendant. The following points arose 
for decision: (i) whether the prohibition against Sagotra
marriages is absolute or only recommendatory under Hindu law 
(ii) whether a daughter can be validly adopted into a different 
family under Hindu law (iii) whether the prohibition as regards 
Sagotra marriage applies in both natural and adoptive families 
and (iv) whether by a custom applicable to the Deccani Brahmins, 
to which community the parties in the suit belonged, such 
marriages were recognised as valid.
On the first point the following remarks of Kane in
21his history of Dfaarmasastra1 are instructive: "It is a
canon of the Purvamimamsa that if there is a seen (drsta) or# N • • • 7
easily perceptible reason for a rule stated in the sacred texts, 
it is only recommendatory and a breach of such rule, does not 
nullify the principal act. But if there is an unseen (adrsta) 
reason for a rule and there is a breach of such rule, the 
principal act itself is rendered invalid and nugatory thereby. 
The rule about not marrying a woman who is diseased or who has 
superfluous or deficient limbs has a seen reason viz., marriage 
with such a girl causes unhappiness (if she is diseased) or 
comment (if she has deficient limbs). Therefore, if a person 
marries such a girl the marriage is perfectly valid. But there 
is no seen or easily perceptible reason for the prohibition 
against marrying a sagotra or sapravara girl. Therefore, such 
rules go to the root of the matter and are obligatory and,
21. Vol. 2, i, p. 437-
£ 7
if there is a breach of them* the marriage is no marriage, it 
is null and void”.
-  22Construing Manu, Medhatithi lays down that if one
happens to marry a girl belonging to the same gotra as himself,
the marriage though performed would be as good as not performed;
and this for the simple reason that the character of the
marriage is determined by scriptural injunction. The Mitak-
23shara construing Yajnavalkya comes to the same conclusion. '
Gajendragadkar J. rejected the argument regarding 
the principle of Adrsta, stating that *Vijnaneswara's inter­
pretation is based on the Mimamsa rules of Interpretation* 
and that *the rule is artificial* and that he *would not be
prepared to adopt it as a safe guide in interpreting Sanskrit
—  _  . _ 24
texts”. Nataraja Ayyar in his Mimamsa Jurisprudence des­
cribes this as a really serious charge ag&inst the Adrsta
principle of the Mimamsa Sastra and quotes the following
25passage from Sir P.S. Sivaswamy Ayyar*s ^ to elucidate the 
Adrsta principle. ’’Hindu lawyers and philosophers did not 
consider it wise to base any system of rules of conduct whether 
legal, social or ethical upon a purely rationalistic foundation 
or upon the commands of human authority. The authority of 
Revelation alone could furnish the bedrock upon which a
22. Medjatithi on Manu; III, 11. Manu Smriti (with the Bhasya 
of Medhatithi) translated by G. Jha, Vol. II, Pt. I,
(1921) p. 23 et. seq.
23* Mitakshara iii, 52 to 54.
24. Ganganatha Jha Research Institute Series No. 2\ 1952, 
p. 13*
25. Sir P.S. Sivaswamy Ayyar*s foreword to Sankara Rama 
Sastry, Fictions in the development of Hindu Law Texts, 
Madras, 1926
suitable system of law and order could be founded".
"The raison d ’etre and function of Sruti according 
to the Hindu Theologians is to impart knowledge 
which could not be obtained from other sources 
or to prescribe acts which would not be performed 
by the mere prompting of natural inclination. 
Otherwise the Vedas would be superfluous. No 
revelation, inspiration or supra-mundane 
authority is required to tell us things which 
can be learnt by the light of nature alone ... 
where the Smritis enjoin the performance of 
particular acts for which no justification in 
the mere light of nature can be found, the rules 
are held to be valid and for this reason. To 
discard the injunction as not binding on the 
ground that no earthly reason can be found for 
it would be a total repudiation of the validity 
of the scriptures. No principle of interpretation 
could be accepted as valid which wopld have the 
effect of abrogating the rule. The maxims of 
interpretation applied by the Mimamsaka show a 
very high legal acumen and differ but little 
from the maxims of modern lawyers in the inter­
pretation of Statutes";26
"Dharma has been defined by the Mimamsaka as fthe 
means of attaining welfare or happiness where the 
connection between the act or omission and the 
consequent welfare or happiness is mysterious 
and not ascertainable1. An act may constitute 
Dharma in the popular sense, but it is not Dharma 
according to the Mimamsaka unless the connection 
hetween the act or omission and the resulting 
good is mysterious i.e. can be established only 
by_the intervention of what is called Adrsta or 
Apurva - the existance of the link being*vouch­
safed only by the Sruti".
That there could be little doubt that the prohibition
of Sagotra marriages was meant to be absolute and mandatory
declaration that a Sagotra wife should be abandoned as far 
as sexual life is concerned and that a man who has intercourse
26. Sir P.S. Sivaswamy Ayyar's lectures o n #The Evolution of 




by the Smriti writers could be seen from Bahdhayana's '
6 7
with a Sagotra girl should undergo theChandrayana penance.
ifter that he should not abandon the woman, but should only
maintain her as if she were a mother or sister, if a child is
born it does not incur sin and it should take the gotra of
Hasyapa. The views of Sumantu and Gautama on this subject
PRwere extremely strong.
The Courts in India have also upheld the restrictions
as to sagotra marriages under Hindu Law among the three higher
29castes y and even in the present case Gajendragadkan J. held
such marriages invalid for the following reason:
"However, as I have already pointed out, the 
Privy Council have consistently taken the view 
that under the Mitakshara school of Hindu Law 
the gloss of Vijnanesvara must be accepted as 
authoritative and binding. That being so, there 
is no alternative but to hold that marriages 
between Sagotra persons like defendants 1 and 2 
are invalid under Hindu law".
There hardly seems to be any doubt that under Smriti law
Sagotra marriages are invalid.
The second point relevant to this case is whether
a daughter could be validly adopted under Hindu law. Prom
the above discussion it is clear that Sagotra marriages are
invalid ’under Hindu la?/. Gajendragodkar J. , however, further
adds 'This finding, however, does not affect the decision in
the case, since I have already held that the custom under which
such marriages are permitted and on which the defendants relied
has been proved'. In other v/ords this amounts to holding that
adoption of daughters is valid in the Bombay School on the
28. Apararka p. 80.
29. Hanchandra v Gopal (1908) 32 I.L.R. Bom. 619, 627;
: inakshi v Ramanadha (1888) 11 I.L.R. Mad. 4-9, 51 F.B; 
antarpa:/ya v Rangappayya (1895) 18 I.L.R. Mad. 397*
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ground of custom* But according to the Vyavahara-Mayukha,^
(the chief authority in the Bombay School), which relies on 
the analogy of Upanayana (that only a male undergoes) and from 
the use of the pronoun ‘he1 used in Manu*s text *He (Sah) is 
called a son given* concludes that only a male could be 
adopted. In Thakoor Jeebnath Sing v. The Court of Wards* the 
Privy Council held that the adoption of a daughter was a custom 
of Hindu law which if not obsolete, as appears to be the opinion 
of text-writers, is one which in modern times does not seem to 
have been brought under the consideration of Courts, and their 
Lordships therefore held that assuming the custom to exist, 
in as much asit breaks in upon the general rules of succession, 
it must be strictly proved.^1 In Gangabai v. Anant^the 
adoption of a daughter by a Brahmin of Poona was held 
invalid according to law and not sanctioned by custom* It 
was also settled that the adoption of a daughter was invalid 
under the Hindu law.33 In Gangabai's case32 the Plaintiff sued, 
as the adopted daughter and heiress of one R. of Poona to 
recover possession of his property* The defendants were sons 
of R*s step-brother* They disputed the Plaintiff*s title on 
the ground that her adoption was invalid under Hindu law and
30. Vyavahara Mavukha* V. 6, 7 quoted by Kane in his history 
of Dharmasastra Vol. Ill (1946) p. 674.
31. (1875) 2 I.A. 163; 23 W.R. 409.
32* (1889) I.L.R. 13 Bom. 690 where the Vyavahara Mavukha is
expressly^referred to and followed in preference to 
Dattaka Mimafisa and SaAakarakaustubha
33. In re Munshi Ram (1931 I.L.R. 12 Lah. 658, 660, 661:
Ram Piari v. Biwan Shiv Ram A.I.R. 1934 Lah., 659 (2).
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usage, The subordinate judge held on the authority of the 
Lattaka Mimamsa and Sanskara Kaustubha that, according to 
the Hindu law a daughter could be adopted. He also found 
that the custom of adopting daughters was prevalant in the 
• district where the parties resided. He therefore passed a 
decree in the Plaintiff’s favour. On appeal the Assistant 
judge reversed the decree. He held that adoption of a daughter 
was invalid under the Hindu law and that there was no local 
usage sanctioning such an adoption. Against this decision 
the Plaintiff preferred a second appeal to the High Court. 
Parsons J. observed:
’The point which arises in this case is one 
which appears to have come before the Courts 
now for the first time. It relates to the 
validity of an adoption of a daughter by a 
Brahmin, to place that daughter in the same 
legal position that his own natural daughter 
would have held. The Plaintiff claims by 
virtue of the adoption to be entitled to the e 
estate of the person who adopted her and to 
exclude the defendants, who are that persons 
next of kin from the inheritance. The Dattaka 
Mimamsa S. 7 and the Sanskara Kaustubha are 
quoted to us as authorities in favour of the 
legality of the adoption. We do not however 
consider that they establish the propositions 
for which they are cited. The adoption of a 
daughter appears opposed to the very purpose 
and history of adoption. "Males only need sons 
to relieve them from the debt due to ancestors”. 
Colebrook's Dig. Bk. V.T. 27$. The adoption 
of a dTL^ghter is not warranted by any Smriti, 
it is supported 1-y only by some Puranic instances.
Ho instances, however, is cited to us in whi-eh 
the estate passed to the adopted daughter to 
the exclusion of other male relations. Jagannath 
denies altogether that a daughter can be adopted.
A male only, he says, can become adopted -Vbavahcrrct
S. V, para. 1. We think that this 
latter authority is of great weight and we 
follow it”•
With regard to this decision it may be pointed out 
that in the first instance it conflicts with the view of the
Privy Council in Gurulingaswami v Ramalakshmamma to the
effect that the authority of the Dattaka Mimamsa is not open 
to examination, explanation, criticism or rejection like any 
scientific treatise on European jurisprudence. Such treatment 
would not allow for the effect, which long acceptance of 
written opinions has upon social customs and it would probably 
disturb recognised law and settled arrangements. ^ The 
Dattaka Mimamsa has positively laid down that a daughter can 
be validly adopted and the fact that such adoptions are rare 
or scarcely ever come up for dispute before a court of law 
cannot be the basis for invalidating such adoption. As to 
Parsons J.fs remarks that the adoption of a daughter is not 
warranted by any smriti, although the Smritis are silent onv *
the point but the glaring examples of adoption of daughters 
given in the Puranas and discussed below are sufficient to 
tilt the balance in favour of thevalidity of adoption of a 
daughter. It is also not true that adoption of a daughter 
does not serve any beneficial purpose. As shown me* in the 
discussion which follows the adoption of daughters confers a 
doubly spiritual benefit. I am therefore unable to agree 
with the decision of Parsons J. in this case.
Kane in his History of Dharmasastra"^ mentions the 
different views on this subject without adding any comment of 
his^ He refers to the view of the Vyavaharamayukha which 
relying on the analogy of Upanayam (that only a male undergoes) 
states that only a male must be adopted which view has been
33a. (1898) I.L.R. 22 Mad. 398, 412; (1898) L.R. 26 I.A.
113, 131.
33L. Vol. Ill, pages 674-673.
33c. Kane: History of Dharmasastra Vol. Ill, p. 674 referring
to V.M. pp. 108-109*
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32 33followed in Gangabai v. Anant and in re Munshiram. Next
he refers to D.M. (pp. 112-116); Sam K. (p. 188) and PharmasindS^
which relying upon such instances as that of. Santa, the
daughter of King Padaratha ( who was adopted by King lompada)
and of Prtha, who was the daughter of Sura and was adopted
by Kuntibhoja, say that even a girl may be adopted. Kane
also refers to Pannalal who in his 'Kumaun local customs1
states that a girl may be adopted as a daughter in Kumaun by
custom. In Goa although the Pharmasindhu which sanctions
33dadoption of daughter*^ is accepted as the leading work but 
Art. 10 of the Pecreto of the 16 Pec. 1880 provides only for 
the adoption of males. The leading authority on luso-Hindu 
law, namely Luis da Cunha Goncalves, Pireito Hindu e Mahometano 
(Coimbra, 1923)> discusses the matter at pp. 231 ff. In his 
view adoption of girls would have no secualr effect in Portuguese 
territories. He goes on to show how, under the Pecreto Art;
12, a son adopted with the consent of the husband (given in 
writing and registered) will have all the rights as if he were 
a legitimate posthumous son; but if the widow adopts without 
such authorisation her son will be able to inheret only from 
her and her kindred.
The above discussion is merely to show the incongruity 
in the judgment in the present case where adoption of a daughter
for purposes ofsmarriage;.is,held to be valid while in the
other cases referred to above the adoption of a daughter has 
been held to be invalid.
The only solution for their lordships to justify
33d. Kanes History of Pharmasastra Vol.I, p. 449 n. 1119.
Kashinatha*ss Pharmasindhu (C.1790) III, 1*9; Nirnayasagar ed^ 
1936 p. 138. See also Perretts A critique of Modern Hindu
Law (Bombay Trip at hi 1970) Paras 160 & 161.
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their judgment would have been to clearly hold the adoption 
of a daughter as valid under the Smriti law. Iam inclined 
to hold the view that adoption of a daughter is valid under 
the Smriti law. The whole of See. vii of Nanda-Pandita's 
Dattaka MimaAsa deals with the different substitutes for the 
legitimate daughter. Excellent authority is given in it for 
the daughter * given* and the daughter 'purchased* etc. Its 
opening verses show that the progeny which men desire and. need 
is either male or female, and that he who is doomed to fall 
to a region of horror by reason of his not having produced 
issue, is he who has produced neither sons nor daughters. The 
term 'Apatya' i.e., ’’that through which man obtains exemption 
from falling into hell”, applies to the two sexes'. Sec. vii 
of the Dattaka-Mima&sa seems to be intended to show that a 
daughter serves to ' prolong the lineage', and save from 
torments, equally with a son, and in default of a legitimate 
daughter, a substitute will serve. The whole section is very 
remarkable and important and seems not to have been sufficiently 
considered. Nandapandita in his Dattaka-MimaAsa supports his 
conclusion that 'putra* includes a daughter and that on failure 
of a daughter, a daughter of another could be adopted, by 
referring to ancient precedents, such as the adoption of Santa 
the daughter of King Dasaratha (a prominent figure of the 
Hamayana and father of Lord Rama) by King Lomapada and the 
adoption of Prtha or Kunti (a prominent figure of the Mahabharata 
and mother of the Pandavas), the daughter of Sura by Kuntibhoja.
34. Dat. Mim. VII, 30, 34* Vide Adiparva III, 2-3 (or. ed. Chap.
104) for the adoption of Prtha or Kunti. and Ramayana,
Balkanda, 9th Chapter for that of Slnta.
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The instances of adoption of daughters and that too
among the prominent figures of the Eamayana and Makjabharata
mentioned above are hy themselves a very strong evidence in
favour of the validity of adoption of a daughter in Hindu
law. It is not true that adoption of daughters will give no
spiritual benefit to anyone. On the other hand Sastric
material seems to show that a doubly spiritual benefit could
be got by adoption of daughters. In the first place, spiritual
_ or
merit is achieved by the ceremony of Kanyadarprm^ gift of the 
daughter in marriage to a suitable bridegroom and secondly 
benefit could be derived from her son 'the Putrika-putra1 who 
is capable of conferring a spiritual benefit almost equal to 
that of the Aurasa son.
Now under Sections 10 and 11 of the Hindu Adoptions 
and Maintenance Act 1956 either a boy or a girl may be adopted. 
By these provisions the HAMA has restored the right of a female 
to be capable of adoption (even though unwittingly), which 
seemed to be legally incapable of being exercised under the 
Anglo-Hindu law except in restricted Malabar customs.
Finally the question to be considered is whether when 
a person is adopted into another family his gotra is completely 
changed for purposes of marriage. The Dattaka Mimamsa citing 
the following text of Brihat Manu "Sons given, purchased and 
the rest, retain relationship of Sapinda to the natural father, 
as extending to the fifth and seventh degrees, like this, their 
general family, (which is) also, that of their adopter"; 
states that consanguineal sapinda relationship continues after 
adoption.^ Nilakantha in the Vyavahara-Mayukha denies the
35. Dat. Mim. II, 8.
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authenticity of the text quoted and seems to hold that sapinda
relationship in the case of the dattaka ceases in the natural
family (vide Manu 12, 142) and he would be free to marry a
girl in his natural father's family and quotes the instance
of Arjuna, the son of Kunti, born after she was given in
adoption by her father Sura to Kuntibhoja and Su^hadra the
36daughter of Vasudeva, who was the son of Sura. It may
however be pointed out here that Manu in 12, 142 merely refers
to the cessation of 'gotra' and 'riktha' in the natural father's
family of the adopted son and does not mention cessation of
•Sapinda' relationship in the natural family.
The above interpretation of Manu's text by the
Vyavahara Mayukha seems to be erroneous since, extending the
argument to its logical conclusion it would mean that the
adopted son would be free to marry, after adoption, his own
36anatural sister, which conclusion is obviously absurd. The 
only instance quoted by the Vyavahara Mayukha viz., of the 
marriage of Arjuna and Subhadra could well be an instance of 
a special custom amongst the Kshatriyas of marrying one's 
maternal uncle's daughter under special circumstances.
The text of Manu that by adoption the child loses 
the gotra of the natural father could be logically explained, 
for, after a couple of generations, his affiliation with the 
adoptive family would be so complete that his original gotra 
would be completely forgotten and in course of. time, for all 
practical purposes only the adopter's gotra would stand.
36. Vyav. May. IV, V, 21-35.
36a. For a similar view expressed by Derrett see Adoption in 
Hindu law by 25.D.M. Derrett, Z. vergl. R. 60, p. 79*
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37However, Kane refers to certain families who possess two 
gotras i.e., are ’dvigotras1 and says that *In the case of the 
adopted son also, both gotras and pravaras of both gotras have 
to be considered and the dictum of Manu (IX. 142) that ’the 
sons given does not share the gotra. and inheritance of the 
genitive father and the Svadha (Braddhas etc.) of the giver 
ceases1, is restriced only to matters of inheritance, Sraddha 
and the like and does not apply to marriage”. On a plain 
interpretation of Manu’s text, which clearly states that the 
adopted son gives up the gotra etc. of the natural father, it 
seems doubtful whether the above interpretation put on it by 
Kane is correct.
The present case (including the final decision of the 
judges in the case) hinges around customary law as recognised 
by the modern Courts of law in India. In the light of the 
rules enunciated by the Privy Council and the Courts, it was 
held that the custom under which ’Sagotra* marriages were 
permitted and on which the defendants relied had been proved. 
However, as I have shown in the discussion at pages 3 / "to 3 
above, a perusal of the rules for proof of custom would show 
that in many instances they contradict each other.
37. History of Bharmasastra: P.V. Kane 2; i, pp. 492-493.
In his article entitled: After-effects of Adoption (1963)
2 An. W.R., J. 16; Mr. K.V.V.L. Narasimhaehary is of the 
view that the gotra of the natural father enures for the 
purpose of marriage in the case of the adoptee, but as 
discussed above this view does not seem to be correct.
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Prom the above discussion, the following salient points
emerge:
(a).Under the Smriti law Sagotra marriages are 
invalid.
(b) A daughter may be validly adopted under the 
Hindu system.
(c) The Mlmaftsaka rule that custom should not 
infringe the Smyiti injunction is a wholesome 
rule and should be adhered to as far as 
possible.
(d) On the question whether when a person is 
adopted into another family, his gotra is 
completely changed for purposes of marriage 
etc., the Smritis seem to be silent. There are
conflicting interpretations of Manu's text as to whether the
dattaka loses the gotra of his natural father and assumes
that of his adopter especially for purposes of marriage etc.
Further Manu and other Smyiti writers allow adoption only
in cases of genuine distress and not to be used as a
device to evade the law regarding prohibition of Sagotra
marriages. Such marriages, it would appear are valid but
must be kept within the strictest possible limits.
7 ?
Is the adoptee divested of property vested in him before 
adoption
On the question whether the adoptee is divested of 
the property vested in him before adoption, there has been a 
difference of opinion between the various courts of India,
Whilst the Bombay and the Allahabad High Courts have held that 
he is divested of such property, the High Courts of Madras, 
Calcutta, Nagpur and Lahore have maintained the contrary view.
In Ramchandra v Manubai^ the Bombay High Court l&id 
down the rule that the adopted son should be treated as having 
been from his birth in the adoptive father*s family as such 
the adopted son cannot acquire a vested interest in the property 
of his natural father. According to their Lordships of the 
Bombay High Court the theory that the adopted son lived in the 
natural family until adoption is untenable having regard to the 
definite pronouncement of the Privy Council in Nagindas 
Bhugwandas v Bachoo H u r k i s s o n d a s ^  wherein a passage from 
Mitter J.^° is cited in which it is stated that the theory of 
adoption involves the principle of complete severance of the 
child adopted from the family in which he is born, both in 
respect to paternal and maternal lines and his complete sub­
stitution into the adoptive family as if born in it - a state­
ment with which their Lordships of the Privy Council agreed.
However in Manikbai v Gokuldas^ a dattaka adoption 
has been held as civil death in the natural family and the
38. (1919) I.L.R. 43 Bom. 774. 
3^. (1915) B.R. 43 I.A. 56.
40. Quoted above see note 9» 
44. (1925) I.L.R. 49 Bom. 520.
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birth of the boy in the adoptive family with all the legal
consequences that are incidents of such adoption. It was
there held that the right to property in the natural family
accrued as if he had been born in it and on adoption he lost
all rights to such property. They also observed it quite
unnecessary to add the further fiction "as if he had never
been b o m  in the family”, as the result would be that he would
take his own family including his sons b o m  before the adoption
with him, but he does not take his sons with him into the
adoptive family.^ If he is to be treated as having civilly
died in the natural family, on his adoption the property would
pass to the natural heirs of the adopted son and not to heirs
of the previous holder. Their Lordships opined that the texts
were silent on this question as in olden times, it was thought,
adoption of a married man having children would be repugnant to
4.3orthodox Hindu customs. Sp also in Lharam Singh v. Bakshi.  ^
it was held (obiter/§) that if any sons of the adoptee were in 
existence on the date of adoption they would be vested with 
interest in the property of the natural family and the father's 
adoption, though it involves his civil death as regards the 
property does not have the same effect on the rights of his 
son or sons.
In Raghura.i Chandra v. Subhadra^  the principle of ”a 
complete severance of the child adopted from the family in 
which he is born ••. and complete substitution into the adoptive
42. Kalgavda Tavanappa v. Somappa Tamangavda (1909) I.L.R. 33 
Bom. 669. The same opinion was also expressed in Bai 
Kesarba v. Shiv Singh.ii (1932) 34 Bom. L.R. 1332, 1351 •
43. A.I.R. 1926 All. 425. See also Hagayasami v. Kochadai A.I.R. 
1969 Mad. 329$ which case illustrates the results to which 
this system could lead.
44. (1928) I.L.R. 3 Luck. 76, 87 (P.O.).
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family, as if he were born in it", ■* was re-iterated and the
view of the Bombay High Court in Dattatraya Sakharam v. Govind 
45Sambha.ii was referred to with approval by the Privy Council. 
"The fundamental idea is that the boy given in adoption gives 
up the natural family and everything connected with the family". 
Their Lordships of the Privy Council further opined that the 
expressions f,civilly dead or as if he had never been born in 
the family11 are not for all purposes correct or logically 
applicable but are complementary to the term "Hew birth” - 
’as Vasistha’s text cited in Mayne’s "Hindu Law" para. 107 
would show1 - he first dies in the family of birth in which his 
offerings will be no longer efficacious or desired, given by 
the natural to the adoptive father.
In an earlier case from Madras in Sri Ra.iah v. Sri
4.6Rajah one N. became the sole surviving coparcener of an estate 
and was later adopted by P. The question in dispute was whether 
H. continued to be owner of the estate notwithstanding ;the 
adoption or whether he was divested of it. The Madras High 
Court opined that there is great danger in speaking of adoption 
as civil death and re-birth and in attempting to enforce the 
logical consequences flowing from these conceptions. After 
quoting the Dattaka Chandrika to the effect that the initiatory 
ceremonies already performed by the natural father are not to 
be ’cancelled1 but those yet ’to be completed are to be’performed 
by the adoptive father, their Lordships remark ’Thus for the
45. (1916) I.L.R. 40 Bom., 429, 435; see also ’Adoption in 
Hindu Law* by J.D.M. Derrett, 2 vergl. R. 60 pages 7£-78.
See also article by Sarkar, R.N.s Adopted son if forfeits 
estate of natural father, A.I.R. 1948 (J) 49 where the 
learned author agrees with the view in hfl-htflt-rpyfl*s onap.
46. Sri Ra.iah Venkata v. Sri Rajah Rangayya (1906) I.L.R.
29 Mad. 437.
purpose of these ceremonies there is no idea of death or re­
birth. There is only one continuous existence*. The Madras 
High Court therefore held that adoption does not divest the 
adopted son of joint family property of which he had become
sole and absolute owner. So also the Calcutta High Court held
4-7 -din Shyama Charan v Sri Charan' that under the Bengal school
of Hindu law, an heir, who has inherited any property from the
family of his birth, is not subsequently divested of it on his
being adopted by another person. Their Lordships opined that
Raghuraj Chandra v SubhadEa^ must be read keeping in view the
oft-cited dictum in Quinn v Le athem^^  where in the Earl of
Halsbury L.C. in the Privy Council said that a case is an
authority for what it actually decides and not for what would
logically seem to flow from it - for the law is not always
logical at all. Further in Moniram Kolita v Keri Kolitani^
the P.C. had laid down that an estate once vested under Hindu
law cannot be divested. Their Lordships referred to the Tagore 
5Olaw lectures-^ wherein it was conceded that the adopted son 
would take away his own self-acquired property and remarked why 
should he not take away property to which he is absolutely 
entitled though acquired by inheritance from his father, for, 
under the Dayabhaga law nothing but the son's degradation or 
loss of caste causes extinction of all his property.
However, the Bombay High Court in Dattatraya Sakharam
#J. (1929) I.L.R. 56 Cal. 1155. 
fyg. C1901] A.C. 495 (at p. 506).
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51v. Govind had taken the contrary view and held that the
property of the natural father vested exclusively in the son
before adoption, remains in the natural family, after adoption.
For, according to their lordships the meaning of Manu's verse
IX, 142 is clear. The son given in adoption is not to take
the*gotra* and *riktha* (estate) of his natural father. His
dissociation from the family (gotra) as well as the estate is
insisted upon in unequivocal terms and the words are wide
enough to include the estate vested in him at the time of
adoption provided it is the estate of his natural father. In
the case of self-acquired property it is his own property but
in the property vested in him on death of his father it is the
property of the natural father. The possible reason why the
texts are not explicit enough on the point is that the Smritis
did not contemplate only son’s being given in adoption. Their
52Lordships referred to the cases of Behari Lai v. Kailas and
ac.
Sri Ra.iah Venkata v. Sri Ra.iah Rangayya^ and stated that the
former was a decision under the Dayabhaga while in the latter
case their Lordships were possibly influenced by Behair Lai* s 
52case^ and also did not consider the texts to be explicit enough
to dissent from that view. However, as the texts were in favour
of the appellant's contention, their Lordships of the Bombay
High Court disagreed with the Madras view.
55In a later Bombay case ' it was held that a person 
does not, on his adoption, lose the share which he has already 
obtained on partition from his natural father and brothers in
51- (1916) I.L.R. 40 Bom. 429* the decision in this case has been 
sharply criticized by Kane, P.V.: History of Dharmasastra 
(1946) Vol. Ill pp. 693-4-
52. (1896) 1 C.W.N. 121.
53* Mahableshwar v. Subraman.ya (1923) I.L.R. 47 Bom. 542.
1his family of birth. For such a son had absolute right to the 
share and could well have disposed of it as his right was not 
fettered by a son being born to him and the decision in Latta- 
treya's case ■ coptld not be taken as governing the case. Their 
Lordships commended the views of the Madras High Court in 
Sri Ha.jah v Sri Ra.iah^ especially that there was nothing in 
the texts which necessarily carried with it the idea that the 
adopted son was divested of property which was his own absolutely 
at the time of adoption and according to their Lordships there 
was a good foundation for the conclusion arrived at above.
The Hagpur^and Lahore^ High Courts have taken the 
same view as the Calcutta and Madras High Courts and held that 
in the case of adoption after partition, the adoptee takes the
property vested in him to the family of his adoption.-3*^ The
(Tq
Allahabad High Court^^ has, however, held that the rights of 
an adopted son are extinguished in his natural family irres­
pective of whether the adoption takes place during the life­
time or after the death of the natural father. This view is 
more in consonance with the Privy Council decision in Raghura,i 
Chandra v Subhadra,^^ as a result of which the earlier contrary 
decisions of the courts in the Mitakshara provinces may be 
deemed to have been over-ruled.
In the case of Vi.jaysing.ji v Shivaang.ji ° the Privy 
Council left the question open as it became unnecessary in
A.I.R.
5ip. Maroti v Luxmen [1922]/Hag. 16.
. . A.I.R.
5b• Chhanga v Jai Lai [1924]/Lah. 480.
A.I.R.
S-6. Rulia Ram v Mst. Sodhan [19303/Lah. 470.
5y* Lharam Singh v Bakshi A.I.R. 1926 All. 425.




that case to decide whether the son upon being adopted out of 
the family, retained the estate which he had inherited from 
his natural father before the adoption.
On the question whether the adoptee is divested of 
property vested in him before the adoption, the conflicting 
views of the different courts seem to have arisen in view of 
the fact that the Smritis are not explicit on this specific 
point. The Smritis seem to have contemplated the adoption 
of a child almost immediately after his birth or at the 
earliest time thereafter (before the age of 5) and the compli­
cations seem to have arisen on account of the adoptions being 
madp in certain cases of comparatively mature young persons.
It is settled, however, that an adopted son is not dispossessed 
of any self-acquired property in his possession at the time 
of adoption. As to the joint family property whether obtained 
by inheritance or partition, it appears that the views of the 
Bombay and Allahabad High Courts and approved by the P.C. in 
Raghura,i Chandra v Subhadra^  are more in consonance with the 
intentions of the Smriti writers. The meaning of Manu's verse 
IX, 142 is clear and the words seem to be wide enough to 
include the estate vested in him at the time of adoption.
For even the share of joint-family property obtained on par­
tition remains technically 'ancestral property' as the sons, 
grandsons and great grandsons would acquire equal rights in 
such property on their birth whereas in self-acquired property 
the owner has unfettered rights of disposal etc. Further, as 
the adopted son is relieved of his obligation to offer funeral 
offerings to his natural'father and acquires full rights in 
the estate of his adoptive father, it would be but equitable 




Professor Derrett, however, observes*^ that the
preferable view is the one taken by Madras,^ more recently
vindicated in Rakhalraj v. Debendra. ^  where the Calcutta High
Court investigated the meaning of Manu*s text more thoroughly,
and showed that the adopted son was prohibited from taking with
him (or subsequently inheriting) only what was not vested in
him at the time. Also referring to the provision of S.12(b)
of the Hindu Adoption and Maintenance Act, 1956, according to
which any property which vested in the adopted child before the
adoption shall continue to vest in such person subject to the
obligations of maintenance of relatives, etc. attaching to the
61ownership of such property, Derrett observes that as a result 
the natural family may suffer inconvenience thereby. But this 
is seldom serious, firstly because children with property of 
their own rarely leave in adoption and secondly because the 
property continues to vest in him or her subject to all 
obligations and rights of maintenance of others attaching to the 
ownership.
Position under Customary laws.
Under the Punjab customary law, it has been held that 
the customary appointment of the heir did not involve trans­
planting from one family to another. Hence the son of the
appointed heir who predeceases the appointer does not succeed
62to the adoptive father*s property. The descendants of the 
adoptee can succeed to the estate of the adopted son*s natural 
family even in the presence of descendants in the natural
59* J.D.M. Derrett: Introduction to Modern Hindu law (1963)* 
para. 174.
60. A.I.R. 1948 Cal. 356, 359b, 361b.
61. J.D.M. Derrett: Introduction to Modern Hindu law (1963)* 
para.171•
62. Mela Singh v. Gurdas (1922) 3 I.L.R. lah. 362 (P.B.) Por 
further discussion of the topic see page.. .214 ff...........
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63family.  ^ In Gu.i.iar Singh v. Sunder Singh Kapur J. observed 
that in the customary adoption of a son the tie of kinship with 
the natural family is not dissolved and the fiction of blood 
relationship with the members of the new family has no 
application to the son. Therefore to the son of the adopted son, 
the heirs are not the collaterals of the adoptive father but 
those persons who are natural heirs.^ In Inder Singh v. Kartar
i
Singh, Dua J. observed that under the rules of Punjab custom
adoption is in no sense connected with religion and appeared to
be a purely secular arrangement resorted to by a sonless owner
of land in order to nominate a person to succeed him as his
hdir, the object being not to secure spiritual or religious
benefit but to obtain practical temporal benefit. It is in
essence an appointment of an heir and created only a personal
relationship between the appointed heir and the appointer in
that the appointed heir does not become the grandson of the
appointer^a. These cases are governed mainly by customary
law and not by the rules of Dattaka adoption, for the customary
appointment of an heir does not involve transplanting from one
family to another and the tie of kinship with the natural
family is not dissolved. Also among the G-ayaswal Brahmins of
Gaya there exist peculiar and loose customs in regard to
adoption whereby the adopted son has rights of succession in
both families and the adopted child does not lose his rights in
65the natural family. ^
63. Ishar v. Hukam Singh A.I.E. 1923 Bah. 483.
64. A.I.E. 1955 NUC (Punj.) 4998.
64a. A.I.E. 1966 Punj. 258 (260) para. 7.
65. Lactunan Lai Chaudhrl v. Kanhava Lai (1895) 22 I.L.E. Cal. 
609, 618 (P.O.).
The effects of adoption in the various customary 
forms and in forms other than the Dattaka are dealt with in 
Chapter IX of this thesis, which may be referred to.
The Present law
Now under section 12(b) of the Hindu Adoption and 
Maintenance Act, 1956, the adopted child shall not be 
divested of any property which might be vested in him prior to his
adoption. However the adopted child continues to hold the 
property subject to the obligations, if any, attached to its 
ownership. Such obligation includes the obligation to 
maintain relatives in the family of his or her brith as are 
mentioned in Section 21 of the said Act.
English Law on the Subject
Adoption has been legally recognised comparatively 
recently in England, the earliest enactment being the Adoption 
of Children Act, 1926 followed by the Adoption Acts of 1950 
and 1958. The effects of adoption are dealt with in S. 5 of 
the 1926 Act, Sections 10 to 14 of the 1950 Act and Sections 
13 to 19 of the 1958 Act. The sections deal with the conse­
quences of adoption in English law in relationship, citizenship, 
proprietary rights, industrial insurance, marriage law, 
affiliation proceedings etc. Section 13(1) of 1958 Act repeats 
the provisions of the earlier Acts (1950 Act S. 10(1) and the 
1926 Act S. 5(1)) and deals with the guardianship rights and 
obligations concerning the adopted child. It states that on 
an adoption order being made, all rights, duties, obligations 
and liabilities of the parents or guardian in relation to the 
future custody, maintenance and education of the adopted child, 
including all rights to appoint a guardian or to consent to or 
give notice of dissent from marriage, are extinguished and 
vest in and are exercisable by and enforceable against the 
adopter as if the adopted child had been born to the adopter 
in lawful wedlock, and in respect of these matters the adopted 
child stands in relation to the adopter exclusively in the 
position of a child so born.
According to Section 12 of the 1930 Act, where an
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unmarried mother adopted her illegitimate child, any affiliation
order or agreement under which the putative father of the child
contributed to its maintenance continued after the adoption until
the child*s mother married. Section 15 of the 1958 Act, however,
provides that when an adoption order is made in respect of an
infant who is illegitimate, any affiliation order in force with
respect to him and any agreement whereby his father has
undertaken to make payments specificially for his benefit, shall
cease to have effect (without prejudice to recovery of arrears
to the date of the order) unless the infant is adopted by his
mother, being a single woman. Thus the provision of the 1950
Act which terminated the affiliation order if the mother later
married were superseded. The marriage of the mother (after the
1st April 1959) has of itself no effect on the currency of the
order or agreement, but a court may nevertheless revoke or vary
because of the marriage so much of an affiliation order as
66provides for money payments. For, as observed in the Hurst
66. Compare Children Act, 1958, S. 22(4). In a recent case 
S (P.P.) v. S(E) Law Report, July 16th, 1971, discussed in 
the Times of 17.7.71, the question whether a husband had 
accepted his wif e1 s illegitimate children as children of the 
family and was therefore liable for their maintenance, was 
held to be an objective question of fact which had to be 
determined as at the date of the marriage. Accordingly, if 
he had accepted them on marriage, the wife’s subsequent 
withdrawal from him of authority over them did not affect his 
liability to maintain them, nor did an affiliation order 
against their natural father extinguish his liability.
The husband had contended that after the marriage his 
wife had withdrawn them from his control and that that breach 
of control should release him from future liability. He also 
argued that since their natural father was known it was the 
father’s liability to support them in full and that therefore 
he should not have to pay anything. The Divisional Court 
could accept neither contention. In the Court of Appeal 
their Lordships, Davies and Buckley agreeing said that some 
authorities tended to suggest that acceptance meant there 
must be an offer, with which their Lordships disagreed and 
observed th&t that was not the law of contract. Acceptance 
in relation to a child meant that the child would be taken 
into the house of the newly married couple.
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67Committee Report such a provision was considered as being 
obsolete as the step-father is not responsible financially 
for his step-children, but the putative father could apply for 
variation or discharge of the order on the plea of changed 
circumstances•
It may be pointed out here that in Hindu law, adoption 
under the Hindu Adoption and Maintenance Act (which permits
6 7n
the adoption of illegitimate children) will not cancel 
an order for maintenance under S. 4-88 Criminal
67. Cmd. 9248 para. 199.
67a. At Anglo-Hindu law an illegitimate child could not be 
adopted, for his incapacity to perform Sradh for his 
natural father was felt to deprive him of capacity 
to give spiritual benefit to the adoptive parent.
See J.D.M. Derrett: Modern Hindu Law (1963) paras
163 and 128.
68Procedure Code. In the textual Hindu law there is no 
express text disallowing the adoption of illegitimate children. 
Also, as observed by their Lordships of the Allahabad 7 and 
Madras High Courts^ the Hindu law does not, like the English 
law, consider an illegitimate person quasi nullius filZius. It 
recognizes his relationship to his father and family, and 
secures him substantial rights. Under the ancient law it seems 
that at one time in the case of the three superior or "regen­
erate tribes" sons not born in lawful marriage had rights of
inheritance subsidiary to the "Aurasa", or son by a lawful wife
71and could perform obsequies' and although this as a general
law applicable to th&se tribes had, in respect of inheritance,
become obsolete yet, as their Lordships of the Madras High 
70Court observed' fit is clear law at the present day that by 
birth and without any form of legitimation, illegitimate 
children of those tribes are recognised as members of their 
father's family, and have a right to maintenance. It is also 
equally clear that in the case , of j^udras the law has been and 
still is that illegitimate children succeed their father by 
right of inheritance'.*^ In Inderun Valungypoly Laver v 
Hamasawmy Pandia Talaver^  their Lordships of the Privy Council
68. The Code of Criminal Procedure, A.I.H. Publication 3rd 
edition, Vol. Ill, pp. 2369-2370.
69* Ram Kali v Jamna (1908) I.L.E. 30 All. 308, 309-
70. Pandaiya Telaver v Puli Telaver (1863) 1 Mad. H.C.R. 
476, 482.
71. Manu IX, 159» 160, 180; Mitakshara I, XI; 2 Strange's
H.L., 193-211.
72. Mit. I, XII; Strange's H.L., 1, 132.
73. (1869) 13 Moo., I.A., 141.
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held, that the illegitimate children of the Sudra caste, in 
default of legitimate children inherit their putative father’s 
estate. In Sarasuti v Mannu,'^ Pearson and Oldfield, JJ., 
held that the illegitimate offspring of a kept woman, or 
continuous concubine, amongst Sudras, are on the same level as 
to inheritance as the issue of a female slave by a Sudra, and,, 
that the illegitimate son of an Ahir by a continuous concubine, 
of the same caste took his father*s estate in preference to 
the daughter of a legitimate son of his father who died in
75the father’s life-time. In Hargobind Kuari v. Dharam Singh.. 
Straight, O.C.J. and Duthoit J., held that, according to Hindu 
law and usage, illegitimate sons are entitled to maintenance
75afrom their father, and his estate is liable for such payment.  ^
Section 15(2) of the 1958 Act clarifies a hitherto 
dubious point and prohibits the making of an affiliation order 
or decree of affiliation and aliment after an adoption order 
has been made in respect of an infant who is illegitimate, 
unless the adoption was made on the application of the mother 
of the infant alone.
It should however be noted that the 1926 Act only 
transfers the guardianship rights and obligations from the 
natural parent to the adopter and specifically lays down in 
Section 5(2) that an adoption order shall not deprive the 
adopted child of any right to or interest in the natural 
father’s family nor confer on him any right to or interest 
in the adopters property as a child of the adopter. Under 
the later Acts i.e., the 1950 and 1958 Acts the adopted child
74. (1879) I.L.R. 2 All., 134.
75. (1884) I.L.R., 6 All., 329.
75a See also article by J.D.M. Derrett: Inheritance by, from 
and through Illegitimates at Hindu Law; 1955 57 Bom.
L.R.J., 1 ff. and also by the same author: More about
Illegitimacy at Hindu Law; 1955 57 Bom. L.R.J., 89 ff.
j u
is "for any purpose treated as the child of the adopter" 
including devolution of the adopter*s property as if the 
adoptee were the child of the adopter, and his exclusion from 
succession in the natural family and vice versa. Referring 
to the effects of adoption under the 1926 Act, in the case of 
Coventry Corporation v Surrey County Council, ^  one W.W.H. was 
horn an illegitimate child in the county of Leicester and lived 
with a foster-mother in the county borough of Leicester until 
he was eleven years of age. He was then, by an order under 
S. 1 of the Adoption of Children Act, 1926, adopted by one 
C.H.W. and his wife, with whom he lived continuously for four 
years in the county borough of Leicester, from which place the 
adopters were irremovable and in which they were settled at 
the date of the order. A few days after he had reached the 
age of 16 years the child became chargeable to the county of
Surrey (as he was an inmate of the Gordon Boys Home at Woking
ordered
in Surrey). The Justices of Surrey y d h i s  removal to 
Coventry where his mother was then last settled. It was held 
by the Privy Council on appeal that the order for removal must 
be quashed.
Lord Atkin observed:
"it is to be observed that the Act does not put 
the adopter and the child into the position of 
natural parent and child for all purposes. But 
as to the matters enumerated in subs. (1), custody, 
maintenance and education, it does in the plainly ;. 
language transfer from the natural parent to the 
adopter the whole of the rights and obligations 
that flow from parenthood".
Thus an adopter may appoint, not only a testamentary guardian
76. [19353 A.C. 199 at p. 203.
/  I f!
of the child to act after the adopter's d e a t h h u t ,  under 
Section 4 of the Guardianship of Infants Act 1925 > even the 
survivor of a husband and wife who jointly adopt an infant 
becomes its statutory guardian. Also under the same Act an 
order for the maintenance of an adopted child may be made 
against its a d o p t e r . T h e  Coventry Corporation case may still 
be useful in the light it may shed on the effect of adoption 
in the interpretation of enactments affecting aspects of fhmily 
relationship not dealt with specially in the Adoption Acts.
As regards the rights of succession of the adoptee, 
the 1926 Act (S. 5(2)) specifically laid down that an adoption 
order did not deprive the adopted child of any right to or 
interest in the natural father's property, nor did it confer 
on the adopted child any right to or interest in the adopter's 
property as a child of the adopter. This position was 
virtually reversed as regards devolution on a death occurring 
on or after 1st Jan. 1950 and Sections 16 and 17 of the 
Adoption Act 1958 repeats that provision.
Section 16(1) enacts that, where, at any time after 
the making of an adoption order, the adopter or the adopted 
person or any other person dies intestate in respect of any 
real or personal property, that property shall devolve in all 
respects as if the adopted person were the child of the adopter 
born in lawful wedlock and were not the child of any other 
person. Also Section 16(2) (b) lays down that in any disposition 
of real or personal property made, whether by instrument inter
77* Guardianship of Infants Act, 1925» S. 5; Adoption Act 
1958, S. 15(1).
78. Skinner v Carter [1948] Ch. 587*
vivos or by will (including codicil) after the date of an 
adoption order any reference (whether express or implied) 
to the child or children of the adopted person's natural 
parents or either of them shall, unless the contrary intention 
appears, be construed as not being or as not including, a 
reference to the adopted person. It should be noted that, 
for a disposition to be affected in its construction by 
S. 16(2) of the Act, it must have been made after the date 
of the adoption order. In the case of instruments inter vivos, 
the dispositions are obviously made on the date of their 
execution even though according to the terms of the disposition 
it is to take effect at a later date. The law was, however, 
formerly silent as to the date on which a disposition by will 
or codicil was to be regarded as "made". In the case of Re 
Gilpin^  it was held that the Legislature meant to indicate 
the date of execution of the will or codicil incorporating the 
disposition and not the date of death of the testator from 
which the disposition itself speaks. But now under S. 17(2) 
of the 1958 Act the position as regards wills and codicils 
made after March 1959 is completely reversed. According to 
this section a disposition made by such a will or codicil is 
treated for the purpose of S. 16(2) as made on the death of 
the testator. So also a codicil executed after March 1959*
OQ
if in accordance with the ordinary rule of law will enable 
the disposition to be treated under the Act as made on the 
date of the testator's death, though the will preceded the
79. C19543 Ch. 1.




81Act and the adoption order. This iss a rule which avoids 
anomaly and is much easier to understand.
o p
In Re Jones* Will Trusts, Jones v Squire in 1949 
a testator made a will hy which he gave his residue to be 
divided equally amongst his seven named nephews and nieces 
including Mrs. H. in equal shares per capita as tenants in 
common. On Sept. 1, 1953» 'the testator made a codicil con­
taining a substitutionary provision whereby if any nephew or 
nieve died in his lifetime leaving children living at his 
death such children were to take by substitution the deceased 
parent*s share. On Nov. 11, 1958, the first defendant, a 
child of Mrs. H. was adopted by a stranger to the family. In 
1939 and 1983 the testator made new wills, which incorporated 
the residuary provisions of the previous will and codicil.
There was evidence that before making his wills in 1959 and 
1963» the testator was aware that Mr. H. had died in 1953 and 
that the first deft, had been adopted and that in a conversation 
sometime after making the will of 1959 the testator had 
referred to the first and second deft.'s, as being entitled 
to share in the testator's estate. Under the Adoption Act 
1958, (C. 5) S. 16(2)(b) the testator's will had to be read 
as though the first deft, were not included in the reference 
to the children of Mrs. H. unless "the contrary intention 
appears”, ^t was held that the contrary intention required 
to satisfy the words "unless the contrary intention appears" 
in Adoptton Act 1958 (C. 3) S. 16(2)(b) might appear from
81. Sched. V, para. 4(3)*
82. [19653 2 All E.R. 828; [19653 Ch. 1124; [19653 3 W.L.R. 
506.
any surrounding circumstances which must he really cogent and 
convincing. The history of the testator's testamentary dis­
positions was admissible in determining whether the relevant 
contrary intention appeared and the evidence (a) that the 
scheme of the testator's testamentary dispositions had 
remained unchanged in this respect since the codicil of Sep.
1, 1953 and (b) that at some date after his will in 1959 
(though not after his will of 1963) he bad referred to the 
first deft, as being entitled to share in his estate, was 
sufficiently cogent to carry conviction of a contrary intention 
within Sect. 16(2)(b) on the part of testator viz., that the 
first deft, was entitled to benefit from his gift in favour 
of the children of Mrs. H.
The decision in this case is of great practical 
importance and stresses the significance of the words "unless 
the contrary intention appears" used in Section 16(2)(b). 
Although S. 16(2)b lays down that in any disposition of 
property intervivos or by will after the date of an adoption 
order, any reference to the child or children of the adopted 
person's natural parents will be construed as not'being or as 
not including, a reference to the adopted person it provides 
an exception in the case where a contrary intention appears.
o p
As observed by their Lordships in Re Jones' case the contrary
intention might appear from any surrounding circumstances which
must be really cogent and convincing. In the case under review
the contrary intention was inferred from the testator's con-
83versations with other members of the family. ^
In Re Brinkley's Will Trusts, Westminster Bank Ltd.
83* Bromley: Family law (3rd edh) , p. 413*
QJI
v Brinkley, however, a testator A, imade his will on May 5»
1899 whereby he settled his residue equally on each of his
children for life and, from and after the death of each child
his or her share was to be held "upon trust for all or any one
or more of the children or remote issue of such child (but so
that such remoter issue be born in the lifetime of such
deceased child) ... as such deceased child shall by will appoint
and in default of such appointment ... in trust for the children
or any child of such deceased child ... in equal shares”.
After A's death leaving five children including B who had one
child only C, in 1950 C and his wife who were childless,
adopted two children. In 1951 B executed his will and made
an appointment thus:
"I hereby direct and appoint that the trustees 
... of the will of my father ... shall after 
my death stand possessed of my share in the 
said trusts fund upon trust absolutely for all 
or any of my grandchildren or grandchild who 
shall be living at the expiration of twenty-one 
years after my death ..."
In 1950 C»s marriage was dissolved and he remarridd in 1957
and a son was born to C by his second wife. On the question
whether the appointment operated in favour also of C's adopted
children, it was held (i) a person taking under the appointment
made by B's will took as a result of the disposition made by
A's will, the appointment being only the means of carrying out
A's dispositions; and the disposition for the purposes of
Adoption Act, 1950 (C. 26) S. 15(2) was A's will; accordingly,
as Sect. (15)(2) operated only in respect of a disposition
made after the adoption order, it did not apply to the
84. C1967] 5 All E.R. 805; [1968] Ch. 407; [1968] 2 W.L.R. 
217.
I 0 to
disposition made by A*s will, (2) further, the reference to 
”my grandchildren” in B's will did not extend to C's adopted 
children hut only to grandchildren of B, born in lawful 
wedlock.
In this connection it may be pointed out here that 
the problem whether "child” includes an adopted child is also
found in Indian law. As pointed out by Derrett®^ for purposes
86 8*7of inheritance and maintenance ' an adopted child is on the
same footing as a legitimate child. The adopted child is
prohibited from marrying an adoptive sapinda or 'prbhibited
■) . oo
relation (unless customs permit either), as if he were a 
blood relation of those relations by adoption.^ por purposes 
of guardianship also the adopted child is placed upon the same 
footing as a legitimate child.^ The position appears to have 
been made clearer still by S. 12 of the Hindu Adoption and 
Maintenance Act which lays down that an adopted child shall be 
deemed to be the child of his or her adoptive father or mother 
for all purposes with effect from the date of the adoption.
Similar is the position of the adopted child under 
the English lav/ under the recent adoption Acts of 1950 and 
1958. I am therefore of the opinion that the decision in the
Oh
above case to the effect that the reference to ’grandchildren'
85* Introduction to Modern'Hindu Law: JJf.D.M. Derrett (1963)
p. 121.
86. Hindu Adoption and Maintenance Act Section 12. .
8?. Gen. Clauses Act, 1897, S. 5(55); HAMA, S. 12.
88. Hindu Marriage Act, S. 5(2).
89* Hindu Marriage Act, S. 5 expl. (iii).
90. Hindu Minority and Guardianship Act, S. 7.
does not extend to the child’s adopted children requires
^ ^ l U €  C-O VCX-T M, ~fc 5 ‘ / 6 * 2 - 6 0reconsideration*aS it o u  icj. r ,->/->
Hv'S. CX<3.^ ^ 1rcc?va ArdtT t 9 b jyj/f-Oj*
■J Section 13(5) of the 1958 Act deems an adopter and
the person whom he has been authorised to adopt under an 
adoption order to be within prohibited degrees of consanguinity 
for the purpose of the law relating to marriage. This statu­
tory relationship continues notwithstanding that the adopted 
person is subsequently re-adopted by another person (it may 
however be noted that such re-adoptions are impossible in 
Hindu law)* The latter provision would seem to imply that 
prohibited degrees of consanguinity vis-a-vis the adopted 
child would also continue in the natural family for the 
purpose of the law relating to marriage even after an adoption 
order. The silence of the statutes does not seem to be a 
sufficient guide on the matter.
A perusal of the above resume would show that there 
is a great similarity between the English and the Hindu laws 
in the sense that under both laws there is almost "complete 
severance" of the adopted child from the natural family. In
m
many other countries (as in shown in a subsequent discussion)7 
the laws of inheritance do not appear to be as strictly 
logical, wherein normally an adopted child inherits from the 
adopter as if he were a natural child but usually the adopter 
does not inherit from the adopted child. Commonly also, the 
adopted child does not inherit from his relatives by adoption 
and keeps the right to inherit from his natural family.
However, there seem to be some differences between 
the English and the Hindu law, for example, as to the question
91. Please refer to pages 26/ to 169*
whether the adoptee is divested of property vested in him 
before adoption, there was previously a difference of opinion 
between the various Indian courts based on the different 
interpretations of Manu's verse IX, 142 that the given son 
is not to take the 'gotra' and 'riktha' of his natural father.^ 
But now under Section 12(b) of the Hindu Adoption and Main­
tenance Act 1956, the adopted child is not to be divested of 
any property which might have vested in him prior to his 
adoption, which corresponds to the English law on the subject, 
and this will exclude an interest in Mitakshara joint family 
property, which is not in practice an important exception to 
the general proposition. Also as regards prohibition for the 
purpose of marriages etc., it would appear that the effect of 
Section 13(3) of the 1958 Act is to maintain the prohibited 
degrees of consanguinity in the natural family vis-a-vis the 
adopted child for the purpose of the law relating to marriage 
even after the adoption order. Under the Hindu law whilst the 
prohibitions of marrying 'sapinda' relations in the natural 
family continued even after adoption, it would appear from the 
decision in Madhavrao v Raghvendrarad^  that a Hindu may marry 
a girl belonging to his natural father's gotra after she is 
adopted into a different gotra.
92. For a discussion please refer to pages et seq.
93. A.I.R. (1946) 33 Bom. 377-
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CHAPTER III
RIGHTS OF ADOPTEE IN THE ADOPTIVE FAMILY
- • The Concept - "A child for all purposes”
- Directives of Smriti-writers
Hanu, Brihaspati and other Smtiti writers divided 
the twelve kinds of sons“^ into two classes viz. the ’bandhu- 
dayadas' (which means those inheriting to the Bandhus or 
collaterals) and 'abandhu dayadas* (i.e., those not succeeding 
to the Bandhus but inheriting only from their adoptive 
fathers), which has a far-reaching consequence on the inheri­
tance of the secondary or fictional sons including the dattaka.
Yajnavalkya and Vis^imu, however, ignore the distinction between
2
'bahdhu-dayadas1 and 1 abandhu-dayadas1 .
The code of Manu classes Aurasa, Kshetraja, datta, 
Kritrina, Gudhotpanna and Apaviddha in the bandhu-dayada 
class,^ and the latter six i.e., Kanina, Sahodha, Krita, 
Paunarbhava, Svayam-datta and Saudra as the a-dayada bandhus, 
thus
"Among the twelve sons of men whom Manu, sprung 
from the self-existent, enumerates, six are 
kinsmen and heirs, and six are not heirs, (but)
kinsmen........These eleven, the Kshetraja and
the rest as enumerated above, the wise call 
substitutes for a son, (taken) in order (to
1. Read pages antejp.l^-to l6;Manu IK, 158; YajtTlI, 128-152. 
Also see Kane ’History of Dharmasastra* Vol. Ill (194-6 
edn.) p. 64-5; G.S. Sastri Hindu Law (seventh edition)
p. 191; J.D. Mayne 'Treatise on. Hindu Law & Usage* 
(eleventh edition) p. 107*
2. Chandreshwar Prasad v Bishesfawar Pratap (1926) I.L.R.,
5 Pat. 777, 84-6 et seq.
5.- IX-, 158-1-59- - - - ......... .....................
iVOLf.
prevent) a failure of the (funeral) ceremonies" .^ *
No such division is known to Eandhayana but Harita
is quoted in the Vvavahara Mayukfya as placing the datta as
the first among the 'a-bandhudayadah .'. Gautama calls his
5
groups of six each as 'Rikthabhajah' and ' Gotra-bhajah' i.e.
6
'inheritors* and 'bearers of gotra-names* Narada and Devala 
(quoted in the Vyava^ara Mayukfaa) divide their enumerations 
of the twelve sons into two divisions of six each under 
' \ bandhu-dayadas' and 1 a-bandhu-dayadas *. The two terms 
denote that the first class of sons will succeed to collaterals, 
while the latter will inherit lineally or more strictly from 
their adoptive fathers only. By counting the dattaka aon 
below the first six, the metrical Dharmasastras except Manu 
and Brihaspati exclude the collateral succession of the 
dattaka and Kritrima amongst others. Brihaspati calls datta, 
apaviddha, Krita and Krita, 'riktha-suta^', 'inheriting sons.;'.
Yajnavalkya and Visftnu, however, ignore the distinc­
tion between "bandhu-dayadas" and "abandhu-dayadas". According
to Yajnavalkya "Of these twelve sons, failing each preceeding
.........................................   7
one thS other gives the ipinda and takes the inheritance".
Visiinu says "Amongst these (sons) each precedent one is
preferable (to the one next in order)
According to Kaijtfcilya^  "The son produced by the
4. IX, 160.
5. XXIX, 32-33.
6. XIII, 47, V.M.
father inherits also (from) the relatives of the father, that 
one produced by another, inherits (from the father) who per­
forms his sacrament, and does not inherit (from) the relatives 
(bandhus). Such (the latter) is the status of the datta (son)*1
b; Interpretation by the Commentators
The commentators met the problem and all over India
except Bengal, unanimously rejected theb limitation on the
dattaka1s capacity. Asahaya, the oldest knovm commentator,
in spite of his being the commentator on Narada, who places
the Dattaka son amongst the non-bandhu dayadas, counts the
dattaka as the third.^ Asahaya expressly holds that he
inherits from both his adoptive father and that fatherfs
relatives (jnatis). Visvarupa, the oldest commentator of
Yatjuavalkya and a high authority, writing on Yajn. II. 132,
cites Manu in preference to others and bases his opinion on
* 11his text. Similarly Vi^jnanesvara refuses to recognise the
distinction even of Manu, and explains away the difference
between Manu and others 'as founded on the difference of the
sons' personal qualities. This interpretation is adopted by
12all subsequent writers of every school e.g. Devanna Bhatta 
and Chandesvara. ^  Mitra Misra^ after a masterly review of 
the different authorities notices the conflict
10. Jolly, Narada ( including.. Asahaya),. Asahayacarya cited 
by Candesvara in the Vivada Ratnakara.
11. On Yajnavalkya II, 132, Mit. 1. II, 30-35.
12. Smriti-Chandrika.
13. Vivada Ratuakara, p. 551*
14-. Viramitrodaya pp. 618-621.
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*Here is a conflict with Manu clearly*...
*this is to be removed by referring the 
(opposing, contrary texts) to a difference 
in caste or local custom, that is, the other 
texts being contrary to Manu, they have to 
be taken as referring to the adoption of a 
lower-caste son or to a local custom contrary 
to Manu*.
-  15The Dattaka Ohandrika "says
*The doctrine of one smriti writer that the son 
given is heir to kinsmen and that of another 
that he is not such heir are to be reconciled 
by referring to the distinction of his being 
endowed with good qualities or otherwise*.
—  —  16The author of the Sarasvativilasa counts him as fourth.
—  —  17 —
Similarly Madhava rejects Harlta and the Madana Parijata
  _ — 18
follows the order given in the Subodhini on the Mitakshara.
Jimutavahana is not explicit on the point, but according to
Justice Mitter*s explanation of the relevant verses of the 
19Dayabhaga , it would appear that the dattaka son falls within 
the * first six sons ’ and hence entitled to inherit collaterally.
The Dattaka Mlmamsa and the Dattaka Ohandrika are
of the view that the adopted son is a substitute for the
Aurasa son for purposes of inheritance as well as for purposes
20of funeral oblations.
The Courts in India, however, have laid down a rule 
based upon the principle of equity and justice - the principle 
being that the adopted son should have the same rights in the 
family of his adoption, as he loses in the family of his birth, 
unless there be express texts curtailing the same. Thus, the
15* V, 22-24.
16. Para. 386, Setlur*s Transl., p.161.
17. Para. 52, Setlur (p.330).
18. Setlur, p. 521.
19. K, 7-8. Also see Justice Miller*s explanation (see pp.174-5).




Footnote 20 continued from previous page (106).
20. It was observed in Nagammal v. Sankarappa A.I.E. 1951 Mad. 
264 that the main purpose of adoption is to secure the due 
performance of obsequial ceremonies for the adopter and that 
the perpetuation of lineage was also another object for 
making an adoption. As such the existence of a son 
incapable of performing those ceremonies such as one 
suffering from a virulent and loathsome form of ulcerous 
leprosy cannot serve the purpose of sonship and the 
existence of such a son can be ignored and an adoption made.
A similar view was taken by the Bombay High Court in the case 
of a person affected by dumbness which is congenital and 
incurable. (Bharmappa v. U.1 janganda. A.I.R. 1922 Bom. 173)* 
Although Yajnavalkya does not mention a dumb person among 
those disqualified from inheritance but Vijnanesvara 
includes him in the list under the word 'Adya* on the 
authority of Manu. However, the Bombay High Court held in 
Krishna.ii v. Raghavandra, A.I.R. 1942 Bom. 178 that under 
Hindu Law a person having a son subject to disqualifying 
defects cannot be treated as sonless. In view of the 
recognised possibility of an idiot*s son being cured and 
his begetting a son free from disqualifying defects, and 
in view of the absence of a positive statement anywhere in 
the texts that the expression * .Aputrena* includes a person 
having a son incapable of inheriting or performing the 
funeral rites, an adoption during the lifetime of a son 
who is a congenital and incurable idiot is invalid. This 
view of the Bombay High Court has been rightly criticized 
by Derrett as erroneous. See his Modern Hindu Law (1963)» 
para. 155*
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courts have laid down that as regards inheritance the adopted 
son has the same rights as an Aurasa son of the adoptive
son of the adoptive father in which case he gets a reduced
Rights in the coparcenary and separate property of the 
Adoptive father (where the adoption is by the~father)
According to the Dattaka Himamsa and the Dattaka
Candrika an adopted son is entitled to inherit not only to
his adoptive father hut to the adoptive father’s father and
other more distant lineal ancestors as in the case of an 
23Aurasa son.  ^ In a Dayabhaga case, a majority of fifty-one
pandits attached to various courts were of the opinion that
in case of a conflict between Manu and the Dayabhaga the
former was to be preferred and according to the Bengal school
2 4an adopted son could inherit to his adoptive grandfather.
the right.of an adopted son is analogous to that of an 
appointee under a power given by the donor as regards the 
effectuation of the gift and the gift to an appointee will be
21. (1881) I.L.R. 6 Cal. 257, 259-260 (R.B.); Dattatraya v 
Gansabai (1822) I.L.R. 46 Bom. 54-1; Tirumal v Rangadami 
(1942) 2$ Li.l .j . 79, 97.
22. ITagindas Bhugwandas v Bachoo Kurkissondas (1916) 7 I.L.R. 
40 Bom. 270, 279 (P.C. ) ; Fratapsing,ji v Agar Singhji . 
(1919) I.L.R. 45 Bom. 778 ( P . O . hah, of Kolhapur v 
Sundaram Iyer (1925) I.L.R. 48 I,lad." 1.
25 Dat. Him. VI, 5, 8; Dat. Chand. V, 26, III,. 20.
24. Gourbullah v Jaggernath P. Mac. Cons. H.L. 159*-I 6
21arents, except in competition with an after-born legitimate
22share cn account of express texts in this regard.
As to the nature of the right of an adoptee the
25Madras High Court laid down in Yethirajulu v Iiukunthu that
25. (1905) I.L.R. 28 Had. 565-
/ o  q
:500b if he be a person in existence at the testator's death.
-heir Lordships referred ho Bai Motivahoo v Bai Mamoobai^°
wherein the P.C. upheld a power given by a testator to another
to appoint by will the person who was to lake the property of
the testator, relying for the recognition of such a power on
the analogy of the pov/er to adopt which the husband may give
to his widow and declared that gifts made under a power to
appoint will be valid so far as they are made to persons in
existence at the deash of the testator. Just as in that case
the gift takes effect on the appointment being made so in the
present case the gift takes effect on the adoption being made.
Such adopted son would be taken in point of law as in existence
at the testator's death and his case would be treated as an
exception to the rule about existence of donee at donor's 
27death ( and that 'grandsons being my sons' sons' include 
grandsons by adoption, excluding illegitimate sons.
As regards the rights of an adopted son in coparcenary 
pxroperty, an adopted son, as soon as adopted, becomes a 
coparcener with the adoptive father with the right of survivor­
ship and of partition; and the latter cannot dispose of any 
joint family property without justification, or the adoptees 
consent. At the moment of death, the right of survivorship 
i s in conflict with the right by devise and the title by 
survivorship, being she prior title takes precedence to the
po
exclusion of that by devise.'"'' However now under the Hindu
26. (1897) i-R. 24 I.A. 93 (J.C.).
2?. Lap;ore v Tagore, (1872) 18 7/.R. 359-
28 Yitla Butten v Yarnenamma (1874) 8 K.H.C.R. 6; Parmanand 
v Shiv Charan Das (1921) I.L.R. 2 Lah. 69; 59 I.C. 2yb;
I rishnauurthi Tyyar v Krishnamurthi Ayyar (1927)I 
50 Macl. 5087 5l9 (T7U.37 Mfl" A k r V  LT&fenla!' U 9 m rP*H.
' iTo. 74' p. '285; 'Section '50, Hindu SticTe’ssioTJTAct 1956.
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Succession Act 1956, the law on this point has been modified
and a Hindu may now dispose by will or other testamentary
29disposition of his share in the joint family property. *'
She rights of the adopted son become, on adoption, indefeasible
7. A
either inter vivos or by, will'' (except as modified by the
lindu Succession Act, mentioned above). The father cannot
alienate the son’s interest by will. There seems to be,
however, a difference of opinion between the Smriti writers
on the father’s powers of alienation of ancestral property
vis-a-vis the sons whether Aurasa or adopted. Whilst the text
of Manu and Par a da admit the father’s absolute rights over the
SIproperty, whether ancestral or self acquired^ (with which 
view the Arthasastra of Kautilya c o n c u r s ) t h e  Sm©itis of. V  / 7 ^
7is#hu, Yajnavalkya and Bril^aspati make the sons joint owner's 
with the father in respect of ancestral property, - though 
conceding his absolute right in self-acquired property.
Under the Uitakshara law, the adopted son acquires 
a vested interest in the ancestral property of his adoptive
29. Section 30, Hindu Succession Act 1950. But under Sec. 6 
only when no female relation, etc., survives.
30. Venkatanarayana v Subbamraal (1916) I.L.R. 39 Had. 107;
32 I .C . 3O3 (H.0.); Rungama v Atchama (1846) 4 H .I.A .1 , 
Bh;wri Appamma v Chinnammi ("19205 50 I . C. 511; Vitla 
Butten v Yarnenamma (1874) 8 Ll.H.C.R. 6; Sudanand v
Surju f onee (1885) 8 A.R. 455; Ganpathi v Savithri (1897)
I.L.R. 2l I..ad. 10, 14; Farmanand v" SHrv Charan Las (1921)
I.L.R. 2 Lah. 69, 59 I.C. 256; lit. Aki v E unban la 1 (1911)
P.R. Ho. 74, p. 283*
31. Manu, IX, 104.; Bar'. XIII, 1$.
32. Arthas, III, 5-
33. Vislinu XVII, 2; Yajn. , II, 121; Brih. XXV, 2, 3; Also 
Payne: Hindu Law; 1953 edn. Chapter VIII p. 315 et seq.
father, on adoption and does not become divested of such 
interest although its size at an eventual partition may be 
altered by the birth of real sons.7 ' In a case where an 
aurasa son and an adopted son survived the father and the 
former died without issue the latter took the whole estate 
by survivorship. v
A conveyance by a Hindu, without male issue at its 
date, will bind his subsequently born or adopted male issue, 
as such issue at birth or adoption respectively take a vested 
interest in such property only as it is at that time.^ In 
respect of self-acquired property it has been held that an 
adopted son does not stand in a better position, with regard 
tc the self-acquired immovable property of his adoptive father, 
than a natural born son would occupy; arid there is nothing in 
the Hindu law to prevent a father from disposing of his 
property by an act intervivos^ or by will^S and so defeating 
the rights of inheritance of his adopted son. In Karam Singh
34. Birbhadra v Kalpataru (1905) 1 C.L.J. 388; Amarendra v 
Banamali (1930) I.L.S. 10 Fat. 1.
35. See note to Ayyavu v Hiladatchi (1862) 1 Mad. H.C.R. 45 
(49); Venkatanarayana 1illai v Subbammal (1916) 43 I.A.
20, 23, 3$ Mad. 107.
36 . Rambhat v Lakshman (1881) I.L.R. 5 Bom. 630; Gangubai
v Ramanna (1666) p Bom. H.C.R.(A.C.J.) 66; Vrandavandas
v Yamunabai (1875) 12 Bom. H.C.R. 229iSlVtfRRM/l K r i s h  n a iq  
V K A V Z f l  T ~M'K' I 9 5 $~Mcu/ ‘ 70t>. ' *
37* Rangama v itch am a (1846) 4 H.I.A. 1; 7 . .R. P.C. 57.
38. Iurshotam v Vasudev (1871) 8 Bom. H.C. 196; Sri Ra,ja Venkat
urya v"~?he Court of Hards (1899) I.L.R. 22 Lad. 383, 390
(I .C.') ; Subba Red di v j oraisami (1907) I.L.R. 30 Mad. 369»
zq
v Lit. Rup Wanti^  the Lahore High Court opined that the , 
argument that under Hindu law self-acquired property becomes 
joint immediately upon adoption of a son is not supported by 
any authority ahd in fact is in direct contradiction to views 
of text writers, and held that under the Hindu law, self­
acquired property does not become joint immediately on the 
adoption of a son. To convert self-acquired property into 
joint property, a clear intention to waive the separate right 
of the owner must be established* Such intention will not be 
inferred from acts which may have been done out of kindness 
and affection. The mere tie of adoptive father and son is not 
sufficient to show an intention to convert self-acquired 
property into joint property. Also the mere fact that a Hindu 
and his adopted son lived together is not sufficient to show 
an intention, on the part of the father as owner of his self­
acquired property to throw it into the common stock for the 
benefit of both himself and his adopted child, so as to make 
the property, joint property.^ Also in Yenkataswamy v 
Radhakrishna the Madras High Court held that proof of the 
existence of a joint family does not lead to the presumption 
that property held by any member of the family is joint, and 
the burden rests upon any one asserting that any item of the 
property is joint to establish the fact. Unless it is 
established that the family possessed some joint property 
which from its nature and relative value may have formed the 
nucleus from which the property in question may have heen 
acquired, the burden does not shift to the party alleging that
39. (1925) 85 I.C. 296, [19253 Xah. 122.
40. Tajmulali v Jaga Mohan Das (191?) 38 I.C. 96.
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it is his self-acquired property.^ So also under the 
Dayabhaga system, where there is no distinction between self­
acquired and ancestral property as regards a father’s power 
of disposal as in the case of self-acquired property of the 
adopter under the Mitakshara, an adopted son does not seem 
to stand in a better position than a natural born son.
Express Contracts by Adopter for the benefit of Adoptee
The question may arise as to the position when there
is an express contract by the adopter appointing the adopted
son as the heir to the adopter's estate. In Gopee Mohun v
42Ra.ia Ra.i Krishna, a boy was adopted on an express stipulation
that he would inherit the whole of the adopter's property but
on the birth of a real son the adoptive father made a will
giving him less than his legal share. The case was however,
settled out of court. Referring to this case Sir P. Macnaghten
observed that the opinion of the court was
"that a man who had adopted a son was not at 
liberty, by his will, to cut off the adopted 
son from that proportion of the estate to which 
in virtue of adoption he was entitled by Hindu 
law"
with which he agreed and added that "a boy who is taken for
adoption ought to be considered as a purchaser" But in
! \ ! \
Sri Ra.ja Venkat Surya v The Courts of Y/ards the P.C. were
41. A.I.R. 19^3 A.P. 476; also see Derrett: Introd. to 
Modern Hindu law (1963)para.549.
42. Cons. H.L. p. 228.
43• Cons. H.L. p. 230.
44. C1899) I.L.R. 22 Mad. 383, 390 (P.C.'). See also Surendra 
v Kala 6:3 (190?) 12 Cal. W.ET. 668.
of the opinion that the argument that the adopted son Must 
he considered to he a purchaser for valuable consideration is 
opposed to all authorities on the subject of adoption and held 
that a Hindu adopting a son does not thereby deprive himself
will. There is no implied contract on the part of the adopter, 
in consideration of the gift of his son by the natural father, 
not to make a will. According to the Hindu authorities also 
/ the adopted son is in the same position as a son born. They
all treat it as a case of gift of the son by the natural
father, which is assented to i^nd received by the adopter, and 
tjiere is not a trace of any restriction on the adopter*s power 
more extensive than in the case of a natural son. The argument 
of implied contract not to make a will in consideration of 
being given the son in adoption by the natural father is without 
any authority to support it. If it were a right, the adopted 
son would be in a higher position than the natural son. In 
this case, the adopter had made an express agreement constituting 
the boy as the heir to his estate, but their Lordships treated 
it as meaning that he had given him the same rights as a 
natural son would have. Also copareanary between the Raja 
and the adopted son was not admitted but the contrary was held.
If the Raja had power to alienate he might do it by will, and
the title by will would have priority to title, by succession.
4-5Commenting on this case G.S. Sastri ^ remarks that as a result 
of this decision it has become absolutely necessary for the 
natural parents to require the adopter to settle his property 
on the boy before.making the gift of their son for fear of
of any power that he may have to dispose of his property by
4-5• G.S. Sastri 'Hindu Law*1 1936 ec
ilve cUsc USS Co Y\ 0 y\ Pf>- I I ^ et s -
115
disinherison by him. I am unable to agree with the decision 
in this case for reasons mentioned subsequently at page 127.
Following the Privy Council decision the Calcutta 
High Court have held that in Hindu adoption there is no implied 
contract with the natural father that in consideration of the 
gift of his son the adopter will not make a will.^ In an 
earlier case, however, it was held that although the adopted 
son was not a party to an express agreement, he could insist 
on the performance of the contract, by which each widow bound 
herself to the other to deal with the estate in his favour. ^
In this case^ a testator bequeathed all his property to a 
family thakur; and to secure the debsheba, directed that his 
two widows should each adopt a son to him, the sons to become 
shebaits of the property dedicated, of which the widows, 
during the sons' minority, were to have control. The widows, 
having purported to adopt according to the will, then bound 
themselves by an ikrarnama, each to the other, to bring up 
the sons as their mothers and guardians; and, after payment of 
the expenses for the debsheba, to divide the surplus income 
into two equal shares, making accumulations, which should be 
handed over by each to the son adopted by her on his attaining 
majority.
In a suit by the son purported to have been adopted by 
the elder widow, who was then dead, against the younger widow, 
and the son purported to have been adopted by her, in effect 
for the administration of the testator's estate, with a claim 
for relief based on acts of the widows, including the ikrarnama
46. Surendra v. Kala (1907) 12 O.W.H. 668.
47. Surendra Keshub v. Doorgasoondery, $1892) I.L.R. 19 Cal.
513, 536 lE.C.J.
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executed by them, it was held first that the adoption being 
invalid the plaintiff could take nothing under the will; 
secondly that, by the law of inheritance the widows, as heirs, 
took the office of shebait, and became entitled to the beneficial 
interest in the surplus income for their estate for life; so 
that each of them could contract to bind her own interest, and 
thirdly that there was no trust imposed upon the surviving 
widow independently of the contract which she had made, but 
that the ikrarnama taken as part of the series of acts, gave to 
the boys, so far as the widows* interests extended, the same 
benefit that they would have taken had they been heirs; and 
although they were not, and could not have been at their age 
parties to the ikrarnama, yet that they could insist on the 
performance of the contract, by which each widow bound herself 
to the other to deal with the estate in their favour. Fourthly, 
that each boy was entitled on attaining majority to half of 
the surplus income during the life of the surviving widow, 
and to the accumulations thereon; and accounts were accordingly 
directed against her.
In Rani Chhatra Kumari Devi v. Prince Mohan Pikram
a a
Shah; a case arising from an appeal from a decision of the 
Patna High Court, the Privy Council held obiter that if the 
adoptive father contracts with the natural father that in 
consideration of the son being given in adoption, he would 
devise to the adopted son all his properties absolutely and
48. (1931) 35 C.W.H. 953, 961 (P.O.) on appeal from (1931 ) 
Pat. 114. (1931) 10 Pat. 851 P.O.; (1931) 35 C.W.H.
953, 961 (P.O.) on appeal from (1931) Pat. 114- Kapur: 
law of Adoption in India and Burma (1933 edn.) p. 431.
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he leaves a will under which no properties are left to the 
adopted son but they are left to the testator’s widow; the 
adopted son could not be the owner of the properties merely 
by virtue of the contract but if his natural father had 
obtained a decree against the adoptive father’s estate, the 
adopted son might conceivably have had some remedy against the 
natural father, but he could hardly have claimed the properties
n %
'
from the adoptive father. The following were the ratio(nes)
decidendi of the case (i) The contract does not make the
adopted son the owner of the properties and he cannot sue
the widow as such, (ii) The natural father or his legal
representative after his death, can in such a case obtain
compensation for the breach of the contract and can perhaps
even obtain specific performance, he would certainly obtain
compensation for the breach.^ (iii) IT the natural father
were to obtain a decree against the estate of the adoptive
father, the adopted son may have a remedy against the natural
father but he would hardly have a claim against the properties
from the widow. (iv) The widow may be regarded as a ;::trustee
for the adopted son, but only so long as the contract remains 
50enforceable. (v) Even assuming that the properties were
impressed with a continuing trust, the ownership of the
properties would be in the trustee against whom the adopted
son wopld have the right to call upon her to convey to him,
such right being enforceable up to 6 years under Art. 120 of
the Limitation Act. The adopted son cannot bring a possessory
suit as an owner after this period has expired, (vi) The
properties vested in the widow cannot be regarded as vested
for the specific purpose of being made over to the adopted son
51and so section 10 of the Limitation Act would not apply.
49. Synge v Synge [1894] 1 Q.B. 466; Robinson v Ommanney
23 2b. Div. 283; and In re Parkin -1892) 3 Cb. 510
(relied on). Kapur: Law of Adoption, p. 431*
50. DufosjTv Pereira (1 Dick 419; 2 Harq. Jui, Arg. 304 (1769);
Gray v Perpetual Trustee Coy. (1928) A.C. 391; In Re 
Hagger C1930) 2 Ch. 190; and Central Trust Coy, v Snider 
[1916] 1 A.C. 266 referred to.
51. Khew Sim Tek v Chuah Hooi (1921) L.R. 49 I.A. 37, 43.
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(vii) The Indian law does not recognise legal an equitable
52 55estates. In India a trustee is owner of the trust property"^
The question of Contracts for the benefit of Third Persons”
has been discussed at length in a learned article in the
5 A
Madras law Journal. The author also compares the English
and Indian law on the subject. The English rule on the subjedt
55was enunciated in 1861 by Wightman J. in Tweedle v. Atkinson J 
who said:
”... it is now established that no stranger 
to the consideration can take advantage of a 
contract, although made for his benefit”.
This principle was affirmed by the House of Lords in Dunlop
56Pneumatic Tyre Co. Ltd. v. Selfridge & Co. Ltd. but this rule
57has been criticised in a number of recent cases/' and in 
1937» in its sixth Interim Report the Law Revision Committee 
stated:-
"Where a contract by its express terms purports 
to confer a benefit directly on a third party, 
the third party shall be entitled to enforce the 
provision in his own name, provided that the 
promisor shall be entitled to raise against the 
third party any defence that would have been 
valid against the promisor ...”
52. Tagore v. Tagore (1872) L.R.I.A. Supp. 47, 71; Webb v. 
Macpherson (1909) I.L.R. 31 Cal. 57» 721; L.R. 30 I.A.
238, 245.
53. Opinion of Sir George Lowndes in the case of Ra.ia Bhupendra 
Ear ay an v. Ra.ieswar Pros ad (1931) 35 C.W.N. 870.
54. Contracts for the Benefit of Third Persons by R.C. Jaiswal, 
1968 2 M.L.J., 73-82.
55. 124 R.R. 610.
56. L.R. (1915) A.C. 857.
57. Smith and Snipes Hall Earm Ltd. v. River, Douglass Catchment 
Board (1949) K.B. 500 and Drive Yourself Hire Co., (LondonT~ 
fctd. v. Strutt, (1954) 1 Q.B. 250; Beswick v. Beswick
(1966) 3 All. E.R. 1. Also, see article by Prof. Corbin: 
Contracts for the benefit of third persons, (1930) 46 L.Q.R. 
12 and also (1933) 49 L.Q.R. 474. Also see article by 
A. Shankar Reddy: A Stranger’s right to sue on a contract 
1968 26 An.W.R, J. 13.
In India there has been great divergence of opinion 
in the Courts as to how far a stranger to a contract can
c cr
enforce it. The rule of Tweddle v Atkinson was applied by
r.Q
the Privy Council in Jamuna Das v Ram Autar9 5 and by Rankin
59C . J . in Krishna Lai v i-romila l ala  ^- . In Khwa.ja Luhammad Khan
v hussaini Begum^  there is another line of thinking wherein
their Lordships of the Privy Council observed:
"... In India- and among communities circumstanced 
as the Mahomedans, among whom marriages are 
contracted for minors by parents and guardians 
it might occasion serious injustice if the common 
law doctrine was applied to agreements or arrange­
ments entered into in connection with such contracts".
This statement has been taken by the Madras^ and Calcutta
High Cburts as laying down the rule that the Indian Courts
55are not bound by the rule in Tweddle v Atkinson."  ^ The
6PCalcutta High Court observed:
"Nor is there anything in the Indian Contract 
Act, which prevents the recognition of a right 
in a third party to enforce a contract made by 
others, which contains a provision for his 
benefit.
In the United States of orth America, this
is frankly recognised.....
And same is the Scots Law".
The Courts in India have introduced a great number
of exceptions in v/hich the rule of privity of contract does
not prevent a person from enforcing a contract which has been
58. (1911) 21 M.L.J. 1158: (1911) 39 I.A. 7-
59- A.I.R. 1928 Cal. 518.
60. (1910) 37 I.A. 152: 20 M;L.J. 614.
61. huniswami Uaicken v Vedachala Naicken and another,
A . I . R .  1 9 2 8  h a d . "  2 3  .
62. I . Datta v I ~. landa I.L.R. (1932) 61 Cal. 841, as per 
Lord Lilliams, J. at p. 857*
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made for his benefit but without his being a party to it*
Some of the most commonly known exemptions are in cases of,trust
or charge, marriage settlement, Partition or other family
arrangements and acknowledgement or Estoppel. The Privy
Council decision in Ehwa.ia Muhammad Khan v. Hussaini Begum^
referred to above is illustrative of this principle. In Rana
63Umanath Baksh Singh v. Jang Bahadur. one U was appointed
by his father as his successor and was put in possession of
his entire estate. In consideration thereof, U agreed with
his father to pay a certain sum of money and a village to J ,
an illegitimate son of his father, on his attaining majority.
It was held by the ^rivy Council that in the circumstances
mentioned above a trust was created in favour of J for the
specified amount and the village. Hence he v/as entitled to
maintain the suit. Also it has been held that a constructive
trust results in favour of an addressee of insured articles
and he can claim compensation from the Central Government on
non-delivery of the insured articles.
Where an agreement is made in connection with
marriage, partition or other family arrangement and a provision
is made for the benefit of a person he may take advantage of
that agreement although he is no party to it. In Rose Pemandes
65v. Joseph Gonsalves , where the girlfs father entered into 
an agreement for her marriage with the defendant, it was
63. A.I.R. 1938 P.O. 245: (1937) 12 luck. 639.
64. Chandari Amirullah v. Central Government. (1959) All. l.J.
271 and Postmaster-General v. Ram Kripal Sahu and another. 
A.I.R. 1955 Pat. 442. See also article by K.D. Bhate: Third 
Partyfs Claim and some Problems (1963) 65 Bom. L.R. (J) 65» 
wherein the author expresses the view that there is no 
privity of contract between the third party and the insured.
65. I.L.R. (1924) 48 Bom. 673; see also Daropti v Jaspat Rai 
($905) Punj. Reports 171.
\ '
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held that the girl after attaining majority can sue the
defendant for damages for breach of promise of marriage and
the defendant cannot take the plea that she was not a party
to the agreement. It has been held in many cases that
"a person though not a party to a contract can 
sue to enforce the terms thereof if it be a 
family settlement by which some provision is 
made for him or her as a member of the family, 
for example, for maintenance or marriage, though 
the same is not made a charge upon the family 
properties”.
Also where by the terms of a contract a party is
required to make a paymao. t to a third person and he acknowledges
it to that third person, a binding obligation is thereby
incurred towards him. This acknowledgment may be express
or implied. Such cases are also treated as exceptions to the
67general rule of privity. In Devaraja Urs v Ram Krishniah, '
A sold his house to B under a registered sale deed and left
a part of the sale-price in his hands desiring him to pay
this amount to C, his creditor. Subsequently B made part
payments to C informing him that they were out of the sale
price left with him and that the balance would be remitted
immediately. B, however, failed to remit the balance and C
sued him for the same. The suit was held to be maintainable.
"Though originally there was no privity of 
contract between B and C, B having subsequently 
acknowledged his liability, C was entitled to 
sue him for recovery of the amount".
66. Sundarraja Aiyangar v Lakchmiammal, I.L.R. (1915) 38 
Mad. 788, Rakhma Bai v Govind Moreshwar (19Q4) 6 Bom. 
L.R. 421; Mst. Ban Kuer v Mst. Saria Levi* A.I.R. 1947 
P.O. 8; Shuppu Ammal v Subramaniayan (1910) I.L.R. 33 
Mad. 238.
67. A.I.R. 1952 Mys. 109• Also see Debnarayan Putt v 
Chunnilal Ghose, I.L.R. (1913) 41 Cal. 137*
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It would be seen that the privity rule often causes 
injustice and hardship as it results in a multiplicity of 
suits whereas the object of the courts should be to do complete 
justice in one suit. The author of this article rightly 
observes that in India, there are no reasons - "legal, historical 
or otherwise" - why we should follow the English rule which 
is based upon the now abolished common law forms of action
and consequently which is under attack in its country of
68
origin itself.
The doctrine of rights (if any) of third party under
68a
a contract was considered in Beswick v. Beswick • In this 
case, in March, 1962, the deceased, a coal merchant, by 
agreement in writing under the hands of the deceased and the 
appellant who undertook to pay him £6. 10s. weekly for the 
remainder of his life and in the event of his death to pay his 
widow, the respondent an annuity of £3 weekly. The deceased 
died intestate in November, 1963* In 1964 the respondent took 
out letters of Administration to his estate. The Appellant 
made one payment of £5 to the respondent and refused to make 
any further payment. The respondent, as administratrix of 
her husband’s estate and in her personal capacity claimed 
payment of arrears of the annuity and an order for specific 
performance of the continuing obligation to pay the annuity.
68. Denning L.J. is the Chief Critique-of the doctrine. See his 
Lordship’s observations in Drive Yourself Hire Co. London 
Ltd. v. Strutt (1954) 1 Q.B. 230 at pp. 273-274: Smith and 
Snippers Hall Farm Ltd. v. River Douglass Catchment Board 
(1949)'2 K.B. 500 at p. 314 and Beswick v. Beswick (1966) 3 
All. E.R. 1 at p. 9. See also a. note by E.J.P. on Privity 
of Contract in (1954) 70 L.Q.R. 467 and Prof. Corbin, 
Contracts for the benefit of the Third Persons (1930) 46 L.Q. 
R. 12.
68a. (1967) 2 All. E.R. 1197 (H.L.).
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It was held that the respondent as administratrix of the estate 
of her husband, a contracting party, was entitled to enforce 
the agreement and to do so by way of an order for specific 
performance in her own personal favour, and that remedy was 
available to her suing as administratrix.
The right of a third party to sue on a contract was 
also considered by a full bench of the Madras High Court in
£ Ol»
Subbu Chetti v. Arunachalam Chettiar. In this case their 
Lordships observed that where on a contract between A and B, B 
agrees to pay a sum of money to C and no more circumstances 
appear, C being a stranger to the contract, cannot sue B for 
the money though all the parties to the contract are parties 
to the suit. This is the general rule, though some exceptions 
to the rule arise under the following circumstances, e.g.
(a) where B afterwards agrees with C to pay him direct or 
becomes estopped from denying his liability to pay him personally,
(b) where the contract between A and B creates a trust in 
favour of C,
(c) where the contract charges the money to be paid out of 
some immovable property or
(d) where it is due to C under a marriage settlement, partition 
or other family arrangement.
In larachand v. Syed Abdul Kazak , where an advocate 
acted as legal adviser of the arbitrator and the parties 
agreed in the award to pay certain amounts to the advocate as 
his fees and the latter sued them for the same it was held 
that the advocate could not succeed on the principle of trust, 
agency, estfippel or privity of contract.
68b, (1929) I.I.R. 53 Mad. 270 F.B. 
68c. A.I.R. 1939 Sind 125.
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In Kshirodebihari v. Mangobinda. however, it was
held that a Zemindar can sue upon a contract made between his
mokarraridar and darmokarraridar, whereby the latter undertook
to pay the mokarraridar1s rent direct to the Zemindar; and the
Zemindar can obtain a decree for the rent direct against the
darmokarraridar. Their Lordships observed that there is nothing
in the Indian Contract Act, which prevents the recognition of
a right in a third party to enforce a contract made by others,
which contains a provision for his benefit; and the definition
of consideration in Section 2(d) is wider than in English law.
Their Lordships referred to Khwa.ia Muhammad Khan v. Hussaini .
60Begum and observed that there is ample authority for saying J
that the administration of the law of contract in India is not
55affected by the doctrine laid down in Tweedle v. 4tkinaon^. 
that only a person, who is a party to the contract can sue 
upon it. In India the aim is to do complete justice in one 
suit. In the mofussil courts of India the rights of parties 
are to be determined according to general principles of justice, 
equity and good conscience, without any distinction, as in 
England, between that partial justice, which was administered 
in Courts of law and the more full and complete justice, for 
which it was frequently necessary to seek the assistance of 
a court of equity.
The expansion of the equitable concept of a trust 
to enable a third party to enforce a contract made between 
others is an instance of the growth of law by means of fiction. 
Their Lordships observed that whatever may have been the
68d. (1933) I.L.R. 61 Cal. 841; Subbu Chetti v. Arunachalam 
Chettiar (see note 68b) not followed and dissented from.
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necessity in England, whether historical, procedural or 
otherwise for making use of such fictions, there aeemed to 
be no similar necessity for importing these anomalies into 
India.
In a recent case M.C. Chacko v. The State Bhnk of- 
Travancore the Supreme Court has held that under S.2(d) 
of the Indian Contract Act (1822) only a person who is a party 
to a contract can sue on it and the exceptions to this rule 
were explained. A donor1s creditor does not have a right to 
sue.
In this case The Highland Bank, Kottayam of which the 
appellant M.C. Chacko was the manager had an overdraft account 
with the Kottayam Bank. K.C. Chacko, father of the appellant, 
had executed from time to time letters of guarantee in favour 
of the Kottayam Bank agreeing to pay the amounts due by the 
Highland Bank under the overdraft agreement. By the last 
letter of guarantee dated 22nd January, 1953, K.C. Chacko 
agreed to hold himself liable for the amounts due by the 
Highland Bank to the Kottayam Bank, on the overdraft 
arrangement subject to a limit of Rs. 20,000/-. The Kottayam 
Bank Ltd., sued in the Lower Court for the amount due in the 
account, which case later came up before the Supreme Court for 
decision. Their Lordships of the Supreme Court held that the 
Kottayam Bank not being a party to the deed was not bound by 
the covenants in the dee$,nor could it enforce the Covenants. 
Their Lordships observed that it was settled law that a person 
not a party to the contract cannot, subject to certain well
68e. (1969) 2 S.C.W.R. 241.
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recognised exceptions, enforce the terms of the contract;
the recognised exceptions were that beneficiaries under the
terms of the contract or where the contract was part of the
family arrangement may enforce the Covenant. Their lordships
56referred to Dunlop Pneumatic and Tyre Co. v. Selfridge & Co
60and Khwa.ia Muhammed Khan v. Hussaini Begum which have been
discussed above, and also to the case of I&muna Das v. Ham 
58Autar wherein the Judicial Committee pointed out that the
purchaser*s contract to pay off a mortgage debt could not be
enforced by the mortgagee who was not a party to the contract.
It must be taken as well settled, observed their
Lordships, that except in the case of a beneficiary under a
trust created by a contract or in the case of a family
arrangement no right may be enforced by a person who is not a
party to the contract. The basis of the rule giving the
beneficiary the right to enforce the contract is that though
he is not a party to the contract his rights are equitable
and not contractual.
In the case of the adopted sons also, on equitable
considerations I think that ante-adoption agreements for the
benefit of the minor adopted sons should be made enforceable
at law. For psychologically and otherwise the adopted son is
not in the same advantageous position as a natural son and
needs protection from the law.
Family arrangements:
It will not be out of place here to discuss briefly
the subject of family arrangements in India.
The subject has been dealt with by Prof. Derrett in
his instructive article in Anderson's Family Law in Asia and 
69Africa. The learned writer observes that the special feature
69. Published in 1968, George Allen & Unwin Ltd., 1968. Also see 
Article, by J.D.M.. Derrett: Family Arrangements (1-968) -70 Bom* 
L.R. (j). 1,
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of the family arrangement is the right it may create in those
■ ' o are not parties ot it. The English assumption that "it
is right and proper for every person whose legal rights are
dehated to take a share in all negotiations affecting them,
either personally or through his agent, by no means operated
in all developing societies. Unlike normal contracts, where
a contract is intended to secure a benefit to a third party
as a beneficiary under a family arrangment he may sue in his
70 mown name to enforce it. The family arrangement enables
parties to dispose in advance of such estate as would fall to
them or any of them upon the death of a person now living.
Ouch instruments secure the peace, happiness and welfare of
families and litigation is avoided. Derrett observes that
the family arrangement exists in principle as much to rearrange
pro erty rights about which the parties may have no clear
notion, as to compromi e a doubtful claim. 'The Privy Council
and the Courts in India have never acknowledged openly that
the family arrangement in Asia differed from that in England
and the rules which emerge bear a close resemblance to those
found in Halsbury's Laws of England. The Supreme Court of
71India has in recent years, made pronouncements on them.
72Mentioning the advantages of the institution Derrett'
70. I.hwa,ia Muhammad v I-Iusaini Bep:um (1910) L.R. 37 1.1* 1952, 
150-9; Dan E'uer v Oarla Devi (194-6) 73 I.A. 208,
Shangmugan v innamalai, A.I.R. 1935 Mad. 141, 143-4.
71. Sahu Ivladho Das v Pandit Ilukund Ram (1955) ; Potti Lakshmi 
v P. Prishnayenamma' (19&5) ; 7am CEaran-Pas v C-irja~~ 
Uandini (1966) ; Tek-Rahadur v Devi Singh & Ivlaturi Pullaiah
v U. Uarasimham (I960) - see below.
72. At P . 161.
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observes that the main object was to vary the title to
property, including expectancies, in a manner conducive to
the best interests of the family and thus avoiding the waste
of the family*s estate by improvident and avoidable litigation.
In course of time a family arrangement became a much larger
institution than merely a class of compromise and could bind
parties including minors^ and persons yet to be born,^ so
as to avoid a situation fraught with the making of a dispute.'
In Sahu Madho Das v Pandit Mukund Ram the widow of the last
male holder of the estate made a gift of certain properties
of her limited estate to each of her three daughters absolutely
and other properties to each of her four grandsons. The donees
themselves tried to persuade others, including the persons to
whom they ultimately sold their shares, that they had taken
the properties absolutely. Thus from a long course of dealing,
75it was held, that the arrangement could be imputed. y So also
in Lakshmi Chand v Mst. Anandi, an invalid alienation was
acted upon by the testator*s relatives, including those
entitled under the personal lav/ by survivorship from the
deceased and their lordships of the Privy Council held it as
good evidence of a family arrangement contemporaneously made
76and acted upon by all parties. Derrett further observes 
that particularly where families are ignorant of the new law
73* Keramatulla v Keamatulla (1915) 23 I.C. 118; Dwarka v 
Krishnan (1921) I.L.R. 2 Lah. 114.
74. He Hew (1901) 2 Ch. 534 C.A.; Chabildas v Hamdas (1909) 
11 Bom. L.H. 606.
75* (1955) 18 S.C.J. 417>419 following Clifton v Cockburn 
(1835) 3 My. & K 70 and Williams v Y/illiams (1867)
L.H. 2 Ch. App. 294.
76. (1926) L.H. 53 I.A. 123.
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and successive deaths occur the only way to avert desperate 
chaos may be to impute to the parties a family arrangement, 
although such arrangement cannot circumvent the general law 
by attempting to provide for the future devolution of the 
properties once they have vested absolutely.*^ There are 
also other useful features of a family arrangement. No con­
veyance is needed and the agreement need not be in writing, 
and if intended to be oral need not be registered.*^® It may 
be proved by oral evidence. Also there is no requirement that 
the parties should emerge in approximate parity so far as the 
benefits are concerned. A further advantage is that such an 
arrangement will bind transferees who have or ought to have 
notice of it, whether they are voluntary alienees or have
taken under a compulsory transfer from the parties or from 
7 0
any of them. '
In order that the family arrangements may be valid 
and binding upon all parties, certain requirements must be 
met, v/hich are listed by Derrett as follows
1. The parties must be interested1 in the property concerned. 
There must be an antecedent title of some sort in the parties
o n
(even to expectancy) Persons about to enter the family by 
marriage, and their eventual issue, may well take a benefit 
under the agreement, although strictly they were strangers at
77* Purna Skashi v Kalidhan (1911) I.L.R. 38 Cal. 603 (P.C.).
78. Tek Bahddur v Devi Singh A.I.R. 1986 S.C. 292, 294, 295*
79. Raya Shenoi v Kesava Malian (1943) 34 Cochin L.R. 465
Tftett:
80. Ram Prat an v Indr a .jit A.I.R. 1950 All. 320.
i w
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the time the agreement was entered into. Also .'where the 
parties have interests in the property, such as a right of 
maintenance as in the case of an illegitimate son or a 
reversionary right or a moral right as in the case of an 
invalidly adopted son. Where however the claimants to the 
property have no interests at law and no moral claim, hut 
only claim by virtue of some act on the part of one or more 
members of the family, the tendency of the decision is to deny 
such settlement the status of a family arrangement and to such 
settlements the ordinary law relating to dispositions of pTTOf^^ 
w&mdty ought to apply. However, a strictly limited exception 
has been recognised, where, along with a valid family arrange­
ment, disputes with strangers are compromised, provided the 
disputes are intimately connected with members of the family, 
in which case the arrangement is not invalid for embracing
op
grants to strangers.
2. The arrangement must be intended to settle a bonajcide claim 
In Ram Niranjan Singh v Prayag Singh^  the Calcutta High Court 
held that though a dispute between two brothers was founded 
on a mistake of lav/ the compromise would bind both parties.
A full bench of the Allahabad High Court have held that *a 
family arrangement atdbottom is nothing but an agreement and 
the essential thing is that it should be for consideration, 
while the object of the arrangement was to maintain good 
relations, to preserve the family property, to convert the
81. Surendra Keshav v Doorgasundary (1891) L.R. 19 I.A. 108.
82. Sultan Ahmad v Sirajul Hague I.L.R. (1938) All. 125*
83- (1881) I.L.R..8 Cal. 138, 142, 143*
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expectancy of reversioners into a certainty, it was a sufficient 
consideration in law to uphold the arrangement' . In 
~ .an gas ami Gownden v LTachiappa Gov/nd en the Privy Council 
hove observed that provided the parties are related to one 
another in some way andhave even a semblance of a claim, 
even on the ground of, say, affection, the arrangement may 
be effective.^
The test eventually developed in India was that,
though the claims might be ill-founded, a conflict must be
at
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86resent which the parties intended to fight outc but recen ly
the Supreme Court has held that a conflict is not essential.
In . lullaiah v I . rTarasimham^  the arrangement had not 
been entered into in order to settle a claim to property, but 
to prevent losses to the family as a whole which might have 
accrued had the younger brother exercised his undoubted right 
to a separation. So also the arrangement mzy well be sustained
o o
if the mistake is one of fact and not of law. ' But a purported
family arrangement which is really a cloak for a transfer of
89property to strangers will be struck down. y
84. -.st. Dasodia v Gangaprasad I.L.R. (1943) All. 411, A.I.R. 
1943" All. 101 (F.B .) followed in Laxmi Narain v Banshi Lai 
A.I.R. 1965 All. 522.
85- (1918) I.R. 45 I.A. 72, followed in Ram Charan Das v 
Cirri a handini (1966) 1 S.C.J. 61, 67; A.I.R. 1-66 3.C.
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co. Pokhar Singh v Dulari (1930) I.L.R. 52 All. 710; Sidh 
lo-. al v BlSari Lai (1927) I.L.R. 50 All. 284; Jang 
Bahadur v tana Uma hath (1937) I.L.R. 12 Luck. 639; 
luehibai v :agour V iversity I.L.R. (1946) hag. 433*
87* I . Fullaiah v . harasimham A.I.R. 1966 S.C. 1836.
8 8. Ram ITiranjan Singh v Prayag Singh (1881) I.L.R. 8 Cal.
138, 140.
- • - -J • Sc.ngubaa v : unau Ra,jwa Teh ..I.R. 195§,4feg* ts
f cllowii. Ties v :... I . ~ .I.f orcL estate Co » (lcSBp 32 Ch.D«




3• The arrangement must finally settle the differences between
the parties, and must he acted upon by them. A fair test
whether the parties intended to put an end to their disputes
is whether they acted upon it. As held in Potti Lakshmi v
qn
F ♦ Krishnavenamma,y an arrangement which is not acted upon 
cannot he enforced after an interval within which it would, 
if genuine, have been put into effect.
4. The interests of non-consenting members must be properly 
consulted. Those who propound an arrangement should be able 
to satisfy the conscience of the court that the non partici­
pating members' interests were fully and fairly‘consulted,
91and that advantage was not taken of their ignorance,' and
that the share or value which they took under the arrangement
was equitable in the then circumstances.
Family arrangements are generally favoured by courts,
who will not lightly reopen matters which the settlement has
purported to close. But where the arrangement was procured
92through fraud or undue influenceJ or minors interests were
, 93unfairly disregarded, the arrangement may be upset. ^
In conclusion Derrett says that for the validity of 
a family arrangement there is not need to pretend that a dispute 
exists where none ever did, the members living in perfect amity. 
He observes that as in the case of English law, the moral
90. A.I.R. 1965 S.C. 825, 828 Col. 2.
91 • Billage v Southee (1852) 9 Hare 534-, 540.
92. T. Harayana Bhatta v Barasimba, A.I.R. 1965 Ker. 189; 
Gopal Bas v Bha^ran, A.I.R. 1945 Sind. 11.
93* Bishambhar Hath Kapoor v Amar Hath, A.I.R. 1937 P.O.
l05. (no evidence of unfairness).
obligations binding on a family should be a sufficient 
consideration to found a family arrangement. The same 
principles could well apply to ante-adoption agreements made 
for the benefit of the minor adopted son.
.adoption of an adult - agreement with adult
The Bombay High Court has held in Bandurang v
94armadabai"' that an adopted son who is of full qge deliber­
ately making aggangement as to the extent of his interest in 
the property of his adoptive father at the time of his adoption 
is bound by it. Also in List. Asa Bai v Brabhulal it has been 
held that it is not open to the adopted son to renounce his 
status as such and to return to his family of birth though 
he may renounce his right of inheritance in the adoptive
family in which case the inheritance would go to the next
95heir."'
Chen the adoption is by the widow
In Krishmamurthi v Krishnamurthi the Privy Council 
have held that an ante-adoption agreement entered into between 
the natural father of the adopted son and the widow who is 
going to adopt his sen, by which a reasonable provision for 
maintenance of the widow is made in her favour absolutely is 
valid and binding upon the adopted son. On principle there
94. A.I.R. 1932 Bom. 571* 56 Bom. 395 following 40 Bom. 668 
(Kashibai v Tat' Y -anas ami' s case (1879) I.L.B. 2 Had. 
91 (B.C.) . -.I.E. 1927 B.C. 139 Expl. and A.I.R. 1930 
Bom. 58 (Thivram v Ram Krishna) Dist.
95. A.I.R. I960 Raj. 304.
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is nothing wrong in the widow taking a reasonable portion of
the estate absolutely for her maintenance under such an
agreement. The Andhra Pradesh High Court have held that
an ante-adoption agreement should not extend to anything other
than the regulation of the rights of the widow in the property
and the sanction to it is based on custom. An arrangement
cutting down the rights of the adopted son to a life estate 
97is not valid. In M. Pumananda v. 0. Purnanandam where, as
a result of an agreement the adopting widow took one-tenth
of the estate absolutely for her maintenance, the dattaka son
98taking the remainder, was held to be fair and reasonable.
In 1 fundthavalli v. Ramalingam^? the Supreme Court 
has held, reversing the Madras High Court decision in 
Ramalingam v. IPUnithavalli'^. that the full ownership 
conferred on a Hindu female under Section 14(1) of the Hindu 
Succession Act (1956) is not defeasible by the adoption made 
by her to her deceased husband after the Act came into force. 
These cases are discussed at pages 344 to 345 which may be 
referred to.
96. A.I.R. 1927 P.C. 139; 54 I.A. 248.
97. P. Venkatarao v. P. Venkateswara Rao (1955) An. W.R. 783
98. A.I.R. 1961 An. P. 435.
99. A.I.R. 1970 S.C. 1730, see also Kavuluru v. K K. Purnshothamma
1971 1 An.W •R. 134 where a similar view is held (see
pp.; .346-347.
100. A.I.R. 1964 Mad. 320.
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Rights in separate property of adoptive father.
The Privy Council held in Kalyan Sundaram v. Karuppa 
that an alienation by way of gift by the adoptive father of 
his separate property prior to the adoption is binding on the 
adopted son.1^
It has also been held that the will of self-acquired 
property of a Hindu testator is not revoked by the birth of
102aposthumous son or by a subsequent adoption of a son by him.
102In Subba Reddi v. Doraiswami their lordships of the Madras
High Court remarked that
"the legislators having dealt with the question 
of revocation of wills and having enacted that 
no wills shall be revoked except in the manner 
provided in the Act, it is not open to courts 
to hold that such wills may be otherwise revoked”.
Also it appears that even when the property is ancestral 
subsequent adoption will not revoke a will, for the will speaks 
at death and the property is carried away before the adoption
101. (1929) I.E. 54 I.A. 89; (1927) P.O. 42.
102. Vinavak v. Govindrao (1869) 6 Bom. H.C.R. 224, 229; 




Under the Punjab customary law an appointed heir
has practically the same rights as a son adopted under the
Hindu law. 'There are minor distinctions e.g. as regards
16 If
collateral succession and another difference is that if the
appointed heir dies sonless and leaves no widow, the inherited
estate from the appointer passes to his own natural heirs if
the appointer had absolute po?/er of disposition but passes to
male collaterals of appointer*s family of the appointer had
10 5only a restricted power over the property. " Further if a 
natural son is born after the appointment of an heir, the 
appointed heir succeeds equally with such subsequently born
\0(o
natural son. This shows that the position of an appointed 
heir is for most purposes that of a son or an adopted son.
In '.Vary am Singh v Ishar Singh, a case under the Tun Jab 
Customary law it was held that a declaratory decree obtained 
by the reversioners of the adoptive father ensures for the 
benefit of an appointed son, appointed after the decree Just 
as in the case of an after-born son with whom in fact he would 
share. Also as the owner had died before the Punjab Act I of
103. See lerrett: Introduction to modern . indu Law, p .  127;
Krishnamurthi v hrishnamurthi , . 1. 1. 1927 I .C . , 139 5
l4$a; jjT Lakshminarasimham ~ G .  Rajeswari , A.I. 1. 1955 
nd . 27s ; al s c_ Ramalingam v I uni tliavalli . A. I. R. 1964 
Had. 320 and { l W T T l n .  .2. pi.
\oif ±ih-kh
105. lara. 55 of Rattigan's Ligest i.e. according as it is 
self acquired or ancestral property.
106. [1932] I.l.R. 13 lah. 589* See also kahomed Din v
Fattch Mahomed (1906) P.R. vo . 24 p. 90.
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1920 came into force that Act has no application to rights
accruing before the Act came into operation, as nothing
contained therein could affect rights which had already
107accrued upon the owner's death.
Position under the English law.
The effect of provisions contained in Section 13(1) of 
the Adoption Act, 1958 as regards custody, maintenance and 
education of the adopted child have already been dealt with 
at p . $ w h i c h  may be referred to. Section 13(2) further adds 
that where a husband and wife are the adopters, then, in 
respect of the matters referred to in the last paragraph and 
for the purpose of the jurisdiction of any court to make orders 
as to the custody and maintenance of and right of access to 
children, they stand to each other and to the adopted child 
in the same relation as they would have stood if they had been 
the lawful father and mother of the adopted child and the child 
stands to them in the same relation as to a lawful father and 
mother. This section, read with sections 4 and 5 of the 
Guardianship of Infants Act, 1925> provides that not only may 
an adopter appoint a testamentary guardian of the child to act 
after the adopter's death but the survivor of a husband and 
wife who jointly adopt an infant becomes its statutory
107. Also see pages 86 et seq and 214 to 224 for the effects 
of adoption under customary law.
^ 9  .
10ftguardian. And under the same Act an order for the maintenance 
of an adopted child may be made against its adopter. In re 
Skinner (an i n f a n t an adoption was made jointly by persons 
who were bigamously married. The man was later convicted of 
bigamy and sentenced to a term of imprisonment. After his 
release he left the woman who applied to the court for the 
child's custody which was awarded to her, together with a 
weekly maintenance from the man. On appeal by the man, Vaisey 
J. discharged the maintenance order made against the defendant 
as guardian of the adopted child on the ground that the 
adoption order was invalid. It could be valid only if the 
man and woman were validly married, since S. 1(3) of the 
Adoption of Children Act 1926 laid down that there could be 
no adoption of a child by more than one person unless there 
was a joint adoption by the husband and wife. His decision 
was, however, reversed by the Court of Appeal which stressed 
that it was the child's welfare that was the important point.
"It is essentially a thing which alters the status of the 
infant who is the person primarily concerned" The court
held that the justices who ordered the maintenance had juris­
diction to make the maintenance order on the basis that the 
adoption order v/as valid.
"Even if the adoption order could be challenged 
by appropriate process (as to which quaere) it 
was not competent for the justices to challenge 
it, and, therefore, they had jurisdiction to make
the maintenance order on the basis that the
108. S. 4 of the Guardianship of Infants Act 1925*
109* He Skinner (an infant) [1948] 2l*A11. E.R. 917 (C.A.) 
reversing [1948] 1 All. E.R. 42.
110. Ibid., per Lord Greene at p. 918.
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adoption order was valid”.
111Lord Green said
”If an order cannot be made without the presence 
of the infant properly represented by a guardian 
ad litem, that order, in my opinion, cannot be 
revoked or disregarded (if, indeed, there be a 
court competent to disregard it) in the absence 
of the infant”.
The effect of intestacies, wills and settlements is 
dealt with in Section 16 of the Adoption Act, 1958 and is 
discussed at pages 95 to 97.
By Section 16(2) in any disposition of real or 
personal property made, whether by instrument inter vivos or 
by will (including codicil) after the date of an adoption order, 
any reference express or implied (a) to the child or children 
of the adopter shall be construed as, or as including, a 
reference to the adopted person; (b) to the child or children 
of the adopted person's natural parents or either of them 
shall be construed as not being, or as not including, a 
reference to the adopted person; (c) to a person related to 
the adopted person in any degree shall be construed as a 
reference to the person who would be related to him in that 
degree if he were the adopter's child born in lawful wedlock 
and not the child of any other person; unless in all cases 
the contrary intention appears. This provision would not 
appear to be sufficient to constitute the adopted person a 
"child of the marriage” of the adopter within the meaning 
of a marriage settlement or other disposition which turned 
on that wording. But an adopted child may still take on the
111. (1948) 1 All. E.R. 917 at p. 920.
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true construction of a particular disposition even though the
112Act does not apply. This section is further discussed at 
pages 95 to 97 which may be referred to.
Before the Adoption Act 1950, only British children 
could be adopted but Section 16 of the 1950 Act (which corresponds 
to Section 19 of the Adoption Act 1958) permits the adoption 
of a child who is not a citizen of the United Kingdom and 
Colonies.
Where an adoption order is made in respect of a 
child who is not a citizen of the United Kingdom and Colonies, 
then, if the adopter, or in the case of a joint adoption the 
male adopter, is a citizen of the United Kingdom and Colonies, 
the child becomes a citizen of the United Kingdom and Colonies 
as from the date of the order. The references in this section 
include references to an order authorising an adoption under 
the Adoption of Children Act (Northern Ireland), 1950, or any 
enactment of the Parliament of Northern Ireland for the time 
being in force when a citizen of N. Ireland adopts a child in 
England^ Wales or Scotland.
Also a child adopted by foreigners here does not 
change its nationality and a British child adopted by foreigners 
therefore stays British. Although a British child adopted by 
a foreigner does not lose British status, his position in his 
adoptive parents own country may be dubious, particularly in a
112. In Re Gilpin (1954) Ch. 1.
14-2.
country such as the Netherlands where there is no legal
adoption and where a British adoption is not binding.
113In Re Wilson, Grace v Lucas the deceased and
his first wife were British subjects domiciled in England.
In 1939 they adopted P in Canada (Montreal) and on return to
England did not apply for an adoption order in England. It
was held that the capacity of an adopted child to succeed to
the property was a matter to be determined, not by the law
governing the adoption but by the law governing the succession,
which, in the case of personal property, was the law of the
deceased’s domicile (i.e. England); an adoption order made
under a foreign jurisdiction could not be brought either
expressly or by implication within the provisions or principles
of the Adoption Act 1950 (C. 26), S. 15(1) (which corresponds
to S. 16(1) of the Adoption Act 1958) and therefore P was not
entitled to participate in the property of the deceased as to
which he died intestate. Commenting on this case R.E. Graveson 
iiu.
observes that in the case of recognition of foreign marriages, 
divorce decrees and legitimation etc. the English Courts had 
adopted a liberal attitude towards foreign institutions by no 
means identical in all respects with the English. He rightly 
suggests that a foreign adoption should be recognised if either
(a) made or recognized by the Courts of the domicile of the 
adopter and adopted person or (b) made 011 a similar juris­
dictional basis to the English which does not rest on the 
domicile of the adopted person. Graveson further remarks
1.13
that one is justified in regarding Re Wilson purely as a
113 . [1954-3 1 All. E.R. 997.
lit*-. R.H. Graveson "The Conflict of Laws" 6th edn. 1969 P* 4-06.
^ 3
refusal to recognise a particular incident- of a foreign status
so far as that incident (capacity to succeed under an English
intestacy) is sought to take effect in England. The case does
not deny recognition generally to the status of the adopted
child, conferred by the lav; of the child's domicile. From the
point of private international law the decision has only 
llSTlimited value. The lav; was developed further in Re
] 6
I, arshall. In this case the Court of Appeal propounded
two principles which, observes Graveson, represent a little 
progress in the law and have at least the merit of certainty, 
which are in the words of Homer L.J.
(a) "that only those who are placed by adoption 
in a position, both as regards property 
rights and status, equivalent, or at all 
events substantially equivalent, to that
of the natural children of the adopter can 
be treated as being within the scope of 
the testator's contemplation" .3-*7
(b) "that So far* as adopted children are con­
cerned their status and capacity to take 
under a gift to 'children' in an English 
will is (subject, of course, to British 
legislation) fixed once and for all at 
the testator's death and that subsequent 
legislation in the country of their domicile ^  
enlarging their rights is to be disregarded".
lib. In Re ilson [19543 Ch. 753 at p. 742 cf. Harman J. in 
Re Marshall deed. C19572 Ch. 263 at pp. 273-274.
116. [19573 Ch. 263, questioning Re ••il'by [1956] 1 All. E.R.
27 which was overruled by Re Valentine's settlement 
[1965] Ch. 831, p. 4-07 Grave son's "The Conflict of 
Laws". For a discussion of Re Marshall's case refer jrU|vuCvtr 
Chapter V, p. 2Z%. Re .vilby and Re Valentine ' s/ are u 
discussed below.
1/7* In Re Farshall [19573 Ch. 507 at p. 523? adopting the 
principle" expressed in Re Fletcher [19493 Ch. 473? 479*
1|$. [19573 Ch. 507 at t . 525? following Lynch v Irovisional 
Govt, of laraguay (1871) L.R. 2 F. & F. 268.
.1^I
This rule has now been embodied in statute and 
presumably applies equally to internal English cases as to 
the recognition of foreign adoptions. The Adoption Act 1958,
S. 17(2) prescribes the death of the testator as the date 
for ascertainment of the adopter’s children, a reference which
1 [Cf
includes adopted children unless a contrary intention appears.
12D-*-n Re Uilby v it was held that although an adoption 
in Burma would be recognised as valid in England for some 
purposes, it did not entitle the adoptive mother to succeed 
to the deceased's estate (the deceased was adopted in Burma 
and was later domiciled in England) on her death because the 
law of intestate succession applicable was the lav/ of the 
deceased's domicile at the date of her death viz. English law 
and the adoption of the deceased in Burma was not an adoption 
to which the Adoption Act 1950 (C. 26) S. 13 (corresponding 
to S. 16 of the 1958 Act) applied; accordingly the application 
was dismissed. Under the Adoption Act 1950 (C. 26) S. 13 the 
property of a person adopted by an adoption order (i.e. an 
adoption order made by a court having jurisdiction under that 
Act) would devolve as if the adopted child were born in lawful 
wedlock. However, one must note with regret that the parties 
deceived the Court. There is no adoption of Christians in 
Burma and was none at the time. Adoption is confined to Hindus 
and Burmese Buddhists."^' T&e view of Barnard J. in Re Uilby^ ^  
that the court might deny all rights of succession to the
1/£J. Graveson's "The Conflict of Law!' 6th edn., p. 407*
120. £1956] 1 All. E.R. 27 (disapproved in Re Valentine's 
settlement (below)).
124 . J.L. Kapur: The Law of Adoption in India and Burma,
(1935) edn.).
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children adopted in a foreign country on the dubious ground
that Section 13 of the Adoption Act 1950 (corresponding to
S.16 of the 1958 Act) applies to the British Islands only
122has been severely criticised and has since been overruled
123in Re Valentinefs settlement. y In this case one A.Y. was 
resident and domiciled in Southern Rhodesia and the only child 
of his marriage was born in 1936. He and his wife adopted two 
children C and I by orders of the Children*s Court of the 
Union of South Africa in 1939 and 1944 respectively. It was 
assumed that both adopted children were domiciled and resident 
in South Africa at the date of their adoption orders. Ho 
order for adoption was ever made in S. Rhodesia and it seemed 
from the expert evidence that the Courts in Southern Rhodesia 
would not recognise as valid in that country an adoption order 
made in a country in which the adopter was not resident and 
domiciled at the date of the order. By a settlement dated 
Feb.7,1946, the settled fund was to be held in trust, after 
the death of A.Y., for all or any of his children who attained 
the age of twenty-one or being female married under that age.
The settlement provided that the rights of persons claiming 
under it should be regulated by English law. A.V. died on 
July 5. 1962. It was held that the English Court would not 
recognise the adoption order of a court of a foreign country 
aa conferring on the adopted infant the status of being a 
child of the adopting parents unless the adopting parents were
122. See Dicey and Morris: The Conflict of Laws (7th edn. by 
J.H.C. Morris with specialist editors) Harman J. in Re 
Marshall (1957) Ch. 263, 273-274; Mr. Justice Scarman"Tl962)
11 I.C.l.Q. 635, 636-637. English law and Foreign adoptions.
_ .Also an'article by Z. Cowen: English Law and Foreign 
Adoptions, (1963> 12 Int. and Comp. L.Q.168-74 for 
information on trends in Hew Zealand, Australia and Canada.
123. (1965) Ch. 831, 844,846, 848 (C.A.); (1965) 2 All.
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domiciled (or per Danckwerts, L.J., regarded by English. Law
as domiciled) in the foreign country at the time of the
adoption order. In that case the adopting parents were not
domiciled in South Africa at the time when the adoption
orders were made, and accordingly neither adopted*child could
by English law take under the Settlement as a. child of the
adopting father. Lord Denning M.E# stated ( at p. 842) that
r,this new status of parent and child, in order 
to be recognised everywhere, must be validly 
created by the law of the domicile of the adopting 
parent. You do not look to the domicile of the 
child: for that has no separate domicile of
its own. It takes its parents’ domicile; you 
look to the [adopting! parents’ domicile only.
If you find that a legitimate relationship of 
parent and child has been validly created by 
the law of the [adopting! parents' domicile 
at the time the relationship is created, then 
the status so created should be universally 
recognised throughout the civilised world, 
provided always that there is nothing contrary 
to public policy in so recognising it".
Lord Lenning M.R. also stated (At pp. 842, 845) a further
requirement for the recognition in England of a foreign
adoption, namely, that the child must be ordinarily resident
in the foreign country; but Lanckwerts L.J. was "not sure" on 
1 PA 1 PS
this point. Dicey observes that this rule is not limited 
to adoption orders made by a Court, but extends to any form 
of adoption e.g. by contract, deed, religious ceremony or 
special statute. English Courts, observes Dicey, are now 
willing to recognise foreign divorces obtained extra-judicially 
and rightly remarks that there seems to be no reason why *
124. [1965] Ch. 831 at p. 846.
125. Dioey and Morris: Conflict of laws, (8th edn. by J.H.C.
Morris with specialist editors, at p.464.
126. See Dicey and Morris: Conflict of Laws 8th edn., by J.H.C.
Morris with specialist editors at pp. 319-521.
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127they should not recognise foreign adoptions so effected. '
Salmon, L.J. in his dissenting opinion said at p. 852
nI would recognise the validity of these adoption 
orders made by the South African Court, the laws 
of adoption in South Africa are very nearly 
exactly the same as our own, and the court should 
be slow to refuse recognition to an adoption 
order made by a foreign court which applies 
the same safeguards as we do and which undoubtedly 
had jurisdiction over the adopted child and his 
or her natural parents”.
Commenting on this Dicey remarks that it is not easy to see
how the question whether the foreign court applied the same
safeguards as we do can be relevant when the question whether
to recognise the foreign adoption arises a quarter of a century
later, when the children are grown up, as happened in Re,
12*5Valentine's settlement . He further observes that since the 
English safeguards are probably the strictest in the world, 
not many foreign adoptions would be recognised if this test 
were to be applied. At p.472 Dicey mentions that Section 16 
and 17 of the Adoption Act 1958 (as extended by the Adoption 
Act 1964) do not in terms apply to children adopted in a 
foreign country outside the British Islands and says that it 
does not follow, that such children cannot take as "children” 
of the adopter when the succession is governed by English 
domestic law.
127. See Dicey and Morris (8th edn. by J.H.C. Morris etc.)
p. 464 note 61 - Also Re Wilby 1956 p. 174 (adoption by 
deed in Burma), overruled in Re Valentine!s settlement 
[19653 Ch. 831 (C.A.), but not on this point. Cf. Re 
Cherisky!s Estate 288 N.Y. Supp. 266 C1936) (religious 
adoption.in Russia); Re Johnson’s Estate. 100 Cal. App. 
2cl. 73, 223 P 2d. 105 (1950) (Contractual adop. in
Norway), Martinez v. Gutierrez, 66 S.W. 2d. 678 (1953)
(adop. by deed in Mexico), in all of which extra-judicial 
adoptions were recognised by American courts.
/ 4 &
Assuming that the adoption is one which the English
Court can recognise for purposes of succession he points out
four possible solutions to this question, of whom the preferable
view is that the court might treat the foreign-adopted child
as though he had been adopted in England (notionally shifting
the place, but not the date, of the adoption), and give him
the same rights, of succession, no more and no less, as a child
adopted in England would have had. The authority of Lord
Lenning M.R. in Re Valentinefs settlement was in favour of
this view”, which was also consistent with all the Canadian
12 %decisions except one. I am inclined to agree with the view
of Lord Denning M.R., which seems to be most reasonable and
which is as follows:
"In my opinion, when English law recognises a 
foreign adoption order as conferring the status 
of a child, it does not give to the child all 
the self-same rights and benefits of succession 
as a natural-born child. It only gives the 
child the self-same rights and benefits as a 
child adopted in England by an English adoption 
order... The correct solution to this: the
12$\ See Dicey: The Conflict of Laws, 8th edn., p. 473
n. 18. The exception is Re Me Eaden [19373 O.W.N.
404, which was however not followed in Kohut g Fedyna 
(1963) 43 D.L.R. (2d) 333* Adopted children were 
held entitled to succeed in Re Throssel (1910) 12 
We stern I.R. 683; Robertson v Ives (193-3) 13 D.L.R. 
122; Re McGillivray [192$!] 3 D .b .R . 854; Re McAdam 
[ 1925'J 4 D.I .R. 138; Re Ramsay Estate [19353 2 W.T.R. 
506; Re Milestone (1959) 3.5 D.L.S. C2d) 546, Re Jensen 
Estates (1963) 40 D.L.R. (2d) 469; and ICohut v Fedyna 
(I963) 4-5 D.L.R. (2d) 335 • In Burnfiel v Burnfiel 
[1926] 2 D.L.R. 129, Re Donald [19293 2 D.L.R. 244 
and Re Skinner [19293 4 D.L.ft. 427? the testators 
died before adoption was introduced into the lex 
successionis (which was also the lex fori).
127. At p. 844.
child is to be treated in English law just as 
if he had been adopted in England, no better 
and no worse".
However, the following opinion is expressed by 
1 ?,Q
Cheshire ' who quotes the view of a distinguished advocate 
that the law of the common domicil is conclusive in this
respect.
"The problem is, in truth, that of the recog­
nition of a status created by a foreign adoption. 
Thus the court, in any given case, must first 
determine the domicil of the parties at the 
time of adoption. If the adoption be according 
to that law, the effect of the act of adoption 
under the law must then be investigated. If 
it be to confer upon the person adopted substan­
tially the status of a child born in lav/ful 
wedlock, English law, I suggest, may recognise 
such a person as such a child and English, property 
law will apply to him accordingly. But if the 
foreign adoption does not have that effect 
according to its own lai, there is no reason 
why it should be given any greater effect in 
England than by its own law". la!^
#
Cn the question where adopter and infant have 
different domiciles, Cheshire observes " t h a t  there is no 
agreement among foreign legal systems. An some the personal 
law of the infant governs; in others, the personal law of the 
adopter is preferred, but in many the doctrine of cumulation 
prevails by which the personal lav/ of both parties must be
172> nsatisfied. - 'The jurisdiction of the English Court, Cheshire 
points out, is based on the domicil of the adoptive parents,
I'O. Cheshire: Private International lav/: 8th edition,
p. 4-53*
1:1. The Ion. Hr. Justice Ccarman (1962) 11 I.G.L.Q. 635?
638. Por a decision to this effect, see He MacDonald 
(1962), 34 D.L.R. (2d) 14, affirmed (1964) 44 D.L.R.
(2d) 208 - Cheshire p. 453 note 1.
151- At p. 455-
139). Discussed in I:' i (196j) 12 I.G.L.r. 835 (Adoption
in Private international law); and adoption in Comparative
Private International law by Rodolfo Be ITova, Recueil
' des Cours, 1961,' pp. 75-1:53•
I5~0
that of the child and natural parents is ignored. The 
interests of the child are considered to be safeguarded by
134the need for its residence within the jurisdiction. Graveson 
observes that the major factor in this undeveloped body of 
principles (recognition of foreign acts of adoption) should 
be one of the choice of law rather than the choice of juris­
diction, though both elements are important. In the absence
of any existing rule of applicable law Graveson suggests the
138Tcumulative reference to the domicile laws of both parties, v 
irrespective of whether such adoption is effected by the order 
of a court or by private contract or other act. If adopter 
and child are of different domcil esr, Graveson suggests that 
any court can satisfy itself that the adoption complies with 
the requirements of both relevant systems of personal lav;.
He points out that the policy of recognition of foreign 
jurisdiction corresponding to that of English courts has in 
recent years twice been expressed by the Court of Appeal
1 in
and once by the House of Lords, v nov; applies in the recog­
nition of foreign jurisdiction to make an adoption order and 
justifies such recognition when the foreign court acts on a 
basis corresponding approximately to that of the English 
C o u r t . I n  any case, observes Graveson, the English Court 
would retain its overriding power of regarding the welfare
I3t\- Graveson: The Conflict of Laws: 6th edn., p. 405*
135 • See the proposal of Mr. Justice Scarman (1962) II 
I.C.L.Q. 635 at p. 638.
156* He Dulles Settlement (Ho. 2) [1951] Oh. 842; Travers 
v~Holley [1955] P« S46.
14^ 1 • Indyka v Indyka [19673 3 W.L.R. 510.
lh%» He falentine's Settlement [19653 Ch. 831*
1^1
of the adopted child as the paramount consideration, a power 
which it has not hesitated to apply in appropriate cases
1 lQ
involvin the recognition of foreign orders of guardianship.'
Cheshire observes"^"0 that it may he that in the post-Indyka
era, English courts will he prepared to recognise foreign
adoptions in circumstances where, mutatis mutandis, an English
Court would not have Jurisdiction proved there was a "real
and substantial connection with the foreign Court".^ 1
The tenth session of the Hague Conference on Private
International Law (1964) produced a draft convention on 
142.adoption. 1 This convention contains 24 articles relating 
to Jurisdiction, choice of law and recognition of foreign 
adoptions. This convention has now heen given effect hy 
the Adoption Act 1 9 6 8 . Article 8 of the convention 
provides for the recognition of any order made in accordance 
with the Jurisdiction established hy Article 3* Article 8 
reads thus:
Every adoption governed hy the convention and 
granted hy an authority having Jurisdiction hy 
virtue of the habitual residence of the adopter 
must he recognised without further formality 
in all contracting states; and the findings of 
fact on which that authority based its Juris­
diction are binding.
1if. Re B's settlement [1940] Ch. 54, cases, 256; McKee v 
hcfee [ 19513 A.0. 352 •
140. At p . 456.
14/. forth (1968 31 M.L.R. 257, 280-281. Recognition of 
Foreign Divorce Decrees.
1 -Z The text of the convention is printed in full in (1965) 
14 I.C.L,Q. 558 et seq. For a commentary see Graveson 
6th edn. pp. 402-3; lipstein [19653 Camb. L.J. 224,
Unger (1965) 28 E:L.R. 463.
146 • alsbury's Statutes of England (3^d edn.) 1968 Statutes
p . 1041.
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Article 3 lays downs
Jurisdiction to grant an adoption is vested 
in the authorities of the State where the 
adopter habitually resides or of which he 
is a national*
In a case under Hindu law, in Q*S. Natara.ia v.
C.S* Subbaraya,^^ the Privy Council held that the widow1 s
144. (1949) 77 I.A. 33 (P.C.). Also see Sukdeo v. Kapil A.I.R.
I960 Cal. 597 - A Hindu's national law in family matters
is his personal law. See also Derrett: Introduction to 
Modern Hindu law (1963) p* 128 ff.
In Mira v. Am an A.I.E. 1962 M.P. 212 a Raj G-ond, 
who was not a Hindu, married a Hindu under the Special 
Marriage Act, 1872, whereupon succession to his property 
became subject to the Indian Succession Act. His children 
by this marriage were held entitled to his lands, though 
neither the Special Marriage Act nor the Indian Succession 
Act. were ever in force in the region where the lands lay 
on the basis that the status was determined by the law of
the place (here a part of India where the Acts were in
force) where the marriage was solemnized.
In an earlier Bombay case Ratanshaw v. Baman.ji* 
A.I.R. 1938 Bom. 238, the Bombay High Court had held that 
even though status would ordinarily be determined according 
to the law of domicile and such status would be recognised 
by British Courts, yet for the purpose of succession to 
the immovable property in British India, the law 
applicable will be that of British India.
Hence in determining the succession to immovable 
property in British India of a deceased Parsi who had been 
a resident of Baroda State, the law applicable will be 
that prevailing in British India according to which a 
divorce among Parsis by mutual releases is not a valid 
divorce and will not be recognised by British Indian 
Courts though it may be valid in Baroda State. See also 
Derrett I.M.H.L. p. 130, Note 1.
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capacity to adopt a son to herself and the status of the child
so adopted were matters to be determined in accordance with
the law of her domicile, and that a son adopted by a Hindu
according to a foreign law could succeed as a dattaka son to
his immovable property in India. In this case a Hindu and
after his death his widow, were domiciled in Pondicherry in 
French India, their personal law being admittedly Hindu as 
obtaining there. After her husband*s death the widow purported 
to adopt in Madras the respondent who, after her death, 
alleging that the adoption, which in fact had been held to 
be effective by the French Courts in Pondicherry and affirmed 
by the Court of Cessation in Paris, was an effective adoption 
of himself to the widow under the law applicable i.e. the 
French law, claimed the suit property, situated in British 
India, of which the widow had become the owner on her husband*s 
death. It was conceded in the High Court on appeal that 
"under French law a Hindu widow can adopt a son to herself 
and that if she does her adopted son succeeds to her estate**. 
Affirming the decision of the High Court, Lord Greene delivering 
the judgment of the Board observed: (at p. 40)
1 It is not in dispute that a Hindu widow whose 
personal law is that of British India cannot 
adopt to herself. But in this case it is 
conceded that the personal law of Vasavambal (the
adoptive mother) was Hindu law as obtaining 
in French India. In the appeal to the High 
Court it was also conceded that under French 
law a Hindu widow can adopt a son to herself 
and that if she does, her adopted son succeeds 
to her estate. This concession was in their 
Lordships' opinion properly made. Vasavambal 
was domiciled in Pondicherry and her capacity 
to adopt a son to herself and the status of 
the child so adopted as her adoptive son were 
matters to be determined in accordance with 
the law of her domicile i.e. French law".
Further (at p. 42) his Lordship observes
"Lastly it is argued that to succeed to immove­
able property in British India an adopted child 
must have been validly adopted in accordance 
with the municipal law of British India and 
that adoption by a widow not being recognised 
by that law it could not be relied on in a claim 
to such property. Their Lordships do not accept 
this argument. The personal status of the res­
pondent as the heir of Vasambal falls to be 
ascertained by reference to French law, and 
for the reasons already given his status has 
been established. Their Lordships have not 
been referred to any authority to the effect 
that some principle vaguely analogous to that 
which for special reasons governed in English 
law i.e., that an heir to succeed to English 
real estate must have been born in wedlock, 
has the effect of disentitling the respondent 
from claiming as the adopted son by the law 
governing his status and they can see no 
reason in principle why a person who, by the 
law of his domicile and thus (as is admitted) 
by the law applicable in British India, must 
be regarded as the adopted son of the owner of 
immovable property in India should be regarded 
as incapable of succeeding thereto any more 
than he would be incapable of succeeding to 
movables".
Commenting on this case Derrett observes
"It is of great interest to note that the view 
of Professor Rabeljngtuch approved by a recent 
writer on Adoption, Professor Campbelll4-f?
146. Article by Prof. JJ.D.M. Derrett entitled "Conflict 
of Laws: Adoption and a difficult Bombay decision”
(1956) 58 Bom. L.P. (Journ.) 33-4-1.
146. The Law of Adoption in New Zealand, Wellington (1952),
175 quoting Rabel, ’The conflict of Laws, Ann Arbor, 
Chicago (1945) 648-95 that adoptions should be recognised 
to exactly the extent to v/hich they have been created 
. . .as .measured by the entire legislation of the state of
adoption^. ....................................
/ 56T
is directly supported by ITataraja's case and 
directly" negatived by Yilson1 s case.l-* The 
different view expressed in the American Re­
statement 147 is not cdto^ced at by either decision.
It is submitted that che ratio of In re bilson--^  
is irrefutably sound, while the weakness of 
batara.la's ca^e^ls by no means confined to the 
novel attitude adopted towards the distinction 
between movable and immovable property".
However as already mentioned above In re Ailson1s^~^ case has
been over-ruled by subsequent decisions  ^ which latter
appears to be the more progressive and equitable view.
Also the Supreme Court has held in Virdhachalam
1v Chaldean Syrian Hank Ltd. that the doctrine is that, 
between two or more territories in which a personal law is 
applied it will not be the lex situs of the property which 
will determine who has a right to enjoy or deal with it, but 
the lex domicilii of the persons claiming to be entitled to 
it. As a result of this important case Derrett was obliged 
to reconsider the whole thing in an article entitled 'Private 
International Law and. Personal L a w s ' w h e r e i n  he observes 
the position to be that where the individual is governed bya 
personal law and the personal lav; is also administered in a 
foreign jurisdiction, the decisions of that foreign court on 
a matter coming within the exclusive scope of the law. of his 
domicile should be recognised by the courts of the domicile, 
even where the foreign court's view of the personal lav; differs
14 L
fro that of the court of domicile. ,T
1^ -7; This is Professor Beale's view. Restatement of the Lav; 
of Conflict of Laws, -St. Paul (1934), 209: 2. 14-3;
the status of adoption will be given the same effect 
in another state as is given in that state to the 
status of adoption when created by its own lav;.
llr%. uI.R. 1964- B.C. 14-25 at 14-34- col. ii.
Iffi. (1965) 14 I.C.L.;. 1370-1375.
Following the Privy Council decision in Nataraja's
case^1^ the Bombay High Court observed in Vasant v Dattoba^ ^
that there is nothing like a lex loci in India for a Hindu,
Muslim, Jain, Buddhist and Sikh and therefore disputes
relating to personal relations between parties belonging to
these communities will have to be judged by reference to the
law of the personal status. In this case the adoption was
not valid according to the Kolhapur law for no consent of the
husband was given to the adoptive widow, and as rightly
145-
pointed out by Derrett it cannot be valid by applying the 
Bombay law (into which state, the former Kolhapur State had
merged).
Considering next Section 16(3) of the Adoption Act 
1958, according to this section the devolution of entails and 
estates accompanying a title as well as the title itself, are 
expressly excluded from the effects of an order. In such case 
the property devolves as if Section 16 had not been enacted.
"No one suggests" said Viscount Simon in the Lords elucidating 
this point, "that if any of your Lordships had an adopted child 
and an only child, the adopted child would, by heredity, 
become a member of your Lordships’ House".
Cn the other hand, if Dearest had allowed her Cedric 
to be adopted before he became Little Lord Fauntleroy this 
would not have prevented his fortunes from being unrolled to 
their delicious conclusion and equally the foundling earl in 
real life cannot be deprived of his rights. This provision 
of the English Adoption Acts seems to detract from the equitable 
and logical basis of English Adoption Law based on considerations
150. (1955) 57 Bom. L.R. 1026.
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of the welfare of the child and on the'complete severance1
of the adopted child from the natural family and his complete
substitution into the adoptive family.
Section 13(3) of the Adoption Act 1958 deems an
adopter and the person whom he has been authorised to adopt
under an adoption order to be within prohibited degrees of
consanguinity and they may not marry each other. This was
not so under the law before the Adoption Act 1950, but as the
Lord Chancellor observed on the point,
"Surely it is undesirable that (the adoptive 
father) should be placed in the position where 
he could even contemplate marriage with that 
child... I would throw out for consideration 
whether the corollary of what we are doing 
ought not to be that, that boy and that girl 
(two adopted children) become brother and 
sister in the ordinary way, so that the natural 
home life which happens in a normal family... 
should take place in this family".
As regards adoption by one party to a marriage, the 
law is altered as from 1st Jan. 1959 by the Matrimonial 
Proceedings (Children Act), 1958. Part I of that Act includes 
provisions extending the class of children in respect of whom 
custody and maintenance orders may be made in matrimonial 
cases in the High Court, so as to include, inter alia, adopted 
children of one of the parties who have been accepted into the 
family by the other party. Custody and maintenance may be 
ordered notwithstanding that the petition is dismissed.
On the other hand, S.25 of the Matrimonial Causes
Act, 1950 (variation of settlements) is not similarly extended.
151And in Best v. Best  ^the Court of Matrimonial proceedings 
declined to vary a marriage settlement not affected by the 
enactment now contained in S. 16(2) of the Act so as to bring 
in an adopted child. The child of the marriage would have 
suffered financial sacrifice by the variation suggested. Where
151. f)956]p. 76.
158
however, the Court was satisfied that the natural children 
were being compensated for what they were giving up, a 
variation which let in an adopted child was approved (Purnell 
v. Purnell 2
As to the effect on the adopter1 s marriage, in ¥.Y.W. 
the Court of Appeal held that, in the particular circumstances, 
the adoption of a child jointly by the parties to a marriage 
was an act approbating the marriage, and that with other 
factors this rendered it inequitable and contrary to public 
policy to annul the marriage for non-consummation . Pealing 
with theMdoctrine of sincerity”, Selborne L.C. observed in 
G.Y.M.154
flThe real basis of reasoning which underlies 
that phraseology is this, and nothing more than 
this, that there may be conduct on the part of 
the person seeking this remedy which ought to
estop that person from having it......  The
circumstances which may justify it axe various, 
and in cases of this kind, many sorts of conduct 
might exist, taking pecuniary benefits, for 
example, living for a long time together in 
the same house or family with the status and 
character of husband and wife, after knowledge 
of everything which it is material to know.*..”
As to whether approbation is recognised in Hindu
.........  4 cc
law, Perrett observed
’V.. The benefits obtained from the marriage 
even in non-sexual contexts, the length of time 
that has elapsed before the petition is presented, 
and the date when the petitioner first learnt 
of his legal rights will weigh with the Court 
in deciding whether the petitioner is precluded 
by * insincerity1 or otherwise under S. 23(l)(e)
152. (1955) 57 Bom. L.R. 1026.
153. 1952 1 All. E.R. 858.
154. (1885) 10 A.C. 171.
155. Perrett: Modern Hindu Law (1963) para 297.
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(of the Hindu Marriage Act) from succeeding 
because of the 'legal ground', namely approbation 
of the marriage, why the decree should not be 
granted."
156However, in a recent case, it has been held that the doctrine
of "approbate" and "reprobate" referred to in (1885) 10 A#C.
154.171, 0. v. M., ^  has no place under the Hindu Marriage Act.
In this case a Hindu marriage took place in 1948 and the 
parties lived together from 1948 to 1956. The respondent 
wife began to live separately after July 50, 1956 and filed 
the petition for declaring her marriage with the appellant 
a nullity on the ground of impotency, on March 19« 1962.
Their lordships of the Delhi Bench allowed the relief originally 
by the Petitioner (Respondent) and observed that lack of 
sincerity on her part or her approbation of the marriage 
cannot make the appellant potent. The want of sincerity on 
the part of a spouse or his or her approbation of the marriage 
may be an element which can be taken into consideration in 
deciding whether the complaint of impotence was true. The 
Hindu society looked with disfavour on dissolution of marriages 
and the respondent said that her parents told her that if her 
marriage with the appellant was dissolved, their society 
would shun them and it would be difficult for them to get 
alliances for the daughters of her sisters and brothers. 
Therefore, she hesitated for long before approaching the 
Court. The evidence on this point was believed by all the 
Courts and they accepted the explanation for delay as it 
accorded with the facts of life.
156. S.v. R. A.I.R. 1968 Delhi 79.
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157W. y . W. was distinguished in Slater v. Slater  ^
where the wife was unaware at the time of the adoption that 
the law provided a remedy for her in respect of her husband’s 
incapacity.
If a marriage between joint adopters is annulled or 
dissolved, or if a decree of judicial separation is pronounced, 
an order for custody of the adopted infant may be made under 
S. 26(1) of the Matrimonial Causes Act 1950 (see Martin v. 
Martin) An adoption order, however, supersedes any 
previous custody order (Crossley v. Crossley).^ ^
The effect of S. 212(2) of the Income Tax Act 1952 
is that an adopter is entitled to the like reliefs from income 
tax by way of child allowance provided that no other individual 
is entitled to the allowance or that any other individual so 
entitled has relinquished his claim thereto.
For the purposes of enactments relating to friendly 
societies, collecting societies or industrial insurance 
companies, Section 14 of the 1958 Act, lays down that an 
adopter shall be deemed to be the parent of the infant whom 
he is authorised to adopt under an adoption order. Further, 
where, before the making of an adoption order in respect of 
an infant, the natural parent of the infant had effected an 
insurance with any such society or company for the payment, 
on the death of the infant, of money for funeral expenses, 
the rights and liabilities under the policy shall by virtue
157. 09530 1 All. E.E.
158. [19303 46 T.l.R. 257.
159. [1953] p. 97.
of the adoption order he transferred to the adopter, the 
adopter heing treated as the person who took out the policy 
(S. 14(2)). By a provision enacted in 1958, references in 
S. 11 of the Married Women’s Property Act 1882 to a person’s 
children are to include and be deemed always to have included, 
references to children legally adopted by that person.
Section 11 of the 1882 Act created a trust in favour of the 
spouse and children of the assured in the case of certain 
policies effected by a married person, and it had previously 
been held (In He Clay's Policy)'^ not to extend to a case 
where the named beneficiary was an adopted child.
Speaking generally,, a child is in the position of 
a natural child of his adopters in connection with industrial 
insurances, income tax, family allowances etc.
The law3 in certain other countries
In the United States, as in the United Kingdom, 
the effect of an adoption order is generally that the adopter 
assumes all the rights and obligations of the natural parents. 
But each of the different states has a different law. In many 
of the states such as California, Connecticut, Washington, 
Delaware etc., the adopted child inherits from the adoptive 
parents and their relatives and vice versa. In some states
160. Adoption Act 1958, S. 14(5); Sched. V, para. 2.
161. [19573 2 All. E.R. 548.
162;. Martindale: Law Directory (1965) Vol. IV: Arizona,
p. 72; California, p. 157; Colorado, p. 185; Connecticut, 
p. 227; Delaware, p. 277; Columbia, p. 504; Florida, 
p. 554; Hawaii, p. 411; Idaho, p. 454; Iowa, p. 561; 
Kansas, p. 591; Kentucky, p. 655; Maryland, p. 767;
F/note contd. on next page
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such as Massachusetts and Virgin Islands the adoptive children
and their issue inherit from the adoptive parents but do not
161inherit from relatives of the adopters. In the States of
Maine, New Hampshire, Ohio etc. the adopted child does not
inherit property of adoptive parents expressly limited to the
heirs of the body of the adopters nor the property from their
collateral kindred. In these ^ ^and other States such as
Alabama, Massachusetts, New York, Texas, Illinois etc. the
adopted child inherits from and through natural parents and
other kin but the natural parents and their kindred cannot
inherit from him unless the adoption decree specificially 
165provides. ^In New Jersey an adult adoptee does not lose the
right of inheritance from natural parents and their kindred
but his right of inheritance from the adopting parents is
166subject to certain limitations.
Footnote 162 continued from previous page.
Missouri, p. 991; Nebraska, p.1066; Michigan, p. 868; 
Minnesota, p. 910; Mississippi, p. 949; Nevada, p. 1110;
New Jersey, p. 1198; New Mexico, p. 1254; N. Carolina, 
p. 13559; N. Dakota, 1408; Ohio, p.1449; Oklahoma, p.
1500; Oregon p. 1544; Pennysylvania, p. 1578; Puerto 
Rico, p. 1650; Rhode Island, p. 1657; S. Carolina, p.
1556; S*. Dakota, p^ : 1740; * Tennessee, p. 1788; Texas, 
p. 1821 (adoptee inherits from both the natural and 
adoptive parents); Utah, p. 1865; Vermont, p. 1895; 
Virginia, p. 1920; Virgin Islands, p. 1961; Washington, 
p. 1979; W. Virginia, p. 2015; Wisconsin, p. 2051;
Wyoming, p. 2097. Also see article by H.W. Baade: Inter- 
State and foreign adoptions in North Carolina; (1962) 40 
N.C.L. Rev. 691.
165. Martindale: Law Directory (1965) Vol.IV. Louisiana,
p. 687; Massachusetts, p. 809; Virgin Islands, p. 1961.
164. Martindale: Law Directory (1965) Vol. IV. Maine, p.
735; New Hampshire, p. 1145; Ohio, p. 1449; Vermont,
p. 1895; Virgin Islands, p. 1961: W. Virginia, p. 2015.
165. Martindale: Law Directory (1965; Vol. IV. Alabama,
p. 5; Arkansas, p. 101; Illinois,p. 469; Indiana,
p. 525; Louisiana, p. 687; Maryland, p. 767; Massachusetts, 
p. 809; Michigan, p. 868; Montana, p. 1051; New York, 
p. 1289; Texas, p. 1821; Vermont, p. 1895.
166. Martindale: Law Directory (1965; Vol. IV. New Jersey,
p. 1198.
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The Canadian law has strong links of sympatr^rand 
practice with U.S. adoption work and the transfer of parental 
rights, resembles the continental type of adoption. In 
Alberta the mutual rights of inheritance are the same as 
a natural parent and child between the adopter and adoptee, 
but the child also retains the right to inherit from natural 
parents
In British Columbia the adopted person was, before 
1956, entitled to succeed to the real and personal property 
of the legal descendants add no other of the kindred of his 
adoptive parents as if born to such parent in lawful wedlock. 
The adopted child did not lose his rights of succession to 
his natural parents or kindred. If a person adopted died 
intestate, his real and personal property received by gift, 
will; settlement, inheritance or succession from his natural 
parents or kindred was distributed as if no adoption had taken 
place, and all his other real and personal property was dis­
tributed in the same manner as if he had been born to his 
parent by adoption in lawful wedlock. This type of adoption
1 Ley
seemed to resemble, the customary adoptions in India, and 
the rules of succession were akin to the rules of succession 
to the property of a female Hindu dying intestate as laid down 
in Section 15 of the Hindu Succession Act 1956. It may be 
observed that whilst under the Hindu and English Lav/s there 
is almost 'complete severance1 of the adopted child from the 
natural family and his substitution into the adoptive family, 
the laws of inheritance in other countries vis-a-vis the
16^. Martindale: Law Directory (1963) Vol. IV, p. 2224.
l^S. See pages S (^  et seq.
i,1 '
adopted child do not appear to he as strictly logical.
However in British Columbia the Adoption Amendment Act 1956
repealed S. 12 of R.S. 1948, C. 7 and provided that for all
purposes an adopted child became on adoption the child of the
adopting parent, as if the child had been born to that parent
in lawful wedlock and that the relationships of persons to
ib?
one another should be determined accordingly. These provisions 
do not apply for the purposes of the law of incest or prohibited
degrees of marriage.
The French law recognises two different types of
17 0adoption, 1 resembling in its effects to some extent the 
different types of adoption formerly recognised under the 
Hindu law. The two types of adoption are the simple adoption 
and adoptive legitimation, the more complete type being 
reserved for very young children. In the former the link is 
established betv/een the adoptive parents and the child and 
not with the whole family. The latter was a status created 
in 1939 wherein the child enters completely into the total 
family of the adopters and becomes their child as though born 
to them in wedlock. In the case of a simple adoption even a 
single person may adopt whilst adoptive legitimation may only 
be arranged for married people adopting together and for 
children under 5 years, who must be orphans, foundlings or 
abandoned by their parents, and the greater family must be 
told of the adoption. Such a child inherits as a child of 
the marriage except where he is expressly disinherited. In
lift. Also see I. art indale: Law Directory (1963) Vol. IV,
p. 2247•
170. Margaret Eornitzer: Child Adoption in the Modern
World, p. 323.
I toS
Norway, Switzerland as also in Spain the adopted child retains
17/his rights of inheritance in the natural family ' but parental
responsibility is transferred to the adopter who gives the
child his name. In the Latin American countries, except in
Uruguay the relationship created by adoption is limited to
the adopters and the adoptee. In Uruguay, however, under the
194-5 law, all natural ties are severed. As in France there
are two kinds of adoptions. One, under the Children's Code
of 1934- is adoption with limitations whilst the other form
"adoptive legitimation", like the similar modern status in
France, is complete adoption and is available only on behalf
17'o
of special categories of deprived children.
171In Norway ‘' adopted children inherit a share of the 
adopters estate equal to half what a child born to the adopter
in wedlock would have received, but the adopters do not auto-
the
matically become heirs of/adopted child if the latter leaves
natural relations legally entitled to inherit. In Switzerland
the adopted child inherits from the adopting parent, though
not from the adopter's relations, and he also retains his rights
17/of inheritance from the whole of his natural family. * An 
official explanatory note accompanying the articles in the 
civil code relating to adoption states
"... The code relates adoption to two simple
1 7 /• Margaret Kornitzer: Child Adoption: Norway (p. 3 2 7 ) ;
Switzerland ( p .  3 3 0 ) ;  Spain ( p .  3 3 5 ) *  Also Martindale:
Law Directory ( 1963) Vol. IV, Switzerland ( 3 0 1 5 ) ;
Greece (p. 2 6 9 3 )  - adoptee inherits from adopter but 
not from relatives of adopting parents. The adopter 
does not inherit from the adoptee, nor the latter's 
relatives.
17t'7/Kornitzer: Child Adoption, p. 34-1.
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principles: it is the creation of an artificial
relationship and is bound therefore to imitate 
nature in order to avoid anomalies. Secondly 
it must serve legitimate interests and not en­
croach on the rights of others".
In Australia the adoption law varies in the different 
states. In Queensland the adopted child secures "full here­
ditary rights in the estates of the adopting parents".
In Victoria the adopted child inherits in intestacy the
property of the adoptive parent to the same extent as a child
born to the adopter in wedlock, although he does not automa­
tically inherit the property of any relatives of the adopters. 
The adopted child loses the right to succeed to the estate of
his natural parents but not the right to succeed to the
17 A
estates of relatives of his natural parents. In Key/ South
Vales the adoption order terminates all rights and liabilities 
between the natural parents and the child except the right to
17 c
inherit property. In Tasmania and New Zealand adopted
children inherit in the same manner as natural children from
17Atheir adopters but from nobody else of their adoptive family.
A note in the Tasmanian Act of 1920 refers to a New Zealand 
precedent, dated 1916, whereby it was established that the 
rights of parents by adoption and those claiming through them 
in the property of an adopted child prevail over the rights 
of the child’s natural parents. In Southern Rhodesia the 
adopted child has no rights of automatic inheritance to the 
adopter’s estate and he does not lose any inheritance rights
1?3• Eornitzer: Child Adoption, p. 24-9*
174- Eornitzer: Child Adoption, p. 252.
175”* Eornitzer: Child Adoption, p. 24-7•
176* Eornitzer: Child Adoption, pp. 255 and 257 respectively.
177he may possess in his natural family. 1 In S. Africa
adoption is governed by Act No. 33 of I960. This Act is
-j
framed on the English Act.
thus
It would/be seen that whilst under the Hindu and 
English laws there is complete severance of the adopted child 
from his natural family and his substitution in the adoptive 
family and he is regarded as a child for all purposes in the 
adoptive family, the laws of inheritance in other countries 
do not appear to be as strictly logical.
Under the Hindu law, however, on account of the 
Institution of joig.t family the adopted son acquires a vested 
interest in the ancestral property of his adoptive father on 
adoption and does not become divest&d of such interest although 
its value (at an eventual partition) may be altered by the 
birth of real sons. The rights of the adopted son become, 
on adoption, indefeasible by transfer either inter vivos or 
by will, except as modified by the Hindu Succession Act, 1956. 
As there is no such Institution like the Hindu joint family 
system, in other legal systems there is no restriction on the 
adoptive father's right to dispose by gift or will of property 
which he might have inherited from his ancestors.
Again according to S. 16(3) of the Adoption Act 1958 
the devolution of entails and estates accompanying a title as 
well as the title itself are expressly excluded from the 
effects of an order. In such case the property devolves as 
if Section 16 had not been enacted. Under the Hindu law,
177* Kornitzer: Child Adoption, p. 263.
17?. Martindale: Lav/ Directory (1963) Vol. IV, p. 2983*
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however, there is no such restriction on the adopted child 
as the adopted child is considered as a "child for all 
purposes". It would appear that this provision under the 
English law detracts from the equitable and logical basis 
of English Adoption lav/ based on considerations of the v/elfare 
of the child and his ’complete severance1 from the natural 
family and substitution into the adoptive family.
According to S. 13(3) of the Adoption Act 1938 
(reproducing S. 10(3) of the 1930 Act) an adopter and the 
person whom he has been authorised to adopt under an adoption 
order are to be within the prohibited degrees of consanguinity 
for the purpose of the law relating to marriage. The sub­
section appears not to bring any relatives of the adopter 
within the fiction of consanguinity with the adopted person. 
Thus as the law stands there is nothing against the marriage 
of adopted brothers and sisters or others related through 
adoption, and although for some of the purposes of the law 
adopted brothers and sisters are regarded as brothers or 
sisters of the whole or half blood, consanguinity is not 
affected. This seems to be anomalous. Under the Hindu law 
and in some other countries like the Australian State of 
Victoria the prohibitions with respect to marriage within
the degrees of consanguinity or affinity apply both to the
170
adoptive and natural relatives. f
Also as to relationships outside marriage, although 
an adopter may not marry an adopted child there is nothing to 
forbid their sleeping together. The question of incest
17?- See also Margaret Eornitzer: ChildAdoption in the
Modern World, p. 251*
I6<f
between the adopter and adopted seems not to have been 
forgotten when the law was framed, but the law was not 
anxious to add to the list of criminal offences. ' This 
anomaly should be rectified in the interests of the child 
and the community and the law made to conform to logic.
, •• ■ - ,
180. h • Mornitzer: Child Adoption, p. 143*
CHAPTER IV
SHARE OP THE DATTAKA IN COMPETITION wTTH 
AETSR-BORH AURASA SOU OP THE ADOPTER '
Smriti Law
(1) Manu in Chapter IX, verses 163 to 165 says: "The Aurasa 
son alone is the sole heir of his father's wealth; hut as a 
matter of compassion, he may give maintenance to the rest"
(v. 163); "And, when the son of the body has taken an account 
of the paternal inheritance, let him give a sixth part of it 
to the son of the wife begotten by a kinsman before his 
father's recovery; or a fifth part,(if that son be eminently 
virtuou^)" (v. 164); and in V. 165 he says "The son of the 
body, and the son of the wife, may succeed immediately to 
the paternal estate in the manner Just mentioned; but the 
ten other sons can only succeed in order to the family duties 
and to their share of the inheritance, those last named being 
excluded by any one of the preceding". The Mitakshara 
interprets Manu IX, 163 as applying to the other class of 
sons "who are devoid of good qualities" and says that the 
general rule as to a fourth share is not affected by Manu's 
text.
(2) According to Vasistha as cited in the Mitakshara "when 
a son has been adopted, if a legitimate son be afterwards 
born, the given son takes a fourth share".^
(3) Katyayana is quoted in the Dayabhaga, Colebrooke's Digest, 
Vol. II,,page 348 as saying "A son of the body being born,
1. Vasistha XV, 8, 9, hit. 1, XI, 24.
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the adopted sons of the same class take one-third of their 
portion”. But in the Madanapari.1 atha. Viramitrodaya, Mitakshara, 
Sarasvatl Vilasa. the Mayukha and the Dattaka MTmamsa the sage 
is quoted as allotting only a fourth part.
(4) Baudhayana says 1 If after the performance of these (rites) a 
legitimate son of his 0wn body is born (to the adopter, then the
p
adopted son) receives a fourth (of the legitimate son’s)share.
(5) Vishnu says that the legitimate son should support the other
3sons.
(6) The same rule as laid down by Katyayana above is given 
in a text cited in the Day ab hag a as a text of Devala.^
(7) As against these Smriti writers there is a text attributed
to Vriddha G-autama which gives an equal share to an adopted
5
son endowed with good qualities with the natural born son.
According to Golap Chander Sircar and Ghose this text is an
interpolation and Mr. Shyama Charan Sircar in his Vyavastha"
—  6 Chamdrika inclines to the view that the text is obsolete.
Views of the Commentators
In his Mit akshar-5, Vijnaneswara refers to a
number of Smritis and propounds the rule that the adopted
2. Prasna VII, Adhyaya V, Translation in Principles of Hindu 
law by J.G. Ghose, 2nd Edn., pp. 641-642.
3. Vishnu XV, 30.
4* Dayabh Ch. X, 7,9*
5* Datt. Mim. V. 43, Datt. Chandrika V, 32.
6. Karturi Gopalan v. Karturi Venkataraghavulu (1915) 31 I.C.
574, 576. See Vyavastha-Chandrika by Shyama Charan Sircar (1880)
Vol. II, Book III, Ch.II, IV para 360 (Page 169). A similar
view is expressed in his Vyavastha - Darpana (1867 edn.) Para. 
627 i.e. That the adopted son gets a diminished share in 




son's share is a fourth of the Aurasa son*s. The Madana- 
pari.iatha and the Yir ami trod ay a adopt the rule given in the 
Mitakshara* The Saraswatl vilasa after a full discussion, 
concurs in the same view.8 The Dattaka Mimamsa and the
Vy.avahara Mayukha also favour the one-fourth share for the
q _
adopted son. On the other hand, according to the Dayabhaga
-  10and the Dattaka Ohandrika the adopted son gets a third share.
Nanda-Pandita, in his Vainayanti opines that the adopted son
gets one-third or one-fourth shares according to the degree
11of virtue that the after-born Aurasa son possesses.
The text of Yridriha Gautama has been explained 
away by the author of the Dattaka Chandrika and the Dattaka
_,___ -j p
Mimamsa. According to the former, the text applies to Sudras 
only, whilst according to the latter it refers to an after-
born son absolutely destitute of good qualities. J The author 
of the Dattaka Chandrika refers to the fact that among Sudras, 
illegitimate sons are given at least a third share in competition 
with legitimate sons, and argues that the adopted sons should 
not be in a worse position.
7. Mitakshara, Ch. I, Section 11, pi. 24 et seq.
8. Para. 19* (1915) I.L.R. 40 Mad. 632: Karturi Gopalan v.
Venkata (1915) 31 I.C. 574* 576; Ayyavu v. Niladatchi 
(1862) 1 Mad. H.C.R. 45.
9. Dat. Mim. X, 1; V. Mayuk IV, 2, 25.
10 Dayabhaga X, 9; Datt. Chand. V, 16-17* 3 Dig. 154; Dat Chand. 
V, 16 Suth. Syn. Note XXII, Dig. V, 301. Kautilya 
(Arthasastra II, 42) also prescribed a third share.
11.Referred to by Kapur in his law of Adoption in India and 
Burma (1933 edn.) p. 447.
12.Datt. Chand. V. 32.
13.Datt. Mim. V, 43.
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Adopted son is not an equal sharer with after-born Aurasa son.
Their Lordwhips of the Madras High Court in
6Karturi Gopalan v Karturi Venkataraghavulu point out in this 
connection that, whatever may he the social status of an 
illegitimate son, the fact that he is of the same flesh and
blood as the person whose property he seeks a share in, may
account for the favourable position assigned to him. As to
the interpretation given by the Dattaka Mimamsa, their Lordships 
in the same case opine that the reference apparently is to
i
! the quality which a person to be adopted is expected to possess.
S Manu in Chapter IX, sloka 169, describes an adopted son thus
t
; "He is considered as a son made or adopted,
I whom a man takes as his own son, the boy.
being equal in class, endowed with filial 
j virtues, acquainted with the merit of per-
i forming obsequies to his adopter, and with
the sin of omitting them".
Their Lordships observe that this was the reason why Handa
A
: Pandita translated Vpidjha Gautama*s text in the way mentioned
above and opine that Gautama*s rule was an exception to the
I general law. It would be impossible, observe their Lordships,
to administer such a rule by the Courts, as the determination
! whether a man ... possesses good qualities would lead to
; endless conflict of views. The author of Dattaka Mimamsa,
d
after examining Vpi^ha Gautama's text carefully, inclines
to the view taken by Vijnaneswara and the other commentators.
T£us with the exception of the battaka Chandrika^ all the
commentators agree in not giving an equal share to the 
/ 3 tx ^
adopted son.
The share of the adopted son in competition with Aurasa son.
| Modern writers on Hindu Law have noticed this
conflict bqt have, not settled it, although most of. them- have- - -
CL fn CO/Ze ~ Ot %  Vp. / 7 .
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accepted the view taken by the Mitakshara* It is not clear 
whether the expressions one-third or one-fourth used in the 
texts means a share out of the entire estate or a share of 
what the Aurasa sons get? G.S. Sastri and J.L. Kapur are 
of the view that the expressions quarter and third share do 
not appear to be used with reference to the estate, for if 
that were so, he would be in a better position than a real 
legitimate son if there be three or more such sons.^" So 
also J.C. Ghose and Siromani Bhattacharya are unhesitatingly 
for a fifth share and Messrs West and Buhler and Dr. Jolly 
are also of the same opinion. Mr. Mayne expresses no definite 
opinion on the question. He says-that in Ceylon, the adopted 
son shares equally with the Aurasa son. On the other hand 
Macna^ghton in his Hindu Law Vol. II, p. 184 quotes the 
opinion of a Pandit according to which the adopted son takes 
one-fourth of the entire estate thus obtaining one-third of 
what the legitimate son gets.
Prof. H.H. Wilson has tried to explain this 
apparent conflict by pointing out that to interpret the phrase 
Ma quarter share to mean a fourth of the whole inheritance 
would reconcile the two readings of Vasistha's aphoristic 
text with each other, and both with the metrical text namely 
by taking 1/3» where it occurs, to mean 1/3 of the after-born 
son's share and l/4th to mean 1/4 of the whole estate i.e., 
dividing the property into four parts, the Aurasa son taking 
3 parts and the adopted son one part.^^ Their Lordships of
14. The Hindu Law of Adoption by G.S. Sastri (1891 edn.)
p. 398 & Law of Adoption in India and Burma: J.L. Kapur
(1933) p. 449*
15. Wilson's Works V, 32; Giriappa v Hingapa (1893) I.L.R.
17 Bom. 100, 103, ....................
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15the Bombay High Court, in Giriappa v ITingapa observe that 
there are difficulties even on this construction e.g., in 
the case of four or more son^s being born after the adoption 
and according to the principle laid down by the Privy Council 
in The Collector of Madura v Mootoo Bamalinga^  the Court 
must give effect to what it finds to be the interpretation 
of Vasistha's text actually current as shown by the modern 
Digests in general use and not enforce as law a doubtful 
inference from the words of ancient Smriti writers.
The following rules were laid down by the Courts 
in the different Provinces
(i) In Bengal under the Dayabhaga school the
adopted son took 1/3 share of the inheritance.-
(ii) In the ]arts of India following the Benares 
school he took 1/4- of the adoptive father's 
estate. --P
(iii) In Southern India, Bomay and Bengal, in 
cases governed by the Mitakshara law he 
took a fourth of the Aurasa son's share 
or 1/5 of the father's estate.1-
adras view:
20In Ayyavu v Hiladatchi the Madras High Court 
held that the share of an adopted son was 1/4- of the share of
16. (1868) 12 Moo. I.A. 397-
I/. Birbhadra v Balpataru [19053 1 C.I.J. 388, 4-04-. (The 
Bengal law is stated in a Mitakshara case).
18. Iarmanand v Shivcharan (1921) I.L.K. 2 Lah. 69; and also 
amongst Jains, Bukhab v Chunilal (1892) I.L.B. 16 Bom. 34-7*
19. Venkammamidi v Tr iamb ah am (1920) I.L.H. 4-3 lad. 398; 
Giriappa v ITingappa (1693) 17 Bom. 100; lukaram v 
Tamchandra I.L.11. (1925) 4-9 Bom. 672; Sahebgouda v
.Shiddangouca I.L.H. [19393 Boa. 33-4-, 318 (B .B.; .
20. (1862) 1 had. H.C.B. 4-5.
a son born to the adoptive father after the adoption. Their 
Lordships observed that it was true that in the Mitakshara 
(Ch. 1, Sec. II, par.24), the share of the adopted son,where a 
begotten son springs up, is declared to be a one-fourth share, 
but it is explained in the Saraswati Vilasathat this is to 
amount to a fourth part of what a begotten son is to have i.e., 
the estate is to be divided into five portions of which the 
begotten son is to have four and the adopted son, one. The latter 
gets thus but one-fifth of the whole property. The Pandits being 
in attendance had explained to the Court that such was the law.
The editorial notes mention the following as the then unprinted 
passage from the Sarasvati Vilasa referred to in the judgments 
Per Vasistha: ’’And when there has been an adoption, if a
legitimate son be afterwards born, let the given son share a 
fourth part”. ^ a the mention of ’a given son”, says the note, is 
intended for an indication of others also, as the son bought, son 
made, and the rest, according to the difference of son-making. 
According to Katyayana "And when a legitimate son is born the 
(other) sons are takers of a fourth part, (provided they are) of 
the same class, and those not of the same class are entitled to 
maintenance”. ’’Those of the same class”, explains the note 
i.e., son raised on the wife, son given etc., share a 1/4 
part, there being a legitimate eon. A fourth part means, a 
portion equal to 1/4 of the share (of a legitimate son) i.e., 
a fifth share, inasmuch as a smriti declares a son given, 
a son made etc., to be entitled to a 1/5 share in the event 
of a legitimate son being born afterwards. The editorial 
note further says ’’Those not of the same class” i.e., son 
of the unmarried girl, son of the concealed birth, son of a
20a. See Thomas Poulkes: The Hindu Law of Inheritance according 
to the Sarasvati-Vi^asa (London 1881) Para 377.




pregnant bride, and son of a twice-married woman. But
—
according to the Vyavahara Mayukha, some authorities in
— — ' 21the quotation from Katyayana have 'third part'. In
22Karuturi Gopalan v Karuturi Venkataraghavulu the Madras 
High Court again held that under the Hindu Lav/, even among 
Sudras, an adopted son was entitled to 1/4- share of the 
subsequently born Aurasa son i.e., 1/5 of the estate, where 
there was one Aurasa son.
Bombay
The Bombay and Calcutta High Courts have inter­
preted the texts in a similar manner. In Giriappa v Ningappa 
the Bombay High Court held that in 7/e stern India, both in the 
districts governed by the Mitakshara and those specially under 
the authority of the Vyavahara Mayukha+ the right of the 
adopted son, where there was a "legitimate son" born after
the adoption, extended only to a fifth share of the father's 
23estate. ^ In this case the court of first instance awarded 
the Plaintiff (the adopted son) a fourth share in the father's 
property in competition with an after born legitimate son.
On second appeal to the High Court by the defendant (the 
legitimate son) it was contended that the adopted son was
21. The reporter was informed by Prof. Buhler that according 
to the Yyar Mayul^some authorities, in quotation from 
KStySyana have "trjtty&mcahar&h sutih" . - Yyav. May.
Ch. IY; Sec. V,para.25.
22. (1915) 51 I.C. 574, 576.
23. Giriappa v Hingappa (1893) I.L.R. 17 Bom. 100; Nagipdas 
v Bachoo (l9l6; I.L.R. 4-0 Bom. 270 (P.C.); Tukaram v 
Ramchandra (1925) I.L.R. 4-9 Bom. 67,2 (a case of Agris 
who are probably not Sudras) . fMSo i ^  I^ UTr|_v I JPtdBH M A (y_
a -1-ft. n & o  j v l  • H i .   ;■
only entitled to a one-fifth share in the father’s property.
In this case the question turned on the meaning of the 
equivalent phrase, where a "legitimate son1 is b o m  after the 
adoption, the adopted son "shares a fourth part". Their 
Lordships observed that in IT ar ay an Baba.ii v. Nana Manchar^  
it was commented that the Mitakshara had set out the text 
of Vasistha but said nothing as to the interpretation of it.
The Vyavahara Mayukha IV, V, 25 was explicit on the point 
and stated that the adopted son took 1/4 of the Aurasa son’s 
share. The Viramitrodaya and Dattaka Chandrika threw no 
light on the subject. The Dattaka Mimamsa says "receives 
a quarter, not an entire share" (according to their Lordships 
the correct translation could be "not an equal share, possibly 
referring to some opinion that the two share equally). Hence 
their Lordships inferred that the Dattaka Mimamsa meant one- 
fourth of the legitimate son’s share. According to the Smriti 
Chandrika the adopted son took 1/4 share in the inheritance.
Their Lordships also referred to the view of Prof. H.H.
Wilson mentioned above at page 174 (footnote 15) and pointed 
out that as laid down by the Privy Council in Collector of 
Madura’s case, in interpreting the Smriti texts, the opinion 
of recognised commentators should be followed. Among the 
modern English writers Strange leaves the point in uncertainty 
and so also do West and Bugler. Mayne mentions 1/4 of 
legitimate son’s share in the Bombay school. J.S. Siromani 
Bhattacharya and G.C. Sirkar opine that the adopted son takes 
1/4 of the legitimate son’s share. Their Lordships referred to the
Q
decision, of the Madras High Court in Awavu v. Hiladatchi
24. (1,870) 7. Bom. H.C. Eep. A.C.J. 153.
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where it was held on the authority of the Saraswati Vilasa 
that the adopted son took 1/4 of the legitimate son's share; 
with which view their Lordships agree.
In the Smyiti texts Vasistha and Katyayaha are quoted 
as giving the adopted son:a quarter and one-third share 
respectively. But it is not clear whether these shares 
mean the share out of the entire estate or a share of what 
the Aurasa son receives. In this respect I am inclined to 
agree with the view of Prof. H.H. Wilson mentioned above.
For reading Vasistha and Katyayana together the texts seem 
to mean that the adopted son's share is 1/3 of the legitimate 
son's share or 1/4 of the Estate. Where the Smritis are 
silent, equity demands that the benefit of doubt should be 
given in favour of the adopted son, who gives up his rights 
in the natural family.
When laying down the rule, possibly Vasistha had
• •
only one after born legitimate son in mind. If there be 
more than one son, then reading Vasistha and Katyayana 
together an on an equitable interpretation the adopted son
would take 1/3 of the natural son's share.
2*5Again in Tukaram v. Ram Chandra the Bombay High 
Court held that in the Bombay Presidency, under Hindu law, 
an adopted son was entitled on partition to a 1/4 of the 
share of the after-born Aurasa son and that no distinction 
is drawn in the case of Sudras. Crump J. observed that the 
argument that the parties were Sudras and that in the case 
of Sudras the adopted and after-born Aurasa son took equal 
shares on the authority of the ^rivy Council decision in
24a Derrett, J.D.Ivl. is of the view that the Dattaka ought to 
take 1/4 of what any Aurasa takes, i.e., l/5th of the 
estate and 1/9 if there be two Aurasas. See*his 
Introduction to Modern Hindu Law (1963) para 186. In other
. . words. 1/4 = .1/4. of .Aurasa's. share .and. 1/3 - .1/3. of.........
Auras a's share•
IZO
25A .Perrazu v Subbar ayudu does not hold for Bombay as this case 
was an authority for Madias and "Bengal. Further the parties
in the present case were "Agris" by caste, who are probably
/  2^ 5
not sudras. 'Their Lordships referred to Giriappa v Hingappa ^
wherein it was held that the share of the adopted son was 1/4-
of the share of the after-born son; and observed that this had
always been the rule. It was stated in Steele's work on
Hindu law and customs as far back as 1868 that there was no
/_
exception to the rule in the case of Sudras. The ratio
25decidendi in Perazzu's case is as follows
"The inference which their Lordships draw 
from the materials before them is that the 
rule of the Dattaka Chandrika that on a 
partition of the joint family property of 
a Sudra family an adopted son is entitled 
to share equally with the legitimate son 
born to the adoptive father subsequent to 
the adoption has been accepted and acted 
upon for at least more than a century in 
the Presidency of Madras, as the law appli­
cable to such cases to Sudras. It also appears 
to their Lordships that thb rule of the 
Dattaka Chandrika, although not supported 
by any ancient text of the Smritis or by 
the Mitakshara, is not inconsistent so far 
as Sudras are concerned with the Smritis 
or the Mitakshara".
Their Lordships observed that in the Bombay Presidency, Y/here
the rule of the Dattaka Chandrika upon the question at issue
has never been followed, for no case and no kind of judicial
or other pronouncement was forthcoming, ought they to accept
the rule upon the authority of the Dattaka ^handrika_alone?
Their Lordships opined that they should err if they did so.
The authority of the Dattaka Chandrika" had never been placed
25. (1921) L.R. 4-8 I.A. 280; 4- Mad. 56.
181
26so high, in Western India as in Bengal and Madras and their
Lordships opined that the case was one where the principle
of stare decisis should be maintained. The Calcutta High
Court has also held that the right of the adopted son, where
there was one legitimate or natural son born after the
adoption, extends under the Mitakshara only to 1/5 share of
the adoptive father’s estate, in other words, the adopted son
takes a fourth share of what is taken by the subsequently
27born legitimate son. In the case of P arm an and v. Shiv. Charan 
28
Das the Lahore High Court referred to and relied on Para.
168 of Mayne’s Hindu Law wherein it was pointed out that the 
adopted son takes 1/4 of the entire estate of adoptive father 
in Mitakshara provinces and held that among Khatris of Amritsar, 
the adopted son takes 1/4 of the entire estate where there is 
a subsequently born Aurasa son. This seems to be a more 
equitable interpretation of the texts.
Partition during father’s lifetime.
29In Venkammamidi v. Venkata the Madras High Court 
held that in a suit for partition during the lifetime of a 
Hindu father, the father and a natural born son were entitled 
to 8 shares of the property and the adopted sone to one share. 
Their Lordships observed that if Manu’s text in Ch. IX, 163
26. Sri Balusu v. Sri Balusu (1899) L.R. 26 I.A. 113; 22 Mad. 
398; Warn an v. Krishna.ii (1889) 14 I.L.R. Bom. 249*
27* Birbhadra v. Kalpatru 1 C.L.J. 388 where the cases of
Giriappa v. Ningappa (see note 2T3); Ayyavu v. Niladatchi 
see note 8) referred to and followed.
28. (1921) I.L.R. 2 Lah. 69; 59 I.C. 256. Also in Anandi v. 
Onkar, A.I.R. 1960 Raj. 251.
29. (1920) I.L.R. 43 Mad. 398. Also refer to the S.C. decision 
in Gruramma v. Mallappa A.I.R. 1964 S.C. 510 discussed at 
pp..195-96 and Derrett’s 1 M.H.L. cited at note 5 9 (p.195).
Iwere to be applied literally, the adopted son would be entitled 
to maintenance and nothing more, but Vijnaneswara commenting 
on Yajnavalkya1s text points out that this rule must be 
restricted to the case where the adopted son was not a good 
man. Since then Vasistha, Katyayana and Batidhayana have 
laid down rules as to the adopted son's share and they all 
say that the adopted son is entitled to 1/4 share. ‘The 
interpretation of this, according to the Madras High Court 
is that the property was to be divided into 5 shares, 4 shares 
to be allotted to the Aurasa and one share to the adopted son.
It was contended that the rule of Vasistha should be confined
* t
to suits between the adopted and Aurasa sons and not when the
suit is between the father and sons, relying on Bratap Singh 
50v Agar Singji wherein their Lordships had pointed out that 
the adopted son was in the same position as the natural son.
This observation was made with respect to the right of main­
tenance .
Adopted son shares equally with natural sons in collateral 
succession
51In Hagindas v Bachoo Hurkissondass  ^ it was held 
that the adopted and natural sons were entitled to equal
52shares in collateral succession. In Gangadhar v Hiralal 
it was laid down that the rule should not be extended to
55
cases of stridhan succession. In Harasimhappa v Chinna Kenchappa
JO. (1919) I.L.R. 45 Bom. 778 (P.C.).
31. (1916) I.L.R. 40 Bom. 270 (P.C.).
32. (1916) I.L.R. 43 Cal. 944 (P.O.).
33* (1917) 58 I.C. 244 (Mad.).
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and Subbarayudu v Perarazu it was taken for granted that 
even if the suit was brought in the father's lifetime the 
text of Vasistha would be applicable but in these cases there 
was no discussion on this point. In the Mitakshara section 1 
defines 'Daya', sec. 2 deals with rules relating^to partition 
in the father's lifetime, sec. 3 with partition after the 
father's death; secs. 4 to 10 deal with matters applicable 
to both classds of partition and sec. 11 discusses the right 
of the adopted son in competition with an after-born Aurasa 
son. Their Lordships therefore observed that sec. 11 must 
be considered as belonging to the same category as sections 
4 to 10. In the Dattaka Chandrika, Dattaka Mimamsa and 
Sarasvati Vilas, the rule of Vasistha is quoted as of general 
application to all cases of partition, the principle being 
that the adopted son is entitled to a limited share. In cases 
of collateral succession his share is as extended as that of 
a natural born son. Their Lordships observed that according 
to BaUdhayana the adopted child had to give and providd at 
the time of the adoption that he would not claim more than 
1/4 share of the father's property if a natural son is born.
Law in Ceylon and Pondicherry
The Thesawaleme and M. Gibelin are quoted by 
Mr. J.L. Kapur to the effect that the rule in Horth Ceylon 
and Pondicherry is according to Vriddha Gautama and all classes 
of Hindus allow an adopted son to share equally with the real
34. Appeal Ho. 104 of 1914 (unreported).
The Illotam son-in-law
36In Hanumantamma v Rama Reddi^ the Madras High 
Court held that for the purpose of succession the Illotam 
son-in-law stands in place of a son and in competition with 
the natural born son takes an equal share.
The rules applicable to Jains
37In Rukhab v Chunilal 1 the Bombay High Court
held that in the absence of special custom the ordinary Hindu
law applies to Jains and the adopted son is entitled to 1/4-
estate of the adoptive father if the natural son is born
after the adoption. In this case the appeal was by one R
the posthumous son against the decision of the District Judge
that according to custom prevalent amongst Jains, the adopted
son took an equal share with the subsequently born natural
son. Their. Lordships of the Bombay High Court observed that
the texts quoted by V.rest & Buhler (at pages 388, 773 > 935 and
1187) show that under the Mitakshara law, the adopted son is
usually entitled to 1/4- of the estate. The law was settled
38by the Privy Council decision in Chotay Lall v Chunno Lall^ 
that the Hindu lav; of inheritance is to be applied to Jains 
in the absence of usage and custom varying that lav;. Reference
35. Thesawaleme 11, 2; 1 Gib. 82, J.L. Kapur: The Law of
Adoption in India and Burma (1933) p* 4-51*
36. (1880) I.L.R. 4- Mad. 272..
37- (1892) I.L.R. 16 Bom. 34-7*
(1878)
38./L.R. 6 I.A. 15.
39was also made to Bachebi v Makhan Lall. Their Lordships 
ohserved that in the present case there was no satisfactory- 
proof of any special custom, therefore, according to Hindu 
law, the adopted son was entitled to. 1/4 of the adoptive 
father's estate.
The rule in the case of Sudras
In Asita Mohun v Nirode luohun^  it was held
relying on the authority of the Dattaka Chandrika, that
among Kayasthas (who are Sudras) the adopted son and after-
born Aurasa son shared equally. Their Lordships observed
that according to a text of Vriddha Gautama, the Dattaka and
and after-born Aurasa son share equally. The Dattaka Chandrika
(V, secs. 29 to 32) says it applies to Sudras only, the
Dattaka Mimamsa says it refers to an Aurasa son destitute
of good qualities. The Madras High Court following 77. Llac-
Haghten and Sir Thomas S^trange say it is in force among all
Sudras of S. India and also in Pondicherry, IT. Ceylon and
41Bengal. Their Lordships quoted a number of cases in support 
of the authority of the Dattaka Mimamsa and Dattaka Chandrika 
with the remark that their Lordships could not concur with 
Knox J. in saying that their authority is open to examination, 
explanation, criticism, adoption or rejection like any other 
scientific treatise on European Jurisprudence. Strangein his
 CIB8U)-----------------------------   :----
39./I.L.H. 3 All. 55.
40. (1916) 20 C.\7.H. 901, 36 I.C. 127, on appeal to P.C.
24 C .17.17. '794, L.B. 47 I.A. 140.
41. RunKama v Atchama (1846) 4 M.I.A. 1, Sri Balusu v Sri 
Balusu (1899) 3 C.Vf.N. 427 (P.C.); Nagindas v BacRoo 
(l9l6) I.I.E. 40 Bom. 270, 279 (P.O.) etc.
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Hindu Lawl»ipi 99 (Ed. 1830) states "Amongst Sudras the
afterborn son and the adopted son share equally the paternal
estate", but no authority is cited in support of it and their
Lordships thought that it was apparently based on the Dattaka'
$(wkaSv
Chandrika. Golap Chandra^/Sastri in his Hindu law (4-th edn.)
questioned the authority of the Dattaka Chandrika, the work
being said to be a literary forgery and according to rumour
"Written in support of an adoption case which was pending in
the Calcutta High Court". G.S. Shastri says that the rule
relating to Sudras was a novel one enumerated for the first
time in the Dattaka Chandrika. Prom this observation the
Privy Council observed in the case of Sri Balusu v Sri
Balusu^ that caution was required in accepting its glosses,
where it deviated from or added to theSmritis. Equal share
between the adopted and Aurasa son was accepted by the Madras
42High Court in Pafja v Subbaraya and quoted by the Privy
31 43Council in Hagindas v Bachoo. In Baramanund v Krishnacharan ^
the Calcutta High Court held that para. 23 of Section 5 of
Dattaka Chandrika does not apply to Sudras. It was pointed
out that in Dattaka Llimamsa, Vols. 40 to 44, Vyavafrara Darpana
1042 to 1046, Vyavahara Chandrika (Ed. 1880) Vol. 2, p. 169;
Dayakrama Sangraha Ch. YII, Cl. 23, Dayatattwa by Haghunandan,
Ch. II, Yol. 37» Dayabhaga Ch. X, Sec. 9* Yol. 13; Vyavahara
Mayukha, Mandslik edn. p. 60 and Mitakshara Ch. I, Sec. XII,
Vols. 24 to 25, no special rules as to Sudras hadbeen laid
down. According to the Dattaka Chamdxika V, 29 to 32, however
the Aurasa and adopted son got equal share in the case of
42. (1883) I.L.H. 7 Mad. 233-
43. (1844) 14 C.L.J. 183-
Sudras, which view was adopted "by their Lordships. On appeal 
to the Privy Council from the decision of the High Court of 
Bengal, their Lordships of the Privy Council concurred with 
the decision of the High Court.
I am inclined to thinkthat this decision is not free
from doubt and I would agree with the observation of the Privy
4-1Council in/Balusu v /Balusu mentioned above that caution is 
required in accepting the glosses (of Dattaka Chandrika), 
where it deviates from or adds to the Smritis. There appears 
to be no exception in the case of Sudras to the Smriti rule 
that the adopted son takes a reduced share in competition
with an after-born Aurasa son.
44-In an earlier case, the Calcutta High Court had 
held that on partition in a Kitakshara family an adopted son 
and the adopted son of a natural son stood exactly in the same 
position and each took only the share proper of an adopted son 
i.e., half the share which he would have taken had he been a 
natural son. The fact that such an adopted son, a member of 
a Kitakshara family, becomes upon adoption a joint owner of 
the family property, will not prevent the operation of the 
rule. Their Lordships observed that according to Dattaka 
Chandrika V, 24, 25 an adopted son and an adopted son of a 
natural son stood exactly in the same position i.e. entitled 
to half the share of the natural son. The contention that 
according to the Mitakshara Ch. 1, Pt. ii, V, 25 the sons 
interest vests as soon as he is born cannot stand as no right 
vests in any member as long as the family was joint. The same
44. Baghubanund Doss v Sadhu Churn Doss (1879) I.L.R. 4 Cal. 
425.
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view was maintained in Debi Prasad v Thakur Dial with the 
observation that if there was signification of intention then 
from that moment the interest became both several and defined.
. ■/! Vl
In this case, however, as so such intention was expressed 
in the liftime of the son, their Lordships held that the 
adopted son was entitled only to 1/6 share. The correctness 
of this decision was doubted by the Madras High Court in Rarja 
v Subbaraya^  Their Lordships of the Madras High Court doubted 
whether the passage in Dattaka Chandrika V, 25, even \ith the 
addition (in Sutherland’s translation) suggested by the 
Calcutta High Court had been eorrectly interpreted. Their 
Lordships also observed that assuming that according to 
Mitakshara, the share of an adopted son on partition is limited 
to one-half of the share which he would have taken had he been 
a natural son, this rule does not apply to Sudras amongst whom 
the adopted son is declared to be entitled to an equal share 
with a legitimate son born after the adoption. By represen­
tation the adopted son takes the share which his adoptive 
father would be entitled to take on partition. The decision
in Ra,ja v Subbaraya was dissented from in Narasimhappa v
47Chinna Kenchappa,1 wherein it was held that among Sudras, 
as among twice-born castes, an adopted son was entitled to 
one-fourth of the share of a natural son subsequently born.
46Their Lordships observed that the decision in Ratja v Subbaraya 
had been dissented from by the Chief Justice and Seshagiri 
Aiyar J. in Karuturi Gopalan v Karuturi Venkata where all
.(1875)
45./I.L.B. 1 All. 105.
46. (1883) I.L.R. 7 Mad. 253.
47- (1917) 38 I.C. 244, 248.
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the authorities had been fully gone into. This latter case 
was followed by Ayling and Srinivas Aiyangar J.J. in Appeals 
Hob. 104 of 1914 etc. Their lordshipa thought they were quite 
clear that the Chandrika followed in Ra.ia v. Subbaraya^  had 
perverted the ancient texts on this question of the share 
which an adopted son of a Sudra father was entitled to. All 
other Hindu texts both ancient and modern have dissented from 
the Dattaka Chandrika and their Lordships were prepared to 
follow the decision of Sheshagiri Aiyar J. in Karuturi Goral an’s 
case. I am inclined to agree with this decision. There 
appears to be no authority in the Smritis for son*s adopted by 
Sudras to be treated differently from the twice born classes.
Even in the text attributed to Vriddha Gautama, which is 
considered to be a spurious one, there is no mention that the
s'
rule is to be applied to Sudras only. As such I. think there seems
to be no textual authority for the special rule for Sudras.
In a later case Arumilli Perrazu v. Subbarayadu.^
the Privy Council held that in the case of Sudras in the
Madras Presidency, an adopted son, on partition of the family
property shared equally with a son or sons of the adoptive
father born after the adoption. It was observed by their
Lordships that the rule stated in Dattaka Chandrika (see V, 29,
32) as to the share of an adopted son among Sudras had been
accepted and acted on for more than a century in that Presidency
until it was disturbed by the decision of the Madras High
22Court in Karuturi G-opalan v. Karuturi Venkata. Their 
Lordships observed that the rule, although not supported by 
the Smritis or by the Mitakshara was not inconsistent with
48. (1921) I.L.R. 44 Mad. 656 (P.C.). This rule has been
followed in Bengal and Madras (see above) but rejected in 
Bombay and Nagpur: Laxman v. Mst^__Bayabai A.I.R. 1955 Nag.
241.
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them and that the same rule applied among Sudras in Bengal.
The earliest authority for the proposition that among Sudras,
the adopted and natural son shared equally was the Dattaka
Chandrika (V, 29, 32) for among Sudras all sons share equally
as against the other castes wherein the shares may "be unequal.
The ^attaka Chandrika does not state the authority but refers
to the text of Vriddha G-autama which is not accepted by the
Indian Courts or the Mitakshara or Dayabhaga as a correct
statement of the lav/ applicable to all Hindus. The Dattaka .
Chandrika had been accepted as a high authority on adoption
nq -^-ke cq
as various cases viz. Bungamma v Atchama, / Collector of Madura
etc. and by various English authorities. Jolly in Tagore
law lectures of 1883 says
"The Dattaka Mimamsa and Dattaka Chandrika 
have furnished almost exclusively the scanty 
basis on which the modern law of adoption has 
been based".
Also it has been stated by Mr. William Macnaghten and Sir 
Thomas Strange that in the Southern Provinces among Sudras 
the adoptive and after-born Aurasa son share equally the 
father’s property^which statement, according to their LoEdships, 
was doubtless based on the Dattaka Chandrika. Their Lordships 
also referred to the case law on the point. The earliest
48reported case was in Madras in 1883 viz. Ra,ja v Subbar ay a
which approved the view of Dattaka Chandrika. The next case
22was of Gopalan v Venkata wherein it was held that the dictum 
based on the authority of Dattaka Chandrika should not be
49- 4 M.I.A. 1, 102, 7 W.H. (P.C.) 37-
’1868)
30./12 M.I.A. 397, 10 W.B. 17.
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•51followed and stated that Avvavu v. Niladatchi  ^ should have 
been brought to the notice of their Lordships in Raja’s case. ^
mm
As Dattaka Chandrika was an authority in Bengal where among
Sudras the adopted son is given an:equal share with an after-
born Aurasa son as decided in the cases of As it a Mohan^  and
52Barmanund Mahanti and considering the texts of Menu,
Yajnavalkya, the Mitakshara and other commentaries their
Lordships of the Privy Council concluded that it cannot be
said that the DattakeT Chandrika had in any way deviated from
the Smritis. I am unable to agree with their Lordships’ decision
for reasons mentioned above at p. 189* I think the decision and
22views expressed in Karturi G-opalan’s case lay down the correct
law on this subject, i.e.; that in the case of Sudras, as in the
case of twice-born castes the adopted son takes a reduced share
in competition with an after-born Aurasa son under Shastric law.
Competition between adopted and illegitimate sons.
In the case where there is a competition between an
adopted son and illegitimate sons it was held in Maharaja of
53Kolhapur v. Sundaram Iyer that as between the one adopted son
and six illegitimate sons, the former was entitled to 4/7ths
and the latter were entitled to 3/7 of the estate. Their 
Lordships explained and applied the Privy Council decision
5 A
in Kamulammal v. Y. Naicker wherein it was held that an 
illegitimate son of a Sudra takes half of what he would have
53taken had he been legitimate. In the case under consideration,  ^
as the Raja left 6 illegitimate sons and one son had since been 
adopted, their Lordships observed that the estate must be 
divided into 7 shares. The 6 illegitimate sons will get, 
among themselves, 3/7ths and the adopted son 4/7ths of the
51. (1862) 1 M.H.C.R. 45.
52. (1844) 14 C.L.J. 183; 12 I.C. 6.
53. (1925) I.L.R. 48 Mad. 1, 93 I.C. 705.
54. (1923) I.L.R. 46 Mad., 167 (P.O.).
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whole estate i.e., the adopted son was to he treated like a 
natural legitimate son.
Tatural and adopted sons by different wives.
55In Gangadhar v Hiralal one S , a Hindu governed by
the I itakshara School of Hindu Law married four wives in
succession. In conjunction with his first wife, by whom he
had no issue, he adopted a son H. By his second wife, S had
a son G born to him. S predeceased his fourth wife M, having
had no issue by her. M died intestate. On a suit brought by
II, it was held that both H and G were entitled to succeed to
M's stridhan property as sapinias of S, and in the absence of
any express text curtailing the rights of the adopted son in
the circumstances of the present case, H was entitled to share
equally with G on the general principle that the adopted son
occupies the same position as a natural son and his rights are
in every respect similar to those of a natural son. Ihe
defendant in this case ha dl based his claim on the texts of
Hanu (If, 183) and Yajnavalkya (II, 117? 145)* fheir Lordships
however observed that according to the principle in The
56Collector of Iladura v Loo too Ramalinga the duty of a European 
Judge was not so much as to enquire whether a disputed doctrine 
was fairly deducible from the earliest authorities as to
ascertain whether it had been received by the particular shcool
of the place. The parties in this case were governed by the 
Hitakshara (Benares) school. Section 21 of the second chapter 
of the itakshara treats of the separate property of a woman.
35- (1916) I.L.R* 43 Cal. 944, 970.
56. (1 68) 12 loo. I. _. 397, 436.
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Manu’s text (IX, 183) wif among all the wives ... one has a son,
Manu declares them all to become mother’s of such son”, was,
according to their lordships a misapplication in this case.
Kulluka points out that adoption by a childless wife was
excluded in such a case and Raghunandana observes this
excludes the levirate, which is also the view of Sarva.inanarayana.
another commentator of Manu. To the same effect as Manu
are Vishnu (XV, 41) and Vasistha (XVII, 11). Mookherjee J.
• •
57referred to Lala Jotilal v. Duranikower wherein it was held 
that the step-mother cannot succeed to the estate of the step­
son, which was the law for over half a century. Their Lordships 
in Gangadharfs oase^  observed that the above argument involved 
an Atidesa upon an Atidesa i.e., a fiction upon a fiction. 
According to Mookherjee J* the term son does not include the 
son of a rival wife although the Viramitrodaya treats the son 
of a rival wife as a preferential heir to the husband. Their 
lordships concluded that neither of these two were qualified 
as a son and the estate devolved on sapindas and as these two 
were sapindas of the same degree they inherited equally.
Punjab custom
Under the Punjab customary law, an appointed heir
has been held to succeed equally with a natural son born after
58the appointment of the heir. But in the case of Khatris 
of Amritsar it was held, relying on para. 168 of Mayne1s 
Hindu law, that in provinces which follow the Mitakshara School 
of law the adopted son took 1/4 of the adoptive father’s estate.
57. [1864J B.L.R. (P.B.) 67; (1864) W.R. (P.B.) 173.
58. Waryam Singh v. Ishar Singh (1932) I.I.E. 13 lah. 589;




The Smriti lav; giving the natural son greater rights 
in competition with the other kinds of sons could possibly 
have been based on the ground that the natural son is obviously 
superior to the other kinds of sons and therefore deserved 
greater rights in the father's property as compared to the 
other kinds of sons. But the modern trend is to give equal 
rights to the adopted and the subsequently born natural sons. 
Section 12 of the Hindu Adoption and Maintenance Act 1956 lays 
down that
'an adopted child shall be deemed to be the 
child of his or her adoptive father or mother 
for all purposes with effect from the date of 
the adoption and from such date all the ties 
of the child in the family of his or her birth 
shall be deemed to be severed and replaced by 
those created by the adoption in the adoptive 
family'.
Thus the section confers on the adoptee the same rights and 
privileges in the family of the adopter as the legitimate 
natural son, subject to the proviso in S. 12(a) that the child 
cannot marry any person v/hom he or she could not have married 
if he or she had continued in the family of his or her birth.
By the use of the words "for all purposes" no distinction 
between a natural and adopted son is made except as mentioned 
in the provisos to the section.
Where an adopted son and one Aurasa son share in 
the property of one who dies before June 1956, the son's share 
(i.e., a single share vis-a-vis the widow i.e., 1/2 to the son 
and 1/2 to widow under H.A.B.F.A.) is divided between the 
Aurasa and the dattaka (an iniquitous rule but traditional).
Hoh/ this works (i.e.; 4/5 x 1/2 to the Aurasa and 1/5 x 1/2
195
to the dattaka) is shown in Gurwimna v. Mallappa. ^  Now after 
June 1956 to Dec. 1956 the same rule applied to the share a 
son v/ould take in competition with mother, widow, daughter's 
son, son's son etc. After Dec. 1956 the Aurasa and adoptee
C A
count as two sons. However, as rightly pointed out by Derrett, 
at partitions of Joint-family property the proportions indicated 
above still apply as far as interests acquired by birth or 
adoption are concerned, though not in relation to undivided 
interests which have passed by testamentary or intestate 
succession under the Hindu Succession Act, 1956. Consider, for 
example, a Mitakshara coparcenary of members of the 'twice-born* 
Hindus consisting of F, A and B the brother of F as follows
W = Fd - 1958 'B
S - b - 1957 A adopted
Nov. 1956
A was adopted by F. in November 1956, S was born to W, 
the wife of F, in 1957. In 1958 F died intestate. A and S 
separate in 1959. The'.question is what is A's share (a)
as heir and (b) as coparcener.
The share in coparcenary property that would have been 
allotted to F. at a partition before his death i.e.; 1/8 
devolved on W, A, and S in equal shares and each of them would 
get £4 estate. At the partition in 1959 between A and
59* A.I.E. 1964 S.C. 510. Also see Derrett:/Modern Hindu
Daw (1963 edn.) pp. 122 to 124* See also Venkammammamidi./.s 
nase (1920) I.L.R. 43 Mad. 398 at p.181'above.
60. Derrett, J.D.M.s Introduction to Modern Hindu Law (1963),
- - - para.■186. ...........................................
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A A
S, A takes ^  ^ x 2/4 (Afs and S's coparcenary interest in
1 1 1 1 1  
F's branch) x ^ (interest of P ’s branch) i.e.; + ^0 = £0
the family estate, while S takes ^  + 5 z 2/4 x | i.e.; ^  +
1 O Q  (L A
5 =1Z0 '^!ie same estate. As remarked by Derrett the reduced
share of the dattaka enriches only the Aurasa.
Position under English law
The curtailment of the adopted sonfs rights of 
inheritance in the adoptive father's property in competition 
with a natural son born to the adoptive father after adoption, 
is peculiar to the Hindu law and does not have a counterpart 
in any modern legal system. In the English law, the adoption 
Act of 1926 only transferred the guardianship rights and 
obligations of the adoptive child from the natural father 
toirrfche adopter and did not confer on the adopted child any 
right or interest in the adoptive father's property. But the 
later Acts of 1950 and 1958 lay down that "the infant shall 
stand to the adopter exclusively in the position of a child
go
born to the adopter in lawful wedlock". So also in respect 
of intestacies, wills and settlements the Adoption Acts of 
1958 and 1950 (Sections 16 and 13 respectively) lay down that 
the property (other than entails arranged before the date of 
the order) devolves in all respects as if the adopted person 
were the child of the adopter born in lawful wedlock and were 
not the child of any other person. As to the devolution of 
entails and estates accompanying a title, Section 16(3) of
61. Derrett, J.D.M.; Introduction to Modern Hindu law (1963)> 
p. 124 note 5*
62. Adoption Act, 1958, Section 13(1) last part.
the Adoption Act of 1958, however, expressly excludes from 
the effects of an order. xn aich case the property devolves 
as if Section 16 had not been enacted.
As I have already mentioned earlier this proviso 
seems to he inequitable and contradictory to the earlier 
provisions of the Act i.e. Section 1351) quoted above and 
also opposed to the considerations of the welfare of the child 
which factor is an important basis of the English adoption law
CHAPTER V
THE ADOPTED SPIT'S RIGHT TC SUCCEED COLLATERALLY
Views of Text writers
A perusal of the Smriti texts would show that almost 
all the Smriti-writers recognize the right of the adoptive son 
to succeed to the property of the adoptive father. However, 
as regards the right of an adoptee to succeed collaterally 
there appears to be a conflict between the Smritis: According
to one group the adopted son inherits both to the adoptive 
father and to his kinsmen, whilst according to the other group 
he inherits only to the adoptive father. The commentators 
tried to reconcile the conflicting Smriti texts by explaining 
that the possession of good qualities will entitle the adopted 
son to inherit from his adoptive father and from his kinsmen, 
otherwise he will inherit only from his adoptive father. Thus 
Ivlanu (IX, 158-160), Brihaspati (5 Big* 162-171)? Gautama 
(XXVIII, 52-55)? Baudhayana (II, 2, 10-25)? the Kalika Furana 
(5 Big’* 155) and the Brahma pur ana (5 Big. 174) place the
  rJ
dattaka in the former group whilst Yajnavalkya (ii, 128-152), 
Vishnu (XX, 1-27)? Narada (VIII, 45-46), Sankha and Likhita 
(5 Big. 151)? Bevala (5 Big* 155)? Harita (5 Big. 152) and 
Yama (5 Big. 154-) place &im in the latter group. The views 
of the Smriti-writers and the commentators have been discussed 
above.^
In a Bayabhaga case, Puddo Kumaree Bebee v Juggut
2Ilishore Acharjee, the B.C. affirmed the decision of the
1. See ante pages tO^kdOZ*
2. (1880) I.L.R. 5 Cal. 615, 650; affirmed by P.O. in (1882) 
ILL. Gal. ^02: 8 T.A. ??Q. _________________________
Calcutta High Court that the rights of an adopted son 
(including the right to succeed to the Sapinda kinsmen of 
the adoptive father) are in every respect similar to those 
of a natural "born son unless curtailed "by express texts.
Hitter J. of the Calcutta High Court opined that gotra- 
dayadas includes all sapindas whether of the bhinna-gotra or
.... -3
/Samana-gotra. He referred to the Dattaka-nimaiqsa and Dattaka- 
—hChandrika to show that there was no difference between a 
dattaka and a natural son in matters of succession to the 
property of his adoptive father’s collaterals. Further ^ ls 
Lordship explained that the contention that V. 8 of Chapter 
X of the Dayabhaga supports the conclusion of the lower court 
was not true as a careful examination of V. 7 would show.
The same text of Devala (as referred to in the Dattaka IJimamsa 
and the Dattaka Chandrika) recites the different sons and 
classifies them in the order (i) the son begotten by a man 
himself (ii) procreated by another (iii) the son received and 
(iv) the son .'Voluntarily given. After having classified them 
in this manner the text says "Among these the first six are 
heirs of kinsmen, etc." The "first six" refers to first six 
according to the classification immediately preceding and not 
according to the recital of different descriptions of sons 
given in an earlier portion of the text (wherein the dattaka 
is ninth on the list) . Also in a note by Sri Krishna Tarka-
5
lanksra a similar classification is given which is as follows: 
"Issue begotten by a man himself" comprises (i) the Aurasa or
5. D.M.S. Ill, 1, SV, 28; SYI, 53, 32, 38, 39, 30 to 32.
4. D.C. V 22; III, 16-18.
5. Stokes Hindu Law Books, p. 500'.
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real son (ii) son by a twice married woman (iii) son of a
Brahmin by a Sudra woman (iv) an ’appointed’ daughter. "Issue
procreated by another man" intends the son of the wife and so
forth. "Sons received for adoption" are (i) Datta, a son
given (ii) Krita, on bought (iii) son of a pregnant bride
(iv) son born of an unmarried damsel (v) Kritrima son by an
arrangement between two parties. "Voluntarily given" signifies
presented unsought comprising (i) son rejected (by his own
parents) (ii) one who comes of his own accord (iii) a son
secretly produced.
According to this classification also, it would be
seen that the dattaka son falls within the first six. Their
Lordships of the Calcutta High Court also referred to the case
of Sumbhoo Chunder v Naraini Debee  ^wherein the P.C. had held
that the doctrine that the adopted son is not an heir to
collateral relations is in opposition to Manu’s text and on
fuller consideration of the Dayabhaga, the views of the
I!itakshara and the opinions given by Fundits of the Court,
came to the conclusion that according to Hindu law, an adopted
son succeeds, not only lineally, but collaterally to the
inheritance of his adoptive father’s relations. JaganFhatha 
7
in his Digest' expressed the same view. Their Lordships of 
the Calcutta High Court therefore held that an adopted son 
is an heir, to kinsmen as well as to his own adoptive father.
Dattaka inherits to collateral in Hithila also'
In the case of Chandreshwar Frasad v BishesInvar
_ _ _
6 . / 5  V/.E. 100 ( P . C . ) .
7. Vol. iii, pp. 270-273.
o
Pratap their Lordships of the Patna High Court held that a
dattaka son in the Mithila school inheirtfe to collaterals.
Their Lordships opined that the dattaka son is recognised
in the Uitakshara and under the Mitabshara the dattaka inherits
to collaterals. The question was how far the Mithila school
departed from the Mitakshara. Under the Mithila school, due
to the interpretation of Vasi£htha's text a widow cannot
adopt and therefore the Kritrima son is the consequential
q
innovation by Brahmins. Their Lordships remarked tiat there 
was nothing to show that the dattaka was obsolete in Mithila 
and the question was whether the dattaka inherits in Mithila.
Their Lordships referred to the views of Vachaspati 
Misra, who did not adopt the distinction (i.e. the classification 
into Eandhudayadas, etc.) between "succedaneous" i.e. 'second­
ary' and "non-succedaneous" sons. After referring to Llanu 
and BaUdhayana, both of whom place the adopted son amongst
the first six and to Levala, he deals with the texts of Vishnu1 «
and Yajnavalkya who make no distinction between "succedaneous" 
and "non-succedaneous" sons. Vachaspati Misra interprets Yama 
and Narada (according to whom the first six sons in the 
respective lists inherit to the adoptive father and his 
collaterals and the latter six only to the adoptive father), 
as "on default of each preceding, the next succeeding in order 
is entitled to the property" and places the adopted son seventh 
in the list, entitled to the inheritance in default of the 
first six. Their Lordships of the Patna High Court therefore
8 . [1926] I.L.R. 5 Pat. 777> 84-6 et seq.
9. Also see Derrett: Introduction to Modern Hindu Law (1963)
P« 200 and A.I.E. 1963 Pat. 362. (Umesh Bhagat v Smt.
held that the dattaka in the Mithila school is capable of
inheriting to the collaterals of his adoptive father.
The English writers F. and W.H. Macnaghten are also
of the opinion that an adopted son succeeds both lineally and
collaterally.^
Manu makes the transfer of the adopted son from
the natural family to the adoptive family complete by declaring
that "an adopted son shall never take the family name and the
estate of his natural father ... the funeral oblations of him
who gives his son in adoption cease as far as that son is
concerned".^  The Dattaka Mimamsa and the Dattaka Chandrika
expressly lay down that the dattaka is a substitute for a real
legitimate son both for purposes of inheritance and for
purposes of funeral oblations and that he is a sapinda to the
members of the adoptive family and that the forefathers of
12his adoptive mother are his 'maternal grandsires1.
Opinions of Courts in Bayabhaga cases
13As observed in Joy Kishore v Panchoo ' there is no
difference as regards SapipgLa relationship between the adopted 
and the natural born son. An adopted son inherits as heir the 
estate of a natural son in virtue of his adoption, though made 
after the latter's decease (by the adoptive step-mother in 
this case) .^ 'r In Kishennath v Hureegobind^  the question to
10. P. Macnaghten 128-132; 1 W. Nacnaghten p. 78; 2 W. Mac­
naghten 178.
11. IX, 14-2.
12. Dat. Mim. VI, 50-53, Bat. Ch. Ill, 17, 20, v. 24-.
(1879)
13 • Joy Kishore v Panchoo/4- C.L.R. 558.
14-. Jo.y. Chundro -v - Bhyrut- Chundro 0184.9V s .pzcfii . Also in 
 k/notes contd. on next page_________
be determined was whether the heir of an adopted son could
succeed collaterally. The Sudder Diwany Adaulat referred to
the decisions of the court reported in Vol. VI of the Select
Reports 1P ’ . 205, and Vol. I 'P' 209 and the doctrine laid
down in Lacnaghten's Principles of Hindoo Law, Vol. I, p. 78
and in Sutherland’s translation of the Dattaka Chandrika,
p. 202 and held that an adopted son is entitled to succeed
collaterally and the appellant being the son and representative
of such adopted son, was entitled to succeed to the rights
and interests of his father in the property, whatever they
may be. So also the adopted son succeeds to the property of
his adoptive father's brother, and in Bengal, where the
Da.yabhaga prevails, an adopted son succeeds collaterally,
as well as lineally, in the family of his adoptive father.^
In this connection their Lordships of the S.D. Court refer
to the following observation of l.H. Macnaghten in his
Principles of Hindoo Lav/ (Vol. I at ' p ' 78)
"Another point which has been the subject of 
much discussion is as to whether an adopted son 
by the dattaka frrm succeeds collaterally as 
well as lineally, but this may now be fairly
said tc be set at rest and decided in the affir­
mative. It is true that Jimutavahana in the 
Dayabhaga has contended that the son adopted 
in the dattaka form cannot succeed to the 
property of his ado;; tive father's relations, 
but the doctrine being in opposition to the 
text of Menu, cannot be held entitled to any 
weight" . / *>cl
Footnotes contd. from previous page
Shamchander v Narayni (1807) 1 S.D. 279 it was held that 
an adopted son succeeds collaterally as well as lineally 
in adoptive father's family (1835) 5 vV.R. 100 (P.C.) 
followed in Gourhuree v Lt Rutnasuree (1837) 6 S.D. 250.
15- [18591 S.D. 18.
16. lokenath v Shamasoonduree [1858] S.D. 1863; Gooroopershad
v kashbeher:/ [i860]. I S.D. 411...., >. -
/6<x ■ >|ou>€ vre r  <x d.c'oirc^Lnov 04
7<j S p e e  «2O0)a>i s o n  e*v(V(< J L d  C & ^ a M ^ r c ^ i U j  .
: 20If.
17In Guru Gobind v Anand Lai ' (another Dayabhaga
case) it was held that, on the theory of spiritual benefit
the adopted son of a paternal uncle’s daughter is entitled
to be recognised as an heir according to the Hindu lav/ current .
in the Bengal school, even though not specifically mentioned
in the Dayabhaga. Bor under the Dayabhaga the principle
recognised is that of spiritual benefit on which the Hindu
law of inheritance is essentially based. The text of Manu
('To the nearest Sapinda, male or female, the inheritance
belongs'.) is interpreted by the Dayabhaga - the nearest heir
is he who is competent to confer benefit on the soul of the
deceased proprietor. The power of the widow (being half of
her husband's body) to confer spiritual benefit commences
from the date of the death of her husband v/hereas the son,
grandson and great grandson confer such benefit from the moment 
18of their birth, hence the latter are preferred to the former 
in matters of succession under the Dayabhaga. The next 
exception is the daughter because she can confer great 
spiritual benefit by giving birth to a son who will deliver 
him and his ancestors from hell, hence childless daughters 
are excluded from the line of inheritance. The male heirs 
are divided into (a) Sapindas (b) Sakulyas (c) Samanadokas 
and (d) specified strangers, from spiritual preceptor to 
learned Brahmins. On this theory of spiritual benefit the 
paternal uncle's daughter's son is one of his sapindas and
,Ben.
17- [1870] 5 /.L.Ii. 15 (F.B.).
18. Dayabhaga, Ch. XI, S. 1, V. 43 quoted in the case. For
Dayabhaga succession see Sarvadhikari! Principles of 
Hindu lav/ of Inheritance p. 657 et seq, Kane: History
of Dharmasastra, Vol. Ill, p. 734- ff and Derrett: Introd.
to Modern Hindu L a w  paras 614- to 618. Also PLD 1967
. . .Dacca 745 must .now. he .tak-en into account. - f-Rab-indranath - -
v Rarayaw Chandra)
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hence a preferable heir in this case. Sapiflflas are those that 
are entitled to offer oblations to a common ancestor, and the 
son of paternal uncle's daughter, even though not specifically 
mentioned in the Dayabhaga, is a sapinda. The great majority 
of them have been left to be determined by the application of 
principles of spiritual benefit.
Dattaka inherits collaterally - Litakshar~ cases
Under the Punjab customary lav/ it has been held that
1°the adoption of a daughter's son is valid " and that, as soon
as adopted, the adopted son becomes a coparcener with the
adoptive father and the latter cannot dispose of any joint
family property. But this was a case in Mitakshara law and
not actually in Punjab customary law.
The Privy Council observed in the case of Sumboo 
20Chunder v Naraini Dibeh that the adopted son of the whole 
blood was in the same situation as a natural son of the whole 
blood and that according to the authorities a brother of while 
blood succeeds in preference to one of half-blood. According
^ OCX.
to the Dayabhaga, Colebrooke's principles of Hindoo Law p. 177? 
Sutherland's Synopsis p. 219? the LI itakshara and the opinions 
given by Pundits of the Court, the adopted son succeeds not
only to the adoptive father but also succeeds collaterally.
Their Lordships
/ therefore held that the adopted son of a full brother 
had a preferential right to succeed over that of the real son
19. Parmanand v Shiv Charan Das [1921] I.L.R. 2 Lah. 69;
59 I.C. 256; Kirpa Ram v %abi Datt [1924] I.L.R. 5 Lah. 
154; Rup Narain v Gopal DeVi [1^09] I.L.R. 56 Cal. 780
(P.C.).
20. (1855) 5 V/.K. (P.C.V lOQ: 3 Knapp, P.O. 55,- -p
lo a. C ole b rOokc'AJX.* JuprA. c ~o e m ta.y y b tj Jcxaavnnav.otr- J»., * J T 7 ,  d . /. JhCL
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of a half brother# Following this decision it was held in
21Taramchun v. Kripa Moyee that the adopted son is entitled 
to the share of his father in the property of kinsmen and 
when he comes to share with heirs other than the Aurasa son 
his share remains unaffected vis-a-vis the other relations as 
he represents his adoptive father and is entitled to his share. 
Hence an adopted son shares equally with natural relations of 
the same degree to the property of a distant collateral (in 
this case to the property of the first cousin of his adoptive 
grandfather).
22In Padmakumari v. Court of Wards it was held that 
an adopted son succeeds to his father*s sapindas, whether 
related through males or through females just as if he were a 
real son. This case has been discussed at p.3<?^which may 
be referred to.
21. (1868) 9 W.R. 423; approved by the Privy Council in 
Hagindas v. Bachoo (1915) 20 C.W.N. 703 18 Bom. L.R. 172.
22. (1882) I.L.R. 8 Cal. 302 P.O. + 8 I.A. 229.
The doctrine of the Dayabhaga 10, 8 that the adopted son is 
not an heir of collateral relations (Sapindas) which is in 
op osition to Lanu's text had been considered by the F.C. in 
.dumbhoochunder v ITaraini Dibeh' and held that the adopted 
son succeeds not only lineally but collaterally to the inheri­
tance of his relations by adoption.
3So also in Kali Komul v Uma ^hunker •- the F.C. 
affirmed the view of the Calcutta High Court that the succes­
sion of an adopted son to the relatives of the adoptive mother 
was in the same way as a legitimate son. Following the
a
decisions in Kali Komul v Uma Sunker" and in Fadmakumari v
22Court of Wards it was, held in Radha Frasad v Ranee Mani
Dassee^' that an adopted son holds precisely the same position
as a son born as regards inheritance from the adoptive mother's
relations and that the status of an adopted son, unless
modified by express texts, is similar to that of a son born,
as regards the performance of periodical obsequial ceremonies
and inheritance. It would appear that the adopted son's right
to succeed to ''Ehinna-C-otra' sapindas seems to be recognised
by Courts of lav/ on the negative ground that no text lays down
that the adopted son cannot succeed to the estate of relations
of the adoptive parents sprung from a different family. In
26“Teencowree v Denonath it had been held that an adopted son 
had all the rights ahd privileges of c\n (iuraSA soy) and was also
23- In the H.C.: (1880) I.L.R. 6 Cal. 256; in the F.C. (1883) 
L.S. 10 I.A. 138.
2y. (1906) I.L.R. 35 Cal. 947 F.B.
2b“. (1865) 5 W.R. 49-
2 .0 %
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entitled to succeed to the /Stridhana -^ of his mother in the
absence of daughters, in like manner as a son born, whether
there be or be not a will in his favour. Also a son adopted
by one wife may succeed to a co-wife's stridhana. In Dattatraya 
2 Hv Gangabai it was held that a son's daughter's adopted son 
is a preferential heir to the late owner's sister's daughter.
In this case both the contestants were Atmajbandhus and the 
only test to determining heirship was propinquity to the 
propositus (none of these were mentioned in the Mitakshara 
or the Mayukha which list was considered as illustrative and
y O'
not exhaustive). According to Shah J. the test of religious 
efficacy was not a s£fe guide and not of assistance in deter­
mining nearness of blood relationship in the case of distant 
relations as in the present case. The contention that the 
defendent was an adopted son and could not take the place of 
a natural son was overruled in view of the decision in Kali 
Komul v Uma Shunkur.^  According to Shah J. in the case of 
bandhus equally removed from the propositus, one in direct 
line of descent should be preferred to one in a collateral 
line and the son's daughter's son is a nearer bandhu to the 
sister's daughter though they are both equally removed from M e
2 6. Refer Kane: History of Dharmasastra, Yol. Ill, p. 770
ff. for a discussion on Stridhana.
2V. (1922) I.L.R. 4-6 Bom. 54-1.
I.L.R.
As held in Mohandas v Krishnabai (1881)/5 Bom. 597 and 
Parot Bapalal v Mehta Barilal "TT894-) 19 Bom. 651, that 
propinquity is the sole test and the former case preferred 
Atma bandhus not mentioned in Mitakshara to one mentioned 
in Mitakshara - confirmed by P.C. in Adit Uarayan v 
Mahabir Prasad (1921) L.R. 4-8 I.A. 86 and Veaachala v 
Subramania (1^21) L.R. 4-8 I.A. 34-9* Lor miles of Mitakshara 
succession refer to Derrett unt-Modern Hindu lav/ (1963) 
p. 361 et seq.
I.L.R.
*29* Una Sankar v Kali Komul (188l)/6 Cal. 257 approved by P.C 
in Kalr Lonul 1. :a bliiinkur (1883/L *R. 10 1 .A. 138 . 
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propositus.
*50In Nagindas v. Bachoo  ^ it has been held that the 
adopted son has the same rights as a legitimate son except 
in competition with an after-born legitimate son of the father, 
in which case his share is reduced. The only question in 
appeal in this case was whether the appellant (as a member 
of the joint family by adoption) took on partition a share 
equal to that of the respondent (a member by birth) or a 
reduced share. Their Lordships of the P.C. were of the 
opinion that the learned judges of the High Court had put a 
wrong interpretation on V. 24, 25 of the Dattaka Chandrika.
The Dattaka Mimamss in 10, 1 adds "On the death of him (the 
natural born son) he (the adopted son) is entitled to the 
whole". Both Vasishtha and Nanda Pandita were referring to 
competition between an adopted and after-born legitimate son 
and not to competition between an adopted member of one family 
and natural son of another. What the Dattaka Chandrika meant 
was that the adopted son would share equally with his uncle 
whilst an adopted son of . adopted soil.cannot take a greater
share than his father in competition with an uncle naturally
32
....................................... 31
bom. Raghubanand Doss v. Sadhu Chum/ was wrongly decided,
and an opposite view was taken in Tara Mohun v. Kripa Moyee'
33which was followed in Dinanath Mukherji v. Gopal Churn and






1916) I.L.R. 40 Bom. 270
1879)/?.L.R. 4 Cal. 425. 
1868) 9 W.R. 425.
1881) 8 Cal. L.R. 57. 
1885) I.L.R. 7 Mad. 253.
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V 25 of Dattaka Chandrika had been correctly construed by the
High Court in Sumboo Chunder v. Naraini^  it was held that
the adopted son becomes for all purposes son of the adoptive
father which view was approved in Padma Kunari v. Court of 
56Wards that the adopted son succeeds lineally and collaterally
and occupies the same position as a natural son except in
respect of marriage and in competition with an after-born son
of the adoptee.
It is a canon of interpretation in Hindu Law that a
special text forming an exception to a general text should be
construed strictly and applied only to the cases falling
57clearly within it.
58In Anandi v. Hari Suba  ^ it was held that under the 
Mitakshara school of Hindu law the adoptive mother is entitled 
to succeed in preference to the adoptive father, to a son taken 
in adoption. According to the Mitakshara. when a son dies 
leaving his parents as heirs, the mother succeeds to the son's
estate before the father. Vijnanesvara prefers the mother on
/ 59\two grounds (as West J. observed in Lallubhai v. Mankuvarbai^^)
1(a) that the word pitarau is abbreviation of the conjunctive
compound matapitarau« (parents) in which the word mata comes
before Pita: (b) that the motherfs propinquity is greater than
35. (1835) 5 W.R. 100 (P.C.).
36. (1882) I.L.R. 8 Cal. 302.
37. (1908) I.L.R. 32 Bom. 275 (Gangu v. Ghandrabhagabai).
38. (1909) I.L.R. 33 Bom. 404, 409, 3 1.0. 745.
39* 1876 I.L.R. 2 Bom. 388 at p. 439*
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the father's. Their Lordships remarked that no doubt
propinquity does enter the reasoning of Vijnanesvara, but it
does not, on that account, follow that he intended to deny the
same propinquity to an adopted son which he allows to a
natural-born son.
In Crangadhar v. Hiralal^  it was held that both an
adopted son (adopted by the husband in conjunction with his
first wife) and a natural son (by a co-wife) were entitled
to succeed to the mother's (fourth wife's) stridhana property
as sapindas of the adoptive father. This case has been
discussed at p .192 which may be referred to.
4-1In Mokundo Lall Roy v. Bykunt Nath the adopted son 
was held entitled to succeed to the third cousin of his
4-2adoptive father and in Mahara.ja of Kolhapur v. Sundaram Ayyar 
it was held that the adopted son of a daughter's adopted son 
is a better heir than the father's sister's son's son.
Inheritance from an adopted son.
43In Annapurni v. Collector of Tinnevelly the Junior 
wife, having taken part in the adoption was held entitled to 
the impartible estate in preference to her co-wife. As to
40. (1916) I.L.R. 43 Gal. 944. 970 F.B.
41. (1881) I.L.R. 6 Cal. 290.
42. (1925) I.L.R. 48 Mad. 1, 221-5.
43. (1895) I.L.R. 18 Mad. 277. •
2 12-
Manu IX, 183 that, 'if among all the wives of the same husband, 
one brings forth a male child, they are all declared by means 
of that son, to be mothers of male issue', nevertheless the 
actual mother succeeds to the son in preference to her co­
wives, similar is the case of the wife associated with the 
adoption.
In fewari Haghura.j v Subhadra a case relating to 
the rules of succession under Act 1 of 1869 (the Oudh Estates 
ict), and the amending _ct 3 of 1910, Viscount .Sumner observed 
in the Privy Council that consideration of the intimate 
connection which primitive Hindu laws established between 
the funeral offerings and ceremonies on behalf of the dead 
and the right of succession to his property will show that 
ceremonially the adopted son only becomes new born in the 
family of his adoptive father, so as to be qualified to provide 
efficaciously the offerings of which the dead have heed, by 
first dying in the family of his birth, out of which he is 
given by his natural to his adoptive parent, and in which his 
offerings will be no longer efficacious or desired. Therefore, 
when such an adopted son dies, his natural brother cannot 
succeed to him to his estate in the adoptive family being 
still a member of the family of his birth and bound to make 
the necessary offerings for his own ancestors and thus not 
qualified to do the same thing for his brother and his adoptive 
father and that father's immediate predecessors.
l+U. a.I.R. 1928 i.C. 87. Also see Derrett: Introduction
to iodern Hindu Law (1963) para. 182.
>, J 2/3
Adoption after succession has opened
It may however he pointed out here that, granted 
that collateral rights of succession were secured by an 
adoptee prior to the HAkA, it was requisite that the adoption 
should have occurred before the succession opened.
if-b
In rally Irosonno Ghose v Gocool Chunder it was 
decided that a subsequent adoption, after the succession has 
opened, cannot confer on the adopted son the right to succeed 
collaterally and to divest property already vested in the heir 
of the deceased. A similar rule had been declared by the 
Sudder Bewany Adawlat in the case of ICeshub Chunder v Bishnu
46
Per shad and recognised by the Privy Council in Bhoobun Iwoyee
d -7  _ 4- fid
v Bam Pi shore. ' So also in Nilcomul Lahiri v Jatendra kohuir
it was held that the right to succession is a right which vests 
immediately on the death of the owner of the property, and 
cannot, under any circumstances, remain in abeyance in expec­
tation of the birth of a preferable heir not conceived at the 
time of the owner's death (or in anticipation of the adoption 
of a son). As to the question whether the defendant was 
estopped by his fraud as a result of which the adoption of 
the Ilaintiff was delayed until after the death of the owner 
of the property, their Lordships remarked that in this case 
the adopted son was not even in existence when the fraud was 
committed by the defendant, hence it was of too remote a 
character for the Court, as a court of equity, to disturb
46". (1879) I.L.ii. 2 Cal. 295.
If-b 3.D.i. for 1860, ii, p. 240.
47. (1865) lOiioo I.A. 279.
fg. (1881) I.L.R. 7 Cal. 178.
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the estate which naturally vested in the defendant as the sole 
heir of the owner at the time of her death. This was affirmed
AQ
by the Privy Council in Bhubanewari v. Nilcomul^J wherein it 
was decided that an adopted boy could not claim to share along 
with the nephew the estate which had belonged to the uncle, 
notwithstanding the nephew1s conduct in reference to the 
exercise of the power to adopt, inasmuch as the date of this 
boy's birth rendered it impossible for him under any circumstances 
to have been made an adoptive heir to the uncle. Their Lordships 
remarked that the widow never could by adoption, if there had 
been no fraud, have made the plaintiff a reversionary heir of 
half the estate because he was not in existence at the time of 
the owner's death and according to the law as laid down in 
decided cases, an adoption after the death of a collateral does 
not entitle the adopted son to come in as an heir of the 
collateral.
Position under Punjab customary law.
50In Mala Singh v. Gurdas it was held that in case of 
an appointment under the customary law of the Punjab the
relationship established between the appointed heir and the
............................................... 5 1 ...........................................
appointer is purely a personal one and resembles the Kritrima
52form of adoption under the Hindu law* In this case 'A' a Jat 
of Hoshiarpur appointed 'B* his heir according to the custom of 
the tribe. B died in the lifetime of the appointer and the 
latter died later. B ’s son claimed the estate of 'A* but was 
resisted by A's collaterals. Their Lordships held that B's son
49. [1886] I.L.R. 12 Cal. 18.
50. [1922] I.L.R. 3 Lah. 362 (P.B. )followed in Indar Singh v.
GurdeVi, A.I.R. 1930 Lah. 897.
51. Article 49 of Rattigan's Digest of Customary Law.
52. For incidents of the Kritrima adoption see pages 514 et seq.
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could not succeed to the estate of A. Their lordships referred
to Article 49 of Rattigan's Digest of Customary Law and observed
that the appointment under the Punjab Customary law only affected
the parties thereto and the appointed heir did not become the
grandson of the appointer's father and his son did not become
the grandson of the appointer. Their lordships referred to
various cases, among them being Tulsi v. Ram Rakha wherein a
similar observation was made that in a case of customary
appointment of an heir the appointment is personal to the
appointer and does not operate to make all his relatives or
even his existing sons, members of the agnatic family of the
54adopter. In Cha.i.iu v. Dalipa. however, it was held that by
custom among Mahtons of NawaShahr Tahsil, in the Jullunder
District, the sons of an appointed heir who pre-deceased his
adoptive father were entitled to succeed on the latter's death
to his estate. Kensington J. observed that even though the
relationship set up by appointment of an heir described in
paragraph 49 of Customary law as purely personal, there was
no sufficient ground for extending this dictum so as to meet
a case not specifically dealt with in the paragraph. Cha.i .iu v.
54.
Dalipa was however over-rmled by the Pull Bench in Mela Singh 
50v# Gurdas Reference was also made to the case of Mehra v.
55Mangal Singh wherein it was observed:
"It has been held in many cases that the appointment 
of an heir is tantamount to a gift which comes 
into operation on the death of the appointer 
and that the property received by the appointee 
should be regarded in the nature of a bequest."
(i.e., it is not ancestral qua the latter's son). The tie of
53. (1908) No. 66 P.R. 314 (at p. 315).
54. (1906) No. 51 P.R. 197 (at p. 199).
55. (1915) 27 I.C. 393.
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kinship with the natural family is not dissolved and the
fiction of blood relationship with members of the new family
has no application to the appointed heir, the relationship
being a purely personal one.
Their Lordships distinguished the case from Waryaman 
56y. Kanshi Ram. in which case it was held that in the case of
an adoption made under the customary law of the Punjab it is
to be determined whether it was intended that the adopted boy
should be altogether taken out of his natural family and
introduced into the adoptive father’s family as his son, in
other words, whether the adoption was a complete adoption having
the effect of severing the connections of the boy with his
natural family.
In the case of an adoption in a particular community,
where there is no standard of formality and no precise customary
rule as to what is to be done to produce all the effects of
adoption, all that can be said is that where the adoption is
as complete as an adoption in that community ever is, and where
the intention to make a complete change of family is manifested
there the right of collateral succession may be presumed till
57the contrary is shown. Uttam Singh v. Wazir Singh was
followed. In that case Powell, J. observed:
MIhere is no doubt a sense in which all Jat 
adoptions may be said to be ’informal1, and 
that is perhaps the sense in which the term 
was at first used. Where the parties were 
not governed by the Hindu law-books (which 
gave named to different kinds of adoption, 
and prescribed certain conditions regarding 
age, relationship and religious and social 
ceremonies) and where they adopted in a 
different way, as all Jats do, the adoption
56. (1922) I.L.R. 3 Lah. 17, 66 I.C. 309
57. (1887) No. 84 P.R. 175 (177).
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is, qua the law-books, 1 informal1• But there 
can be also no doubt that passages may be quoted 
in which even among such adoptions as Jats 
practice, a distinction may be drawn between
those that are ‘formal* and those that are
'informal*. Bor instance where the child is 
taken at an early age, the brotherhood assembled, 
sugar distributed, and when after that the child 
is brought up and treated as a son of the house 
betrothed, married, and associated ih the cultivation, 
and allowed to perform the funeral ceremonies then 
the adoption is "formal11".
Commenting on this ease Kapur observes that the nature
of an adoption is not to be inferred from the intention of the
adopter but from the recognised custom of the place and the
tribe and if that is established a man will succeed collaterally
otherwise not, in spite of the intention of the adopting parent,
which cannot create any relationship between the collaterals of
58the adopting father and the adoptee. It is indeed difficult 
to comment on adoptions not made according to the rules laid
down in the Smritis, as adoption is an institution created by
the Smritis it should be governed according to the Smriti law1.
It would appear from this and other cases that the test of 
formality seems to be the intention to make a complete change in 
the family which may be manifested by the actions of the adopter.
50
As observed in Mutsaddi v. Naraina the general 
custom among Punjab Agriculturists is that an appointed heir 
does not succeed collaterally in the family of the person who 
appointed him, the reason being that he does not lose the right 
of collateral succession in his natural family. So where by 
custom such heir does not succeed collaterally in his real 
father's family, his right of collateral succession in the 
adoptive father's family is very often recognised. Where 
custom does not recognise a right of collateral succession
58. The law of Adoption (1933 edn.) p. 444s J.L.Kapur.
59. (1914) No. 40 P.R. 142; (1914) 24 I.G. 894.
in his natural family, that custom would recognise his
right to collateral succession in the appointer's family.
60
bo also in Jagat Singh v Ishar Singh it was held that a
person appointed an heir under the Punjab Customary law is
not debarred from succeeding collaterally in his natural
family in the presence of his natural brothers, although he
cannot compete with them in the matter of succession to the
estate of his natural father. Their Lordships observed that
it was repeatedly laid down that the customary appointment of
an heir does not involve the transplanting of the heir from
one family to another. The tie of kinship with the natural
family is not dissolved and the fiction of blood relationship
with members of the new family has no application to an
appointed heir. The relationship established between the
appointer and appointee is a purely personal one and does not
extend beyond the contracting parties on either side, vide*
61lie la Singh v Gurdas. Hence he does not lose his right of 
succession in that family. His appointment as heir, however, 
confers upon him the right of succeeding to the estate of the 
adoptive father and it was therefore considered unjust that 
he should be allowed to compete with his natural brothers in 
the matter of succession to the estate of his natural father, 
on grounds of equity and justice and an exception was grafted 
on the general rule allowing him to aicceed in his natural 
family. This has no application to the case of succession 
to che estate of collaterals in the natural family because 
an appointed heir has no right of succession to collateral
t>°>- [1930] I.L.E. 11 Lali. 615, 618, 620.
61. (1922) I.L.R. 3 Lah. 362 (R.B.).
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relatives of the appointer. A similar observation was made in
62
Inder Singh v. Kartar Singh which, is discussed at p. 87-8above.
On the question whether the rules relating to ceremonies
and preferences in selection of the child laid down in the
Riwaj-i-am were mandatory, their lordships of the Supreme Court
63observed in Hem v. H a m  am x that whether a particular rule
recorded in the Riwaj-i-am was mandatory or directory must depend
on what was the essential characteristic of the custom. TJnder
the Hindu law adoption was primarily a religious act intended
to confer spiritual benefit on the adopter and some of the rules
had, therefore, been held to be mandatory and compliance with
them was regarded as a condition of the validity of the adoption.
On the other hand, under the customary law in the Punjab,
adoption is secular in character, the object being to appoint
an heir and the rules relating to ceremonies and to preferences
in selction have to be held to be directory and their Lordships
rightly held that adoptions quoted from Mulla*s Hindu Law
(Eleventh edn. p. 541) which says:
"It has similarly been held that the texts which 
prohibit the adoption of an only son, and those 
which enjoin the adoption of a relation in 
preference to a stranger, sire only directory, 
therefore the adoption of an only son, or a 
stranger in preference to a relation, if completed, 
is not invalid. In cases such as the above, 
where the texts are merely directory, the principle 
of factum valet applies, and the act done is valid 
and binding".
62. A.I.R. 1966 Punj. 258.
63. A.I.R. 1954 S.C. 581.
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Their Lordships observed they saw no reason why a declaration 
in the 1Riwaj-i-am1 should be treated differently and the text 
of the answer should not be taken to be directory. Their 
Lordships further observed that however peremptory may be 
the language used in the answers given by the narrators of 
the custom, the dominant intention, underlying their declarations 
which was to confer a temporal benefit upon one's kinsmen 
should not be lost sight of. Simialr views were held in
Jiwan v. Pal, Sant Singh v. Mula, Chanan v. But a and
67
Jowala v. Dewan Singh .
In this connection it may be pointed out here that
in the customary adoptions in the Punjab, like the Kritrima
adoption, the relationship between the appointer and the
appointed heir is a purely personal one, the main object being
to appoint an heir. As such the non-compliance with any
directory conditions should not affect the validity of the
adoption once the appointment is an accomplished fact.
In the case of adoptions in Kamal and Rohtak districts
and other parts of Old Delhi territory, the Hindu conception of
adoption prevails and the adoption is not governed by the rule
applicable to mere customary appointment of an heir such as is
usually met with in the Punjab proper. The result is that the
adopted son is completely severed from the natural family and
68becomes a member of the adoptive family. This rule was laid
down with respect to Jats of Rohtak District in Mansa v. Surta *
70
and Giasu v. Har Dial (Jats of Gurgan District) and approved
68
in Juglal v. Jot Ram.
64. (1913) P.R. Ho. 22 p. 84.
65. (1913) P.R. No. 44 p. 173.
66. A.I.E. 1935 Lah. 83.
67. A.I.E. 1936 Lah. 237.
68. Juglal v. Jot Bam (1930) I.L.E. 11 lah. 624.
69. Hansa v. Surta (1909) No. 99 P.R. 490 (Jats o£ Rohtak Dist.) 
,70.. Gissur v., Har Dayal (.192,1). 59- I.e., 82 , (Hindu Jats, Gurgaon •
Lisirict.).
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In Giasu v Har Dayal (a case of Hindu Jats from 
Gurgaon District) it was observed that the customary appoint­
ment of an heir is almost unknown in the districts which 
formed part of Old Delhi territory, hence the presumption 
that the adoption was a formal one, arises. As pointed out
69in "-ansa v Surta, a judgment dealing with adoption among
Jats of Rohtak District
"in the Rohtak District in common with other 
parts of the Old Delhi territory, adoption, 
when effected, is of a formal nature and not 
the mere customary appointment of an heir such 
as is usually met with in the Punjab proper; 
and the adopted son merges in his new family".
So also where the adoption was proved to have taken place
among Jats of the Gurgaon District the presumption was that
the adoption was a formal one. It was held that the adoption
being a formal one, the defendant must be regarded as a male
lineal descendant of the deceased owner of property, within
the meaning of S. 59 of the Punjab Tenancy Act of 1887* So
n |
also in Sabhachand v Piare L a i a full bench of the Punjab 
High Court decided that a son formally adopted under the Hindu 
law is a "male lineal descendant" of his adoptive father 
within the meaning of S. 59 (l)(a) of the Punjab Tenancy Act 
of 1887 and also that a person belonging to the districts of 
old Delhi territory whose adoption, though prohibited by 
Hindu law, is valid under custom which gives such an adoption 
the full effect of a formal adoption under Hindu law, must be 
regarded as a "male lineal descendant" within the meaning of
S. 59 of the same Act. In arriving at this conclusion their 
Lordships observed that the answer depends upon the interpre-
7/- (1950) I.L.R. 11 Lah. 481, 4-99.
tation of the expression "male lineal descendants" occurring 
in S. 59 of the Punjab Tenancy Act 1887* The expression 
'lineal descent1 is explained in Wharton’s Law Lexicon as 
"descent of an estate from an ancestor to ’heir' in a right 
line. The word 'heir' presumably is to be interpreted with 
reference to the personal law of the part;.r and prima facie 
there was no good reason why an adopted son should not be 
looked upon as a 'male lineal descendant' in the same way as 
a son born of lawful wedlock. The expression 'lineal descen­
dant' obviously does not include 'illegitimate' descendants 
and should be taken as equivalent to 'legitimate lineal 
descendants' determined, from the personal law of the party.
The institution of adoption occupies a unique place in Hindu 
law - it severs the adopted son from the natural family, 
transplants him into the adoptive family and puts him on the 
same footing as a son born in the latter family - it is a 
formal affiliation of a son through the efficacy of religious 
ritual and the Hindu law recognises practically no distinction 
betv/een the rights of such a son and those of a natural son to 
the family property. In the General Clauses Act (X of 1897) 
the v/ords 'son' and 'father' have been defined to include 
relatiions by adoption and the legislature could not have 
intended to exclude the adopted son and the expression was 
used (according to their Lordships) in S. 59 of the Punjab 
Tenancy Act 1887? for brevity instead of using son, son's son 
etc. The Personal law is the Hindu law except in so far as 




In Kanhaya v IIaurang' it ..as held that among the 
tors of Sutana in the Panipat Tahsil of ICarnal District, a 
valid custom exists whereby a widow can adopt a son to her 
husband, and that a son can succeed collaterally in his 
adoptive father's family, fheir lordships observed that there 
could be no doubt that according to the Riwaj-i-am, a widow 
can adopt although such adoption must be made under the 
authority of her husband or with the consent of collaterals, 
-igain accordin - to Riwaj-i-am (at p. 43) it is stated that the 
adopted son becomes a member of his adoptive father's family
and is entitled as such to succeed collaterally in that family.
72
In Gokul Chand v Mllfehi * also it was held that a person who 
has been formally adopted by a Brahmin of I/auza Eurpur, Tahsil 
G-arhshankar of District Hoshiarpur, is entitled to succedd 
collaterally in the adoptive family. Their lordships observed 
that in this case the adoption was a formal one and not a mere 
appointment of an heir, the parties being Brahmins. The right 
to collateral succession was supported by the judgment of the 
Commissioner which decided the question of collateral succession 
in favour of an adopted son.
Prom a perusal of the above cases it seems to be 
established that in case of 'formal' customary adoptions in the 
Old Delhi territories, Karnal and Rohtak and among Jats, as in 
the case of Dattaka adoptions under the textual Smriti law, 
the adopted son occupies the same position as a natural-born 
son for purposes of succession to the collaterals of his 
adoptive father and vice-versa, but in the case of 'informal'
7Z- (1923) 76 I.e. 734. 
73. (1916) 35 I.e. 543.
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adoptions and appointments under Punjab Customary Law the 
appointee does not succeed to collateral relations in the 
appointer1s family.
Position under the Hindu Adoption and Maintenance Act 1956.
The adopted child is entitled to succeed to collateral 
relations of the adopter under the Hindu Adoptions and 
Maintenance Act, 1956. Under Section 12 of the Act the 
adopted child is deemed to be the child of his or her adoptive 
father of mother for all purposes with effect from the date of 
adoption, from which date all the ties in his natural family 
are deemed to be severed and replaced by those created by the 
adoption in the adoptive family. As to adoptions made before 
the commencement of the Act, S. 30 of the Hindu Adoptions and 
Maintenance Act provides that nothing contained in the Act 
shall affect any adoption made before the commencement of the 
Act, and the validity and effect of any such adoption shall 
be determined as if this Act had not been passed.
The position under English law
Section 16 of the Adoption Act 1958 (which corresponds 
to S. 13 of the 1950 Act) deals with English intestacies, 
wills and settlements. The provisions contained in Sections 
I6(i) and (ii) have been discussed at pages 95 to 97 and 140 
to 141 which may be referred to.
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Section 17 of the Adoption Act, 1958 contains 
provisions supplementary to S. 16 and enacts that for the 
purposes of the application of the Administration of Estates 
Act, 1925, to devolutions as in para. 1 above, and in the 
construction of any disposition falling within para. 2, an 
adopted person shall be deemed to be related to any other 
person being the child or adopted child of the adopter or 
either of two joint adopters -
(a) where he or she was adopted jointly by two 
spouses and the other person is the child
or adopted child of both of them, as brother 
or sister of the whole blood,
(b) in any other case, as brother or sister of 
the half blood.
And for the purposes of subsection (2) of S. 16, 
a disposition made by will or codicil shall be treated as 
made on the date of the death of the testator.^ The law of 
inheritance, as could be seen from a perusal of the above 
sections, also covers other relationships created by adoption. 
For instance, the will of a grandfather or uncle by adoption, 
referring simply to "my granchildren" or "my nephew and neices" 
includes adopted children.
74* For a discussion of the law as it was before statutory 
reform please refer to pages 140 ff.
2.2.6
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In 5e G-ilpin, Hutchinson v Gilpin- it was held, on the con­
struction of the will that as the testator knew that his 
daughter could have no natural lawful childrenassd approved 
of the fact that she had an adopted child, he must have 
intended to include in his testamentary dispotion the 
Plaintiff, who was therefore a child within the meaning of 
Clause 8 of the will and entitled to the benefit.
On the right to take under a will, it was held in 
Re IFletcher, Barclays Bank Ltd. v Ewing *^  construing the 
English will on the footing that the testator was domiciled in 
England:
(i) Adoption of Children Act 1926 (C. 29) S. 5(2) (repealed) 
did not exclude in the case of a child adopted under the Act, 
any evidence which would have been admissible in the case of 
an illegitimate child, inasmuch as Parliament could not have 
intended to place an adopted child in a worse position than 
an illegitimate child, and the Act showed no reason for 
applying to adopted children principles different from those 
applicable to illegitimate children.
(ii) as, in the circumstances, which were well known to the
testator (i.e., his daughter could not have children) it was
impossible that any legitimate children could take under the
bequest, the case fell directly within the principle stated
77by Lord Cairns in Hill v Crook4 ' and applied by Jenkins J. m
75". [19531 2 All E.R. 1218. Also see pages 117ff.
76. [19^ 91 1 All E.R. 732.
77. (1873), E.R. 6 H.L. 265, 282. 44 Digest p. 808, No.
6614-.
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79CRe '/ohlgemuth ° and the residuary gift took effect in favour 
of the testator’s daughter's adopted children.
On the question whether 'child’ includes adopted 
child, in Re Jebh, Ward-Smith v Jebb^9 a testator by his will 
j.iade in Oct. 1947 gave his residuary estate on trust, after 
the death of his daughter, "for such of them the child or 
children of my ... daughter ... as shall be living at the 
date of my death and shall attain the age of twenty-one years 
..." At the date of his will the testator was eighty-six 
years old and his daughter was forty-seven. She had married 
in 1934, but the marriage was not consummated and she obtained 
a decree of nullity in Dec. 1938. Thereafter she lived with 
the testator and in Sept. 1947, adopted a child, who had been 
living with her since April 1947* The testator died in 1948 
and the daughter didd in 1959 without having remarried or 
adopted a second child. By the Adoption of Children Act 1926 
(C. 29) S. 5(2) "child" did not include an adopted child unless 
a contrary intention appeared. On the question whether the 
daughter's adopted child was entitled to benefit under the will 
it was held: construing testator's residuary bequest in the
light of the surrounding circumstances at the date of his will, 
the natural conclusion v/as that testator intended his daughter's 
adopted child to benefit, and the extreme improbability that 
she would marry again and have a child sufficed to exclude the 
primary meaning of "child" as being confined to natural and 
legitimate children, so, too, there appeared a contrary 
intention, sufficient for the purposes of Adoption Act 1926
7%- C1948] 2 All E.R. 882; [19499 Ch. 12.
79. [196.5] 5 All E.R. 358; [1965] 3 W.L.R. 810.
(C. 29) S. 5(2) to Justify the words "child or children"0®
being read as referring to the adopted child and any other
children which the daughter might adopt. However, in view
of the amendment of the law by the Adoption Acts of 1950 and
811958 (discussed above)' whereby the adopted child is given 
the same rights as a natural child of the adopter for the 
purposes of succession in the ado- ten's family, the decision 
in this case would be otiose.
c 2,In Re Marshall, Barclays Banh Ltd. v Liar shall a
testator M domiciled in England, after giving a life interest
to his wife, left part of his estate to C.S.J. with a proviso
for the issue of C.S.J. to take in case he predeceased M.
M died domiciled in England in 1945 and his widow in 1955*
In 1945, before M's death C.S.J. and his wife whilst domiciled
in British Columbia adopted A.T. , a child domiciled in that
Province. C.S.J. died in 1950. In 1958 for the first time
general rights of inheritance were conferred on adopted
0-2
children by a statute of British Columbia. The trustees of 
M's will issued summons to ascertain whether A.Y. v/as entitled 
to share in the estate.
SO. Eor the amended law by statute on the subject please 
refer to pages S^ff.
81 . Please refer to pages
831. [19573 5 All E.R. 172.
8$. The Adoption Amendment Act 1958 of British Columbia,
repealed Section 12 of R.S. 1948, C. 7 and provided,
so far as relevant, that for all purposes an adopted 
child became, on adoption, the child of the adopting 
parent, as if the child had been born to that parent 
in lawful wedlock and that the relationships of persons 
to one another should be determined accordingly.
In the court of first instance, Harman J. , differing
in this respect from the view of Barnard J. in Re 7ilbyc
recognised for the purposes of an English will, adoptions
effected in the law of the domicil hut decided on an examination
of the law of domicile of A.Y. in 1945, the date of M ’s death
that he was not entitled to succeed. On appeal Romer L.J.
delivering the Judgment of the court agreed with the ground
upon which Harman J. had based, his decision and observed
"It seems to us, that only those who are placed 
by adoption in a position, both as regards property 
rights and succession, equivalent, or at all 
events substantially equivalent to that of the 
natural children of the adopter, can be treated 
as being within the scope of the testator's 
intention" .ot?
86Commenting on this case, Graveson remarks that
8 7this decision is a great advance on the previous cases for 
it represents an escape from the narfow bounds of the -English 
Adoption Act. He observes that, ignoring for the moment the 
choice of 1945 rather than 1955 as the relevant date for the
8tfr. See page 'L'lflqtt.
SfT* [19573 Ch. 507 a t  p . 525; [19573 5 All E.R. 175, a t p.
p. 179* Lor the contrary view in the U.S.A. see Anderson 
v Erench (1915), 77 N.H. 509; "If by the law of the 
State of adoption, there is a limitation upon inheritance 
by adopted children, such limitation does not, by the 
better rule, apply to inheritance in a state having 
no such limitation. But a limitation upon inheritance 
by a state governing the inheritance in the particular 
case is normally applicable , regardless of the law of 
the state of adoption". Goodrich, The Conflict of Laws 
(4th edn.) 290 quoted.in ChesAire's Private International 
lav/ 8th edn. p. 454, note 2).
£'6. Graveson: The Conflict of Lav/s 6th edn. 1969, p* 407*
87* See pages 142ff.
ascertainment of A.Y's rights of succession, for what is of 
far more significance is the determination of this question 
\  the personal lav/ of the adopted child at whatever date is
C
considered relevant. Dicey in his 'The Conflict of Lav/s1'
observes that the court might allow the lav; governing the
adoption to determine the question, and allow the adopted
child to succeed if that law v/ould have allowed him to do so,
out not otherwise. Dicey observes that this view is contrary
to principle because the law of the testator's domicile, not
that of the beneficiary's domicil, governs the construction
of a will.^ Rights of succession do not become fixed when
a child is adopted, any more than they do when a child is
born or legitimated or when two persons marry. The law
governing a marriage no doubt determines whether a woman is
entitled to the status of a wife; but the law governing the
succession (which may of course be quite different) determines
whether and to what extent she can succeed to her husband's
property on his death intestate. ^hy should a different
90result be reached in the case of adoption? Dicey asks.'
I agree with this view of Dicey for the simple reason that the 
construction of a will is governed by the law of the testator's 
domicile and if the adopted child is entitled to the property 
according to the law of the testator's domicile he should get 
it, irrespective of whether he is entitled or not according
8$. 8®h edition Ch. 17 Rule 69 at (3)*
%cf. See Rule 102, Dicey's: The Conflict of Laws 8th edn.
0 . for further discussion of this topic see pages J f r f  j^ L
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to lav/ governing his domicil.
The above cases also show, that as in the case 
of Hindu law, so also under the present English law, the 
adopted child is entitled to inherit the property of colla­
teral relations in the same manner as a natural child of 
the adopter would be entitled to.
! 2.32-
CHAPTER VI 
DIVESTING BT THE ADOPTEE
Texts on the subject
There are no texts on the divesting of an estate
by adoption. The Mitakshara^has only eight lines. The 
pMayukha also is silent. It has a single sentence ahout a 
woman*s right to adopt. f,Therefore the right of adoption,
even without the order of her husband, does pertain to a 
widow”. The Pattaka Mlmamsa^ does not allow widows to adopt, 
and there can therefore be no discussion on the question of 
divesting of an estate by adoption. The Dattaka Chandrika 
allows widows to adopt but does not go beyond the Mayukha.
5
It presumes assent if there is no prohibition by the husband^ 
and says that a woman with the sanction of her husband is 
competent to adopt.
Divesting of the widow*s estate
Prior to the Hindu Women*s Rights to Property Act 
1957, the result of an adoption by a widow was that her 
limited estate as widow at once ceased and the adopted son
1. Stokes I, XI, 9-14-, PP* 4-15-4-18.
2. C. IV, S. 5, pp. 58-72.
3. S. 5 PI 16-18, pp. 63-64.
4. Stokes, p. 554-, S. 1, PI 15-16; p. 557, PI 27-28.
5. Stokes p. 636, S. 1, Pi 31-52.
6. Stokes p. 630, S. 1, Pi 7; Balu Sakharam v Lahoo Sambhatji
(1937) 39 Bom. L.R. 382, 393; I.L.R. [1937] Bom. 508 F.B.
became full heir to the deceased husband's property, the
widow's rights being reduced to a claim for maintenance.
7
If the ado; ted son was a minor, it was held' that in such 
circumstances, she presented the suit (for possession of her 
husband's share in the joint undivided estate) as guardian 
of the adopted son, and was put into possession as his trustee 
and accountable to him for the profits of the property so 
decreed to her. After the Hindu Women's Rights to Property 
ict 19375 where the widow took along with the male issue of 
her husband, an adoption divested only a moiety of the estate 
held by her, the other moiety being retained by her subject
o
to the limited estate.0 .There there were several widows, 
holding jointly, one who had authority from her husband to 
adopt, where such authority was necessary, would, by exercising 
it, divest, subject to modifications introduced by the Hindu 
Women's Rights to Property Act 1937? both her own estate and 
that of her co-widows and no widow could, by refusing her 
consent, prevent the adoption or destroy its effect upon her 
estate.
adoption by Senior widow divests estate of Junior widow
q
In .Tarayanasami v Langammal, a case from Ladras,
7. Bhurm Das Pandey v Mussumat Shama Soondri (P.C.) (1843)
3“  I.A. 225’. ------------------
. for the Incidents of this estate see J.D.M. Derrett'si 
Introduction to hodern Hindu law (1963) P&ges 424-442.
C . (1905) 1.1. -. 28 Had. 31.3; Cases referred to and followed: 
Rakhmabai v hadhabal 5 Bom. H.C.R. (A.C.J.) 181 at p. 192; 
(1868) ; Bhimawa v Sangawa (1896) I.L.R. 22 Bom. 206; Amaya 
v hahadgauda (1896) I.L.R. 22 Bom. 416; Eubrahmanyam v 
Venkamma (1^03) I.L.R. 26 had. 627 distinguished.
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it was held that an adoption made after the death of the 
husband by his senior widow, after having obtained the consent 
of his sapind,as but without consulting the junior widow is 
valid and cannot be impeached on the ground that such adoption 
has the effect of divesting the estate of the junior widow or 
her infant daughter. The consent of kinsmen is required on 
account of the incapacity of women to act rather than to 
procure the consent of all whose interests will be defeated 
by the a d o p t i o n . I n  Maharashtra, where no authority is 
required, the elder widow could of her own accord adopt, and 
thereby destroy, subject to the modification aforesaid, the
q
estate of the younger widow, without obtaining her consent,'
.Vidov/ can make successive adoptions
A widow's power of adoption extended to making 
successive adoptions. In G-anesan v Ganapathy Iyer^  it was 
held that the second adoption was valid as the authority to 
adopt was not exhausted by the first adoption and that the 
direction that the adoption should be made within one year 
after the husband's death (as contained in the husband's v/ill 
in this case) was attributable with more reason to his anxiety 
for the due performance of his annual funeral rites than to 
any intention to set a time limit for the exercise of the
10. P.C. in The Collector of Madura v Moottoo Ramalinga
Sat hup at hy 12 l.I.A. , '397'at p. 44-2; Also see II. varadamma 
v P. Sankara [1955] An. V7.R. (PIC) 948; II.A . Gopalaswami 
v P . Siddammal A.I.R. 1958 Mad. 488; V. Sundara v C.
Satyanarayanamur thi .^ I. R . 1950 I lad. 74, [1956!! I'acTT 
4&1; Bodo v Hondo A.I.R. 1952 Cr. 307, 311a.
11. (1947) 2 I. .I.J. 126; see also Ram Soonder v Survanee Das see 
(1874) 22 .2 . 121 approved in Surya ITarayana v Venkatar-
anana [1906] I.L.R. 29 Mad. 382 (P.C .).
2- ?> 6
authority by the widow. Also, as decided by the Irivy Council
12 15in Vellanki v Venkat Rama and by the various other Courts, y
where on the death of an Aurasa or adopted son the estate
which had descended to him from his father vests in his mother
and heir and she makes an adoption to her deceased husband,
the estate so vested in her will be divested (because she
inherited for a limited estate only) . In a later case17'1' the
Ladras High Court held that the same would be the case where
the first son left self-acquired property. Mayne has rightly
criticized this decision on the ground that the adopted son
is to succeed to the estate of his adoptive father and he
neither acquires nor has any rights over property which was
15independent of the adoptive father. The decision of the 
Ladras High Court ~r seems to be erroneous, for, in the case 
of serjarate property, the mother is a nearer heir than the
brother.
limitation on the widow's power to adopt.
The starting point regarding the limitation upon 
the power of the widow to adopt was Lord Eingsdown’Ajudgment
12. (1876) 4 I.A. 1; I.L.R. 1 Lad. 174, 186.
13 Ram Soondar Singh v Surbonee Dassee (1874) 22 /.R. 121; 
Jabindra v wnriba (1$00) 5 C . .IT. 20; Jamnabai v Raychand 
(1885) I.L.ST 7" Bom. 225; Rav,ji v faxmibai (1587) I~.1.~R. 
11 Eom. 581; Amrita v Surnamon (1898) I.L.R. 25 Cal. 662; 
Lakhmi v Gato (1886) I.L.R. 8 All. 519; l.umud v Ramesha 
XI9T57 i.lTrT 46 Cal. 749, 759, 49 I.e. 60$.
14. Suryanarayana v Ramdoss (1919) I.L.R. 41 Lad. 604,
45 i.e. 526.
15. MayneV H.L. 252 (9bh edition).
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in Bhoobun Hoyee v Bamkishore, wherein the Privy Council 
held that "upon the vesting of the estate in the widow of 
the son, the power of adoption of the mother was at an end
and incapable of execution". This view was followed in
17 18Thayammal v Venkatarama ‘ and in Tarachurn v Suresh Chander.
Even the fact that the widow left by the son subsequently
19remarried was held not to give the mother.a right to adopt.
20In Ramkrishna v Shamrao Chandavarkar J. referred to the cases
put as illustrations and the reasoning adopted by Lord Kings-
18down in Bhoobun Moyeefs case and summed up the limiting
principle in these words
"where a Hindu dies leaving a widow and a son 
and that son dies leaving a natural born or 
adopted son, or leaving no son but his own 
widow to continue the line by means of adoption, 
the power of the former widow is extinguished 
and can never afterwards be revived".
Continuing Chandavarkar J. says
"It was much pressed upon us that this principle 
was not in accordance with either the letter 
or the spirit of Hindu law as expounded in the 
books or as understood by the Hindus themselves. 
But it is not open to us to go into that question 
and we must take the law as it was laid down in 
Bhoobun Moyee's case by the Privy Council and 
as it was interpreted and reaffirmed in two of 
their Lordships later decisions to which we have
16. (1865) 10 M.I.A. 279.
17. (1887) 14 I.A. 67, 10 Mad. 205.
18. (1889) 16 I.A. 166, 17 Cal. 122.
19. Ramchandra v MurliBhar (1937) 39 Bom. L.R. 509*
I L E '
20. (1902)/26 Bom. 526, 532 (P.B.). Followed in Martickyamala 
v Nandakumara (1906) 33 Cal. 1306 by the Calcutta High 
Court. Approved by the Judicial Committee in Raghunada^
Leo v  Brozokishore (1876)0 I .L.R. . 1.Mad. 69.. L.R. 2.
I.A .  154 J oJU0 article b% 'tlhwte .V* P* \
fov-ei 0^  Adeftccn : i}i£f5'6(T\$-7 f-cY a rei/teur
Ojj- ikt Cases Or the Sdbjec't.
21already referred".
.mother argument urged in favour of the adoption was that in
this case the grandmother took an absolute estate in her
grandson's property and that she could adopt on becoming
possessed of such estate, but their Lordships felt it unnecessary
for them to express any opinion on that point in this case in
view of the law laid down by the Privy Council in Bhoobun
oyee's case.^° The argument tha6 all that the privy Council
meant to decide was that a widow could not adopt so as to
divest an estate vested in another person was also addressed
21to their Lordships both in Padma Coomari's case by the respon-
21dent's Counsel and in Lhayammel's case by Appellant's counsel
and their Lordships pronouncement was that the decision in
Bhoobun Idoyee' s case~^ went much farther than merely holding
that a widow could not adopt so as to divest an estate vested
in another person, that is, what the case decided was that the
vesting of the estate in the widow of the son, Bhowani "was a
proper limit to the exercise of the power", and the moment
that limit was reached the power was at an end. This principle
was approved and applied by the Privy Council in liadana Bohan
22v Purushottama and reluctantly. ~ This case is the story of
21. P.C. decision in Bhoobun Moyee's case (see note 16) was 
reaffirmed in their later decisions in Iadma Coomari's 
case L.R. 8 I.A. 229; 8 Cal. 302 and in Thayammal's 
case (see note 17)-
22. (1918) 45 L.A., 156; < 9  . This question has been 
hotly discussed by Derrett in his article "Adoption 
by a daughter-in-law and divesting" (1964) 1 M.L.J.,
J., 3 and by S. Vaidyanathan at A.L.R. 1967 Journal 
133. These are discussed in subsequent pages at p.
2 87 et sec. and also by the B.C. in Gurunath v Kamalabai 
(1935) 1 M.1.J. (S.c.) 91: (1955) S.C.J.T78 - also
discussed at pages 2JfrL) 2gfT, 2g:^  seq.
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Raghnriada v Brozo Kishore continued. In this case A, the
holder of an impartible Zamindari and a member of a joint
family governed by Mitakshara law, gave authority tito his
wife to adopt a son to him. On A's death his brother E took
possession of the property. The widow subsequently adopted
a son B, who recovered the estate from E, and held it until
1906 when he died leaving a widow but no son. A descendant
of E then took possession of the property but died in the same
year and was succeeded by his son, the Eespondent. In 1907
A's widow purported to make a second adoption to A under the
authority from him by taking in adoption the Appellant. In
a suit brought by him to recover the Zamindari, it was held,
that the law imposed a limit within which a widow could
exercise a power of adoption conferred on her and the limit
to her power was reached when B died after attaining full
legal capacity to continue the line of descent either by a
natural born son, or by adoption to him of a son by his own
widow, against whom it had been established (she not being a
party to the suit) that she had no power to adopt. The
conclusion was in no way in Conflict with the previous decision
20of the Board in Eaghunada Deo v Brozo Kishore. It was 
necessary to decide whether the authority to adopt empowered 
A's widow to make the second adoption.
On adoption of Brozo Kishore, as decided by the P.O. 
in 1876 he became entitled to oust Eaghunadha whose right to 
enter was only temporary, operating merely to prevent the 
ownership from being in abeyance pending any such succession 
to his elder brother as the adoption brought about. But when
23. (1875) 3 I.A. 154, 1 Mad. 69.
Brozo Kishore succeeded he became himself the full owner, 
from whom heirship must be traced instead of as earlier from 
A. The widow of the latter was therefore in a different 
position when she endeavoured to effect the second adoption 
from that which she occupied on the former occasion. She 
could on that occasion, by exercising the power conferred on 
her, establish a direct succession to the estate of her 
husband Adikondai, which related back to his death and any 
authority she could originally be taken to have received to 
make a second adoption had become inoperative by reason of
the changed circumstances. The limiting principle enunciated
24 20by Chandavarkar J. in Ramkrishna v Shamrao was approved
and applied by the Judicial Committee.
25In Pratapsing v Agarsingji ^ the suit was brought 
by the Thakor of CG&nph, for the possession of a village, 
which, in accordance with a family custom of Girasia Rajputs 
had been granted for Jivai or maintenance by one of his 
ancestors to a junior member of the family to be held and 
enjoyed so long as the grantee's male line lasted and then 
reverted to the Thakoor. The last owner died without male 
issue in 1903 but he left a widow, who, though by custom she 
was not permitted to inherit her husband's estate, continued 
in possession of it and in March 1904 adopted the first 
appellant in this case as a son to her husband. It was held 
by their Lordships of the Judicial Committee, reversing the 
decision of the High Court, that the Jivai grant did not 
revert to the Thakoor but was inherited by the adopted son.
24. See ante p. 236.
25. C19193 I.L.R. 43 Bom.. 978.
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The Judgment was delivered by Ameer Ali J. who observed that
it was an explicit principle of Hindu law that the adopted
son becomes, for all purposes, the son of his father and that
his rights, unless curtailed by express texts, are in every
respect the same as those of a natural b o m  son. He referred
(at p. 792) to West and Btihler who pointed out in their
treatise on Hindu law that the Hindu lawyers did not regard
the male line to be extinct or a Hindu to have died without
male issue until the death of the widow renders the contin-
uation of the line by adoption impossible. Much reliance
was placed by counsel for the Respondent on the case of
27Bamundoss v Mst. Tarinee. ' The only point decided in that 
case was that a mere power given to a widow to adopt does not 
preclude her from maintaining an action in her own name and 
in her own right in respect of the property in her possession 
as her husband's widow. It was also pointed out that there was 
no power under the Hindu law to compel a widow to adopt. Unless 
there is a time limit imposed in the authority which empowers 
a Hindu widow to adopt, or she is directed to adopt promptly, 
she may make the adoption so long as the power is not extin­
guished or exhausted. Her right to make an adoption is not 
dependent on her inheriting, as a Hindu female owner, her 
husband's estate. She can exercise the power so long as it 
is not exhausted or extinguished, even though the property 
was not vested in her. The circumstances under tfiich her power
became extinguished was clearly pointed out by their Lordships
16of the Privy Council in Bhoobun Moyee's and Madana Mohan's
26. West and Btihler, Hindu Law, p. 996*
27. (1858) 7 Moo. I .A. l69£r;,This principle is used in I.T.
• - eases’to determine -whether there- is - a- H.U .Pi- -............
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cases. In Hamchandra v Murlidhar the Bombay High Court
held that even the fact that the widow left by the son
remarried did not give the mother a right to adopt. But
this view has been dissented from in Govinda v Shenfad^
wherein it was held that under the Hindu law adoption is a
spiritual matter and should be dissociated from the view that
it was mainly concerned with temporal matters such as the
devolution of an estate. The power of a widow to adopt does
not depend upon the question of vesting or divesting of the 
50estate. Their Lordships of the Nagpur High Court observed
that this principle had been laid down by the Privy Council
50m  Amarendra Man Singh v Sanatan Singh/ and was emphasised 
by their Lordships of the Privy Council in Vinaysing.ji v 
Shivs angtji^
"It was on this ground that the adoption in that 
case (Amarendra1s case)30 which was made by a 
widow after the death of her natural son without 
leaving a son or a widow, was found to be valid, 
though the estate had vested in a collateral of 
the son. In the present case the natural son 
with his wife having ceased to exist for the 
purpose of continuing the line in the Ahima 
family, his mother was entitled to make an adoption 
to secure that object. The adoption of Mansangji 
undoubtedly served the purpose in question, and 
it cannot be impeached simply because it would 
defeat the estate which had vested in some other 
person".
As was stated in Bapu.ii v in summarising the
30
principle established in Amarendra1s case "The religious need 
is a son. It is a need divorced from property. Paupers have
28. (1937) 39 Bom. L.R. 509.
29. [19493 I.L.R. Nag. 416; Also in Bapu.ii Ram.ii v Gangaram
[19413 I.L.R. Nag. 178.
30. Amarendra Mansingh v Sanatan Singh (1933) I.L.R. 12 Pat.
642 (P.C.) and Vijaysingji v Shivsangji A.I.R. [19333
P.C. 93 followed.
31'. [19413 L.L.R.' Nag*' 178,' 181.'
souls and souls need prayers”. This is highly questionable
in view of the Supreme Court ruling on the powers of a widow
who has a daughter-in-law in Gurunath v K a m a l a b a i wherein
it was laid down that the mother's power to adopt was lost
when the son died leaving his son and widow and was not
revived by the subsequent deaths of the son, the son's widow
and the son's son, as had happened in that case. As observed 
32by Derrett^ this would lead to sad effects both in human and 
economic terms and it would be up to Parliament to remedy the 
matter - which it shortly afterwards sought to do for all 
adoptions after enactment of the Hindu Adoptions and Mainten-
16
ance Act 1956. The real meaning and point of Bhoobun Moyee's
32
Gurunath * s cases needSto be examined carefully. Were the 
Privy Council and the Supreme Court in error? I am unable to 
agree with these decisions as I fail to understand why any 
such limitation on the widow's power of adoption should be 
placed at all. The Smritis are silent on the point. Further 
the adoption definitely leads to temporal benefit in continuing 
the name of the family etc., and possibly also to spiritual 
benefit. Logically speaking, it would appear that there should 
be no limitation to the widow's power to adopt as long as she 
lives (except, perhaps, when a daughter-in-law adopts first 
and when her adopted son is still alive to continue the family 
name). The power would automatically cease on the death of 
the widow
32. Gurunath v Kamalabai [19551 1 M.L.J. (S.C.) 91: [19551
S.C.J. 178.. Also see articles entitled "Adoption by a 
Daughter-in-law and divesting* by Derrett [1964-1 1 M.L.J.J.
3 and S. Vaidyanathan: A.I.E. 1967 (J) 135 which are
discussed subsequantly on pages 2 ^  et , - ✓ •
32A ’ sSiyrictay- \rct^ fs -£'fkT£SS€c\ fc>u b ^
’ ^ d o u j ' s  f 0 U € ' f '  ~jtc> A- d  0  (  I*! ^7*
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Capacity of a widow to adopt in Bombay
Where an Aurasa or adopted son died unmarried
leaving his mother as heir, her dormant power of adoption
33had long been held still exercisable. ^ In Bombay, in the
earlier cases, it was held that the widow could not adopt
without consent of her husband's undivided coparceners where
34the husband died joint. She could, however, adopt if she
had the authority of her deceased husband. In Mailappa v
Hanmappa it was held that the adoption of the Plaintiff was
valid as the widow's power to adopt remained suspended even
after partition between her minor son (deceased) and his
uncles and could be exercised as there were no longer any
coparceners whose consent was necessary (i.e. after the
decease of her minor son who died after partition). Their
Lordships observed that a widow succeeding as heir to her son
who dies unmarried is entitled to adopt to her husband
provided that her son has not attained ceremonial competence
37and referred to the decision in Yerabhai v Bai Hiraba 1 .
The principle of such recognition is that the act of adoption
is derogatory of no other vested right than those of the
adopting mother.^ That and the condition that the son's
I L R
33* Mallappa v Hanmappa (1920)/44 Bom. 297; Vellanki v 
Venkatarama (187&) 4 I.A. 1; Yerabhai v Bhai Hiraba 
(1903) 30 I.A. 234. .
34. Ramji v Ghamau (1882) I.L.R. 6 Bom. 498 followed in
Dinkar v Ganesh (1882) I.L.R. 6 Bom. 505*
(1902)
35* Bachoo v Khushal Das/4 Bom. L.R. 883.
*“  i .l t r :
36. (1920)/44 Bom. 297*
I.L.R.
37- (1903)/27 Bom. 492.
38. Yellanki v Yepkat Rama (1876) L.R., 4 I.A. 1;
Gavdappa v Girimallappa (1894) 19 Bom. 331 and Payapa 
• - "AipiFa ( 1 8 9 8 Bom.- 32?. - - - - - - -  - -
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estate has not vested first in some other than herself were 
the ohly two conditions, which, in their lordships opinion, 
stood in the way of a widow's right to adopt even if the 
husband died in union.
The law in Eombay requiring consent where the 
husband died joint, was altered by the Frivy Council in Yadav 
v amdeo^" wherein it was laid down that in the Maratha 
country of Bombay Presidency and in Gujarat a Hindu widow, 
whose husband has not expressly forbidden her to adopt a son 
to him has power to do so without the consent of her husband's 
kinsmen, whether or not her husband's estate is vested in her, 
and whether or not he died separated. In this case a Hindu 
settled in the Central Provinces and was governed by the law 
applicable in Maratha country of Bombay Presidency. Shortly 
before his death in 1905 be stated that he did not wish to 
ado t a son, but that if an adoption was made, the son of his 
brother should be adopted. Upon his death the widow adopted 
the named boy who died in 1907. In 1908 the widow of the 
adoptive father adopted to him the Appellant. It was held by 
the Privy Council that there was no direction to the widow 
forbidding her to make an adoption if the boy named was not 
available or died, and that in accordance with the rule above 
stated she had power to adopt the Appellant. A full bench of 
the Bombay High Court, in a subsequent case ,Zz° held that the
39. (1922) 49 I.L.R. Cal. 1.
40. Ishwar Dadu v Gajabai (1926) I.L.R. 50 Bom. 468 (P.B.) 
folld. in Ganesh v u-our Hath A.I.R. (1926) Bom. 575; 
Bhimabai v Gurunath (1528) A.I .R . Bom. 367 ? 30 Bom. L.R.
859; Babanna v Parawa (1926) I.L.R. 50 Bom. 815? 828;
Bala Anna v ikubai (1926) I.L.R. 50 Bom. 722; Also followed 
in fani v I rishanappa S.I.R. (1929) Hag. 289, Baswant 
Bao v Lee Rao l.I.A. 1927 Hag. 2.
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decision in Ram.ji v. G-hamau was not overruled by the Privy
Council^ (Crump J, dissenting). The view of Shah J. that in
a joint family, where the property vests in the coparceners
on the death of one of them, the religious rites will be
carried on by them and therefore there is no necessity of
adoption is not sound. The full bench decision is undoubtedly
opposed to the views expressed by the Privy Council in Yadao 
39v. Namdeo and the view taken by Crump J. seems correct, For
their Lordships of the Privy Council had rightly observed in
Yadao1s case^?hat there does not seem to be any reason why a
widow's power to adopt should be different according as her
husband died separated or unseparated or she had or had not
39the estate vested in her.  ^ It would appear that Shah J. was
not unreasonably, swayed by the risks to which joint families
would be exposed if widows were allowed unrestricted powers to
adopt. I am inclined to agree with the Privy Council view in
Yadao's case for reasons which I have stated above.
39Following the decision in Yadad v. Hamdeo and 
reversing the decision of the Bombay High Court in Bhimabai v. 
Gurunathgouda^ .  the Privy Council has also held in Bhimabai v. 
Gurunathgouda^ 8, that according to the law prevalent in the
40a. 69321 L.R. 60 I.A. 25# This decision has been criticised
in various articles - see Bhimabai v. Gurunathgouda and 
and After by S.R. Kulkarni: £19331 35 Bom. L.R. (J) 39;r 
Bhimabai ¥*. Gurunathgouda and Afters by S.V. Anegtmdi \1_933i 
35 Bom. L.R. (j) 6TQ,Bhimabai v. Gurunathgouda by "Inner 
Temple" [ 19341 36 Bom. L.R. (J) 1; Bhimabai v. Gurunathgouda 
and Amarendra Man Singh v. Sanatan Singh , by P.V. Kane 
[19341 36 Bom. L.R. (j) 12.
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Ilaratha Country of the Bombay Presidency, a Hindu widow, 
unless she was expressly forbidden by her husband to adopt 
a son to him, can do so although he died undivided and she 
has not obtained the consent of his surviving coparceners. 
The cases of Ram.ii v. Ghamatr^  and Ishwar 3)adu v. Gra.iabai^  
were overruled.
Ho divesting of Property vesting by inheritance in heir of 
last surviving coparcener.
At this stage there was one question on which 
there was for long no definite pronouncement by the Privy 
Council. YThere the property vested by inheritance in the 
heir of the last surviving coparcener, it was originally 
held in earlier cases that a widow of a pre-deceased 
coparcener could not make a valid adoption which would have 




41In Chandra v Gojarabai, one Krishnaji and his
two sons Bhau and Nana were members of an undivided family.
Bhau died first and then Krishnaji died. At the time of his
death, Nana was full owner as last survivor of the joint
family. The property then devolved as his and a subsequent
adoption, however well authorised, to Bhau a collateral heir
of Nana was held not entitled to oust the defendant Gojarabai
from the estate of her husband, who did not claim through
Bhau at all. It was observed by their Lordships that if the
question had arisen between the Plaintiff and Nana, the
Plaintiff would have been entitled to succeed as laid down in
20Raghunada v Brozo Kishore. Adoption by a widow under her
husband*s authority had the effect of divesting an estate
vested in any member of the undivided family of whichihe
husband was himself a member. But it did not divest the
estate of one on whom the inheritance had devolved from a
lineal heir of the husband. Their Lordships further observed 
— ;—  16
that this rule, deduced from Bhoobun Moyee*s and other cases
of the Privy Council, must, however, be supplemented by the
addition that an adoption, though authorised by the husband,
cannot divest an estate vested in a collateral relation; of
the husband in succession to some other person who had himself
become owner in thei meantime. A conclusion opposite to that
expressed here, would, according to their Lordships, certainly
41. (1890) I.L.R. 14 Bom. 463 (2nd Appeal to H.C.), followed 
in Shri Dharnidhar v Chinto (1895) 20 Bom. 250, Vasudeo 
Visbnu v Ramchandra (1S$&) 22 Bom. 551 (P.B.); Shlvbasappa 
v Nilava (1923) 47 Bom. 110; Shivappa v Rudrava (1933)
57 Bom. 1; Adivi Surya Prakash Rao v Nilomarty Gangara.ia 
(1910) 35 MadV 228.
lead to much inconvenience and embarrassment. The adoption 
after Nana's death would have the effect of depriving Gojarabai 
of the whole estate and reducing her claim to one for main­
tenance only. Their Lordships further observed that they 
could find no authority either of the text books of of 
decided cases going to the full extent necessary for sanc­
tioning the claim of the Plaintiff. Thus in this and in
41other cases wherein this view was followed, a mistaken
distinction was made between cases of vesting by inheritance
and vesting by survivorship. While in the latter case adoption
could validly be made till the coparcenary came to an end, in
the former case an adoption could not be made, once the
inheritance vested in a collateral. This view was rightly
42doubted by Seshagiri Aiyar J., in Madanmohan v Purushottam
43and by Venkata Subba Rao J. in Panyam v Ramlakshmamma.
Adoptive son can claim father’s share when coparcenary becomes 
extinct by Partition
43In Panyam v Ramlakshmamma, ^ where the coparcenary 
had come to an end by partition and there was vesting in 
another, it was held that the true test of the principle 
defining the limit of the widow’s power of adoption is to be 
sought, not in the rule of divesting or otherwise of an estate 
but in the rule that requires the continued presence of a 
person to perform all the requisite religious services and
__ _
42. [19153/^38 Mad. 1105, 1118.
/ .  c.
43* £19323^55 Mad. 581, 590. This dissent was noticed by 
their Lordships of the Privy Council in the case of 
Anant v Shankar (1943) 70 I.A. 232. I:L.R. (1944)
Bom. 116 which is discussed in subsequent pages.
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the limit is reached on the happening of the event mentioned
44by Chandavarkar, J. in Bamkrishna v Shamrao. Appellantfs
41counsel referred to cases such as Chandra v Go.jarabai,
45Suryaprakasa Rao v Bidamarty Gangaraju, Shri Dharnldhar
WEiv Chinto. In these cases the reason for holding the adoption 
invalid was that when the estate vested in the heir the power 
of the widow came to an end. Whether these decisions, though 
in conflict with principles affirmed by the Judicial Committee, 
so far as they go, be followed or not on the ground of stare 
decisis was a point on which their Lordships expressed no 
opinion.. They observed, however, that there was no warrant 
for extending the rule beyond the facts of those cases. Those 
facts were that the coparcenary had become extinct by death 
of the last surviving coparcener and his property thereupon 
devolved on his heir. The facts in the present case were 
different in the sense that the coparcenary became extinct 
not in that manner but by the survivors having come to a 
partition of the joint family property and their Lordships 
were not prepared to bold that in such case the widow1s power 
comes to an end. There were no reported decisions on the 
actual point raised in the appeal. But the opinion of Stekar 
Sastri supports the Plaintiff*s contention. Says Sarkar 
Sastri
"To re-open the partition for giving a share 
to the adopted son, would lead to great 
difficulties, for one of the co-sharers might 
alienate his share to a purchaser for valuable 
consideration without notice".
44. (1902) 26 Bom. 526, 532 (F.B.). See ante page 236, 
45- (1909) I.L.R. 33 Mad. 228.
46. (1895) I.L.R. 20 Bom. 250.
But lie go£s on to observe that the point was not free from 
difficulties and refers to some conflict which he supposes 
to exist between the two Privy Council cases viz. Bhoobun 
Moyee1 s case*^ and the first Chinnakimedi case.^ In Krishna
), Q
v Sami a full bench of five judges deduced from the Hindu
law a principle which was the exact opposite of that stated
by Sa£kar Sastri. The relevant observation is contained in
the following passage
"Again, let C have died before partition, 
leaving a widow and having given her power 
to adopt which she does not exercise till 
after a partition has been made by B, D and 
E. When she exercises her power we apprehend 
that the adopted son would be entitled to call 
upon his uncles to make over to him a portion 
of the wealth equal to that which would have 
been taken by his father - Sri Virada Pratapa,.n 
Raghunada Deo v Sri Brozo Kishore Patta Deo'*. y
Examining the matter on principle, Vehkatao Subba Rao J. in
Panyam v Ramalakshmamma^ observed (a) the test of the limiting
principle was what they had stated above, it stood to reason
that, when once the spiritual purposes were satisfied, the
power to adopt finally and for ever comes to an end; (b) the
validity of adoption must be judged intrinsically on its own
merits and not with respect to considerations extraneous to
it. The suit relates to the estate not of the adoptive widow’s
husband but of her father’s and the Plaintiffs were not
interested in the rights which were said to be defeated nor
were the husband’s agnates interested in the estate which
Plaintiff*s represent. The adoption had been made with the
47. [1876] I.L.R. 1 Mad. 69 (P.C.). (Raghunada v Brozo Kishore)
48. [18853 I.L.R. 9 Mad. 64 (P.B.).
49. [1876] I.L.R. 1 Mad. 69 (P.O.).
251
consent of these agnates and thus no question of safeguarding 
their rights can arise.
Distinction between cases of vesting by inheritance and 
vesting by survivorship swept away.
The decision of the Privy Council in the leading
50case of Amarendra v . Sanatan Singh following the implications
25of the decision in Pratapsing*s case swept away the
distinction between cases of vesting by inheritance and vesting
by survivorship and approved the rule laid down in Ramakrishna 
20v. Shamrao. In this case a Hindu governed by the Benaras
50. {i933] I.L.R. 12 Pat. 642 reversing 10 Pat. 1 and over- 
ruling Bhimabai v. Tavaupa (1912) 37 Bom. 598- As a 
result of the P.C. decision Annamali v. Mabbu Bali Reddy 
(1874) 8 Mad H.C. 108; Adivi v. Hidamorty [191^33 Mad.
228 and Chandra v. Grojotfabai /1890] 14 Bom. 463 and cases 
following them were no longer good lav;. The decision in 
Amarendra1s case has been criticized by S.R. Kulkarni in 
his article: Amarendra Man Singh v. Sanatan Singh C1934J 
36 Bom L.R. (J) 25 and by P.Y.Kane in his article Bhimabai 
v. Gurunathgouda and Amarendra Man Singh v. Sanatan Singh 
[19343 3& Bom. L.R. (J) 12 Also see article by Rita B. Hansa 
Adoption and Religious Control; (1968) 54 A.B.A. J 77*
The Bombay Pull Bench decision in Krishna.ii v. Ra.iaram
(1938)I.L.R. Bom. 679 not only holds that the estate 
inherited by a widow as a widow of a gotraja Sapenda is 
not divested by adoption, but that the adopted son could 
not inherit the property in preference to the contesting 
reversioners in spite of the fact that he was nearer to 
the last holder when the succession opened. This decision 
seems to be erroneous and against the views of the P.C.
in Pratapsingh*s and Amarendra*s 50 cases. See also 
article by G.K. Dabke: Divesting of Estate on Adoption
(1939) 41 Bom. L.R., J., 41.
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School of Mitakshara was survived by an infant S and by a 
widow to whom he had given authority to adopt in the event 
of the son dying. The son S Succeeded to the impartible 
Zamindari held by his father but died unmarried at the age 
of 20 years, 6 months. Thereupon the widow, the son S's 
mother made an adoption to his father. By a custom of the 
family, females were excluded from inheriting . In a suit 
claiming inheritance against the adopted son it was held that 
as the natural son had left no son to continue the line nor a 
widow to provide for its continuance by and adoption, the 
adoption by his mother was valid, although the Zamindari was 
not vested in her and although the son had attained the age 
above stated. Their Lordships reviewed the authorities as to 
limits to the exercise of a power to adopt. Their Lordships
I 25-3 1
! %
observed that the Ninth Chapter of Manu's code, which has 1
always been regarded as of paramount authority is instinct
with the doctrine of spiritual benefit of sonship. The father 
by birth of a son discharges his debt to his progenitors 
(V. 106), through him he attains immortality (V. 107); by a 
son a man obtains victory over all people; by a son's son he 
enjoys immortality: and afterwards by the son of that grand­
son he reaches the solar abode (V. 157); a son is called 
'Putra' because he delivers his father from 'Put' (V. 158).
In the Dharmasutra of Bandhayana the formula prescribed for 
adoption is "I take thee for the fulfilment of my religious
51duties. I take thee to continue the line of my ancestors".
In their Lordships' opinion it was clear that the formulation 
of the Brahmanical doctrine of adoption was the duty which 
every Hindu owed to his ancestors to provide for the continuation 
of the line and the solemnization of the necessary rites and 
it may well be that if this duty has been passed on to a new 
generation capable itself of the continuance, the father's 
duty has been performed and the means provided by him for its 
fulfilment spent, the debt he owed is discharged and it is upon 
the new generation that the duty is now cast and the burden 
of the "debt" is now laid. In this connection it may be 
pointed out that if the new generation fails in this duty 
irredeemably and if the widow of the owner is wtill alive to 
revive the line by means of an adoption, there seems to be no 
reason why she should be prohibited from doing so and more so 
as this would be beneficial from the point of view of spiritual
51. Baudh. VII, 11, Sacred Books of the East (1882) Vol. 
XIV, 355.,
I 2Sf
benefit also. Continuing, their Lordships observed that it
could hardly be doubted that in this doctrine, the devolution
of property, though recognised as an inherent right of the
son was altogether a secondary consideration as observed by.
20Sir James Colville in Raghunada's case. Having regard to
this well-established doctrine of the religious efficacy of
sonship, their Lord&hips felt that great caution should be
observed in shutting the door upon any authorised adoption
by the widow. The authoritative texts do not appear to limit
the exercise of the power by any considerations of property.
But, as their Lordships put it, that there must be some limit
to its exercise or at all events some conditions in which it
would be either contrary to the spirit of the Hindu doctrine
to admit its continuance or inequitable in the face of other
rights to allow it to take effect, has long been recognised
both by the Courts in India and by the Privy Council and it
was upon the difficult question of where the line should be
drawn and upon what principle, that the argument in the present
case had mainly turned. Their Lordships then referred to
Bhoobun Moyeefs case. After the death of Bhoobun Moyee,
Ram Kishore got possession of the property and if his adoption
was good he was undoubtedly the next heir. His title however
was disputed by a distant collateral and the validity of his
adoption was the subject of another suit. The Bengal High
Court upheld the title of Ram Kishore but on appeal to the
52Privy Council in Pudmakuman Debi v Court of Wards, the High 
Court decision was reversed, the opinion of their Lordships 
being that upon the vesting of the estate in the widow of
52. [1882] I.L.R. 8 Cal. 302.
ztrr
Bhowanee the power of adoption was at an end and incapable 
of execution and that this was what the Board had held in 
the previous case.
The question was again considered in Thayammal1s
53case. ^
It was clear from the Board's decisions in Raghunada
20 .54 55v Brozo Kishore, Bachoo v Mankorebai^ and Yadao v Namdeo
that vesting of joint family property in another coparcener
does not put an end to the widow's power of adoption. Their
approved
Lordships recited the judgment of Chandavarkar J ./in Madana
22 25Mohana’scase and also referred to Pratapsing's case. ^ Their
Lordships agreed completely with a citation from Wallace J. in
56Tripuramba v Venkataratnanr
"The purpose of adoption, is to perpetuate the
line, and if the only son dies without leaving
anyone to perpetuate the line, there seems no 
good reason for restricting the power of his 
mother to perpetuate it in the only way she can 
by adopting a son to her own husband".
Their Lordships felt that there was no foundation for the
contention that a widow's authority to adopt is extinguished
if her son has attained ceremonial competence. Their Lordships
relied upon the principle stated in Raghunada v Brozo Kishpre
"That the validity of an adoption is to be deter­
mined by spiritual rather than temporal consider­
ations that the substitution of a son of the 
deceased for spiritual reasons is the essence 
of the thing and the consequent devolution of 
property a mere accessory to it".20
After a full review of the authorities their Lordships came
53* Thayamnial v Yenkatarama [1887H 14 I.A. 67, 10 Mad. 203*
54. C1907) 34- I.A., 107, 31 Bom. 373-'\
55. C1921] 4-8 I.A. 513, 49 Cal. 1.
56. (1922) I.L.R. 4-6 Madras 4-23.
to the conclusion that
"the vesting of the property on the death of 
the last holder in some other than the adopting 
widow, be it either another coparcener of the 
joint family, or an outsider claiming by reverter, 
or their Lordships would add, by inheritance, 
cannot be in itself the test of the continuance 
or extinction of the power of adoption”.
Their Lordships held accordingly(i) that the interposition of 
a grand-son or the son’s widow, brings the mother’s power of 
adoption to an end. (2) that the power to adopt does not 
depend upon any question of vesting or divesting of property 
and (3) that a mother’s authority to adopt was not extinguished 
by the mere fact that her son had attained ceremonial compe­
tence .
50
The decision in Amarendra * s case was followed in
57 58Viiaysingji g Shivsang.j i , ( in Anant v Shankar^ and in
59Neelangouda v Utjjangouda, all of which came up from Bombay.
57
In Vijaysingni v Shivs ang.j i , the holder of an impartible estate 
in the Bombay Presidency died in 1899 survived by a widow and 
a son. -The son inherited the estate but in 1915 was adopted 
into another family. In 1917 the widow made an adoption to 
her deceased husband. The High Court held that the adoption 
was invalid on the ground that upon the adoption in 1915 the 
estate had become vested in the heir. The Privy Council 
reversed the decision and held that the widow had power to 
make the adoption, for the purpose of continuing the line of her 
deceased husband, although the estate was not vested in her.
57- (1955) I.L.R. 59 Bom. 360 (P.C.); (1935) 62 I.A., 161 
reversing (1932) 56 Bom. 619•
58. [1944] I.L.R. Bom. 116 (P.C.) .




Amarandra v Sanatan Singh was followed and their Lordships 
observed that a widow's power to adopt does not depend upon 
any question of vesting or divesting of the estate. It became 
unnecessary to decide whether the son, upon being adopted out 
of the family in 1915» retained the estate to which he had 
inherited from his natural father.
No divesting of property from heir of last surviving coparcener 
though adoption was held to be valid - an erroneous view.
60In Ealu Sakharam v Lahoo Sambhaji, (which was
among the main cases discussed by their Lordships in the leading
58case of Anant v Shankar), one S who was the last surviving 
coparcener in a goint Hindu family died in 1919 leaving him 
surviving his widow and his sister. In 1923 a widow of a 
predeceased coparcener in the family adopted a son (Defendant 
No. 1). In 1926 the widow S remarried and his sister claimed 
to have inherited the property in suit. In 1929 the sister 
sold the property to the Plaintiff. In 1930 the adopted son 
having taken forcible possession of the property, the Plaintiff 
filed a suit to recover possession. A question having arisen 
as to whether the adoption was valid, and if so, whether it 
had the effect of divesting the property in the hands of the 
sister the opinion:; of the majority of the Pull Bench of the 
Bombay High Court, Beaumont C.J. and Wadia J. was that under 
the Hindu Law, a widow's right to adopt is based on religious 
considerations and is not affected by any consideration as to 
the vesting and divesting of the property, therefore an 
adoption made by a widow of a predeceased coparcener after
60. (1937) 39 Bom. L.R. 382.
I
/  I .
the termination of the coparcenary by the death of the surviving 
coparcener is a valid adoption, but it would not have the 
effect of reviving the coparcenary and would not divest the 
property from the heir of the last surviving coparcener (other 
than the widow) or those claiming through him or her.
Balu Sakharam1s case over-ruled
58The decision in Anant v Shankar and Neelangouda 
59v U.inangouda over-ruling the full bench decision of the
Bombay High Court, held that as the adoption was valid, it
61
must have effect.
58In Anant v Shankar. the appellant Anant brought
6?
the suit in 1932 to recover certain Watan properties from
respondent Shankar to whom possession had been given in 1928 
by the order of a Revenue Court. The family was governed by 
the Mitakshara school of Hindu law. The pedigree was as 
follows:
61. [1945] 70 I.A. 252; I.L.R. [1944] Bom. 116; [1949]
1 M.L.J. 94, 96 P.C.; Taty Shantappa v Ratnabai [1949]
2 M.L.J. 18 (P.B.); Basangowda v YeTlappa Gowda [1950]
1 M.L.J. 288 P.C.; Krishna Rao Kulkarni v Shrinivas 
[1950] 1 M.L.J. 292 P.C.
62. Amongst the Marathas, watan property had come to import 
any hereditary estate, office, privilege, property, or 
means of subsistence, a patrimony - See Wilson's "A 
Glossary of Judicial and Revenue terms" (1940) p.,889* 


























Dhulappa's sons Punnappa and Hanamantappa separated 
and the Alnavar Fatan with is lands went to Pun&appa. Harayan 
separated from Punnappa in his lifetime.
After the deaths of the persons mentioned in the 
above pedigree in 1905» Bhikappa and his minor son Keshaw.- 
were the only coparceners in the joint family. In 1905 
Bhikappa died leaving a widow and Keshav. In 1908 Harayan 
died and his widow remarried and his separate property devolved 
by inheritance on. Keshav. Keshav died unmarried in 1917* At 
that date Shankar a somewhat remote collateral being the 
nearest heir obtained possession of the suit properties from 
the collector in 1928 despite Gangabai's opposition. Gangabai 
adopted Anant in 1930 and instituted the suit on his behalf in 
1932. The trial judge gave the decree in Plaintiff's favour 
but the High Court set it aside on the ground that as the 
coparcenary which existed at the time of B's death (1905) 
had come to an end on the death of Keshav (1917) and the 
family property had then vested in his heir, the subsequent
adoption (1930) by B's widow, though valid, would not revive 
the coparcenary to divest Keshav's. heir., .and. adopting widow- - -
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herself not being Keshav’s heir. Their Lordships of the
Privy Council held that as regards Watan lands a Hindu family
cannot be brought to an end while it is possible in nature
65or in law to add a male member to it. ^ The family cannot 
be at an end while the±e was still appotential mother if that 
mother in the way of nature, or in the way of law (by adoption) 
brings in a new male member. Amarendra’s^  and Pratap Singh’s^  
cases were followed. Sir George Rankin who delivered the 
Board’s judgment reviewed the case-law then existing on the
41question of divesting by the adopted son. In Chandra’s case 
it had been held that on the death of a sole surviving 
coparcener, an adoption to the predeceased coparcener was 
ineffective to take the property which had belonged to the 
Joint family out of the hands of the former’s heir and vest 
it in the adopted son. The decision was understood by the
Board in Bhimabai v Gurunathgouda to mean that the adoption
41
was invalid. On Chandra * s case Sir George Rankin made the
following observation
”0f Chandra * s case it should be remembered that 
Telang J. had in 1890 to reconcile two lines 
of decisions - those which following Sri Raghunad 
allowed an adoption to divest coparceners and 
those which, as in Bhoobun Moyee refused to 
regard as valid an adoption which would divest 
persons (other than the adopting widow) who 
had taken by inheritance. He had to find a 
dividing line and he drew the line at the death 
of the last surviving coparcener when the 
property passed by inheritance and not by 
survivorship. But Amarendra * s case has profoundly 
modified the effect of previous decisions in 
cases of inheritance and the line of distinction 
need no longer be drawn in the same way”.
65. In fact the rule is general (i.e. not merely confined 
to Watan lands) and still correct.
64. [1952] L.R. 60 I.A. 25 at p. 40.
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The reasoning in Chandra1s case was questioned by 
Seshagui Ayyar J. In Madana Mohana’s case^ and also by
Venkatasubba Eao J. in Panyam v Ramalakshmamma. Aft4r
50
Amarendra1s case had cast further doubt upon it, a Pull Bench
of the High Court of Bombay had in Balu Sakharam v Lahoo
60 ^ Sambhaji dealt with the matter. In that case as in Chandra1s
case the property at the date of adoption to a predeceased 
coparcener had already vested in an heir of the last male 
holder nearer to him than a natural born son of the pre­
deceased coparcener would have been. The present case, their 
Lordships observed, was different in that the Plaintiff, if
he were an heir of Keshav was a nearer heir than the defendant.
60
The learned Chief Justice in Balu Sakhuram1s case had dealt 
with both types of cases and held that in neither case did 
adoption have the effect of vesting the property in the adopted 
son. His view was that an adoption made after termination of 
the coparcenary does not vest in the adopted son the interest
in joint family property which would have vested in a natural
50
born son of the adoptive father, and also that Amarendrafs 
case had not disturbed the rule of law that an adoption by 
the widow of a divided Hindu does not divest any estate of 
inheritance unless the estate was then vested in the adopting 
widow as heir either to her husband or to a deceased son. The 
learned judges of the High Court who decided the present case 
in the High Court followed this Pull Bench ruling. But their 
Lordships of the Privy Council observed that they must examine 
its correctness and for this purpose found it necessary to 
distinguish and separately consider two lines of reasoning.
Upon the initial question of the validity of the Plaintiff’s 
adoption, their Lordships rejected the view that Gangabai's
242-
power to adopt came to an end on her son Keshav's death by 
reason that he was the sole surviving coparcener in the joint
family. This circumstance would seem, upon principles
50
declared in Amarendra1s case to have no bearing upon the
continuance of Gangabai's authority, for, as stated by the
57Board in Vijaysingji v Shivsangji’ s case ' "the power of a 
widow to adopt does not depend upon the vesting or divesting
of the estate". Their Lordships on this point agreed with
60
the majority of the Full Bench in Balu Sakharamfs case and
41
were unable to support Ranguekar J. who had supported Chandra1 s 
case. The learned judge seemed also to have considered it to 
be settled law (p. 572) that the widow’s power to adopt could 
be defeated by a partition between coparceners, a view which
had since been negatived by two high Courts on very cogent
66 66 
reasoning, Bajirao v Ramkrishna and Sankaralingam v Veluchami.
Their Lordships of the Privy Council asked that if the adoption
of the Plaintiff was valid, can it be held that it does not
take effect upon the property which had belonged to the joint
family because there was no coparcenary in existence at the
date of the adoption? On this point their Lordships, differing
60
from the majority decision in Balu Sakharamfs case held that 
the adoption being valid cannot be refused effect. That the 
property had vested in the meantime in the heir of Keshav was
50
not of itself a reason, on principles laid down in Amarendra * s 
case, why it should not divest and pass to the Plaintiff.
Keshav’s right to deal with the family property as his own 
would not be impaired by the mere possibility of an adoption
_ _
65. [194-13/Nag. 707.




(cf. Veeranna v Sayamma). But in his lifetime adoption by 
the widow of a collateral coparcener would have divested him 
of part of his interest and the same right to adopt, subsisting 
after his death must, in their Lordships' view, have qualified 
the interest which would pass by inheritance from him. Their 
Lordships posed the question "What principle requires that the 
death of the last surviving coparcener should prevent any 
further fluctuation of theiihterest to which he was entitled 
notwithstanding that a new male member has since then entered 
the family by adoption"? There was of course some convenience 
in bringing fluctuation to an end and there was force in the 
comment of Seshagin Ayyar J. on the Bombay decisions "The 
learned judges seem to regard the joint family as a quasi­
corporation which loses this character by the death of the
42last male holder". (Madana Mohan v Purushottam). A broader
68and more adequate view is taken by the Nagpur High court.
"We regarc^Lt as clear that a Hindu family cannot 
be finally brought to an end while it is possible 
in nature or law to add a male member to it.
The family cannot be at an end while there is 
still a potential mother if that mother in the 
way of nature or in the way of law brings a new 
male member/;
25and in Pratapsingh' s case, ^ Ameer Ali J. delivering the 
judgment of the Board held that the adopted son was the con- 
tinuatdn? of his adoptive father's line exactly as an Aurasa 
son, and that an adoption, so far as the continuity of the 
line was concerned had a retrospective effect.
67* &929) I.L.R. 52 Mad. 398, 402. This case has been 
criticized by Lerrett in (I960) S.C.J. (J) pp. 43-57 
and discussed subsequently in this Chapter at pages 
3\2t et seq.
68. Bajirao v Ramkrishna, I.L.R. [1941] Nagpur 707 at 
p. 718.
In the present case the adoptive widow was mother 
of the last surviving coparcener. Her power to adopt could 
not have "been exercised in his lifetime and if exercised after 
his death could not, as their Lordships thought, he given any 
less effect than would have attached to an adoption made 
after his death by the widow of a predeceased collateral.
It must vest family property in the adopted son on the same 
principle displacing any title based merely on inheritance
60
from the last surviving coparcener. In Balu Sakharam's case 
the question whether adoption does not divest property in 
favour of adopted son was referred to a full bench in a double 
form (Q. II (a) and (b) C 1937) Bom. at pp. 543-4) according 
as the person in whom the property at tha date of adoption 
had already vested was heir of the last male holder nearer 
or remoter tian a natural son of the adoptive father would 
have been. In both forms the question was answered by the 
full bench in the negative because it was not considered that 
the adoption could be allowed to have any divesting effect 
after the coparcenary had come to an end. But, if, as their 
Lordships held, it could have such effect it became necessary 
to observe that remoteness from the last male holder had no 
relevance or effect as an answer to a claim by an adopted
son to derive an interest in the family property from his
16
adoptive father. As BhoobunMMoyee1s case was understood in 
Bengal (compaie Faizuddin Ali Khan v Tincowri Saha)^^ it 
involved that no adopted son could claim as a preferential 
heir the estate of any person other than his adoptive father 
if such estate had vested before the adoption in some heir
69. [18953 I.L.R. 22 Cal. 565 at p. 5?!..
266-
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other them the adopting widow. So too in Chandra1s case
Telang J. understood it to involve that adoption by the widow
does not divest the estate of one on whom the inheritance had
devolved from a lineal heir of the husband. The question was
50whether, after Amarendra1s case these propositions still
58
held good. Their Lordships in Anant v Shankar thought that
they did not. Iflaizuddin1 s case^as among those cited in
50 30
Amarendra*s case yet in Amarendra1s case it was held by the
Board that the adoption divested Banamalai in whom Bibhudindra1 
estate
/(Bibhudindra was the last male owner of an impartible estate,
having died unmarried) had vested by virtue of family custom
30and in Vijaysingji1 s case-' the Board stated the effect of
previous decisions by saying that (at p. 165)
"the adoption in that case which was made by 
a widow after the death of her natural son 
without leaving a son or a widow, was found 
to be valid though the estate had vested in 
a collateral of the son".
Neither Anant v Shankar^  nor Amarendra1 s case^ however,
expressly (i.e. there was a concealed conflict) brought into
question the rule of law considered in Bhubaneswari v Nilcomul/
and stated by the Board to be that "According to the law as
laid down in the decided cases, an adoption after the death
of a collateral does not entitle the adopted son to come in
as heir of the collateral" Their Lordships in Anant v Shankar
observed that in interpreting the decisions (in Amarendra1s
and Vi.jaysinghji1 s cases) a certain difficulty arose from the
absence in either judgment of a statement that the impartible
estate descended as joint family property or as separate
property and in Balu Sakharam's case^® the learned Chief
70. (1886) I.L.R. 12 Cal. 18.
Justice seemed to have thought that they were to be explained
on the footing that a sort of coparcenary was subsisting.
But their Lordships observed that this was not the explanation
of either decision. On appeal to the Judicial Committee in
Amarendar1s case,^ it was clearly argued and decided on the
footing that the estate was separate property. The language
of the Board* s judgment in Vi jay sing,ji1 s case-' may be thought
applicable to either of the two positions, but they clearly
30followed Amarendra*s-' case and they say that in the presence
of the adopted son "the plaintiff cannot inherit the estate”.
30The Zemindari property claimed in Amarendra * s case^ was 
adjudged to belong to the adopted son on the ground of his being 
heir of the last male owner. If the effect of an adoption by 
the mother of the last male owner was to take his estate out 
of the hands of a collateral of his who was more remote than 
a natural brother would have been and to constitute the adopted 
person the next heir of the last male owner, no distinction 
could, in this respect^be drawn between property which had 
come to the last male owner from his father and any other 
property which he may have acquired. (Sir George Rankin).
The rule of 'relation back*
---------------------------- 58
The decision in Anant v Shankar was followed by the
71Privy Council in Neelangouda v Uj jangouda . Therein.it was 
it was held that where an adoption by a widow of a predeceased 
coparcener takes place after the property had vested in the 
mother of the last surviving coparcener, who had also sub­
sequent to such vesting adopted a son to her husband, the
71. C19493 1 M.L.J. 94 P.C.
subsequently adopted son was entitled to claim a half share
from the previously adopted son. Also that a mere provision
for the maintenance of the widow by the then head of the
family of allotting some properties for her life will not
affect her right to adopt. Their Lordships observed that
the question of adoption by a widow after the death of the
last surviving coparcener had come up for decision before a
full bench of three learned judges in the Bombay High Court
in Balu Sakharamfs case.-': In that decision it was held by
a majority that the adoption in such a case was valid for
spiritual purposes only and could not affect the property
vested in the next reversioner. Commenting on this case,
Sir George Rankin;; delivering the judgment of the Board in
58Anant v Shankar had observed ad follows:
"If then, the appellant's adoption was valid, 
can it be held that it does not take effect 
on the property which had belonged to the joint 
family because there was no coparcenary in 
existence at the date of the adoption? On 
this point their Lordships, differing from the 
majority decision in Balu Sakharam v Lahoo 
Sambhaji, ^  held that the adoption being valid 
cannot be refused effect. That the property 
had vested in the meantime in the heir of 
Keshav is not of itself a reason, on the prin­
ciples laid down in Amarendra v Sanatan,50 why 
it should not divest and pass to the appellant".
In their Lordships view the present case, Neelangouda v
UjJ^angouda^ fell within the principles of the decision by
72the Board in Anant v Shankar.(
73In Basangowda v Yellappa Gowda one D, a member
72. (1943) 70 I.A. 232; I.L.R. [19443 Bom. 116; [19493
1 M.L.J. 94, 90 P.C.; Also Tatya Sha tappa v Ratnabai 
[19493 2 M.L.J. 18 (Federal Ctj; Basangowda v Yellappa 
Gowda [19503 1 M.L.J. 288 P.C.; Krishna Rao Kulkarnl v 
Shrinivas £19503 1 M.L.J., 292 P.C.
73- A.I.R. 1950 P.C. 24 (24, 25).
of a joint Hindu family, died in 1872, leaving a son S, who 
died in 1878 leaving his widow IT, and the Joint family property 
passed to the collateral T. Widow Unadopted one B in 1933*
72It was held by the Privy Council, following Anant v Shankar'
that B was entitled to a share of the joint family property
with Y. So also the Privy Council held in R.K. Kalkarni v 
74.
R.S. Kulkarni' that where a widow of a deceased coparcener 
adopts a son to her husband, the adopted son becomes entitled 
to a share in the coparcenary property notwithstanding that 
the coparcenary had come to an end before the date of the 
adoption
Rule of ♦relation back* applicable to pre-adoption partitions 
also
72Hollowing Anant v Shankar,f the Federal Court of
75India in Tatya Shantappa v Ratnabai observed that if, not­
withstanding the extinction of the coparcenary by the death 
of the last surviving coparcener, the adoption by the widow 
of a predeceased coparcener could effectively divest the
property vested by inheritance in the heir of the last surviving
\ 72 coparcener as held in Anant v Sharker, there was no reason why
such adoption should not equally operate to entitle the adopted
son to claim a share in the family properties in spite of the
extinction of the coparcenary by virtue of a partition. There
is no distinction in principle between extinction of a
coparcenary by the death of the last surviving coparcener
and its extinction by partition so far as the right of the
74. A.I.R. 1950 P.C. 20 (21).
75. [19493 2 M.L.J. 18
269
widow of a predeceased coparcener to make a valid and 
effectual adoption is concerned. The principle of their 
lordships1 decision must apply a fortiori to cases where 
the coparcenary became extinct by partition, for, the family 
properties would still be in the hands of the members of the 
family though divided and there would be no question of 
divesting property vested in a stranger to the family.
Exceptions to the relation back doctrine
nr
In Jiva.ii v. Hanmant a full bench of the Bombay
76. A.I.E. 1950 Bom. 360, 361 ; I.L.R. [1950] Bom. 510. This 
decision has been criticized by Derrett as wrongly decided 
and fit to be over-ruled in an article entitled ’’Some 
Troublesome cases in Adoption” [1953J 55 Bom. L.R.J, 1 
Derrett observes that Jivaji was heir, both to his father, 
and to his father’s brother’s son, for this reason that 
when V died in 1918 his nearest heir was not his grandfather’s 
brother’s son but his father’s brother’s son, had a father’s 
brother or any other nearer heir been alive at that time 
then Jivaji’s claim would have been abortive.- Derrett 
opines that Jivaji should have been able not only to claim 
his father’s estate from K, had he been adopted during K ’s 
lifetime (for a son is nearer heir than a brother), but 
also in actual circumstances to claim his father’s brother’s 
son’s (Y’s) estate from Hanmant or anyone taking from 
Hanmant • The Supreme Court has however followed the decision 
in Jivaji’s case in Shrinivas v. Naravan (A.I.R. 1954 S.C. 
379) and Derrett observes in a subsequent article: An
important Development in the law of Adoption [1955J 57 Bom.
. L.R. (J), 739 that the opinion expressed in his previous 
article requires to be corrected accordingly.
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High Court held that the principle of relation back was not
an. absolute principle but it had certain limitations. For
instance any lawful alienations made by the last absolute
owner would be binding on the adopted son and also if the
property by inheritance goes to a collateral, and the adopted
son is adopted after the death of the collateral the adoption
cannot divest the property which had vested in the heir of the
collateral. Reliance was placed on the Privy Council decision
77in Rhubaneswari Pebia v. Hi1okomul* * where it was expressly
held that according to Hindu law !,an adoption after the death
of a collateral does not entitle an adopted son to come in as
heir of the collateral”. This principle was re-affirmed by
72the Privy Council in Anant v. Shankar. In Mirza Ra.ia v.
78IJahara.i Kumar Yi.iaya Anand their Lordships of the Allahabad 
High Court observed that the doctrine of relation back had 
two exceptions; the first was that it did not apply to the
77. '(1886) 12 I.A. 137; 12 Cal. 18 P.C.




case of succession to a collateral's property and the second 
was that it did not divest a person who had taken the property 
not by intestate succession, but by transfer inter vivos 
or by will of the father or other preferential heir who had 
taken the estate in the meanwhile. So far as collateral 
succession was concerned, their Lordships observed that there 
was a clear distinction between succession to a collateral, 
who had himself succeeded to the father, and held the father's 
property, and to succession to a collateral who died leaving 
his own property, which did not belong to the father. The 
exception applied to the latter case and not to the former.
As regards transfer inter vivos or by will, it may be that 
the adoption cannot displace the title acquired under the 
will or other transfer. But it does not affect the rule of 
relation back of adoption to the father's death.
Also the Madras High Court held in Ra.ju v Lakshmi
79Ammal that the principle of relation back would not apply
so as to divest from the heir the estate of the col3a teral
line in whom it had vested as the adopted son was not in
existence at the time the succession opened. It was confined
only to lineal succession. In Fasala Rama Rao v Board of 
80
Revenue it was held that the right to succeed to a hereditary 
office is not property and the relation back of an adopted 
son's right is only with regard to property. Though therefore 
the posthumous adoption cannot have the effect of divesting 
the incumbent of the office if an appointment had already 
been made by the Collector, but before an order of appointment
79. A.I.R. 1954 Mad. 705.
80. A.I.R. 1954 Mad. 483*
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is passed under S. 10 of the Madras Village Offices Act
(1895) an adoption takes place then the adopted son can claim
to be eligible for appointment as the next heir within the
81
meaning of S. 10(2) of the Act.
No divesting of estate inherited from collateral
The whole law relating to divesting by adopted sons
was reviewed by the Supreme Court in the celebrated case of
82
Shrinivas Krishnarao Kango v Narayan Devtji Kango which 
served to put an end to divesting of any collaterals who had 
succeeded to a propositus collateral to the adopted son, and 
were remoter than he in the order of succession, assuming that 
he was alive and competent to take the estate at the opening 
of the succession. This simplification of the law operated 
both in succession to males and that of females. ^ But the 
adopted son was still entitled to recover the whole property 
of his adoptive father, whether it be joint family property 
or separate property in order that the continuity of the line 
should be preserved in property as well as in name.
The following was the pedigree of the persons 
involved in the case
81. Madras Village Offices Act (1895) S. 10(2).
82. [1954] S.C.J. 408; 57 Bom. L.R. 678, A.I.R. [1954] 
S.C. 379; [1954] M.L.J. 630 S.C.
83. Sivagami g Somasundaram [1956] 1 M.L.J. 441; A.I.R. 
[1956] Mad. 323 (F.B.) and K. Ramakrishnayya v M . 
Narasayya [1956] An W.R. 1120 and the now somewEat 
out of date article by J.D.M. Derrett in (1955) 18 





i-------------------- - i-------------------- 1
Siddopant alias Sadashiy Krishnarao (d. 1897)
(d^ 1898) in, Rukmini (D.6)
Gundo m. Laxmibai (D.5)
Devji m. Akhubai (D.4) Shrinivas (adop. son)




Siddopant (S) and Krishnarao (K) were members of a Joint 
undivided family. K. died in 1897 leaving behind a widow E. 
(Def. 6 in the suit). S died in 1898 leaving him surviving 
a son G. who died in 1901 leaving his widow L (D.5) on 16th 
December 1901. L adopted Devji who died on 6 May 1935 leaving 
3 sons, defendant 1 to 3 and a widow Akhubai (D.4-) on 26 April 
194-Zj.. On 29 June 1944 Rukmini, the widow of Krishnarao, 
adopted the Plaintiff Shrinivas, who instituted the present 
suit for partition claiming a half share in family properties.
Siddopant and Krishnarao represented one branch of a Kulkarni
62
family and were entitled for their share of the watan lands. 
The other branch was represented by Swamirao, who was entitled 
for his half share of the Watan lands.
Swamirao died about 1903 issueless, and on the death 
of his widow shortly thereafter his properties devolved on 
Devji as his nearest agnate. The Plaintiff claimed that by 
reason of his adoption he had become a preferential heir 
entitled to divest Devji of those properties and sued to 
recover them from his sons. In the alternative he claimed a
half share in them on the ground that they had been blended 
with the admitted, joint family properties. -The defendants • -
27j-
denied the truth and validity of the Plaintiff’s adoption.
They further contended that the only ancestral properties
belonging to the family were the watan lands in the villages
of U and K, that the purchases made by Siddopant were his
self-acquisition, that the suit houses were also built with
his separate funds and that the Plaintiff was not entitled to
share therein. With reference to properties in Schedule C
(inheritance from Swami Rao) they pleaded that the Plaintiff
could not, by reason of his adoption, divest Dev^ji of the
properties which had devolved on him as heir. They denied
that those properties had been blended with the joint family
properties. Their Lordships made the following observations:
In the Oxford ipictionary "collateral” is defined as meaning
"descending from the same stock but not in the same line”.
In 1888 Golap Chandra Saskar Sastri observed in his Tagore
law lectures on the law of Adoption
”As regards collateral succession opening before 
Adoption, it has been held that an adoption cannot 
relate back to the death of the adoptive father 
so as to entitle the adopted son to claim the 
estate of a collateral relation, succession to 
which opened before his adoption", (vide pp.
413 and 414).
The law was thus settled that when succession to the properties 
of a person other than the adoptive father was involved the 
principle applicable was not the rule of relation back but 
the rule that inheritance once vested could not be divested. 
Their Lordships observed that the ground on which an adopted 
son was held entitled to take in defeasance of the rights 
acquired prior to his adoption was that in the eye of law 
his adoption related back, by a legal fiction, to the date 
of the death of his adoptive father, he being put in a 
position of a posthumous son. The scope of the principle,
their Lordships observed, was clear. It applied only when 
the claim made by the adopted son related to the estate of 
his adoptive father. That estate may be definite and ascer­
tained as when he was the sole and absolute owner of the 
properties or it may be fluctuating as when he was a member 
of a joint Hindu family, in which the interest of the copar­
ceners was liable to increase by death or decrease by birth.
In either case, it was the interest of the adoptive father 
which the adopted son was declared entitled to take as on the 
date of his death. The theory on which this doctrine was based 
was that there should be no hiatus in the continuity of the 
line of the adoptive father. That, by its very nature, could 
apply only to him and not to his collaterals. In deciding 
that an adopted son was entitled to divest the estate of a
collateral, which had devolved by inheritance prior to his
58adoption, their Lordships observed that Anant v Shankar 
went far beyond what had been previously understood to be 
the law. It was not in consonance with the principle well 
established in Indian Jurisprudence that an inheritance could 
not be in abeyance, and that the relation back of the right 
of an adopted son was only quoad the estate of the adoptive 
father. Moreover the law as laid down therein led to results 
which were highly inconvenient. When an adoption was made 
by a widow of either a coparcener or a separated member, the 
right of the adopted son to claim properties as on the date 
of the adoptive father by reason of the theory of relation 
back was subject to the limitation that alienations made prior 
to the date of adoption were binding on him, if they were for 
purposes binding on the estate. Thus transferees from limited 
owners, whether they be widows or coparceners in a joint
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family were amply protected. But no such safeguard existed 
in respect of property inherited from a collateral. If, 
therefore, the adopted son was entitled on the theory of 
relation hack to divest that property, the position of the 
mesne holder would he that of an owner possessing a title 
defeasible on adoption and the result of such adoption must 
he to extinguish that title and that of all persons claiming 
under him. The alienees from him would have no protection as 
there could he no question of supporting the alienations on 
the ground of necessity or benefit. And if the adoption 
took place long after the succession to tie collateral had 
opened (in this case it was 41 years) and the property might 
have meanwhile changed hands several times, the title of the 
purchasers would be liable to he disturbed quite a long time 
after the alienation. The Courts, their Lordships opined, 
must hesitate to subscribe to a view of the law which lead 
to consequences so inconvenient. Their Lordships further 
observed that the claim of the appellant to divest a vested 
estate rested on a legal fiction and that legal fictions 
should not be extended so as to lead to unjust results. The 
decision in Anant v Shankar^ in so far as it related to 
properties inherited from collaterals was held as not sound 
and that in respect of such properties the adopted son could 
lay no claim on the ground of relation back.
gp I
Following Shrinivas1 s case the Bomjay High Court 
held that the doctrine of relation back had application only 
when the question related to the succession of the property 
of the adoptive father and not when it related to the succession
! -2.77
of the property of his collaterals.^*
Relation hack - divesting of estate - Limitations
The Andhra High Court has held that the right of 
the adopted son to claim properties as on the date of the 
death of the adoptive father *by reason of the theory of 
relation hack is subject to the limitation that alienations 
made prior to the date of adoption are bidding on him, if 
they were for purposes binding on the estate. Thus, alienees 
from limited owners, whether they be widows or coparceners in 
a joint family, are amply protected. Where the estate has 
already vested by collateral succession, it is not divested 
by a subsequent adoption which takes place later than the
opening of succession by reason of the doctrine of relation
85 88back. In ShanmugavadIve1u v Kuppuswamy the Madras High
Court held that in the case of collateral succession the 
adopted son would not be entitled to divest the title of 
persons who took the estate prior to his adoption. The 
principle of provisional vesting was confined only to lineal 
succession and there was no reason or justification to extend 
the principle. In this case a daughter took an absolute 
estate under the will of the father. The mother succeeded 
to the estate on death of the daughter as her heir. On sub­
sequent adoption by the mother it was held that the adoption 
does not divest the toother of the estate and the adopted son
84-. Pralhad v Damodhar A.I.R. 1958 Bom. 79 (90).
85- Ramanna v Sambamoorthy A.I.R. 1981 Andh. Pra. 381 (385» 
366) following A.I.R. 1954 S.C. 379*
86. A.I.R. 1955 MJC (Mad.) 2124.
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had no right or title to the estate during her lifetime.
87
In Singriah v. Ramanu.ia it was held that as an adoption 
dates back to the date of the death of the adoptive father, 
a previous partition cannot prejudice the rights of an 
adopted son and if it does prejudice his rights, he is 
entitled to work out his rights ignoring the said partition.
Alienations made without necessity can be ignored by adoptee
The Mysore High Court observed in Chanbasavva 
88v. Basavva that whether an alienation made prior to an
adoption, though not for legal necessity or family benefit,
would be binding on the adopted son depended upon the question
as to whether the alienor had the legal competence, at that
time, to make the alienation. To the extent to which the
alienation was lawful and valid at the time when it was made,
it cannot be affected by the subsequent adoption. In Vasudev 
89v. Jinhappa it was held that an adoption made by a Hindu 
widow relates back to the death of the adoptive father and 
the adopted son has the right to succeed to the adoptive 
father’s estate ignoring alienations unsupported by binding 
necessity. Consequently a gift of property made by one of 
the coparceners prior to the adoption cannot have any effect 
on the right of adopted son to the share of his adoptive
87. A.I.E. 1959 Mys. 239 (241) (Pt.D) (Er. 10).
88. A.I.R. 1961 Mys. 191 (192) (Et.B) (Er.4). Eor a further 
discussion of this topic see pages 494 to 501 In view 
of what I say at p. 500, I have to humbly submit that 
the decision on Chanbasayya* s c a s e 8 8  requires 
reconsideration.
89. I.L.R. [i960] Mys. 1380.
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father in a partition of the family property.
So also it has been held that where, prior to his
adoption, a valid surrender (which is a transfer in effect
if not in law) has been effected by his adoptive mother the
subsequently adopted son can divest the property which has
91already vested in the surrenderee.
Emoluments of offices are property
92In G. Brahmiah v. M. Venkaiah it was held that lands 
forming emoluments of the offices of a carpenter and blacksmith 
were property and the adopted eon could divest an heir in
93possession of service, inam lands. In Krishnappagouda v. Basava it 
was held by the Mysore High Court that when the sanction by the 
Government was, in its real nature, only a recognition by the 
Government for the purpose of the Radian Inam Tenure that a 
person was the adopted son, then such person*s rights in
91. Bahubali Vasant Katage v. Gundappa Tatya huge A.I.R. 1954 
451 (454, 456) (F.B.).
92. fi. Bramiah v. Venkaiah (1964) 1 Andh. V/.R. 367.
93. I.L.R. (i960) Mys. 999.
I 2$C
respect of Kadim Inam lands could arise only from the date
on which the recognition was accorded by the Government.
Such recognition divests the interest in inam lands held by
persons who were recognised by the Government before adoption.
94The Bombay High Court have held in Mahadeo Gopal v Rameshwar 
that the adoption of the adoptee relates back to the date of 
death of his father and he is entitled to displace the titles 
acquired by inheritance by the successors. That however, does 
not mean that the successors who inherited the property took 
the estates as trespassers. They only took the estate subject 
to a contingency that by an adoption they may be divested.
They are not trustees for the future adopted son. Therefore 
it cannot be said that the successors are trespassers and as 
such S. 51 of the Transfer of Property Act is not applicable 
to their case. On the other hand the successors are entitled 
to get compensation for improvement done by t&em on the 
property which the adoptee divested from them.
Adoptee's rights not affected by Sham Partition
The Supreme Court in a recent case ^ following the
96decision in Anant v Shankar' held (obiter) that the power 
of a Hindu widow does not come to an end on the death of the 
sole surviving coparcener. Neither does it depend upon the 
vesting or divesting of the estate, nor can the right to adopt 
be defeated by partition between the coparceners. The rights
94. A.I.R. 1968 Bom. 323.
95. Mudigowda v Ram Chandra (19&9) 2 S.C.J. 668. A case 
of sham partition between coparceners in order to 
defeat rights of adopting mothers.
96. (1943) 70 I.A. 232; I.L.R. [1944] Bom. 116, [1949]
. , .1 . M..L. J.. 94. (P.C.)-..............................
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of the adopted son relate back to the date of the adoptive 
father’s death and the adopted son must be deemed by a fiction 
of law to have been in existence as the son of the adoptive 
father at the time of the latter*s death. If, therefore, there 
was a coparcenary in existence when the adoptive father died, 
then whether it came to an end by the death of the last 
surviving coparcener or by subsequent partition among the 
remaining members, an adoption validly made by the widow of 
the deceased coparcener would have the effect of divesting 
the estate in the hands of the heir to the last surviving 
coparcener in the first case and of putting an end to the 
partition in the second case and enabling the adopted son to 
claim a share in the family properties as if they were still 
joint.
Doctrine of relation back .justified
The doctrine of relation back, taken too literally, 
had got out of hand. The Supreme Court restored order, but, 
as we shall see, enough doubt and confusion Y/as left even 
where the adoptee claimed nothing more than his adoptive 
father's properties. On the question whether the adoptee's 
rights arise on the date of adoption or relate back to the 
deceased adoptive father's death, the Smritis are silent.
The rule of relation back of the adopted son to the property 
of his deceased adoptive father appears to be an equitable 
one, for the adoptee undoubtedly confers temporal benefit on 
his adoptive father i.e., in the continuance of his family 
name etc., and possibly spiritual benefit alsp. Besidws the 
adoptee sacrifices his rights in the natural parents' family 
and it would but be fair and equitable that he should be given
similar rights in his adoptive family. One may well accept
the theory that the line of the adoptive father should not
he considered extinct as long as his widow is alive to
continue the line by adoption - in which case the rule of
relation hack follows as a reasonable consequence. However
there appears to he no reasonable ground why a widow should
postpone adoption of the child indefinitely, especially when
it is conducive to the spiritual and temporal benefit of her
husband. If she postpones the adoption indefinitely or for
too long after her husband's death, then in soiar as devolution
of the property of collaterals is concerned, his right should
be placed on a par with the right of a son born after and
conceived after partition (in case of a joint family), wherein
he has to take things as they stand at the time of his birth
and has no right to question alienations made before his
birth. It is impossible to disagree with the Supreme Court!s
97decision m  Srimvas v Narayan. 1
Adoptions by mother-in-law and daughter-in-law.
Man dying leaving daughters but no widow or son - his mother 
could adopt
In a case in Bombay,^ following Amarendra1s case,^0 
it was held that where an adopted son who was the last male 
holder of Watan property and was entitled to it as his 
separate property died leaving two daughters but no widow, 
his mother could make another adoption after the property had
97* [1954] S.C.J. 408: A.I.R. [1954] B.C. 379- Above p. 272.
I Tj R seq.
98. Chanbasappa v Madiwallappa [1937]/BomI &42 and also 
Ramchandra v Mt. Yamuni Bai A.I.R. 19J>Nag. 63 B.B.
vested in the daughters by inheritance. It was therefore
plain now, that the mere marriage of the son did not put an
end to his mother's power of adoption, for unless he left a
widow to continue the line, the mother's power to do so was 
99not aii an end. ' So too, an adoption by a step-mother of the 
last male-holder dying childless was valid even though the 
mother of the last male holder was alive, and had the effect 
of divesting the estate vested in her.^^
Custom permitting multiple adoptions
In Subramanian v Somasundaram^^^ it was held by the
Madras High Court that an exception to the rule that the
mother's power of adoption was at an end when the son had
left a widowjmay by custom exist. It was a case of Nattukotai
Chettis in the Ramnad district. A custom that both the mother-
in-law and the daughter-in-law can make adoptions, though not
proved as a custom of the community was held to be sufficiently
proved as between the parties. Their Lordships observed that
as pointed out by G-olap Chandra Sarkar Sastri (Law of Adoption,
1q 2
Lecture Y) , when discussing Rungamma.;\ v Atchama, Hindu 
opinion has long been divided on the question of multiple 
adoptions and where there are more widows than one - whether 
co-widows or daughter-in-law and mother-in-law - the sentiment 
in favour of each having a boy adopted by herself, though in
99* Amarendra v Sanatan [19331 60 I.A., 242, 230, 12 Pat.
442; approving Yenkappa v Jeevafji [1901] 13LTR..23?Bbm. 306
100. Maruti Hhondi v G-una Dhondi [1948] 49 Bom. L.R. 833*
101. (1936D 1 L.R. 59 Mad. 1064.
102. (1846) 4 M .I .A .I•, ? W.R. P.C. 57*
\;
theory to her husband, has been pretty strong in the Hindu
community. Amongst the instances spoken to in this case,
there were one or two where a person adopted a boy even after
the daughter-in-law had adopted a son, whereas under the
Hindu law there could be no adoption when there is a grandson.
by adoption. The language employed by Lord Kingsdown in 
103Bhoobun Moyee’s case seems to suggest that it is against
the policy of law generally to permit an adoption by a mother-
in-law after the estate had vested in daughter-in-law. In
this view, their Lordships opined, that it might be said that
a custom, even if established would be invalid as opposed to
public policy. But as recent cases had not reaffirmed this
ground but had Jpased the termination of the mother’s power on
religious grounds, their Lordships observed that the possible
objection based on public policy need not be examined. In
104Sooratha Singh v Kanaka Singh where the question related 
to the existence of custom permitting the adoption of a 
brother’s daughter’s son, Sadasiva Ayyar J. referred to an 
admission made by the objector and on the authority of the
■j 05
decision in Ramlinga Pillai v Sadasiva Pillai J observed 
that
"it was an admission both of the fact and of 
the validity of the defendant’s adoption. The 
burden of proving that it was not valid was 
therefore shifted”.
Their Lordships observed that an admission could of course be
explained away, but the defendant had not seriously attempted
103. (1863) 10 M.I.A. 279*
104. J1920) I.L.R. 43 Mad. 867.
103. [1864] 9 M.I.A. 510.
to do so in the present case. Again on a mere point of law 
an admission may not he of much significance, hut where the
question raised was one of custom, the position was different.
106Finally, as observed in Bhoobun Moyeefs case, where the 
person whose conduct is relied on could hardly have distin­
guished "between an adoption in fact and a legal adoption", 
and the facts ascertained in the case disproved the adoption, 
the presumptions arising from conduct may not be of any value, 
but it was recognised in the same passage that "upon a question 
which depended upon the preponderance of evidence", acts of 
acquiescence would be important. In the circumstances of 
the case, the adoption of one S by V (the mother-in-law) 
notwithstanding the existence of E (the daughter-in-law) in 
whom the estate of A (the previously adopted son by V who 
died leaving his widow E) had vested was held as a valid and 
proper one as between the parties and it would have the effect 
of entitling S to the half share to which P (the deceased 
husband of V) and A were entitled to in the common properties 
belonging to this branch. E not being a party to the suit, 
the rights of S, if any, as against her or against any son
that she might take in adoption were left open.
107In Gurunath v Kamalabai ( the Supreme Court held 
that a widow's power to make an adoption comes to an end by 
the interposition of a grandson or the son's widow competent 
to continue the line by adoption. The pov/er cannot be revived 
by the death of the grandson or son's widow. Their Lordships
106. (1865) 10 M.I.A. 279-
107. (1955) 18 S.C.J. 178.
108discussed the previous case law and observed that the
result of the series of decisions was that for about three-
quarters of a century the rule that "the power of a widow
to adopt comes to an end by the interposition of a grandson,
or the son's widow competent to adopt;/had become part of Hindu
law, though the reason for limiting the power may not be
traceable to any SHastric text. Their Lordships observed
that it was well known that in the absence of any clear
Shastric text the courts had authority to decide cases on
principles of justice, equity and good conscience and it is
not possible to hold that the reasons stated in support of the
rule are not consistent with these principles. However as I
have stated previously at p. 2 the adoption does lead to
temporal benefit at least and there seems to be no equitable
reason why the limitation should be placed by the courts on
the widow's power of adoption earlier than her own death.
109
In Bapuji v Gangaram a Hindu died leaving a widow and his 
son and the son died leaving a widow only who remarried. It 
was held that the power of the mother revived on remarriage 
of the son's widow. This decision was followed by the Lucknow
Court in Prem Jagat v Harihar^ ^  Their Lordships in
107
Gurunath's case disapproved of these decisions as being based
on a wrong apprehension of the true reasons stated for the ~
99rule in Amarendra's case.
108. Bhoobun Moyee's case followed in Thayammal and Tarachurn1s 
cases, also Chandavarkai J's dictum in Ramkrishna v 
Shamrao approved in Madana Mohan's case and 
Amarendra's case applied in VijaysingjT and restated 
as a sound rule in Anant v Shankar l^obTter). Also 
refer to my disuussion of the rule above p. 2 V? to 2J$U
109- I.L.R. [1941] Hag. 178.
110. I.L.R. (1945) 21 Luck. 1. ....................
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Discussions by Derrett and Vaidyanathan
The questions of 'Adoption by a daughter-in-law 
and Divesting1 have been discussed at length in two learned 
articles by Prof, J.D.M. Derrett^'1' and Mr. S. Vaidyanathan.^"^ 
The former article is a critique of various cases dealing 
with the subject and especially of Vehkalakshmi v Jagannathan 
(minor) The two main points decided in this case related
to (i) the validity of adoption by a Hindu widow after her 
father-in-law^ death and (ii) the effect of adoption on the 
proprietary rights of the mother-in-law in the estate held 
by her as the heir of her husband.
In this case the suit was by Jagannathan, the 
adoptee by the son's widow for possession or alternatively 
for partition and deliveryyof half share of entire estate of 
'R' in the hands of Venkalakshmi, the widow of the last male 
owner (i.e., the mother-in-law). The suit was decreed in the 
first instance for the main relief and the defendant appealed 
to the High Court. Counsel for the widow maintained that 
though the texts afforded no direct guidance on the question 
under discussion, it had "other inner meanings" and that on the 
son's death issueless his father became 'sonless' and the 
religious duty which the latter owed to his departed lineal
111. Adoption by a duaghter-in-law and Divesting: Derrett 
(1964) 1 M.L.J. 3-
112. Adoption by a daughter-in-law and divesting: S.
Vaidyanathan: A.I.E. Journal 1967 (Sept.) 135*
113* A.I.R. [19633 Mad. 316. [In this case one S died 
issueless in 1923? leaving his widow and parents.
His father Ii died without male issue in 1944 and the 
widow inherited his estate as sole heir. In 1952 the 
son's widow adopted 'J' with the consent of the husband's 
nearest sapindas. Next year the widow (of the father) 
purported to adopt a boy. The suit was by 'J' - see 
■ • • above] . ............
ancestors, devolved on his death, on his wife to the exclusion 
of his daughter-in-law. Professor Derrett rightly observed in 
his above-mentioned article that the very texts which were 
pressed into service as imposing the duty of perpetuating the 
line on the widow operate with equal force to cast an exactly 
similar duty on her daughter-in-law as well. Between the two 
women, adoption by the daughter-in-law served the double 
purpose of bringing into existence not only a son to her 
husband but a grandson to the father-in-law equivalent in all 
respects to a son. Anterior adoption by widow will still 
leave the burden of adopting a son to her husband on the son's 
widow - an adopted brother being no substitute for a son. The 
learned judges refused to follow the only decision (Piare Lai
-114
v Hemchand) which supported the appellant on the point.
They dismissed it with the remark that it ignores the principle
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laid down by the Privy Council in Amarendra's case that "the 
validity of an adoption is to be determined by spiritual 
rather than temporal considerations”. On this aspect Prof. 
Derrett poses two questions (a) whether it is invariably true 
that a widow cannot adopt when any competent daughter-in-law 
lives? (b) Whether when a daughter-in-law has adopted, the 
mother-in-law is in all cases disentitled to adopt. As to the 
first question it did not arise in the case as the (later) 
adoption by the widow was found to be without the consent of 
nearest sapinc a^s and therefore void. As to the second question, 
Ananthanarayan, J. (as he then was) stated that adoption by 
the widow "clearly could have no effect whatever", since by 
adoption of Plaintiff "the continuance of the line of
114. A.I.E. C1938] Lak. 339-
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2a: aswami Iyer had beon firmly "secured". In the situation 
which arose in the case the duty fell on each woman on the 
death of her husband as * aputra'.
hr. S. Vaidyanathan in his article referred to
112above  ^opines that there is no limit of time for the per­
formance of this duty. Thermere existence of one widow is 
not in itself a impediment to a valid adoption by the other 
and so long as the daughter-in-law has not adopted, the mother- 
in-law is free to adopt. .But, if, as happened in this case, the 
daughter-in-law adopts first, the mother-in-law loses her right 
to adopt. On the other hand the right of the daughter-in-law 
in this regard remains unimpaired notwithstanding a prior
adoption by mother-in-law. In a Hyderabad case, Mulcta Harahari 
115v - ukta Ra,jiah, wherein as the son’s widow was inactive the
father's widow adopted ’2' to 1, the full bench of the Hyderabad
High Court held that rhis case came within the rule in Gurunath1s 
107case and that the presence of the son's widow was fatal to any 
claim to adopt on the part of her mother-in-lav/, and that the 
adoption was thus invalid. Mr. S. Vaidyanathan observes that 
this view of the Hyderabad High Court was erroneous. The view 
enunciated by the Supreme Court in Gurunath v Hamalabai , 
observes the author, vas confined to cases where the son 
survives the father aid the extension of the rule to other 
situations was impermissible. In Gurunath's case~^ after 
the father's death, tie son, the son's widow and the son's 
son died in succession leaving the mother as the sole heir.
The situation, was fro the religious point of view very 
serious. Hut the Supreme Court refused to uphold the adoption
115. A.I.2. (1957) Eye. l CF.B.).
116. [1555] 1 H.L.J. , 91: . [19551 S.C.J. 178.
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try- the mater familias, made presumably to avert the extinction
of the family. It was pointed out that the principle applicable
99 •
v/as that laid down in Amarendra's case. The mother’s power to
adopt was lost when the son died leaving his son and widow
and was not revived by subsequent deaths. Prof. Derrett in 
111his article observes that the ratio of the Supreme Court
decision in Gurunath1s case^^ was applicable to Venkalakshmi*s 
113case ^ also. Thus the daughter-in-law was held competent to 
adopt X and once the purpose of adoption had been satisfied 
and the spiritual benefit had been secured to P, there was no 
longer any possibility of the widow’s adopting. But the 
question remains, observes Derrett, is it invariably true to 
say that a widow cannot adopt (under the pre-1956 system) 
while any competent daughter-in-law (or grand daughter-in-law) 
lives? And/answers, that the Supreme Court decision referred 
to above gives us to understand that this is so. This leads 
to the inconvenience that if the daugher-in-law died without 
adopting or she adopted and both she and the adopted son died, 
the mother-in-lav/ v/ould be deprived for ever of her power of 
adopting with sad effects both in human and economic terms.
He further observes that according to ths.Supreme Court view 
they must apply stare decisis and it would be up to Parliament 
to remedy the matter - which it shortly afterwards did for all 
adoptions after the enactment of the Hindu Adoptions and 
Maintenance Act 1956.
112According to Mr S. Vaidyanathan, however, m  
cases like Venkalakshmi ’ s^ ^  and Mukta Narahaci's^ ^  it is not 
possible to state on the facts that "the duty of providing for
the continuity of the line for spiritual purposes which was 
upon the father had been assumed by the son and by him passed
29/
on to his widow, so as to bring the mother’s power to adopt
Amarendra's case, __,
to an end" (per Sir George Lowndes in/A.I.R. 1533 P.C. 155)•
Mr. S. Vaidyanathan further observes that the opinion expressed
by Prof. Derrett that if in the Madras case (Venkalakshmi1s 
\ 113case), ^ the widow had adopted first instead of the son’s
widow the adoption would be invalid is incorrect. Both these
learned authors also refer to the case of Sahebrao Madhavrao
117v Rangrao Dadarao ' wherein the Bombay cases (Pandurang Bhau
v Changunabai^^^ which followed Anant v Dnyaneshwar) and
115the Hyderabad full Bench case (Mukta Narahari's case) ^ came
to be reviewed. In this case a father P had two sons S^, and
S^; died in P's lifetime leaving S^W his widow. P then
died leaving his own widow ¥, S^¥ and S^. Then died. W
adopted X in March 1950. S-^ W adopted Y in July 1950. The
Court was impressed by the reasoning of the earlier Bombay
107cases and read the judgment of Gurunath's case ' in the
Supreme Court in that light.
"The earlier decisions made it clear that the 
widow whose interposition was held to terminate 
the mother's power of adoption was the widow of 
the son who was the last male holder".
If the father leaves several sons and dies leaving his widow
and if each of these sons adopts, the mother-in-law has
several adoptive grandsons (hence she can have an adopted son
and adopted grandson). According to the decision in this case
both the mother-in-law and daughter-in-law might adopt, which
view according to Derrett is wrong. But Vaidyanathan opines
117. C19603 65 Bom. L.R. 411.
118. A.I.E. [1945] Bom. 164; I.L.R. 1945 Bom. 48?.
119. (1945) 46 Bom. L.R. 555*
that in this case, wherein the facts were similar to the 
Madras case with the important difference that the mother-in- 
law was the first to adopt, it was rightly held that both
adoptions were valid. The second situation is exemplified by
16 116 
Bhoobun Moyee's case and Pandurang Bhau v Changunabai
119which followed Anant G-ovind1 s case. J In the case of Anant 
119v Dnyaneshwar ' the father died leaving a widow W and son
S, married to S-jW and an unmarried son S^. died and then
SjW died, leaving who then died unmarried. W was left the
sole representative of her family. W adopted and it was held
by the Bombay High Court that the adoption was valid. For
when W adopted there was no daughter-in-law upon whom rested
the duty to prolong the line. According to Derrett, Anant 
119ffovind1s ' case was wrongly decided although it is technically
correct as this case was before the Supreme Court decision in
107Gurunath*s case. ( The inconvenience that the family would
be totally deprived of the right of self-prolongation was
107
specifical&y contemplated in Gurunath1s case but the Supreme 
Court refused to uphold the adoption by the mater familias 
on the ground that the mother*s power to adopt was lost when 
the son died leaving his son and widow and was not revived by 
subsequent deaths.
It may humbly be submitted that this view of the 
Supreme Court is incorrect. As rightly observed by Prof. 
Derrett, it would have sad effects both in human and economic 
terms and as Mr. Vaidyanathan opines there should be no limit 
of time for the performance of this duty. The Smritis are 
silent on the point and the natural limitation is the death 
of the widow herself. The limitations put up by the Courts 
seem to me to be against the principles of natural justice
and equity and opposed to the principle of spiritual benefit
99recognised in Amarendra1s case, and hence against the spirit^ 
of Sastric law also. In Pakistan, Burma and Malaysia Gurunath1s 
case may not be followed.
Relation back as to coparcenary and separate property 
distinguished by Madras High Court
Next as to the legal consequences arising out of
adoption and its impact on property rights, the decision of
113the Court in Venkalakshmi 's case ^ was that the adoptee was 
entitled to divest the grandmother of only half-share in joint 
family property and could claim no rights in the self-acquired 
property of the grandfather. Prof. Derrett crticizes both 
these points and Vaidyanathan fully agrees with him. As to 
joint family property it was settled by a long line of authori­
ties from Raghunadha v Brozo Kishore^ to 70 I.A. 232: A.I.R.
£19433 190 (P.C.) that a person adopted by a predeceased 
coparcener’s widow is treated, as having the same interest in 
coparcenary properties that his adoptive father had at the 
moment of his death. The interest is however, subject to the 
usual fluctuations resulting from deaths and births and 
adoptions in the family, and the family itself is not con­
sidered extinct so long as there lives a potential mother in 
the person of the widow of a coparcener. The Madras High 
Court have held in the instant case that the character of the 
properties inherited by his heir undergoes a transformation, 
a half share acquires the attributes of separate property and 
the other half share alone retaining the essential. features 
of a coparcenary with liability to defeasance on adoption. 
Vaidyanathan observes that a careful study of the Supreme
go
Court decision in Srinivas v Narayan would show how arti­
ficial and anomalous is the theory involved in the Madras 
High Court decision; the entire tenor* of judgment of the 
Supreme Court militates against the soundness of assumptions
underlying the High Court decision. The true legal pesition
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emerging from Anant v Shankar as elucidated and clarified by
RP
the Supreme Court in Srinivas v Harayan is stated by
Veeraswami J. thus
"If in a joint family consisting of two brothers 
A and B; A died leaving his widow W and later B 
the surviving coparcener also died leaving his 
widow but no son, and thereafter W adopted X, 
the adoption would confer upon X the rights to 
the estate in the hands of the widow and the 
adopted son X would be entitled to divest B's 
widow”
and Vaidyanathan remarks that there is clearly no indication 
in this statement of law that the adopted son's right of 
divesture is limited to half share in the estate. Prof.
Derrett also holds the view of the Madras High Court on this 
subject as clearly wrong. He observes that on the subject of 
the rights of a son validly adopted even after the enactment 
of the Hindu Adoption and Maintenance Act, 1958 doubts persist. 
In one view he cannot obtain a birth right in the joint family 
property of his deceased adoptive father since relation back 
has been abolished; in another view (since corroborated by 
the Supreme Court of India) the statute interferes as little 
as possible with the law of the joint family and if a widow 
adopts she will adopt to herself so far as her own property 
is concerned, but also give effect to the Mitakshara birth­
right so far as joint family property is concerned. That the 
adopted son might be a coparcener with adoptive uncles and 
cousins had already been established by the Federal Court in
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120Tatya Shantappa v. Ratnabai and his right to divest joint
family property from the hands of anyone taking it as a sole
surviving coparcener or as heir or successor to such a
coparcenary had been placed beyond doubt by the Supreme Court
121in Krishuamurthi v. Dhruwara.i. which was decided on May 5,
1961 and reports may not have been available when the instant
case was argued before the Madras High Court judges.
To the argument on behalf of the adopted son that
the Mitaksharn birth right does not stop with the adoptive
father but extends to the joint property as such, Anantanarayan,
J. said (p. 326, Col. 2)
"But this argument appears to us to ignore the go 
true principle as stated repeatedly in Shrinivas1s 
case. The following sentences, in particular, 
are very significant fThus far, the scope of 
the principle of relation back is clear. It 
applies only when the claim made by the adopted 
son relates to the estate of his adoptive father’.
Again, ’it is the interest of the adoptive father 
which the adopted son is declared entitled to take 
as on the date of his death*. Also with respect 
to Amarendra's case.99 Venkatarama Ayyar, J. 
observes: ’This decision might be taken at
the most to be an authority for the position 
that when an adoption is made to A, the adopted 
son is entitled to recover the estate of A not 
merely when it has vested in his widow who makes 
the adoption, but also in any other heir of his.
It is no authority for the contention that he 
is entitled to recover the estate of B. which 
had vested in his heir prior to his adoption 
to A ’. But that is precisely the position here...".
The interest of F, which was that of a sole surviving coparcener,
had vested in H7, prior to the adoption and it appeared
only, what would have been the son’s interest (one half) could
be claimed by X. This view was clearly expressed in more or
less identical terms at p. 327, col.1, in the judgment of
120. [194-91 2 M.I.J. 18. (P.O.)
121. A.I.E. 1962 S.O. 59.
lVeeraswami J. at p. 334--325i which Derrett rightly observes 
as being wrong.
What the Supreme Court undoubtedly meant in 
82Shrinivas1s case was that the adopted son was entitled 
only to the property of his male lineal ancestors, whether 
of father or grandfather and not a collateral. All emphasis 
is upon contrast between line of the father, which is being 
prolonged and which of course is also the line of the father's 
father, the the lines of collaterals which are unaffected by 
the doctrine of adoption. Derrett remarks that the ratio of 
the leading Supreme Court is so clear that it is difficult 
to grasp how such literal adherance to the word 'father'
82could have been urged upon the Court. Shrinivas's case,
as it happened, was an instance of the most usual situation,
where the generations die in the natural order, but the
principle that an adopted son is adopted grandson of his
adoptive father's father is beyond question. That the principle
should have escaped the learned judges was unexpected, seeing
that they have already admitted that the reason why a widow
cannot adopt once: her daughter-in-law has adopted is that as
soon as that happens the widow's deceased husband is not
122'sonless' i.e. he has a grandson, 'male issue'.
As to the adoptee’s divesting of the separate 
properties of the grandfather, both the judges had no doubts 
but that he must fail, as the adoptive father himself had no 
rights in them at the time of his death and the rights acquired 
by the heir-at-law of the last male holder by inheritance are
122. See p. 323? Col. 2, in the case, the citation from 
G.C. Sarkar Sastri.
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122aunimpaired by subsequent adoption • With this view both 
Derrett and Vaidyanathan rightly disagree. Prof. Derrett 
says that just as the adopted son is grandson of the deceased 
grandfather who survived the adopted sonfs adoptive father 
and is grandson for the purpose of being a coparcener and 
following coparcerner property, so he is equally and by 
virtue of the same relationship entitled to the grandfather’s 
separate and self-acquired property, for he traces his title 
by'birth alone1, as do all Mitakshara male issue and not by
122a. A similar erroneous view has been held in a recent case 
by the Allahabad High Court in Arjun Singh v. Virendra 
Hath, A.I.E. 1971 All 29> 38. In this case it was held 
(obiter) that the son can only divest ancestral or 
coparcenary property and not the self-acquired property 
of the grandfather. Further, even in the event of a 
valid adoption by the daughter-in-law (whose husband 
had predeceased D the grandfather), the adoption could 
not have had the effect of divesting K and C (the daughter 
of the interest which already vested in them respecting * 
such property of D, the grandfather, as was his self- 
acquired and exclusive property. This decision seems to 
be erroneous for a coparcenary is constituted between a 
person and his father, grandfather and great-grandfather 
and the self-acquired property of the grandfather becomes 
ancestral property vis-a-vis his son, grandson and great 
grandson. The discussion which follows applies to this 
case as well.
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way of his immediate adoptive relationship to his adoptive 
father. If one thing is certain about the Mitakshara family, 
says Derrett, it is that the spiritual 1haven1 or ’state' even 
of living male lineal ancestors is elevated by births of male 
issue and the idea of birth of a son who is not ipso facto 
equally gtandson and great grandson is ridiculous. For Manu 
says(IX, 137).
’’Through the son one conquers the worlds; through 
the grandson one attains immortality, and through 
the son's grandson one obtains the regions of 
the Sun".
This text of Ivianu also appears in Vishnu and Vasishtha and
1 P-? op
has been cited from Sankha-Likhita and Harita.  ^ Shrinivas' s 
case makes no sort of distinction between separate and self­
acquired property and joint family property. Krishnamurthi's 
124.case explicitly equate both classes of property. Principle 
Ho. IV set out in the judgment says:
"The estate may be definite and ascertained, 
as when he is the sole and absolute owner of
123. 170 ff. of Vol. II of Gr. Jha's: Hindu Law in its
Sources, All. 1933.
124. A.I.E. 1962 S.O. 59.
properties or it may "be fluctuating as when he 
is a member of a joint Hindu family".
The adoptive descendant represents his ancestors as well in
the first category as in the second, therefore, says Derrett,
Jagannathan should have obtained the entire self-acquired
property of deceased K. Iyer, his grandfather, divesting
Venkalakshmi, the widow except for any property other than
an interest in agricultural land, which latter would be subject
to the statute of 1937 and would be shared with the widow.
Prior to 1956? observes Derrett, i.e. the period prior to
113
Venkalakshmi1s case (A.I.E. 19^3 Mad. 316) the situation of 
the son would have been even clearer. The self-acquired 
property of first his father and then his grandfather would 
have come to him subject to the Act of 1937* ^he position 
of the adopted son could not be worse than that of an Aurasa 
son in regard to the property of his male lineal ancestors 
sind that is the position established in the Supreme Court
113cases and unfortunately overlooked in Venkalakshmi1s case.
Mr. Vaidyanathan agrees with the above view of Prof. 
Derrett. He says that the principle of relation back is in 
conflict with the principle of Jurisprudence inheritance is
99,
never in abeyance1. Amarendrafs case (a case of inheritance 
as distinguished from survivorship) established that the 
adopted son was entitled to divest not only the widow but
any other heir of such holder. But there was further extension
58'
of this rule by Anant v Shankar. One part of this decision, 
which dealt with the separate properties of a collateral, says 
Vaidyanathan, created an intriguing situation. In so far as 
it held "that an adopted son is entitled to divest the estate 
of a collateral which had devolved by inheritance prior to
his adoption "it did" go far beyond what had been previously 
understood as the law". The value of the Supreme Court
decision, observes Vaidyanathan, lies in the bold lead it
58
gave by over-ruling that portion of Anant v Shankar which 
went beyond limits of what till then was understood as the 
law on the subject. Their Lordships of the Supreme Court 
observed that "the theory on which the doctrine (of relation 
back) is based,is that there should be no hiatus in the
continuity of the line of the adoptive father. This is in
accordance with the principle stated by Mr. Ameer Ali in
25
Pratap Singh1s case
"that an adopted son is the continuator of his 
adoptive father’s line exactly as an Aurasa son 
and that an adoption, so far as the continuity
of the line is concerned has a retrospective
effect, that whenever the adoption may be made 
there is no hiatus in the continuity of the line".
If the legal position be as stated above, it is difficult to
in 113
say, comments Vaidyanathan, that/Venkalakfahmi’s case, Jaganna-
tham is not entitled to the separate property of Ramaswami.
A son of a predeceased son is indubitably a nearer heir than
the widow. The vesting of the estate in the latter was only
provisional and adoption brings about the defeasance.
The point was put beyond doubt by the subsequently
reported decision of the Supreme Court in Krishnamurthy v 
. 125
Dhrp iA/araji As stated in the opening paragraph of the
j'udgment, the case directly raised "the question whether D, 
the respondent, on his adoption, divested the defendants’ 
Appellants, of the properties of his adoptive father and 
grandfather". I agree with the views of Mr. Vaidyanathan
125. A.I.R. 1962 S.C. 59.
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and Prof. Derrett, and a careful study of the Supreme Court 
decisions referred to above would show the artificial and 
anomalous theory involved, in the I'adras High Court decision, 
for the entire tenor of judgment of the Supreme Court 
militates against assumptions underlying the High Court 
decision.
Divesting of Pro ert7/ vested in a sole surviving vcoparcener
In the pre-1956 period, provisional heirs and
limited heirs were well-known, the divided coparcener, the
sole surviving coparcener and the widow holding a title under
the limited estate were the typical examples and those who
dealth with them otherwise than upon sufficient bona fide
enquiry, knew that upon action being taken by someone interested
in the estate, someone who perhaps might not even be alive at
1 P6
the time of the transfer' ^  of the estate might be divested 
without notice or compensation. The collateral heir, inheriting 
fro an absolute owner and to all appearances by an absolute 
title, was in a different position, alienees from him had. no 
notice of a defect in his title and were not on their guard.
Thus the collateral was of a different class from the 
coparcener, manager or widow under the pre-1956 era.
Alienation of property without necessity could be divested 
by subsequently adopted son
A sole surviving coparcener who alienated without
126. Dancfaiti v Curajpal .Singh A.I.E. 1945 F.C. 1: [1944]
2 M.li.J. 595 (F.C.); Shiva Ji C-anpatl Put ha 1 v burlidhar
Daji [1955] 5^ Bom. L.R'. 426; F.B. the rule is fully
accepted in ..ndhra [1956] An. .7.R. 1067 (K. Seshamma
v p. Venkayya).
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justifying necessity prior to the adoption of a son by a widow 
of a predeceased coparcener who died prior to the partition, 
gave only a provisional title, provisional until all widows 
then capable of adoption had died or lost their power to adopt, 
and the adopted son Could divest transferences of property who 
had taken for purposes which would not have been binding upon 
his had he been alive and a coparcener at the relevant moment.
The principle was clear enough. The adoptee was treated like 
a posthumous child. A posthumous child could recover his 
father's share from coparceners who divided after his father's 
death, subject to binding alienations. In the same way the 
posthumous son could divest alienees from a sole surviving 
coparcener, as he could-from an heir, such as his own adoptive 
mother. The coparceners held provisionally as long as a widow 
lived who retained the right to create a new coparcener 
retrospectively by adoption, and the sole surviving coparcener, 
like any heir, though hardly by so strong a title, held 
provisionally in the same circumstances.
The logic of this proposition extended to testamentary
dispositions by the sole surviving coparcener and both legacies
and sales, mortgages and exchanges, not to speak of gifts
would be upset when a son was adopted by the widow of a
predeceased coparcener. This logic has been admitted in 
127several cases and the best of the series dealing with the 
subject is the case of Potharanu Bardhasaradhi Rao v Pothara.ia 
Srinivasa Sanaa wherein the Andhra Pradesh High Court
127. Por example Hdhao v. Bhascar [1046J I.L.R* Nag. 425* 427; 
Krishtappa Venkappa v. Copal Shiva.ii [1956J 59 B.l.R. Bom. 
L.R. 176 (P.B.). The decision in Kristappa’s case has been 
criticized by Derrett in an article entitled: Recent 
decisions and some queries in Hindu Law —  8 Divesting by an 
adopted son; [1960] 62 Bom. L.R., J, 31-32.
128. A.I.R. [1959] Andh. p. 512; [1959] 2 An. ¥.R. 341.
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followed the Bombay Bull bench decisions in Ramchandra
12Q
Hanmant v Bala.ji Dattu y and Krishtappa Venkappa v Gopal 
Shiva,ji
View that the right of the adopted son to recover properties
should be limited to cases of inheritance and not of alienations.
128In Pardhasardhi Rao v Potharana1s case, their 
Lordships of the Andhra Pradesh High Court observed that the 
principle as that the male line is not regarded as extinct, 
or the man to have died without issue, until the continuation 
of the line by adoption becomes impossible, that the adoption 
has retrospective effect and that whenever an adoption is made, 
there is no hiatus in the continuity of the line (vide 
Pratapsing,ji1 and Neelangouda* s^  cases). Thus, there 
can be little doubt, say their Lordships, that the adopted 
son has a right to get the share of his adoptive father from 
other coparceners in possession or from one who has acquired 
it by the law of inheritance^, and further that % the right of 
the adopted son should be limited to displacing of titles 
acquired by inheritance and not to those acquired by outsiders 
in other ways. In other words, the adoption by a widow of a 
deceased coparcener would not affect dispositions made by a 
person holding the estate. The rule that an adoption dates 
back to the date of the death of the adoptive father has no 
application to a case where the last male holder has disposed 
of the property since the sole surviving coparcener is always
129. C19553 I.L.R. Bom. 837; 57 Bom. L.R. 491; A.I.R. 1955 
Bom. 291 (F.B.).
130. [1956] 59 Bom. L.R. 176 (F.B.).
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regarded as the owner of coparcenary property and as such
it is within his competence to alienate property either for
necessity or by way of gift. Iffhen an estate is divested by
a subsequent adoption, the adopted son takes the estate
subject to the alienations made by the holder for the time
being. Their Lordships discussed the case law on the subject
131beginning with the well known case of Veeranna v Sayamma.
In that case a father and his son constituted a Hindu joint
family. The son predeceased the father leaving behind him a
widow hut without any issue. The father as the sole surviving 
coparcener settled all the properties on his daughters. The 
son!s widow then adopted a boy who brought a suit claiming a 
half share in the properties on the ground that his adoption 
relates back to the death of his adoptive father. This con­
tention was repelled and the suit was dismissed. It was laid 
down by the Bench consisting of Odgers and Venkata Subba Rao, 
J.J., that the survivor could alienate all or any of the 
family properties absolutely and the adopted son could not 
question the alienations and could take only what remained 
unalienated. Odgers J, stated the principle thus:
"It seems to me that a sole surviving coparcener 
has always been regarded as the owner of the 
coparcenary property. The theory of relation 
back has only to do with establishing a line of
succession to the adoptive father and in order
to establish that line it is necessary that 
certain intermediate holders should give way 
to the adopted son's superior claims as that 
of a natural born son of his adoptive father ...
But within these limits he can so to speak insist 
on the property devolving in a direct line as 
far as possible from father to son or from 
grandfather to grandson and it is in this 
connection and this alone that the doctrine 
of relation back and the cases I have quoted
131. [19393 I.L.R. 52 Mad. 398.
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in the first category of inheritance are to 
be regarded. .'hat authority there is with 
regard to alienations by a male holder, are 
strongly, and it seems to me conclusively 
against the contention argued by the appellant".
‘The legal position was summed up thus by hr. Justice Venkata
Subba Rao:
"The theory is that a Hindu cannot be said to 
have died without male issue, until the death 
of the widow, makes adoption impossible; in 
other words, so long as the widow is alive, 
there is the possibility of an heir coming into 
existence (Vest & Buhler, 4-th edition 89o - 
Pratap Singh's case, I.L.R. 4-3 Bom. 778: (A.I.R.
FT” f.CTl®')".
Odgers J. quotes a passage from Mayne (Para. 198; 9th edition).
This paragraph of Mayne comes after a discussion on the power
of an adopted son to challenge alienations made prior to his
adoption by the widow who adopts him:-
"It would be intolerable that he should be 
prevented from dealing with his own, on account 
of a contingency which may never happen. .Then 
the contingency has happened’, it would be most 
inequitable that the purchaser should be deprived 
of rights which he obtained from one who at the 
time, was perfectly competent to grant them".
i p o
Their Lordships in Pardhasaradhi Rao1s case observed that 
the rule contained in these passages represents the correct 
law. It may however be mentioned that Mr. Varadachariyar 
(Counsel for appellant in Veeranna's case“^^) had challenged 
the accuracy of this absolute statement and undertook to show 
from authoritative cases that it needed considerable modifi­
cation. But their Lordships doubted whether the expression
"an estate subject to defeasance" used by Seshagiri Ayyar in
1*2Vadana Mohana v Purushothama  ^ was the correct expression to 
apply to an estate of this kind. According to this theory 
with respect to the surviving member of a coparcenary in the
132.. C19153. I.L.R* 58. Mad.. 1105-
3 0 6
position of the grandfather in this case is that so long as 
the power to adopt is outstanding, he has really only got an 
absolute estate in half, because, if and when an adoption 
takes place the adopted son becomes immediately a coparcener 
with himself, entitled to half the property on partition.
The question was whether this theory was supported by decisions 
and even supposing it was so supported, was it to apply to 
alienations made by the adoptive grandfather before the
131adoption took place? Their Lordships in Veeranna's case
observed that it was settled that an after-bornaurasa son
cannot question the alienations made for example by the
manager of the coparcenary, his father prior to his birth
and it seemed startling to their Lordships, if it was true
that an adopted son should be in a better position. The
earliest case to which their Lordships' attention was drawn
133was that of Bamundoss Mookertjea v Mst. Tarinee. It was a
case wherein the Sudder Dewany Adawlut delivered a very full 
judgment covering a number of points in the law of adoption 
and which the Privy Council adopted almost in its entirety.
That decision, inter alia, laid down that until a widow 
exercised the power of adoption vested in her, she is possessed 
of the property from the death of her husband and can, there­
fore, sue in her character as widow in order to claim succession 
to the estate of her husband in spSte of the fact that she
possesses an unexecuted power of adoption. In Bhoobun Moyee1s
134we have an example of the limit to the power to adopt. ^
1$5. [1858] 7 M.I.A. 169.
134. See ante page 236 et seq.
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155In Lakshmana Rag v Lakshmi Ammal where Bamundoss Mukherjee’s
case is relied on as an authority for the proposition "that
an authority to adopt a son possessed by a widow doesnot
supersede or destroy her personal rights as widow and that'
those rights continue in force until an adoption is actually
made", it was held that the title of an adopted son does not
relate back to the death of the widow’s deceased husband.
25In Pratap Singh’s case the Privy Council held that there
was no hiatus in the continuity of the line and that so far
as this was concerned, the adoption had a retrospective effect.
It seems from an examination of the cases, observes Odgers J.,
that the only case in which it can be said that the adopted
son can, on the theory of relation back, object to alienations
made before his adoption, is confined to the case of alienations
by a widow. Venkatasubba Rao J. referred to two cases where
the point directly arose. The first case was Sivagnanam v
156Ramasami Chettiar y in which Arnold White C.J. and Phillips
J. held that the adopted son took the property subject to the
mortgage created by the intermediate holder and remarked that
this case was a direct authority against the appellant's
contention. The second case was Maharaja of Bobbili v
157Zamindar of Chundi. y{ The case related to impartible 
Zamindari. Certain debts incurred by an intermediate holder 
were held binding on an adopted son who divested the former's 
estate and it became unnecessary to decide whether an inter­
mediate holder was full:owner. His Lordship observes
135* (1881) I.L.R. 4 Mad. 160.
136. [1911] 22 M:L.J. 85-
137. ';CL910-) I.L.E. 35 Mad. 108; 21 M.L.J. 593.
’’In the view I take, it makes no difference 
whether the alienation was or was not for value, 
though I may state that I regard the alienation 
in the present case as purely voluntary”.
Finally Odgers J, referred tb the case of Krishnamurthy 
158v Krx-shnamurthy, ^ wherein their Lordships of the Privy 
Council say as follows (Lord Dunedin delivering the judgment 
of the Board)
inter
”\7hen a disposition is made / !„th vivos by one 
who has full power over property under which 
a portion of that property is carried away, 
it is clear that no rights of a son who is 
subsequently adopted can affect that portion 
which is disposed of. The same is true when 
the disposition is by will and the adoption 
is subsequently made by a widow who has been 
given the power to adopt. For the will speaks 
at the death of the testator and the property 
is carried away before the adoption takes place”.
It was suggested (by counsel for Appellant in Potharaju1s 
128case v) that the decision of their Lordships cannot stand in 
view of what was said in their earlier decisions but Odgers 
J. observed that construing the earlier decisions quoted by 
him, apart from those references to alienations by a widow, 
as applying entirely to matters of inheritance i.e. continuity 
of the line, divesting an intermediate holder, the fiction 
that the adoption is a deferred act by the father, that his 
life is prolonged in the widow or that the adoption relates 
back, it would be seen that all these fictions were simply 
introduced for the purpose of introducing a new heir into the 
succession, the ordinary rule being that when succession opens 
there must be somebody to catch the property mien the previous 
holder relaxes his possession of it. Their Lordships further 
observed that it could not be concluded that the Privy Council
138. C19273 I.L.R. 50 Mad. 308 (P.C.).
158in Krishnamurthi1s case  ^ were oblivious of their previous
decisions and that their Lordships must clearly be held to
distinguish the case of interference with alienations from
cases of divesting on the theory of relation back or any theory
of continuity of succession or no hiatus in the line as they
25put it in Pratap Singh’s case.
ipo
Their Lordships in Pardhasaradhi Rao1s case
referred to the opinion of Reilly J. in Sukhdevdoss v Mt.
159Choti Bai ' as being in consonance with this rule. The
learned judge observed:
“It has been recognised clearly by the Privy 
Council in Krishnamurthy Ayyar v Krishnamurthy 
Ayyar ^ that, when by his will the husband has 
disposed of part of his property that disposition 
cannot be affected by the adoption of a son 
after his death, and a similar effect must follow, 
in my opinion; from the disposition by will of 
the whole of his property which in that case 
cannot be affected by a subsequent adoption”.
ipo
Their Lordships in Pardhasaradhi Rao's case next referred
140to Anant v Shankar where the limitation to the doctrine of
relation back was also recognised which approved of the
151decision in Veerannafs case: ' Their Lordships (in Anant .
140  :
v Shankar) stated:-
“Keshav’s right to deal with the family property 
as his own would not be impaired by the mere 
possibility of an adoption. But ... the same 
right to adopt subsisting after his death must 
have qualified the interest which would pass 
by inheritance from him".
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Referring to Srinivas v Narayan their Lordships in Pardhasaradhi
12& 140;
Kao's case observed that the authority of Anant v Shankar " 
had been to some extent impaired by the judgment of the
139- A.I.E. [1928] Mad. 118. 
140. A.I.E. [19433 P.O. 196.
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Supreme Court in Srinivas1s case.0 But the disagreement was 
only with regard to one aspect of the matter, namely the 
rights of the subsequently adopted son to collateral succession. 
Differing from Inant v Shankar^'" the Supreme Court held in
pp
Srinivas v I~arayan° that the adoption after the death of a 
collateral does not entitle the adopted son to come in as the 
heir of the collateral. In other respects, their Lordships
observed, the decision still holds the field. Their Lordships
loo 14-1
in Pardhasaradhi Rao's case noticed various rulings which
contained a view similar to that adumbrated in Yeeranna v
1-51Sayanma and those which followed it, and lastly cited the
142case of 2amchandra v Balaji wherein it was laid down that
"If on the death of a sole surviving coparcener 
A, is property has devolved upon his heir (B) 
by inheritance and on his (B’s) death it has 
vested, in his ov/n heir (C in this case son of 
B) the subsequent adoption in the family of the 
sole surviving coparcener (A) does not divest 
it from such heir".
In this case Chagla C.J. who delivered the judgment 
of the full bench of the Bombay High Court observed that in 
Inant v Shankar"^' what the Irivy Council emphasised as the
principle at p. 8 was:
"In the present case the adopting widow was 
the mother of the last surviving coparcener.
Her power to adopt could not have been exercised 
in his lifetime, and if exercised after his death, 
cannot, as their Lordships think, be given any
141. Sankaralingam pillai v Yeluchami Fillai [1942] - 1 
I.L.J. 119; -.1.2. 1942 Had. 338; followed in Pull 
bench case of Lad. I-I.C. in Sankaralingam v Veluchami 
I.L.R. [19431 Had. 309, A.lTff. 1946 Hag. 203 at p. 206; 
(Udhao v Lhaskar) ; Frahlad Ram chandra v Gendalal Llotilal, 
1.1.2. 1948 :“ag. 331; Bhimaji v Hanumant Rao A.1.5. 1950 
Bom. 271; Ram chandra Balaji v kpparao A.I’.R. 1945 Bom.
220; Puttap~ a v Basappa A.I.R. 1953 Hys. 113 ; Lalithak- 
umari v Lajah of Visianagaram A.I.R. 1954 Had. at p. 40; 
6? Had. L. . v 1.
142.. A . I .R .  1955 Bom.. 291 (P .B . ) :  - I .L .R .-  [19553 Bom. 837*
less effect than would have attached to an 
adoption made after his ddath hy the widow 
of a predeceased collateral”.
Then their Lordships go on to say what the effect would he
and that is the important part of the judgment:
"It must vest the family property in the adopted 
son on the same principle, displacing any title 
based merely on inheritance from the last sur­
viving coparcener”.
The Supreme Court had occasion to consider Anant v
l^i o Q2
Shankar in the case of Shrinivas v Narayan (above p. 2J7&) .
wherein the Supreme Court had disagreed with that judgment
with respect to one aspect of the decision and had pointed out
that the claim of the appellant to divest a vested estate
rested on a legal fiction, the legal fiction being that the
adopted son was in existence at the date of the death of his
adoptive father. It is this legal fiction which enables the
adopted son to divest property which has already vested. In
142our opinion, observes Chagla, C.J., in Ramchandra v Balaji, 
we should be very slow further to extend the scope of this 
legal fiction. It is very necessary that titles should be 
perfected and there should be no doubt as to the title enjoyed 
by a person owning property. TJie heir of a surviving coparcener 
or heir of an owner who leaves no family behind him may during 
his life-time hold property which is subject to defeasance.
But as His Lordships observed there is no principle why this 
uncertainty as to title should be continued after his death 
when his heir has succeeded to him. further there was another 
important principle of succession that inheritance should not 
remain in abeyance and that once the property had vested in 
the heir it should not be divested. 'The case of adoption1, 
observed Chagla C.J. ’was a striking exception to this
principle. The principle is leased on sound reason and we
woulc be extending that exception if we were to give a wider
application to the decision in Anant v Shankar.^~"r®
Applying the principles laid down in Quinn v
Leathem^ ^  vis. (i) that every judgment must be read as
applicable to the particular facts proved and (ii) that a
case is only an authority for what it actually decides to
the case of Anant v Shankar, His Lordship observed that
in his opinion that case was not intended to be an exposition
of the whole law of adoption and that decision must be
governed and qualified by the particular facts'of the dase.
Similarly in view of the exceptional nature of that decision,
in view of the fact that it created a legal fiction and
constituted an exception to the Hindu law of inheritance,
His lordship looked upon that decision as only an authority
for what it actually decided and did not accept any proposition
that might seem to follow logically from it. His Lordship
144
referred to Jiva.ji v Hanmant and overruled Hanmantrao v
hahadevrao, Krishnamurti v Dhruvara.j [in the High Court]"u~r^
147and Ye 11appangowda v Krishtagowda. ' ' She Andhra Iradesh High
1 po
Court in the case of Pardhasaradhi Rao' s u (as we have seen)
142
followed the Bombay full bench decisions in Ramchandra v Balaji.
She above decisions criticized
In his article entitled "Divesting by an adopted
143- C1901] A .C . 495-
144. [194-93 52 Bom. L.R. 527 ( P . B . ) .
145. [1952] P.A. Ho. 161 of 1949.
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son: A pressing problem for the Supreme Court" "r Prof.
Berrett rightly criticizes these decisions stating that they 
:ire contrary to what appears to be the intent of the Supreme
o p
Court in the case of Shrinivas v ITarayan (citing a passage
fro the -iudgment of hr. Justice Venkatarama Iyer). He refers
tc various decisions where for example a sole surviving
coparcener, who, instead of dying and leaving the family
property to pass by inheritance had alienated parts or whole
IzlQ
of it inter vivos J which could not be challenged by the 
subsequently adopted son. Even where the property had passed 
from the sole surviving coparcener by inheritance and had 
then passed from his heir on the latter's death, the Bombay
hgh Court has held that it cannot be reached by the adopted
150son, but here the Andhra Pradash High Court, observes 
Berrett, has very properly declined to observe whether the 
conclusion was fit to be followed. Put the basis of the 
,ndhra decision was that a distinction existed (though not 
cinted out in the Supreme Court) between property which 
passes from the sole surviving coparcener by inheritance on 
the one hand and property which he had alienated on the other.
14-7• C1952] S.A. Ho. 395 of 1949- 
148 [I960] S.C.J. (J) pp. 43 to 57-
149* See Question and Answer In EA Venkaopa v G-opal Shiva,ii
(195b) 59 Bom. L.R. 176 at 132-3”. ^
150. Ramchandra v Bala Ji Dattu A.I.E. [1955] Bom. 291 (P.B.).
The case was attacked in [1956] 58 Bom. L.R. (J.) 1 but
has been followed in G-aneshrao v Ramchandra [1957] 59 
Bom. L.R. 1032 and Jhankaribahu v Phaolciiand A.I.R.
[1958] If.P. 261. fhe case was attacked by Derrett in 
his article entitled Divesting: An Important full
Bench decision on adoption [1950] 58 Bom. L.R. (J.) Iff ■
£ -Qj2l f-J) W~UXA,'^ lf&rru.' r p H'dV] —  i
«Lf- UsfcxJe tvzdUy <^ <7-33 , 0
3/p
lonbay and Andhra views - distinction made between alienation, 
legacy and Intestate Succession" of sole surviving coparcener-- - ---— ......  .—---------- ------— ... . .-■a.-1.— .- . -
IhO
Referring to Bombay decisions berrett says _r J that
Bombay had never permitted a sole surviving coparcener's
alienations of any sort to be disturbed and then poses the
question 'I o . can a distinction be made between alienation
and legacy on the one hand and intestate succession on the
other' and adds 'the property after all is Joint family property
and the absence of the adopted son is irrelevant in view of
151Jhe doctrine of relation back'. He further comments 'Logic
demands the removal of the alleged distinction, but their
lordships in Andhra candidly say that logic is unsupported
by authority'.
The sole surviving coparcener held subject to the
rights of the females and others (such as illegitimate sons
uv concubines, if any) and they could, if they suspected
danger to their interests, apply for a charge to be created
152over the property in their favour. In the case of Urnaya1
153,chi v j..akshmi A chi, ^  Varadachariar J. said
"... But, Judged by the test of power of dis­
position two kinds of property held by a Hindu 
governed by that law viz., property obtained as 
his share at a partition and property held by 
him as a sole surviving coparcener, may, in 
some measure, resemble self-acquired property.
There is however, this difference between them, 
viz., that in the case of self-acquired property, 
the owner's power of disposition will continue
151. Ramchandra Shrinivas Lulkami v Eamkrishna Kri shnarao 
Eulkarni [19523 54 Bom. I .R . 636 cited below.
152. lam chandra Gururao v Eamalabai [19443 Bom. 46’ L.R. 358;
..5.ty;ati~ v Kali Shankar 11953] 1 I.L.R. All. 323 at p. 526 
folic . ' (¥:.E.) Datoatreya 1 utto v Tulsabai I.L;R.
[19433 Bom. 646.
153. C19453 A.I.R. B.C. 25 at 31: [19453 B.C.R.I.: [19453
E.L.J. 10£.
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to remain undiminished throughout his lifetime 
whilst in the case of the other two kinds of 
property his power of disposition will become 
qualified and his interest reduced the moment 
a son is born to him or the widow of a pre­
deceased coparcener, takes a boy in adoption".
Ceylon view - Sole Surviving coparcener is a qualified owner
154
1 \ In Attorney-G-eneral of Ceylon v Arunachalam Chettiar,
a Privy Council case, Lord Simonds said, in answer to the
question whether the property were "Joint property of a Hindu
155undivided family" within the Ceylon Statute ^
"The nature of the interest of ^ single surviving 
coparcener was the subject of exhaustive evidence 
by expert witnesses and their Lordships were 
referred to and studied numerous authorities in 
which in reference to his interest language 
was used not incompatible with his being regarded 
as the "owner" of the family property. But though 
it may be correct to speak of him as the "owner";
yet it is still correct to describe that which
he owns as the joint family property. For his 
ownership is such that upon the adoption of a 
son it assumed a different quality: it is such,
too, that female members of the family (whose 
numbers may increase) have a right to maintenance 
out of it and in some circumstances to a charge 
for maintenance upon it. And these incidents 
arise, notwithstanding his so-called ownership, 
just because the property has been and has not 
ceased to be joint family property";
and again
"... The fatal flaw in the argument of the appellant 
appeared to be that, having labelled the surviving 
coparcener "owner", he then attributed to his 
ownership such a congeries of rights that the 
property could no longer be called "joint family 
property". The family a body fluctuating in 
numbers and comprised of male and female members,
154. L.R. [19573 A.C. 515* For facts of the case see page 3
155. L.R. [19573 A.C. at 542; (1958) 60 Bom. L.R. (J) at 
171 article by J.D.M. Berrett entitled "Estate duty 
and the nature of a Mitakshara coparcener's interest".
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may equally well be said to be owners of the 
property, but owners whose ownership is quali­
fied by the powers of the coparceners. There 
is in fact nothing to be gained by the use of 
the word "owner" in this connection. It is 
only by analysing the nature of the rights of 
the members of the undivided family, both 
those in being and those yet to be born, that 
it can be determined whether the family property 
can properly be described as "joint property" 
of the undivided family".
The ownership of the sole surviving coparcener is
therefore a very qualified affair, and he is certainly not a
full, complete or absolute owner of the joint family property.
•The liadras High Court quote with approval the words of
/asoodew J., in Ayyangonda v Gadigeppagonda~^^ to the effect
that an adoptee might have a share in the property acquired
by a sole surviving coparcener out of the proceeds of sale
of the joint family property
"I do not think the position of the sole surviving 
coparcener, who has invested the ancestral funds 
in a fresh business started by him, should be 
different (from the manager of a joint Hindu 
family's position) merely because he was the
sole owner of the entire property at the time
of the investment ..."
But their lordships emphasise that the sole surviving coparcener
is at perfect liberty to alienate joint property right up to
the moment of the acquisition of the 'birth-right', because
in that interval no coparcener exists having a right to 
157complain. "' The rights of maintainnes to dispute alienations 
were not mentioned though the;/ are v/ell known.
Frof. Berrett remarks that the erroneous law which
156. [1940] A.I.E. Bom. 200.
157- [1955] -.1.T. Had. 705 at 713: [1956] 1 H.L.J. 152:
I.ITT. [1956] 1 ac. 649 (Sivaramakrishnan v Haveri Annual) .
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had developed as a result of the pronouncements of the various
High Courts was based on the defects of the twin sources of
legal authority viz., the cases of Veer anna v Sapffiima1^  and
Hr i s hnam ur t hy v Hrishnamurthy. In Veeranna' s case^"^ it
was held that the last surviving member of a joint family was
entitled to alienate all the family properties absolutely,
even by gift as against a son adopted to his predeceased son
'The last surviving male member of a Joint Hindu 
family is the full owner of all the family proper­
ties in spite of an unexercised power of adoption 
possessed by the widow of a deceased member ...
The Theory that on an adoption, the adopted son's 
rights to property ordinarily relate back to the 
date of his adoptive father's death, does not 
apply to such a case".
As their Lordships of the Andhra High Court admit in Pardha-
aradhi Rao v Shrinivasa1'^  it is Hrishnamurtlii's case1^0 which
prevents the logical rule from being declared. Por P. Chandra
Reddy C.J., says
"So far as I can see, there is no legal principle 
on which an absolute estate created by the husband's 
will in favour of his widow or anyone else can 
be divested by a subsequent adoption unless we 
can treat the adoption as so relating back to
the life time of the husband as to destroy in
respect of ancestral property his power of dis­
position by will, a view which the opinion 
expressed by the Privy Council in Krishnamurthi 
Ayyar's case^3£ precludes us from taking".
Professor Derrett suggests that Just as the Supreme Court in
82 140 -Airinivas' s case cut off that part of Anant v Shankar which
v/as not based upon authority so it can in respect of Krishna-
138murthi's case undo the harm which was done by a dictum expres^ 
sly stated upon principle and without authority and having no
connection with the subject matter of the appeal. There, 
their lordships were concerned v/ith the effect of an ante-
158. A.jl. . 1959 -ndh. Pradesh 512 (at p. 514).
adoption agreement entered into by the sole surviving copar­
cener who adopted to himself and the latter part of the dictum
relating to testamentary dispositions had no connection with
159 '3':the subject matter of the appeal. y Referring to Veeranna’ s
I46
case Prof. Derrett remarks 1 that while the sole surviving
coparcener had many privileges, he was not the full owner and
by his adoption the adopted son had a right to recall non-
justifiable alienations made by the sole coparcener in the
interval after his adoptive father's death otherwise the whole
point of adoption would be lost. Knowing that the widow was
about to adopt, the sole coparcener could give the property
away to his sister for example and then say Mwhat a pity!"
151Veeranna v Sayamma and what Prof. Derrett calls
138
’the wretched dictum1 in Krishnamurthy's case were followed
in the other cases which the Bombay and Andhra judges felt
obliged to rely upon and this accounts for the dictum of
Justice Venkatarama Aiyar in Lalithakumari v Rajah of Vizia- 
i finnagaram wherein he distinguishes inheritance from transfer 
inter vivos. Despite the weight of authority resting upon 
these two feeble foundations ’the true view of law’ is hot 
unpepresented. In Nagalutchmee v Gopoo^ ^  their Lordships 
of the Privy Council left the question of the testamentary 
capacity of the, sole surviving coparcener open. In that case 
it was found as a fact that authority to adopt had not been 
given, but had it been given and had the adoption been made 
in pursuance of it, it seems clear that the will would have
159«'For the dictum of Lord Dunedin refer to p
160. A.I.R. 1954 Mad. 19, 40.
161. [1856] 6 M.I.A. 309.
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been held invalid. The headnote and dictum (at p. 345) refuse to
lay down that a man who has no son at the time can transfer inter
vivos. The Pundits whose replies (on p.350) were being
considered, definitely stated the law as it always has been and
the Privy Council in no way contradicted them. In or about the
years 1846-48 it was generally understood by the Pundits and thus
by the Company’s Courts that a man might make a will disposing of
the family estate only when he had no male issue and subject to
adequate provision for all dependents of the family. The
proposition that a coparcener cannot make a will of his coparcenary
interest appeared later, but was another way of expressing part
of the same proposition. In Gurupadappa* s case Bavdekar J.
evinced strong sympathy with the correct view, notwithstanding
the dictum of Lord Dunedin and but for the fact that he felt the
Privy Council dictum binding on him he would certainly have
ignored it. In Ramchandra v. Ramkrishna 5 their lordships of
the Bombay High Court observed:
"It is held that every adoption made by a Hindu 
widow relates back to the death of the adoptive
father; therefore, it can be no valid answer to
the claim made by the adopted son that the 
coparcenary which he seeks to enter by reason of 
his adoption had already ceased to exist".
Thus where a coparcenary has ceased to exist, whether by the
deaths of former coparceners or by a partition of the survivors
from amongst them, the adopted son of a predeceased coparcener
ought to be able to demand a partition of the family property
and call the surviving holders of the property to account for
162. Gurupadappa v. Karishidappa A*I.R. 1954 Bom. 318. In this 
case it was held that the adoption relates back to the date 
of the adoptive father’s death and therefore the Plaintiff 
must be considered as existing at the time of the partition 
and thus entitled to be paid his one-fifth share of the 
family properties. Alienations not binding on those 
properties are therfore not binding on him, and his valid 
claim is free of them - they can however be debited to the 
shares of the actual alienors.
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the ways in which they have alienated it. .
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In Babgonda v Anna ^ the Bombay High Court was
inclined to be conservative and to see no reason to follow
125
Krishnamurti1s case further than necessary. In that case
the question which arose for consideration was whether the
alienation by the sole surviving coparcener could be challenged
by a subsequently adopted son to a predeceased coparcener in
the family by the widow of the said coparcener. The Court
upheld the proposition that "lawful" alienations of the joint
family property made by the sole surviving coparcener could
not be challenged by a coparcener who had come into the joint
family either by birth or adoption subsequent to the date of
alienation. In support of their decision they quoted from
the decisions arrived at in a number of earlier cases, including
131Veeranna v Sayamma. The same view has been taken by the
164Bombay High Court in Bhirnaji Krishnarao v Hanmantrao Yinayak
165and Vithalbhai Gokalbhai v Shivabhai. ^ In the former case
the sole surviving coparcener's right to make an alienation 
of portions of the family property and later challenged by the 
adopted son of a predeceased coparcener adopted subsequent 
to the date of alienation was upheld. In the latter case it 
was held that the adopted son was not entitled to question the 
dispositions made by the testator of the family property which 
were made prior to his adoption. The same view was also taken 
by the former Nagpur High Court in Udhao Samth v Bhaskar
163. A.I.E. 1968 Bom. 8.3‘0'f jo-cts df Me axSe s<u P b~07> fwW 1*-//*
M SHI'DG.ou.'Dft q.| g iqAtj- 3l-7cU<A-tTpM tOctK,
164. [1950] A.I.E. Bom. 2?1 = 52 Bom. I.E. 290.
165. 52 Bom. L.R. 301 = [1950] A.I.E. Bom. 289.
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166Jai Krishna* 'The view taken in these decisions', say
their lordships of the Bombay High Court, 'is not in any way
affected by the Privy Council decision in Anant v Shankar*^?
because in the said decision the Privy Council specifically
131referred to the decision i$ Veeranna v Sayamma and approved
of the view taken in that decision that the theory that on
adoption the adopted son's rights to property ordinarily
relate back to the date of his adoptive father's death does
not apply to the alienations made by the sole surviving
coparcener of the joint family property prior to the date
168of adoption". In Shrinivas v Narayan, the Supreme Court 
narrowed down the application of the doctrine of relation back 
even in cases of inheritance, to the property of the adoptive 
father. Whilst observing about limitations their Lordships 
also pointed out that the theory of relation back is subject 
to the limitation that alienations made prior to the date of 
adoption are binding on him if they were for purposes binding 
on the estate. The Supreme Court was not considering a case 
of alienations made prior to the date of adoption by a male 
person who was competent to make such alienations. The right 
to challenge alienations on the ground that they are not 
justified either by legal necessity or for the benefit of 
the estate is available in cases where there is only a limited 
power to alienate e.g. a widow inheriting for a limited estate 
or the Karta of a joint family. There is no such limit where 
the alienating person is the sole surviving coparcener. Their
166. [1946] A.I.E. Hag. 203.
167. [1943] A.I.E. P.C. 196.
168. [19543 A.I.E. S.C. 379.
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Lordships in Bombay observed that it had always been held
that the sole surviving coparcener could treat the property
as his absolute property and the power to deal with it is not
fettered by the contingency of an adoption being made by a
widow in she family - just as alienations of joint family
property nade with the consent of all the existing coparceners
are incapable of being challenged by coparceners coming into
the family subsequent to the date of alienations or of a
father's alienations, he being the sole surviving coparcener
are incapable of being challenged by sons born subsequent to
16Q
the alienations. Thus if a son or other coparcener is nou
entitled to challenge alienations effected prior to his birth,
a son brought into the family by an adoption made by a widow
cannot be put in a ore favourable position.
Commenting on the Supreme Court case Krishnamurthi 
170v Dhurwara.j their Lordships remarked that it was again a
case of inheritance. It was held therein that the character
of the property did not change fro . coparcenary property to
self-acquired property so long as the widow of the family
existed and was capable of adopting a son. It will be seen
that in this case the application of the doctrine of relation
back was capable of being made within the limits within which
it could operate in view of the Supreme Court decision in
168Srinivas v harayan. ; The doctrine of relation back did not
ajply, their lordships in Bombay opined, to challenging the 
lawful alienations which had taken place before the date of
1GC . ■ -iuu-'i a rishnan I.. . L [1956] • 6495 i. haha 1 ax­
is iamma v I.o.Pl. Rao [1968] A.I.R. LIys. 229-
the rule of overlapping of lives.
170. A-r- R I9 6.2-. ... . 57 = (1962) 61 son. L.?:. 165 S.C.
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adoption. Their Lordships therefore thought that there was
170nothing in Kr i shnamur thi v Dhurwara.j which could be taken 
to depart from the law as to the application of the doctrine 
of relation back to the cases of alienation.
171Another case, i.e. that of Gurammau v Mailappa 
was cited by counsel for the appellant in support of their 
plea. In this case a father had alienated joint family 
properties which were later challenged by a son adopted long 
after his death and by his posthumous son. The latter who 
was in the mother's womb at the time of the alienation was a 
coparcener with the father at the date of alienation and was 
held entitled to challenge the said alienation. It was a case 
of overlapping. Their Lordships of the Bombay Bigh Court 
failed to see how this case could help the Plaintiff's case 
in any way.
In two decisions of the Mysore High Court viz.
172 173Parmanna v S. Ningappa ' &pd Mahadevappa v Chanbasappa,
however, the adopted son's right to challenge alienations
made by the sole surviving coparcener of the family prior to
his adoption had been upheld before the Bombay case referred
to above. The view taken by the learned judges in these
decisions appears to be that the Supreme Court decisions in
Shrinivas v Sarayan, ^ ^  Krishnamurthy v Dhruwara.j^ ^  are to
the effect that the doctrine of relation back can extend even
to cases of alienations and that unless the alienations are
justified by legal necessity or benefit of the estate so as
171. [1964.] A.I.P. S.C. 510 = 66 Bom. L.R. 284.
172. [1964] A.I.R. Mys. 217.
173- [1966] A.I.R. lays. 15.
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to be binding on the family, the adopted son is entitled to chal­
lenge the said alienations. The Bombay High Court did not agree 
with the view taken by the learned judges of the Mysore High Court
in these two cases for the reasons which we have already discussed.
A similar view seems to have been taken by a single judge of the 
Bombay High Court in the second appeal No.907 of the companion 
second appeals decided on the 10th of April 1964 (Bom.) on reason- 
| ing similar to that of the Mysore High Court in the above mentioned
I two cases. In the opinion of their Lordships the Supreme Court
decisions in the three cases cited do not affect the view takenby 
| the Bombay High Court in Bhimaji v Hanmantrao and Vithalbhai v
Shivabhai
I Their Lordships in Babgonda* s case observed that, where
i
| an alienation of the joint family property is made by a managing 
j member with the cons^t of all the other coparceners in the family 
or by the sole surviving coparcener who has an absolute power to 
alienate the property, there being no other member whose consent 
he must take, such alienations whether or not they are for legal 
necessity or benefit of the estate are binding on the joint family, 
'where however an alienation is made by a managing member in the
'h.
family without the conseft of other coparceners, it can only 
be binding on the family if it is for legal necessity or benefit 
of the estate - otherwise such alienation can be challenged 
by the subsequently adopted son on his adoption.
In this conflict, I am inclined to agree with the
174. A.I.r . 1950 Bom. 271.
175. A.I.R. 1950 Bom. 289. A similar view was taken by the
Bombay High Court in Mahadeo v Rameshwar (1967) 70 Bom.
L.R. 89* Also the Court while decreeing an adopted son’s
suit for possession of the share of the joint family 
property, held that it was entitled to make such equitable 
orders as Justice demands.
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views of tlie Mysore High Court^^ and of Prof. Derrett^
mentioned above. For as long as the widow of a coparcener is
alive and capable of adopting, the future adopted son's rights
should be safeguarded against arbitrary alienations by the
sole surviving coparcener. The same appears to have been the
170views of the Supreme Court in Krishnamurthy v Dhruwaratj
et seq.
and in other cases (see p. 2 95V) discussed above. Though
170
Krishnamurthi' s case was a case of inheritance, the reasoning 
of their Lordships could well apply to cover cases of alien­
ations made by sole surviving coparcers without legal necessity. 
As observed by their Lordships in Krishnamurthy v Dhr uwar a ,j^ ^  
a coparcenary continues to subsist as long as there is in 
existence a widow of a coparcener capable of bringing a son 
into existence by adoption and the rights of such adopted son 
are the same as if he had been in existence at the time when 
his adoptive father died. The estate continues to be the 
estate of the adoptive father in whosover's hands it may be 
i.e. whether in the hands of one who is the absolute or one 
who is a limited owner.
Legacies not divested
In Madras as well as in Bombay the High Courts had 
held that the sole surviving coparcener has the power to 
alienate by will and also inter vivos, in spite of the 
relation back of the adoption made afterwards by the pre-
17(9
deceased coparcener's widow. In D. Lakshminarasimhan v
177G-. Ra,jeswari r ' the whole matter was thoroughly discussed
176. At pages 3/2. et seq. above.
177* D. Lakshminarasimhan v G. Ra(ieswari A.I.R. 1955 Andh.
.p, 278, . . TV ..... . - ...... .....
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and it was held that in a case where under the same instrument 
of will the testator confers upon his widow the power to adopt 
and at the same time iiakes certain dispositions, the adoption 
cannot operate to invalidate the bequest made under the will.
The adopted son whose adoption is subsequent to the will 
coming info force, cannot question the dispositions ma;de by 
the testator who under the same instrument has authorised 
his wife to adopt. The adoption has not the effect of 
invalidating the legacies given under the will (Krishnamurthi
■1 O O
v Krishnamurthy f followed). The contention of the defendant 
was that since the will of Subrahmanyam (deceased adoptive
father) could take effect only after the death of the last
male-holder, and the adoption relates back to the death of 
the adoptive father, the adoptive father must be deemed to 
have had no testamentary capacity. But their Lordships did 
not think they could give effect to this contention. They 
observed that although it is true that in certain cases adoption 
has the effect of divestment, but the theory of relation back 
was not an absolute one applying in all respects. The position 
in this respect was summed up by their Lordships of the Privy
ino
Council in Krishnamurthy v Krishnamurthy ' thus:
"When a disposition is made inter vivos by one 
who has full power over property under which 
a portion of that property is carried away, it
is clear that no rights of a son who is subsequ­
ently adopted can affect that portion which is 
disposed of. The same is true when the disposition 
is by will and the adoption is subsequently made 
by a widow #10 has been given the power to adopt.
For the will speaks as at the death of the 
testator and the property is carried away before 
the adoption takes place (my emphasis. The 
correctness of this idea is open to doubt).
It is also obvious that the consent or non-
178. A.I.R. 1927 P.C. 159 (A).
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consent of the natural father cannot in such 
cases affect the question. But it is quite 
different when the adoption is antecedent to 
the date at which the disposition is meant to 
take effect. The rights which flow from the 
adoption are immediate and the disposition, 
if given effect to, is inconsistent with these 
rights and cannot of itself vi propria affect 
them”.
Counsel for the defendants relied on the Madras decision in
179Erram Reddy v Maram Reddy, y which ruling their Lordships 
thought would not help the appellants. In that case, the 
testator after giving an absolute right to his wife in all 
his properties, added that if his wife desired at any time 
to adopt a boy, she could adopt any boy whom she liked. 
Construing this will, the learned judge decided that the 
bequest to the wife with absolute rights was by a necessary 
intendment only a provisional one. Option was given to her, 
according to the learned judges, under the will either to keep 
the property that was given to her absolutely or to make an 
adoption, in which event, she v/ould be divesting herself of 
the estate that was vested in her under the terms of the will. 
The learned judges observed that the testator could not have 
contemplated that the widow should adopt a boy to perform the 
spiritual duties enjoined on hint, and at the same time, he 
would not get anything. In such a situation, their Lordships 
said that the adoption had the effect of defeating the dis­
positions in favour of the adoptive mother. Thdre is nothing 
in the judgment, observed their Lordships, to indicate that
the learned judges were not prepared to accept the concept
178underlying the passage in Krishnamurthy v Krishnamurthy / 
is referred to and adopted by the learned judges.
179- [1928] A.I.R. Mad. 271 (B) .
328
180In Naravan v. Padmanabh the Bombay High Court held 
that where the last male holder in a joint Hindu family dies 
after making a will under which he gives a life estate to his 
wife and absolute estate to X and the wife adopts a son to 
her husband the adoption does not affect the interest of X 
under the will even if the testator might have expressed a 
desire that his wife should adopt after his death. Also the 
Madhya Pradesh High Court held^8Hhat the doctrine of 
* relation back’ laid down in Anant v. Shankar ’ s case^^ should 
be restricted to the case of inheritance by coparcener and 
it has no application to the case of alienation made prior 
to the adoption. Hence, a disposition by will made by a sole 
surviving coparcener is not affected by the adoption of a son 
by the widow of a pre-deceased coparcener made subsequent to
the death of the sole surviving coparcener, again, an illogical
182
rule. In Ganeshrao v. Ramchandra one G. Died leaving his 
widow S and daughter A, and certain property. G's son B 
predeceased him leaving his widow T. On G’s death, S succeeded
to the property. On the death of S, her daughter A succeeded
and came in possession of the property. She, by her will, 
bequeathed those properties to defendants, who on her death 
succeeded to the properties. After the death of A, I, wife 
of B adopted the plaintiff, who claimed possession of the 
properties on the strength of his adoption. The Bombay High 
Court held, assuming that the property left behind by G was
180. I.L.R. [1950] Bom. 480: A.I.R. 1950 Bom. 319 (320-321). See 
article by J.B.M. Berrett: Some Troublesome Cases in 
Adoption 1953 55 Bom. L.R. (J). 1 wherein Berrett observes
that the father was not entitled to dispose by will of
property which never ceased to be potentially Joint family 
property until the death of the person entitled to adopt.
It may be pointed out that such disposition of property 
would obviously be against the interests and welfare of the 
child adopted, who renounces his right in the natural family 
and confers temporal and spiritual benefits in the adoptive 
father's family and hence should not be permitted.
181. Jhunkaribahu v. Phoolchand A.I.R. 1958 Madh. Pra. 261 (266).
182.- A.I.R. 1958 Bom. 141 (142, 143).
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the coparcenary property of G and his predeceased son B, the 
adoptive father of the Plaintiff, that the last surviving 
coparcener or male holder was G and after the death of the 
limited owner, viz., his widow S, the property left Behind 
By G had vested in his daughter A. The family heing governed 
By BomBay School of Law, A had Become an aBsolute owner of the 
property subject to defeasance in the event of potential 
mother T adopting a son into the family of G. On A's death 
the property vested in the defendants under her will. This 
had happened prior to the date of adoption. The Plaintiff 
therefore was not entitled to divest the property which had 
vested not in the heirs of G But in the heirs of A.
The Madhya Pradash High Court has held that the
operation of the will made By the sole surviving coparcener
183is not affected By the subsequent adoption By his widow.
184Recently in Ramachandra v AnasuyaBai the Mysore 
High Court has held that one’s right to deal with one's 
family properties as the sole male member is aBsolute and 
unimpaired and cannot Be curtailed by the possibility of a 
son Being adopted to him By his widow, which may or may not 
happen.
Where his widow adopts a son to him after his death, 
the adopted son cannot claim Back properties disposed of By 
his deceased father Before his death. The doctrine of 
"relation Back" only establishes a line of succession and the 
dispositions made By the father cannot Be disturbed By an 
adoptee who was never in existence as such when the dispositions
183* I.L.R. [19613 Madh. Pra. 188. (Hohanlal v The Commissioner
of Income Tax)
184. A.I.R. 1 % 9  Mys. 64.
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were made. Vi/hat an adopted son is entitled to claim is only 
the properties of his adoptive father or the interest of his
185
adoptive father in the properties as on the date of his death. 
Further, it is competent for a sole surviving coparcener to 
dispose of properties by will, and the subsequently adopted 
son by his widow has to take the estate subject to the dis­
positions made by the will. But, in case the adoption is made 
before the dispositions take effect i.e. before the death of 
the testator, then the adopted son’s right comes into existence 
immediately on his adoption, and, he heing in existence, the 
dispositions made by will cannot take effect and the rights 
of the adopted son cannot be defeated because such vesting is
inconsistent with the right of an adopted son who is entitled
186to claim the properties of his adoptive father.
I agree with the decisions of the various courts 
mentioned above in the cases where legacies made by the 
(deceased) adoptive father have been upheld as against the 
son adopted by the widow after the will had come into effect.
A distinction exists between legacies (which are in effect 
alienations made by the father) and alienations of coparcenary 
property made by a sole surviving coparcener who is not the 
father. Even according to Manu and the Dayabhaga school the 
father is the absolute owner of property and considering the 
Mitakshara father's rights in this light it would seem 
justified that he shouldnave the right to dispose of: his
185* Veeranna v Sayamma A.I.R. 1929 Mad. 296 and Anant v 
Shankar A.I.R. 194-3 P.C. 196 (para. 36) relied on.
186. Krishnamurthy v Krishnamurthy A.I.R. 1927 P*C. 139 




property by will as there exists no 'son' having a right to 
complain. But in case of arbitrary alienations of a sole 
surviving coparcener who is not the father, as already pointed
CLV)d.
out by me on pages 3  2^  - 3  , the rights of the
future adopted son adopted by a deceased coparcener's widow 
must be safeguarded and all such alienations made without 
legal necessity must be capable of being set aside when the 
adoption is actually made by such widow.
Adoptions after death of last surviving coparcener
A full bench of the Mysore High Court held that 
where, after the death of the last surviving coparcener in 
a joint Hindu family, the family property passes by inheritance 
to his heir and subsequently the widow of a predeceased copar­
cener makes an adoption in pursuance of an authority to adopt 
given to her by her husband the adoption dates back to tie 
death of the adoptive father and will have the effect of 
divesting the estate vested in the heir of the last surviving 
coparcener, or in persons claiming through such heir, and 
vesting the property in the adopted son subject to lawful 
alienations made in the meantime by the person who was entitled
ion
to hold the estate until the adoption. ' Also, following the
Privy Council cases of Anant v Shankar, Neelangouda v U.j jangoUda
188and Srinivas v Narayan (Supreme Court), the Nagpur High 
Court held in Tukaram v Gangi that where an adoption is made 
by a widow of a deceased coparcener even after the death of
187. Chikkawa v Chikkappa (1959) 54 Mys. H.C.R. 12; 28 Mys.
L.J. 2?1 (P.B.).
188. A.I.R. 1943 P.C. 196; A.I.R. 1948 P.C. 165 and A.I.R.
1954 S.C. 379 respectively.
I
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the last male coparcener the rights of the adopted son would
oe the same as if he had teen in existence at the time when
his adoptive father died and his title as coparcener would
prevail as against the title of any person claiming as heir
189of the last coparcener. " The Andhra Pradesh high Court
190has also upheld this contention in Furnananda v Purnanandam. '
View that property vesting in collateral not divested on adoption
191ln G-anpati v -uiandrao ' the Bombay High Court
observed that it.was clear principle that Where the property
had vested in a collateral on the death of the last male
holder and an adoption was made thereafter then in such a
case the adoption had not the effect of divesting the property
already vested in the collateral or an heir of the collateral.
A full bench of the same High Court had held that an adoption
after the death of a collateral will not allow the adopted
192son to come in as an heir of the collateral. y the Mysore 
high Court has also held that where the sole surviving 
coparcener dies without leaving wife or children his mother 
inherits the estate as his heir and the property becomes her 
stridhan property and a subsequent adoption made by her to her
19%
husband cannot divest her.
189. I.I.p. [1956] Hag. 712: A.I.R. 1957 Hag. 28 (29, 50).
190. I'urnananda v Purnanandam A.I.P. 1961 Andh. Ira. 455 (444).
191. A.I.R. 1954 Bom. 584 (585). As shown in the subsequent 
discussion (p; . 33 3 et seq.) t is view a pears bo be 
erroneous.
192. ffiva.ji Annatji v Hanmant Pamchandra I.L.R. [1950] Bom.
510: A.I.R. 1950 Bom. 560 (56c, 565) (F.B.).
193. Bee (Mysore) Hindu Law 'omen's Rights Act (10 of 1933)
2s 9(2;(a), 10(g). A.I.R. 1950 Mys. 77 (D.B.) Local 
Acts. (Sannamma v Larappa.) .,    •
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Relation back to adoptive father's estate whether in hands of 
absolute or limited owner
The Supreme Court has now decided in the case of
193aKrishnamurthy v. Dhruwara.i that so long as the widow in the
family existed and was capable of adopting a son who becomes a
coparcener, the fact that a person inherited the property of his
father absolutely did not change the character of the property
to self-acquired property of such person, (a) An adopted son has
been held entitled to take, in defeasance of the rights acquired
prior to his adoption on the ground that in the eye of the law
his adoption relates back, by a legal fiction, to the date of the
death of his adoptive father, he being put in the position of a
posthumous son. (b) A coparcenary continues to subsist as
long as there is in existence a widow of a coparcener capable
of bringing a son into existence by adoption and the rights
of such adopted son are the same as if he had been in existence
at the time when his adoptive father died and that his title
as coparcener prevails as against the title of any person
claiming as heir to the last coparcener, (c) The principle
of relation back applies only when the claim made by the
adopted son relates to the estate of his adoptive father.
The estate may be definite and ascertained, as when he is the
sole and absolute owner of the properties or it may be
fluctuating as when he is a member of a joint Hindu family. The
principle of relation back cannot be applied when the claim
is made to the estate of a collateral (where the governing
principle is that inheritance can never be in abeyance, and
not of relation back), (d) The estate continues to be the
estate of the adoptive father in whosoever*s hands it may
193a. A.I.R. 1962 S.C. 59- See also article by S.R. Kulkarnis The
Doctrine of Relation ibaok in Adoption and its Validity. Q963]
65 Bom. L.R. (J) 4 wherein the doctrine, of relation back 
(with special reference to Krishnamurthi*s case) has been 
criticized on the ground of absence of textual authority on 
the point. Although as pointed out by me at p.T.g'/ , the 
. . . .Smritis are. silent, on. the relation back theory, it could
be justified on equitable grounds and also from the point of 
view of welfare of the child adopted. See p.2 #7 - 3
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be i.e.. whether in the hands of one who is the absolute or one 
who is a limited owner. Anyone who inherits the estate of the 
adoptive father is his heir, irrespective of the inheritance having 
passed through a number of persons, each being the heir of the 
previous owner.
The Supreme..Court considered, among other cases, the case of
~\ A O
Ramchandra Hanmant v Balaji Dattu, (above p.3/0).
Their Lordships of the Supreme Court did not agree with the
view of the Bombay High Court in this case and said that the
conclusion went against what has been said by that Court in
194.
Shrinivas Krishnarao Kango's case.  ^They further added
lfIt has been overlooked that the heir of a
collateral succeeding to the sole surviving 
cop&rben^r-inherits the property absolutely, 
but still subject to defeasance, as no better 
title could have been inherited so long as there 
was the possibility of the defeasance of the abso­
lute title by a widow of the family of the last sur­
viving coparcener adding a member to the coparcenary
by adopting a son to her deceased husband and in
overlooking what was stated in this connection by 
this Court in Shrinivas v Narayant s case 194 though 
not as a decision but as a reasoning to come to a 
decision in that case".
The view expressed by the Supreme Court in Krishnamurthi v
170 eDhruwaraj seems to me to be the correct on^/, for, as long as
the widow of a coparaener is alive who is capable of continuing
the family line by adoption of a son, any intermediate heir who
inherits the property takes its subject to defeasance on adoption
194abeing made by the widow. The view expressed by Chagla C.J.
*1 i Q
in Ramchandra v Balaji therefore seems to have been
erroneous. So also the view of Mallappa J.
194. /1954/ A.I.R. S.c. 579 = /1955/ 1 S.C.R. 1.
194a. Krishnamurthi’s case is commented upon in the cases of
Babgonda; N . Parmanna and Mahadeo v Rameshwar discussed 
above at pages to
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195in Venkatiah v.Kalyanamma ^  that the adoptive son's right to 
what can be said to be his adoptive father's properties 
arises, not on the date of his death but on the date of 
adoption is inequitable to the adopted son who loses all 
his rights in his natural family*
196In S. Pedda Subbavva v. S* Ademma the Andhra
Pradesh High Court held that the rights of an adopted son
&£crue on the date of his adoption and he is entitled to
challenge the alienation made by a limited owner prior to
the adoption. If the widow of the last male holder is in
possession on the date of the adoption by the widow of a
predeceased coparcener, the adopted son of the family has a
right to divest the widow in possession. And if he does not
do so, the widow will be deemed to be in adverse possession,
she being entitled to maintenance out of the estate only,
unless it can be shown that there was an arrangement between
her and the adopted son to leave that property in her possession.
Their lordships referred to the special bench decision of the
Madras High Court in Vedathanni v. The Commissioner of Income 
197Tax, Madras, though no doubt an income tax case, nevertheless
held that there can be a joint family with a single male
member, provided there are widows of deceased coparceners
or other persons entitled to maintenance* Also in Krishnamurthy 
170v. Dhruwaran. their lordships, after referring to the cases 
of Anant v. Shankar  ^8and Amarendra Mansingh^^observed at p* 62thus
195. A.I.R. 1953 Mys. 92. See also Derrett, J.D.H.s An 
Important Development in the Law of Adoption (1955) 57 Bom. 
L.R. Journal 73 if. at 83-4.
196. (1967) 2 An. W.R. 314.
197. (1932) 63 N.L.J. 542; I.L.R. (1933)) 56 Mad. 1.
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"It follows from these observations that if 
A is an owner of property possessing a title 
defeasible on adoption, not only that title 
but also the title of all persons claiming 
under him, will extinguish on the adoption".
So also the Supreme Court has recently recalled (it was obiter)
198m  Mudigowda v Ramchandra that an adoption validly made
by the widow of a deceased coparcener has the effect of 
divewting the estate in the hands of the last surviving 
coparcener and puts an end to partition and enables the 
adopted son to claim a share in the family properties as if 
they were still joint. In a very recent case Sitabai v 
Ramchandra^^^ one of the questions to be considered in the 
appeal before the Supreme Court was whether an adopted son 
at the time of his adoption by the widow of a deceased copar­
cener became a coparcener with the last surviving coparcener 
(his adoptive uncle) in the joint family properties. We may 
for the present take notice of this case v/ithout reference 
to Sec. 12 of the Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act. At 
the time when the son was adopted the joint family still 
continued to exist and the disputed properties retained their 
character of coparcenary properties. Their Lordships referred 
to the Supreme Court decision in Gowli Buddanna v Commissioner 
of Income-tax, Mysore^ ^  that under the Hindu system of law 
a joint family may consist of a single male member and widows 
of deceased male members and that the property of a joint 
family did not cease to belong to a joint family merely 
because the family is represented by a single coparcener who
198. (1969) 2'S.C.J. 668.
199* A.I.R. 1970 S.C. 343. 
200. A.I.R. 1966 S.C. 1323.
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possesses rights which an absolute owner of property may
possess. Their Lordships also referred to the observation
by the Judicial Committee in Attorney General of Ceylon v
201A.R. Arunachalam Chettiar that it is only by analysing 
the nature of the rights of the members of the undivided 
family, both those in being and those yet to be born, that 
it can be determined whether the family property can properly 
be described as 1 joint property* of the undivided family.
In that case one Arunachalam Chettiar and his son 
had constituted a joint family governed by the Mitakshara 
school of Hindu law. The father and son were domiciled in 
India and had trading and other interests in India, Ceylon 
and Par Eastern Countries. The undivided son died in 1934 
and Arunachalam senior became the sole surviving coparcener 
in the Hindu undivided family to which a number of female 
members belonged. Arunachalam died in 1938, shortly after 
the Estate Ordinance Ho. 1 of 1938 came into operation in 
Ceylon. By S. 73 of the Ordinance it was provided that 
property passing on the death of a member of the Hmndu undivided 
family was exempt from payment of estate duty. On a claim 
to estate duty in respect of Arunachalam senior’s estate in 
Qejylon, the Judicial Committee held that Arunachalam was at 
his death a member of the Hindu undivided family, the same 
undivided family of which his son, when alive, was a member 
and of which the continuity was preserved after Arunachalam*s 
death by adoption made by the widows of the family and since 
the undivided family continued to persist, the property in 
the hands of Arunachalam as a single coparcener was the
201. L.R. [19373 A.c. 540. See c^ lso P* 3 I
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property of the Hindu undivided family. The basis of the 
decision was that the property which was the joint family 
property of the Hindu undivided family did not cease to be 
so because of the ’’temporary reduction of the coparcenary 
unit to a single undividual". The character of the property, 
viz., that it was the joint property of a Hindu undivided 
family, remained the same. Applying the principle to the 
present case, after the death of the adoptive father B the 
joint family property continued to retain its character in 
the hands of D (the elder brother of B) as the widow of B was 
still alive and continued to enj'oy the right of maintenance 
out of the joint family properties.
Coparcenary determined by partition is revived by adoption
202 . . .In Ramchandra v Ramkrishna the possibility that
a legatee may be divested by the adopted son, where the 
testator was a sole surviving coparcener has been asserted 
by the Bombay High Court. In this case one S and his two sons 
R and K formed a joint Hindu family. K died in 1950 leaving 
a widow but no issue. In 1952 K's widow adopted the Plaintiff 
to her deceased husband and on the day of the adoption S and 
R entered into a partition deed partitioning the coparcenary 
between them. Thereafter S alienated the property which had 
fallen to his share by executing deeds of gift in favour of 
R*s children. After the death of S in 1954- the Plaintiff 
filed a suit claiming a half share in the coparcenary property 
as adopted son of K. It was held that the coparcenary which 
had been determined by the partition between S and R was in
202. (1953) 54- Bom. L.R. 636.
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effect revived by lithe adoption of the Plaintiff and that the 
Plaintiff's claim made in the suit should be treated as a 
claim for reopening a partition which had been made without 
recognizing his share in the family properties that it was 
not open to S to alienate any of the family properties so 
as to bind the Plaintiff unless such alienations were justified 
by the provisions of Hindu law, and that, therefore the 
Plaintiff was entitled to claim a half share inkthe properties 
in suit.
"In dealing with this question it is necessary 
to remember that in the branch of Hindu law 
dealing with adoptions and their effect, legal 
fictions abound and their sway is supreme. Some 
of these fictions are based upon a very liberal 
interpretation of the texts, while some others 
claim authority on grounds of equity, justice 
and good conscience. But these fictions, have, 
for some time past been so consistently and so 
emphatically laid down by their Lordships of 
the Privy Council that it is not now open to 
inquire whether they should be given full effect. 
Besides, we apprehend that such an inquiry may 
even L$ inexpedient. Their Lordships of the 
Privy Council have consifered the relevant pro­
visions of the Hindu law of adoption and have 
clearly stated what, according to them, is the 
effect of the spirit and the letter of these 
provisions. In dealing with the present question, 
therefore, it is necessary to find out the effect 
of the legal fictions which have been and must 
now be judicially recognised. If these legal 
fictions give rise to anomalies in the adminis­
tration of this branch of Hindu law, the only 
remedy is for the legislature to step in and 
codify the law".
In this case the High Court on appeal had reversed the Lower
Court's decision and held that partition took place before
the adoption and on the date of the adoption there was no
coparcenary in existence. The Privy Council on appeal held
that- the Plaintiff was entitled to the share of his adoptive
father and that the property in suit in which he claimed his
share must be deemed to be coparcenary property. In remitting
the appeal to the High Court to determine what share in the 
suit property the Ilaintiff was entitled, Sir John Beaumont, 
who delivered the judgment of the Board on Uovember 14, 19^9?
observed as follows.
"... Since the decision of the High Court it 
has been held by this Board in the case of 
■inant Bhikappa latil v Shankar Hamchandra^S 
Patil, that the vie?/ taken of the law in Balu 
Sakharam1s case^O was erroneous, and on the basis 
of the Board's decision, it is clear that the 
appellant on his adoption became entitled to 
share in the coparcenary property notwithstanding 
that the coparcenary had come to an end before 
the date of his adoption".
It was therefore held that under the Hindu law the 
rights of an adopted son are not affected by reason of the 
fact that the joint status of the family which he seeks to 
enter by his adoption had been terminated either by a prior 
partition between the surviving coparceners or by the death 
of the sole surviving coparcener. In either case the adopted 
son is entitled to enter his adoptive family on the basis 
that the family is a joint and undivided Hindu family and 
his rights in the property of the family must be decided on 
that basis.
Under the Hindu law partition is made only once, 
but there are some exceptions to this rule. The posthumous 
sen can daim a re-partition and so can the heir of a dis­
qualified person and an absent coparcener. The case of the 
adopted son must be included amongst these exceptions because 
the x-osition of an adopted son is analogous to that of a son 
who was in his mother's womb, at the time of partition, but 
who is born thereafter, losing the question as to the viqyj 
the Hupreme Court would possibly take if the question came up 
for decision before it, Prof. Derrett in his above mentioned
34-/
article observes^"8
’For it is inconceivable that the Supreme Court 
should hold that the sole surviving coparcener 
was a full and complete owner of the joint family 
estate for the purpose of disenabling a future 
adoptee to claim a share in whatever he may have 
happened to transfer inter vivos, whilst at the 
same time holding that the property in the hands 
of a sole surviving coparcener is "joint family 
property"’;
and again
'Nothing can be clearer than that the sole sur­
viving coparcener is not the full and complete 
owner of the property; his fruitless attempt 
to dispose of it to the prejudce of maintenance 
rights of female dependants of predeceased 
coparceners shows that clearly enough,203 and 
the freedom that the temporary absence of a 
coparcener gives him is apt to prove illusory1.
Yet we have noted a dispute between the High Courts.
The ’relation back* theory after the Hindu Adoptions and 
Maintenance Act 1956
The Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act 1956 is 
silent on many vital points. For example, on the question 
whether a son adopted by a widow will be deemed to be the 
son of her deceased husband or not, or conversely on the 
relationship of an adopted son of a widower with the deceased 
wife of the adoptive father. Section 12 of the Hindu Adoptions 
and Maintenance Act 1956 provides that an adopted child shall 
be deemed to be the child of the adoptive father or the 
adoptive mother for all purposes. It lays down:
203. Manilal v Bai Tara (1893) I.L.R. 17 Bom. 398; Somasun- 
daram Chetty v Unnamalai Ammal (1920) I.L.R. 43 Mad. 
800; 39 M . L . J . 179; Ram Kunwar v Amar Nath (1932)
I.L.R. 54 All. 472; Malkar.jun v Sarubai 1.1945] A.I.R. 
Bom. 187• The right is postponed to joint family 
debts but not it seems, the personal debts of the 
sole surviving coparceners.
An adopted child shall be deemed to be the child 
of his or her adoptive father or mother for all purposes 
with effect from the date of the adoption and from such date 
all the ties of the child in the family of h|s or her birth 
shall be deemed to be severed and replaced by those created 
by the adoption in the adopted family.
Provided that -
(a) the child cannot marry any person whom he or she could 
not have married if he or she had continued in the family of 
his or her birth;
(b) any property which vested in the adopted child before the 
adoption shall continue to vest in such person subject to the 
obligation, if any, attaching to the ownership of such property, 
including the obligation to maintain relatives in the family
of his or her birth;
(c) the adopted child shall not divest any person of any 
estate which vested in him or her before the adoption.
Section 14 provides:
1. The living wife or the seniormost wife in case where 
more than one wives are living of the adopter shall be deemed 
to be the mother of the adopted child. The other living wives 
shall be deeded to be the step-mothers.
2. A wife married by the adopter subsequent to the adoption
shall be deemed to be the step-mother to the adopted child.
3. A husband married by the adopter (the adopter being a 
widow or spinster) subsequent to the adoption will be deemed 
to be the step-father to the adopted child.
Thus in spite of having had the occasion and 
necessity to describe the fictional relationship of both 
mother and step-mother, the Act is silent about the relationship
34-3
of the adopted child with the deceased spouse of the adopter.
In his article entitled 'Desirability of Amendments
204in present law of Hindu Adoption', Mr. Narayan Das opines 
that this omission must be presumed to show that the legis­
lature never intended to create any relationship whatsoever 
between the adopted child and the deceased wife of the 
adoptive father or with the deceased husband of the adoptive 
mother, and quotes the old maxim "expressio unius est exclusio 
'alterius" in support of his above deduction. He further says 
that
'at least such a deceased spouse of the adopter 
cannot be deemed to be the father or mother of 
the adopted child, even if by any stretch of 
.imagination he or she can be deemed to be the 
step-father or step-mother'.
He also refers to a decision of the Board of Revenue reported
205in Roshan Lai v Pooran Lai, and according to him this
decision is incorrect. The Board in the aforesaid case had
held as follows:
"If a child is adopted by a widow after the 
death of her husband the child becomes the 
son of both even though the husband was not 
alive at the time of adoption and at the death 
of the widow he would succeed under S. 171 TJ.P. 
Zamindan Abolition and Land Reforms Act as the 
heir of the husband.'
Although according to this writer this decision is incorrect
but then he has suggested the following amendments to Section
14 to be added after 14(4) as 14(5) and 14(6):
”14(5) where a widow, who has been expressly 
prohibited by her husband by a writing signed 
by him, from adopting a son, adopts a son, the 
deceased husband of the widow shall be deemed 
to be the step-father of the adoptive child.
204. A.I.R. 1965 Journal 27.
205. C19643 All L.J. (Rev.) 54.
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14 (6) In any other case of adoption of a son 
by a widow, not covered by sub-section (5), it 
shall be presumed that such an adoption is made 
to the deceased husband. The adopter shall be 
deemed to be the mother and her deceasdd 
husband ;thfe father Of the adopted::child{!
Adoptions made before Adoption Aot 1936 —  Can adoptee divest 
property in the widow*?
Coming now to the cases decided on the subject, a
206convenient place to start is Ramalingam v. Punithavalli Ammal.
In this case, a Hindu governed by Mitskshara law called 
Somasundaram died in 1937 leaving a widow and two daughters. The 
estate was inherited by the widow, who was possessed of it in 
1956 when the Hindu Succession Act came into force; under Section 
14(i) of this Act she became absolute owner. On July 13>1956, 
i.e., before the Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act came into 
force, she adopted Ramalingham. On June 19> 1957 she made a 
settlement of her late husband!s property or substantial part of 
it, on one of the daughters. It was held by the Madras High 
Court that notwithstanding the full or absolute estate, the 
relation back of the adoption of the adopted son to 1937 when the
father died could not be prevented from taking effect. The .
207doctrine established in Krishnamurthi v. Dhrowara.i that 
adoptions at Anglo-Hindu law enable the adopted son to divest 
property belonging to his father, no matter into whose hands 
it might have passed in the interval between the father's 
death and the adoption, had not been abolished by anything 
in this Hindu Succession Act. The result was that the adopted
206. [196^ 2 M.L.J. 571.
207. [1961] 64 Bom. 165, S.C., 096j 11 S.C.J. 582. See
also regarding alienations N. Paramanna v. Ningapra 
p96| A.I.R. Mys. 217.
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son was owner of his adopted father's estate since his adoption 
worked a defeasance. The adopting mother had no title from 
the moment of the adoption and could not make the impregned 
settlement. It was argued that by Section 14(1) she was 
absolute owner and could not be deprived of the property.
But S. Ramachandra Iyer C.J. and Anantanarayana J. convincingly 
showed that the absolute estate could be subject to defeasance 
on the analogy of that of the widow-heiress under the old 
system who would certainly be divested if a son who had been 
missing for more than 7 years turned up and claimed his deceased 
father's estate.
The Supreme Court has, however, recently reversed the 
decision of the Madras High Court in Funithavalli v. RamalingaS^^a 
wherein their Lordships of the Supreme Court held that the 
full ownership conferred on a Hindu female under S.14(1) of 
the Hindu Succession Act (1956) is not defeasible by the 
adoption made by her to her deceased husband after the Act 
came into force. Their Lordships of the Supreme Court observed 
that the section plainly sa£s that the property possessed by 
a Hindu female on the date the Act came into force whether 
acquired before or after the commencement of the Act shall be 
held by her as full owner thereof. That provision makes a 
clear departure from the Hindu Law texts or rules and those 
texts or rules cannot be used for circumventing the plain 
intendment of the provision. Also the Supreme Court held in 
Mtmna Lai v. Ra.ikumar^ ^  that by virtue of Section 4 of the 
Hindu Succession Act (1956) the legislature abrogated the rules 
of Hindu Law on all matters in respect of which there is an
207a. A.I.R. 1970 S.C. 1730. 
207b. A.I.R. 1962 S.C. 1493.
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express provision in the Act. Their Lordships in
P itnithavallies case approved the decision of the Bombay
2 08High Court in Yamunabai v. Ram Mahara.i« (which case is 
discussed below).
A similar view has been taken by the Andhra Pradesh
q f\r7r%
High Court recently in the case of Kavuluru v. K. Purushothamma 
In this case the father of the appellant executed a will in 
favour of his wife, the step-mother of the appellant, prior to 
the coming into force of the Hindu Adoption and Maintenance 
Act^ 1956# Under the will he gave power of adoption to his wife, 
and to adopt a son of his daughter, the appellant in the case.
The testator died in 1947• His widow made the adoption 
contrary to the directions given by her husband, in his will 
after the Act came into force. The widow died in 1963. The 
appellant filed a suit contending that the adoption-was invalid 
and Shd was entitled to her father*s properties as per the terms 
of the will. The third defendant,the adopted son resisted 
the suit contending inter alia, that after the Hindu Adoptions 
and Maintenance Act came into force, his adoption was governed 
by the provisions of the Act though it was contrary to the 
direction gitren in the will. The trial Court upheld the 
contentions of the defendant and dismissed the suit. On appeal 
by the plaintiff the High Court held that on a reading of 
Sections 4 and 5 and the other sections (6 and 9 to 12) of the 
H.A.M.A 1956, the validity of an adoption which had taken place 
after the commencement of the Act had to be tested with 
reference to the provisions of the Act and not with reference 
to any conditions laid down by the adoptive father either in 
a will or other instrument. If on the other hand, an adoption
207c. |l971J 1 An. W.R. 134.
208. • (i960] A.I»R. Bom. '463'.
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takes place before the commencement of the Act, its validity 
has to be judged with reference to the state of the Hindu Law 
prevailing before the Act. The directions given in the will 
(regarding the boy to be adopted) cannot be relied upon for the 
purpose of invalidating an adoption which was otherwise valid 
under the Hindu Adoption and Maintenance Act, 1956.
Their Lordships also observed that the terms of the 
will showed that the widow was allowed to enjoy the properties 
as 'limited owner'. However, on the commencement of the Hindu 
Succession Act (x x x of 1956) an event not in the contemplation 
of the testator, her limited estate became enlarged into an 
absolute estate under Section 14 of this Act, with the result 
that the son adopted later could not divest that absolute 
estate. He can succeed to the property only as her heir.
It would appear that the decisions of the Supreme Court 
in Ttmithavalli' s case^^a and of the Andhra High Court in
A A H
Kavuluru's case in respect of the husband's properties vesting
absolutely in the widow between the intervals of the passing of 
the Hindu Succession Act 1956 and the Hindu Adoptions and 
Maintenance Act, 1956 appear to be correct in view of Section 
4 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956, mentioned above. But 
as discussed subsequently the various provisions of the Hindu 
Adoptions and Maintenance Act, 1956 have restored the theory of 
'relation back' and properties vesting in the widow after the 
passing of the Hindu Adoption and Maintenance Act, 1956 could 
be divested by the son adopted by the widow as such a son
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is deemed to be the son of the deceased husband of the widow 
from the moment of his death.
View in Bombay
The judgment of the Madras High Court in 
206Ramalingam1s case conflicts in important respects with that
208in the Bombay case of Yamunabai v. Ram Mahara.i wherein an
opposite conclusion was reached. In this case an adopted son
was held not entitled to divest an estate which was in the hands
of co-widows pending the regularisation of his adoption, during
which period the Hindu Succession Act had come into force so
that their title ripened into an absolute estate. The Bombay
High Court held that Section 14 of that Act debarred the adopted
son from any claim based upon relation back such as would
disturb the widow1s full ownership. Commenting on these cases,
Prof. Derrett in his article "Adoption, Succession and the
20Q
present state of Hindu Law"  ^ opines that plainly the Madras 
case was more fully argued and more acutely reasoned out.
But then both these cases were concerSined with adoptions
209. Bom. L.R. (J) April 1966. p. 41
made before the Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act;1956
came into force. What of adoptions made thereafter?
210In Ankush Narayan v Janabai Rama it was held 
that as a result of an adoption by either spouse' , the adopted 
son becomes the child of both the spouses and that this result 
necessarily followed from the combined operation of the 
customary Hindu lav/ and the provisions of the Hindu Adoptions 
and Maintenance Act 1956. The case deserves a special study 
since the Supreme Court has explicitly approved of it. In 
this case, one Narayan died intestate in 1917* His immediate 
heirs were his two widows. The senior was Laxmibai who died 
intestate in 1948. The junior widow was Tanubai, who in Dec. 
1957 adopted Ankush aged 9« Ibe deceased Narayan had also 
left a daughter, Janabai, daughter of Laxmibai. In 1957 the 
estate, after the death of Laxmibai, was in the hands of 
Tanubai, and T&nubai claimed that she alone was entitled to 
the property. On Dec. 31? 1957? Ankush sued his adoptive 
mother and her step-daugher (v/ho had made common cause) /for 
possession of the estate. It was claimed on behalf of/the 
ladies that when an adoption Ad made under the new sVstem by 
a widow she dows not divest herself, but merely obtains a son, 
who has no relationship whatsoever with his adopt/ng mother*s 
deceased husband's family. Their Lordships tool/ the view that 
the most important part was the last phrase of Section 12 of
210. [1 9 6 5 ]  67 Bom. L.R. 864 commented upop by Haridas
Gujarathi at [1966] A.I.R. Journ. 19/20 where numerous 
difficulties are adverted to and aTf likely to arise 
out of a literal adherence to principles suggested 
here and also by Derrett at [1966]/68 B.L.R.J. p. 44. 
The estate of the adopted father /Narayan) who died 
in 1917? bad surely vested absoli^ely in the surviving 
widow prior to the adoption. /
the Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act 1956 (i.e. before
the proviso's commenced) which states
”... with effect from the date of adoption ... 
all the ties of the child in the family of his 
or her birth shall be deemed to be severed and 
replaced by those created by the adoption in 
the adoptive family”.
Their Lordships opined that the necensary consequences of
the Act's provisions in Subsection (VI) of Section 11 and
Section 12 of the Act were that the widow's adoption provided
an heir for her deceased husband. This must be so if the
adopted child were to have the same relations in his new
family as he would have had in his old, and the range of
relations could not be restricted to those which he actually
had. He must stand as a new member in the family exactly as
if he had been b r m  in it. In their view when either of two
spouses adopts, both get a child and this would be true for
all purposes. He is related to collaterals; he becomes (p. 868)
a coparcener. At p. 866 the effect of proviso (C) of Section
12 is considered. It was not thought to have any limiting
effect on the general proposition in the main body of the
section. As a result Ankush was held entitled to divest his
adopting mother, notwithstanding her being an absolute owner.
'This would have been true', remarks Prof. Lerrett, 'as we
have seen under the Madras ruling, had the adoption taken
place a year earlier. But could it be true after the coming
20.9into force of both statutes?'. Mr. Haridas Gujarathi m
his article "Adoption by a Hindu widow after 21st December 
2111956" observes that the question to be decided in Ankush
T V * . 2 1 0v Janabai's case was
211. A.I.E. 1966 Journal 19*
"If a Hindu adopts a child after the coming 
into force of the Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance 
Act 1956 i.e. after 21 'ftec. 1956 whether the 
adopted child also becomes the adopted child 
of her deceased husband".
Their Lordships answered the question in the affirmative but
according to Haridas Gujarathi the question was not free from
doubt. Mr. Gujarathi further observes that the words "by" or
"to" in Section 9 are very important and may have two meanings
(a) 'to1 may refer to physical act of giving and taking a
child in adoption under Section ll(vii) i.e. the child to be
adopted must be actually given and taken by the parents or
guardians concerned or under their authority to transfer the
child from the family of its birth to the family of its
adoption. This view is preferred by Mr. Gujarathi. (b)
Secondly the word 'to' may refer where one person also adopts
to himself and another - as in the present case. Section 12
of the Act provides that the adopted child shall be deemed to
be the child of the adoptive father 'or' mother for all
purposes. Mr. Gujarathi observes that the word 'or' is
important in that it does not speak of the relationship of
the child with the spouse of the adopter. There is no other
provision in the Act which, says Mr. Gujarathi, may possibly
throw light on this aspect. In the statement of objects and
Reasons published in The Gazette of India Extraordinary
(Pt. II, Sec. 2 dated 23 Aug. 1956 at p. 759? para. 2 at
p. 749) stated ... There is no longer any justification for
allowing a husband to prevent his wife from taking a child
in adoption after his death. The adoption made by a Hindu
widow will hereafter be in her own right. The equality of
an adopted child to the natural child is a fiction of law.
To treat such child as a child of the deceased husband (as
in the present case), opines Mr. Gujarathi, would be to
superimpose a fiction upon a fiction.
The crucial question in cases of adoption is not
mere relationship with one person or the other, it is that of
the right to properties in cases of intestate succession. The
Hindu Adoption law of British times entirely revolved round
this question, observes Mr. Gujarathi and quotes P.V. Kane
as follows^^
"There is so much bewildering confusion and 
so much case law on the several aspects of 
adoption that it is only legislation that can 
resolve the tangled shein of the modern law of 
adoption".
According to Mr. Gujarathi, Sec. 12(c) of the Act has attempted 
to 'resolve the tangled skein’ and adds that it remains to be 
seen whether their Lordships of the High Court have gone to 
the extent of nullifying this.
I may however point out that as for Mr Kane' s 
remarks quoted by Mr. Gujarathi, the 'tangled skein' ought 
to be resolved, where the Smritis are silent, as in this case, 
by putting interpretations in conformity with equity and 
justice. As the adopted son undoubtedly confers temporal and 
possibly (in many cases) spiritual benefit also on the 
deceased adoptive father and sacrifices his rights in his 
natural father's family, it seem equitable that he should be 
allowed to succeed to his deceased adoptive father, and to 
dispossess the inferior heirs who might have come in his 
absence, as such heirs took their titles subject to defeasance
212. History of the Lharmasastra by P.V. Kane, Vol. Ill,
C£. XVIII, pp. 662-63.
on the contingency of the widow adopting the child. Mr.
Gujarathi, however, opines that after the coming into force
of the Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act 1956, it is only
such child as has been adopted during coverture that becomes
the natural child of adoptive parents. In all other cases,
the adopted child acquires relationships only through the
person adopting.
‘This view however has been rejected by the Supreme 
214- a
Court in ASawan Ram1s case and also in/very recent case,
199Sitabai v Ramchandra, wherein their Lordships approved the21Q
decision in Ankush v Janabai.
Andhra view - no divesting
Before passing to those Supreme Court cases we must
first see another High Court case to which the Supreme Court
213referred. In the case of N. Hanumantha Rao v N . Hanumayya, 
one A had two sons joint with him, B and C. B died in 1924- 
leaving a widow W . A died in 1956, whereupon W s  interest 
ceased to be capable of fluctuation. On June 17, 1957 W 
adopted E, a boy of 15• E sued C and C*s son E for partition 
and possession of a half share in the family properties.
The Andhra High Court held that the adoption of E could not
belonged
have the effect of divesting the interest that had /.long to 
B and had passed by survivorship to C prior to the adoption. 
The decision rested on two feet: firstly, that all adoptions
take effect now from the date of the adoption; secondly, that 
no property that has vested can be divested. The Andhra
213* [1964-] 1 An. W.R. 156; criticised severely by the 
Supreme Court in Sawan RamyKalawanti [1967] A.I.R. 
S.C. 1761 below.
ZSif-
Pradesh High Coprt held that, on account of the specific . 
provision made in Section 12 of the Hindu Adoptions and 
Maintenance Act 1956 that the rights of the adoptee are to 
be determined with effect from the date of adoption, the 
rights of the adopted son, which were rested on the theory 
of "relation back" can no longer be claimed by him land that 
clause (c) of the proviso to Section 12 lays down the explicit 
rule that the adoption of a son or daughter by a male or 
female Hindu is not to result in the divesting of any estate 
vested in any person prior to the adoption. This would 
appear to many readers to be an natural, even inevitable, 
construction to put upon the statute.
Supreme Court decisions - relation back stands
The Supreme Court in the difficult case of Sawan 
214Ram v Kalawanti were unable to accept this interpretation
of the provisions of the Act by the Andhra Pradesh High Court,
as the High Court had ignored two important provisions of the
Act and did not consider their effect when arriving at its
decision. The first provision in which the Supreme Court
have detected great significance is contained in S. 5(1) of
the Act which lays down:
"Nb adoption shall be made after the commencement 
of this Act by or to a Hindu except in accordance 
with the provisions contained in this Chapter, 
and any adoption made in contravention of the 
said provisions shall be void". (emphasis mine).
It is significant that, in this section, the adoption to be
made is mentioned as "by" or "to" a Hindu. Thus adoption is
214* A.I.R. 1967 S.C. 1761. Discussed by Derrett at C1968]
70 Bom. L.R.(J) 51-55 and also by G.K. Dubke at Nov. 
[1968D Bom. L.R.(J) 145-148. Discussed at p. 35S and
• • • 36I respectively. ..................................
1ST
envisaged as being of two kinds. One is adoption by a Hindu, 
and the other is adoption to a HinduI If the view canvassed 
on behalf of the appellant were accepted, the consequence 
would have been that there will be only adoptions by Hindus 
and not to Hindus. On the face of it, adoption to a Hindu 
was intended to cover cases where an adoption is by one person, 
while the child adopted becomes the adopted son of another 
person also. The most common instance will be that of an 
adoption by a female Hindu who is married and whose husband 
is dead, or has completely and finally renounced the world or 
has been declared to be of unsound mind. The second provision 
which was ignored by the Andhra Pradesh High Court is the one 
contained in Section 12 itself. The section not only lays 
down that the adopted child shall be deemed to be the child 
of his or her adoptive father or mother for all purposes with 
effect from the date of the adoption, but also lays down that 
from such date all the ties of the child in the family of his 
or her birth shall be deemed to be severed and replaced by 
those in the new family.
A question naturally arises what is the adoptive 
family of a child who is adopted by a widow, or by a married 
woman whose lining husband has completely and finally renounced 
the world or has been declared to be of unsound mind? It is 
well recognized that, after a female is married, she belongs 
to the family of her husband. The child adopted by her must 
also therefore, belong to the same family. On adoption by a 
widow, therefore, the adopted son is to be deemed to be a 
member of the family of the deceased husband of the widow.
Further still, he loses all his rights in the family of his 
birth and those rights are replaced by the rights .created by. .
the adoption in the adoptive family. The right which the 
child had, to succeed to property hy virtue of being the son 
of his natural father, in the family of his birth, is thus 
clearly to be' replaced by similar rights in the adoptive 
family, and, consequently, he would certainly obtain those 
rights in the capacity of a member of that family as an adopted 
son of the deceased husband of the widow or the married female 
talcing him in adoption. This provision in Section 12 of the 
Act, thus itself makes it clear, that on adoption by a Hindu 
female who has been married, the adopted son, will, in effect, 
be the adopted son of the husband also. This aspect was 
ignored by the Andhra Pradesh High Court when dealing with 
the effect of the language used in other parts of this section.
In view of the special provision contained in 
Clause (c) of the proviso to Section 12 of the Act viz., the 
adopted child shall not divest any person any estate which 
vested in him or her before the adoption1, it appears^observed 
their Lordships of the Supreme Court that the Act had narrowed 
down the rights of an adopted child as compared with the 
rights of a child born posthumously. Under the Shastric law, 
if a child was adopted by a widow, he was treated as a natural- 
born child and consequently, he could divest other members 
of the family of rights vested in them prior to his adoption.
It was only with the limited object of avoiding any such 
consequence on the adoption of a child by a Hindu widow that 
these provisions in Clause (c) of the proviso to Section 12 
and Section 15 of the Act were incorporated. This restriction 
was placed on the rights of a child adopted by either a male 
or a female Hindu and not merely in a case of adoption by a 
female Hindu. This restriction on the rights of the adopted
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child cannot therefore, in the opinion of their Lordships of 
the Supreme Court, lead to any inference that a child adopted 
by a widow will not be deemed to be the adopted son of the 
deceased husband.
I may also point out here that Section 4- of the 
Hindu Adoption and Maintenance Act 1956 provides that any 
text, rule or interpretation of Hindu law in force immediately 
before the commencement of the Act shall cease to have effect 
with respect to any matter for which provision has been made 
in the Act.
The Act is of a prospective or substantive nature 
and ordinarily it cannot have retrospective effect ’save as 
otherwise expressly provided'. The section seeks to repeal 
all existing laws whether in the shape of ancient texts, 
customs or legislative enactments which are inconsistent with 
the provisions of this Act. Thus (i) matters not dealt with 
in this Act shall continue to be governed by the old Hindu 
law and (ii) matters expressly saved by this Act will also 
continue to be governed by old Hindu law. In other words, 
one more reason could be added in favour of the Supreme Court's 
decision i.e., that, as the Act is silent on the point of 
relationship of an adopted son of a widow with that of her 
deceased husband, the old Hindu law will apply: i.e., the
theory of relation back still stands.
Same view of Allahabad High Court
In this connection the observations made by their 
Lordships of the Allahabad High Court in the case of Subhash
215Misir v Thagai Misir ^deserve to be noticed. On reading
sections 12 and 14 together one finds there is no mention as
to what relationship the adopted child will bear with the
deceased husband of a widow who has not remarried. The only
thing which we find in Section 12 of the Act is that the
adoption severs all his family ties and connections with the
family of his or her birth and they are replaced by those
created by the adoption in the adoptive family. On adoption
the adopted child becomes a member of the family wherein he
or she is adopted. 'In the absence of any provision to the
contrary it is not unreasonable to infer that the child
adopted by the widow should be held to be the son of the widow
as well as her deceased husband1, i.e. vice versa the son of
the husband as well as the (adopting) widow.
'The absence of any specific provision on this 
point suggests that the common notion that was 
held before the coming into force of this Act 
was accepted by the legislature so far as the 
relationship of the adopted child vis-a-vis the 
husband of the widow was concerned. This Act 
has only removed the bar of permission placed 
on the adoption by a female'.
Befbre the coming into force of the Act a Hindu widow could
not, except in Bombay and Madras, adopt any person without
the permission of her husband. But with the passing of this
Act she could adopt even without the permission of her husband
as provided by Section 8 of the Act. An adopted son has all
the rights of a natural son and it is reasonable to hold,
215
their Lordships in Thagai Misir's case observed that in the 
circumstances he should be accepted to be the son of the 
husband of the widow. It would be very harsh, observe their
215. A.I.R. 1967 Allahabad 148.
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Lordships, if in such a case the adopted son who severs all 
his connections from the family of his birth does not get 
anything in the adoptive family on the ground that he is 
adopted by the widow. In Madras and Bombay even before the 
Act (under the old Hindu law) a widow could adopt without the 
permission of her husband and the various authorities of the 
Madras High Court would show that such adopted son was always 
Jreated as the son of the husband of the widow. In the view 
of their Lordships of the Allahabad High Court the same status 
should be given to the adopted son after the passing of the 
Act in other states as well. The learned judge makes a 
reference to para. 180 of 'Introduction to Modem Hindu Law1 
by J.D.M. Derrett where the author, after dealing with Sections 
12 and 14 of the Act has opined that for the purpose of 
inheritance and maintenance an adopted child is precisely 
upon the same footing as a legitimate child and from this 
the learned judge has deduced, though it seems wrongly, that 
according to this view also, as soon as the adopted son of the 
widow is held to be the legitimate son of the widow's husband, 
the latter would be deemed to be the father of the adopted child. 
Derrett's opinion - relation back stands
Prof. J.D.M. Derrett in his article entitled
'Adoption in the Joint Hindu family: A recent Supreme Court
216
decision and its Limits'; observes:
"It is clear that none of the statutes of the 
"Hindu Code" may be taken to have affected 
rights arising in the Mitakshara joint family 
more than the express words or necessary intendment 
of the statutes require. Thus, as this
216. Bom. L.R. (J) April *68: pp. 51-55. For an earlier view of 
Derrett that after Dec. 21, 1956, no adoption will give any 
right to divest any person of any property, and for a 
review of cases from Anant v. Shankar A.I.R. 1943 P.C. 196 
onwards see article by Derrett: Recent Decisions and some
Queries in Hindu Law: 1. Adoption; (l957l 59 Bom. L.R.,
J., 178-182.
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writer foretold, the possibility of a son 
adopted by a widow having the right to reopen 
partitions, dispute alienations, and generally 
represent his deceased father as to his interest 
in joint family property remains. But this 
possibility is delimited by some aspects of 
the legal situation obtaining after 1956...".
Derrett
/:. says that prior to 1956 the interest passed by survivorship
or th the widow herself under the Act of 1937* Where the
\
father died before 1956 it may be worthwhile pursuing the 
adopted son’s rights, even to the extent of investigating 
the improper alienations of joint family property (other
217than those made by the sole surviving coparcener himself). 1
After 1956 the interest in joint family property will pass
by testamentary or intestate succession in every case because
the presence of the widow (who adopts) makes this certain
(Section 6 of the Hindu Succession Act 1956). Prof. Derrett
further observes
"Now since (the doctrine of) relation back has 
been reprieved, the adopted son must be under­
stood as alive, at the moment of the adoptive 
father's death. Thus there are three people 
to be considered, the father himself, his widow 
(the adoptive mother-to-be) and the (adopted) 
son, hence the proportion that passes to the 218 
......... heirs is one-third (i.e. see Rangubai1s case)".
Thus, according to Derrett the adopted son will get his share
in the one-third share of his adoptive father (according to
the rules of devolution in the Hindu Succession Act) together
with his birthright in respect of one-third of that estate
(the mother will be entitled absolutely to her third under
the Bombay ruling in this matter, which Prof. Derrett holds,
217* Babgonda Ramgonda v Anna [19673 69 Bom. L.R. 523*
218. Rangubai Lalji v Laxman Lalji [1966] 68 Bom. L.R. 74- 
followed in Ananda Nark v Haribandhu Naik [196?] 
A.I.R.Or. 194.
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must be taken as correct) . This view is in conformity with 
the view I have expressed earlier i.e. as the Act is silent 
on the point of relationship of an adopted son of a widow 
with that of her deceased husband, the old Hindu Law will 
apply (vide Section 4 of the Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance 
Act 1956) i.e. the theory of relation back still stands.
Dabke's article in Bom. h.R. (J) - Takes opposite view
Mr G.K. Dabke in his article 'Divesting on adoption',
219however, takes a different view. J He refers to the decisions
210
of the Bombay High Court in Ankush Narayan v Janabai Rama
214and the Supreme Court in Sawan Ham v Kalawanti wherein 
it was held that when a wife or a widow validly adopts a son, 
he becomes the son of her husband, alive or dead. He observes 
that the Bombay High Court had mainly based its decision on 
the interpretation of S. 12 of the Act, while the Supreme 
Court had mainly based it on the words 'by' or 'to' in S.
5(1) thereof. The view of the Supreme Court was that the 
word 'to' clearly contemplates adoption to some person other 
than the actual adoptive parent, and as adoption to any other 
person except the husband or wife of the adoptive parent is 
not permissible under the Act, the word 'to' must mean adoption 
by a male to his wife or by a female to her husband whether 
alive or dead. Mr. Dabke observes that Sections 7 and 8 of 
the Act clearly exphasise the position that adoption can be 
only to oneself and that unless no interpretations other than 
those placed by the Bombay High Court on S. 12 and by the 
Supreme Court on the word 'to' in S. 5(1) of the Act, are
\$>o a. ^219. [Bov. 1968L Bom. L.R. (j) pages 145-148.See
 ^Oh-t TAe. 'HcnciK fr&QpttowclticI i^dCyjtt^cxnce flc t ;U96^]y/, IT., 13 <
362.
possible, it would not, according to him, be correct to say 
that the Act contemplates adoption to any other person except 
the adoptive parent. He says that the Act does not presuppose 
that every adopted child must have both parents after adoption, 
for, under the Act a bachelor or spinster could adopt. He 
further points out that if the interpretation placed by the 
Bombay High Court on S. 12 were correct it would follow that 
a child adopted by a male with the consent of his wife would 
automatically become the child of the wife and S. 14(1) will 
have to be treated as redundant. As to the interpretation 
of the word ’to' in S. 5(1)? Mr. Dabke points out that at 
least one interpretation other than that placed by the Supreme 
Court is possible. He observes that Section ll(vi) of the 
Act enjoins that there must be actual giving and taking, but 
permits performance of that Act by another under the authority 
of the adoptive parent. He refers to Mulla's treatise on 
Hindu Lav; (15'th edn. , p. 928) to confirm his position "Like­
wise an adoptive father or the adoptive mother can authorize 
any person to accept the child in adoption on his or her 
behalf”. He urges that an agent’s act is not an act of the 
agent but of the principal. According to Mr. Dabke, it is 
in this context that the words ’by or to1 appear to have been 
used in S. 5(1) of the Act and not with a view to enable 
anybody to foist a child on any person (alive or dead), other 
than the adoptive parent.
It may harwever be pointed out here that Section 14 
of the Hindu Adoption and Maintenance Act 1956 which deals 
with the relationships of a spouse to the child adopted by
the other spouse seems, as if deliberately, silent as to the 
adopted child's relationship with the deceased spouse of the
adopter. Also according to Section 4 of the Act, on the 
points on which the Act is silent the old Hindu law will 
apply. It would appear, therefore, that on a correct inter­
pretation of the Act, the theory of relation back stands.
214The recent decision of the Supreme Court in Sawan Ram * s
199case and Sitabai v Earnchandra unequivocally uphold the -
theory of relation back, but without explainigg in detail 
what its effects will now be.
Recent decision of Madras H.C. - takes view opposite to that 
of Supreme Court and latest Supreme Court decisions'
Recently the Madras High Court unaware of the
214
Supreme Court decision in Sawan Ram * s case, has held, in the
220case of Arumugha Hdayar v Valliammal, that a widow has no
capacity to make an adoption to the deceased husband. In 
this case one Balayee Animal succeeded to the properties of 
her husband, Hallathambi, she made several alienations and 
Mallathambi's sisters (Plaintiff's in present litigation) 
instituted proceedings in 1951 and obtained a declaration 
that the alienations would not be binding on the reversioners 
after the lifetime of Balayee. She died on 17-1-60 and 
Nallathambi's sisters filed a suit for recovery of possession 
of the properties from the alienees on the basis of the 
declaration secured in the prior litigation aforesaid.
Balayee appeared to have adopted her younger sister's son, 
minor Ganapathi on 31-12-59 and on the same day she had also 
executed a registered deed of adoption acknowledging the said 
adoption. The contesting defendants i.e. the alienees and
220. [19693 A.I.R. Mad. 72.
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their representatives resisted the suit on the ground that 
the Plaintiffs had no title to sue and that as a result of 
the adoption, the minor Ganapathi hecame the nearer heir to 
the estate of Nallathambi. The Subordinate Judge found that, 
the adoption had been made out. But (on the question of law) 
he differed from the trial court and decreed the suit holding 
that the son adopted by a widow would be an heir only to the 
properties of the widow and not to the estate of her deceased 
husband. Thus in the second appeal before the Madras High’. 
Court the question raised was the question of law as to whether 
an adopted son who was adopted by a Hindu widow afifcer the 
Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act 1956 came into force would 
be entitled to the properties which the widow (the adoptive 
mother) took as an heir to her husband.
The judgement was delivered by Ramamurti J. who 
observed that under the Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act 
1956 adoption was a purely secular institution and had lost 
all its religious significance. It is because of this vital 
change that the Act provides that a woman can make an adoption 
- whether married or unmarried and the child adopted may be 
a boy or a girl. The necessary consequence is, according to 
his Lordship, the discrimination between a male and a female 
based upon religious considerations in the law of adoption 
has to disappear under the Act.
His Lordship observed that reading sections 4 and 
5 of the Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act 1956 together 
it is clear that there is no field in which any portion of 
customary law could operate with respect to adoption as
unabrogated Hindu lav/. If the theory of affiliation to the 
deceased spouse is accepted, it would cut at the root of S. 8 ,
which confers unqualified power upon all the widows irres­
pective of what any one of the widows may do in the matter 
and also would render many of the important provisions of 
the Act useless and unworkable. According to his Lordship 
the object underlying S. 7 is completely to abrogate the 
customary Hindu lav/ under which a male Hindu can foist the 
relationship of an adoptive mother upon his wife without her 
consent or even despite her objections. After the Act, if 
the requisite consent of the wife is obtained the wife is 
regarded as the adoptive mother because the adoption so made 
by a male Hindu is not only by himself but by his wife as 
well. In the case of a Hindu female, there is no such pro­
vision for her taking an adoption during the husband’s life­
time even if he consents and there is no provision corres­
ponding to S. 14 for the affiliation of the adopted child to 
the deceased husband. Apart from the four specified classes 
of cases dealt with under Section 14 there is no further 
affiliation by fiction. In the face of Sections 4 and 59 
says his Lordship, it is impossible to read into the Act any 
such power of affiliation by necessary implication. His 
Lordship further says that the rule of necessary implication 
cannot be invoked when it would be inconsistent with what is 
expressly declared in the Statute itself i.e. Sections 7* 8 
and 14.
As regards S. 12, his Lordship observes that it does 
not state that all ties of the child in the family of its 
birth are severed and they are replaced in the adoptive family. 
The replacement is not that all ties are lost in the natural 
family, but it is only those created by the adoption in the 
adoptive family. S. 12 by itself is not decisive, and does
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not lead to the necessary conclusion that there is an
affiliation to the deceased spouse, maintains his Lordship.
Under the Act an adoption by a male and a female are placed
on the same footing and there is no scope for invoking the
doctrine that the widow makes the adoption as the surviving
half of the husband and as his representative. . Section 12
states that the adoptive child shall be deemed to be the
child of his "or" her adoptive father. ’The word used, observes
his Lordship, is "or" and not "and". Further the relations
are replaced only with effect from the date of the adoption
and not retrospectively. If on an interpretation of sections
5 , 8, 11 and 1-4- the tie of an adoptive father based upon the
theory of affiliation is not created, S. 12 does not improve
the position. His lordship further observes that the theory
of vesting and divesting has no place after the Act as seen
from proviso (c) to Section 12 and states that if the main
affiliation by fiction to tie husband does not exist, the other
collateral relationships do not arise at all. His Lordship
221dissented from the cases of Ankush Harain v Janabai and
222Subhash Misir v Thagai Misir and referred to the cases of
?23Sivagami Achi v Somasundaram ChettaarR  ^and to Mulla's Hindu
221
Law 13th Edition, p. 483? section 435* Referring to Ankush's
case his Lordship observed that the main reasoning was that
and
under S. 12 /A sub-section (6) of Sec. 11 of the Act there is 
a complete severance of all ties of the child given on adoption 
in the family of his or her birth and correspondingly "these
221. A.I.R. [1966] Bom. 1?4.
222. A.I.R. 1967 All. 148.
223. A.I.R. 1956 Mad. 323 (F.B.).
very ties of the child become automatically replaced in the 
adoptive family”. The effect of the adoption is to completely 
transfer the child from the family of its birth to the family 
of its adoption. The several deeming provisions of Section 
14 of the Act tend to the same view. Sections 3 and 8 of the 
Act do not warrant the view that after the commencement of 
the Act, the widow can make an adoption only to herself and 
it was not competent for her or permissible for any widow to 
take any child in adoption to her deceased husband. The 
acceptance of the rival view, observed their Lordships, would 
result in absurd results that while the adopted son wopld lose 
all his ties in his natural family, he would not become 
related to the deceased husband or the husband's collateral 
relations and there is nothing in the Act to indicate that 
the provisions in the Act were intended to abrogate the 
position which existed under the customary Hindu law as 
regards the new ties of the adopted son in the adoptive 
family, in consequence of his adoption by a widow.
According to Ramamurty J., the .two Acts (viz. the
Hindu Succession Act and the Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance
Act 193S) have introduced far-reaching vital changes sweeping
away and cutting at the root of the old traditional and
conservative notions and concepts of customary Hindu law.
It may however be pointed out hew© that relation back was not
a creation of customary Hindu Law but of Judicial decisions
based on considerations of equity and Justice. Also surprisingly
enough there appears to be no reference in this case to the
214Supreme Court decision in Sawan Ram v Kalawanti. I am
unable to agree with the views of Ramamurti J. on most points 
especially on the interpretation put by him on Sections 4 and. .
34T
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5 of the Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act 1956 for reasons 
already stated by me above (on page 3S7 c: •' ). With
reference to Ramamurti J ’s observation (referred to at p.
33zl- above) that under the Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance 
Act 1956 adoption was a purely secular institution and had 
lost all its religious significance, I may repeat my obser­
vations made at p. 3122 above that the adopted son undoubtedly 
confers temporal benefit also on the deceased adoptive father 
for he continues the family name and discharges all the 
obligations which a natural born son would otherwise have 
discharged. Also the adopted son sacrifices his rights in 
his natural father’s family and it would be inqquitable not 
to allow him similar rights in his adoptive family. Also as
observed by their Lordships of the Supreme Court in Eramma v
224Muddappa,
”... it is sufficient to say that the real object 
behind her adoption is the belief in general 
that unless there is a son to offer oblations 
to the deceased ancestor their souls will not 
reach the higher regions and may even sink into 
hell. The mere existence of a daughter is not 
sufficient to save the souls of ancestors and 
that is why a sonless Hindu makes an adoption 
of a son even though he may have a number of 
daughters".
I am therefore more inclined to agree with their Lordships
PI 4 PPR
views in the case of Sawan Ram and Sitabai .
226
In Ra.i Kumar Mohan Singh v Ra.i Kumar Pasupatinath 
the Supreme Court held that the adoption contemplated to be 
made by a Talugdar or by his widow with his consent under the
224. A.I.R. (1966) S.C. 1137.
225. A.I.R. 1970 S.C. 343-
226. A.I.R. 1969 S.C. 133.
Oudh Estates Act I of 1869 has not the incidents and con­
sequences of adoption under the Hindu Law. The Taluqdars 
belonged to the Hindu, Mohammadan, Christian and Sikh communities. 
The personal lav/s governing the Hindus and Sikhs recognize 
adoption and the creation of rights in the adopted sons.
Amongst the Mohammedans and Christians no adoptions are 
recognised by their personal laws. Under the Oudh Estates 
Act it was open to a Taluqdar, whatever his persuation, to 
authorise by writing his wife to adopt a son. To such an 
adoption the personal law had no application. In matters not 
expressly covered by provisions of the Oudh Estates Act, the 
personal law of the Taluqdar may be applicable, but the right 
of adoption not being uniformly exercisable by the Taluqdars 
according to their personal laws, the peculiar incidents of 
Hindu adoptions have no application. Under the Hindu law 
adoption has primarily to be viewed in the context of spiritual 
rather than temporal considerations, observed their Lordships 
of the Supreme Court, and the devolution of property is only 
of secondary importance. The spiritual considerations are 
out of tune in considering the status of a son adopted by a 
Muslim or by a Christian. Under the Hindu law the adoption 
made by a Hindu widow relates back to the date of death of 
the adoptive father, but in the absence of any express pro­
visions in the Act, their Lordships observed that it would be 
impossible to attribute to the adoption mdde by a widow of 
a taluqdar, pursuant to the authority given by her husband, 
the incidents of an adoption under Hindu law. It is a necessary 
concomitant of the doctrine of relation back, that the adopted 
son takes the estate of his father as if he were in existence 
at the date of his death. Any attempt to give to the adopted
son an interest or right which is deemed to commence from the
date of the adoptive father's death so as to divest the estate
which is already vested in the widow, observed their Lordships,
is not only inconsistent with tie personal law of a taluqdar
who is not a Hindu or Sikh but comes in conflict with the
express provisions of S. 22(7) of the Oudh Estates Act (1869).
The Act provides that a son adopted by a widow in pursuance of
instructions given by her husband takes the property on her
death and not before. It is thus clear, their Lordships
observed, that the doctrine of relation back is not applicable
to an adoption made by the widow of a taluqdar governed by
the Act. Their Lordships reversed the decision in Raj Kumar
227Mohan Singh v Raj Kumar Pashupati Hath. I must emphasise
that I adduce this authority to show, by contrast with the
position under the Oudh statute, how the general Hindu law
has consistently been viewed by the Supreme Court.
In the very recent case of Smt. Sitabai and Another 
225versus Ramchandra the Supreme Court approved the decision
228of the Bombay High Court in Ankush v Janabai and held that 
Sureshfhand i.e. the son adopted by a widow became the adopted 
son of both the widow and her deceased husband and, therefore, 
became a coparcener with the sole surviving coparcener 
Dulichand the adoptive uncle in the joint family properties. 
After the death of Dulichand, the adopted son, SuiQshchand, 
became the sole surviving coparcener and was entitled to the 
possession of all joint family properties. The facts of the 
case are that Dulichand and Bhagirath were brothers and the
227. I.L.R. (1964).2 All. 191.
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properties concerned were ancestral. The Plaintiff Sitabai 
was the widow of Bhagirath, who pre-deceased Dulichand, his 
elder brother in 1930. It was admitted by both the parties 
that after Bhagirath died, the plaintiff Sitabai was living 
with Dulichand as a result of which connection an illegitimate 
child the defendant Ramchandra was born in 1933* Dulichand 
died on March 13, 1958. Sometime before his death Sitabai 
adopted Plaintiff No. 2 Suresh Chandra and an adoption deed 
was executed on March 4-4 1958. After the death of Dulichand, 
Ramchandra took possession of the joint family properties.
The Plaintiff therefore brought the present suit for ejectment 
of the defendant Ramchandra, the illegitimate son of Dulichand, 
from the disputed properties. One of the questions which arose 
for decision before the Supreme Court was whether Suresh 
Chandra, Plaintiff No. 2^ when he was adopted by Bhagirathfs 
widow, became a coparcener of Dulichand in the Hindu joint 
family properties. The High Court had taken the view that 
Suresh Chandra became the son of Plaintiff No. 1 with effect 
from 1958 and Plaintiff No. 2 would not become the adopted 
son of Bhagirath in view of the provisions of the Hindu 
Adoptions and Maintenance Act, 1956 (Act 78 of 1956). It 
was argued on behalf of the appellant that the High Court 
was in error in holding that the necessary consequence of a 
widow adopting a son under the provisions of Act 78 of 1956 
was that the adoptee would be the adopted son only of the 
widov/ and not of her deceased hushand. But in the opinion 
of their Lordships of the Supreme Court the argument put 
forward on behalf of the Appellant was well founded and it 
was accepted as correct. Their Lordships observed
"The scheme of Sections 11 and 12 of the Hindu
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Adoptions and Maintenance Act, 1956 is that 
in the case of adoption by a widow the adopted 
child becomes absorbed in the adoptive family 
to which the widow belonged. In other words 
the child adopted is tied with the relationship 
of sonship with the deceased husband of the 
widow as his adoptive father. ... It is a 
necessary implication of Ss. 12 and 14 of the 
Act that a son adopted by the widow becomes a
son not only of the widow but also of the
deceased husband. ... The true effect and 
interpretation of Ss. 11 and 12 of the Act 
is that when either of the spouses adopts a 
child, all the ties of the child in the family 
of his or her birth become completely severed 
and these are all replaced by those created 
by the adoption in the adoptive family. In 
other words the result of adoption by either 
spouse is that the adoptive child becomes the 
child of both the spouses".
I agree with their Lordships of the .Supreme Court for the
reasons already mentioned by me at pages 552, 5^7, 361, 362-
363 36 - .'6 ' above. It would also appear that the law
relating to reopening of partitions and questioning of
alienations is continual as a result of the Supreme Court's
decisions and the law relating to relation back stands as it
was in the pre-HAMA... period.
229The decision in Sitabai v Ramchandra has been 
criticized by Mr. G.K. Dabke in. his recent article in the
i pzn
All India Reporter entitled 'Nate on Sitabai v Ramchandra . J
Mr. Dabke says that the main object of codification
of law relating to Hindu Adoptions must have been to avoid
mischief of unsettling old titles and that the recent pro-
229nouncement of the Supreme Court in Sitabai v Ramchandra 
appeared to perpetuate the said mischief with respect frb 
coparcenary property.
229. A.I.R. 1970 S.C. 543.
230. A.I.R. 1970 August (Journal Section) pages 99 to 101.
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It may however be pointed out here that this is
merely Ur. Dabke's presumption, for it is nowhere stated in
the Hindu Adoption Act that this was the main object of the
ict. In fact the Act is completely silent on the relationship
of the deceased husband to a son adopted by his widow, even
though there was the occasion and necessity (in Section 14
of the wet) to define such relationship. But in view of the
various provisions of G. 12 which state that the effect of
the adoption is to completely sever the adoptee's ties in
bhe natural family and to replace them with similar ties in
the adoptive family; and also in view of S. 4 which in effect
amounts to saying that on the points on which the Act is silent
the old Hindu lav/ stands and on account of the various reasons
already discussed by me under the various recent Supreme Court
and High Court decisions above, I am of the view that the
decision in Sitabai v Ram Chandra to the effect that the
'relation back' cf the son adopted by a widow to his deceased
adoptive father still stands, appears to be absolutely correct.
Ur. Dabke also says that the decision is contrary to
the clear provisions of S. 12(c) of the Hindu Adoption Act,
which lays down that the adopted child shall not divest any
person of any estate which might have vested in him or her
before the adoption. The effect of this provision has,
However, been correctl interpreted by the Supreme Court in
214Gawan Ram v Lalawanti 1 wherein their Lordships of the
Supreme Court observed
"It appears that, in making such a provision 
(i.e. referring to S. 12(c) of the Act), the
Act has narrov/ed down the rights of an adopted 
child as compared with the rights of a child 
born posthumously. Under the Shastric law, 
if a child was ado^ ted by a widow, he was treated 
as a natural-born child and, consequently, he.......
could divest other members of the family of 
rights vested in them prior to his adoption.
It was only with the limited object of avoiding 
any such consequence on the adoption of a child 
by a Hindu .widow that these provisions in Cl.
(c) of the proviso to £. 12 and S. 1$ of the 
Act were incorporated. In that respect the 
rights of the adopted child were restricted.
It is to be noted that this restriction v/as 
placed on the rights of a child adopted by 
either a male Hindu or a female Hindu and not 
merely in a Case of adoption by a female Hindu.
This restriction on the rights of the adopted 
child cannot, therefore, in our opinion, lead 
to any inference that a child adopted by a 
widow will not be deemed to be the adopted 
son of her deceased husband".
Heading this interpretation of S. 12(c) with the other clauses
of 3. 12 according to which the adoption results in complete
severance of ties in the adoptee's natural family and his
complete substitution in the adoptive family and also in view
of the effects of S. 4 and other sections of the Adoption Act
already discussed above, I am completely in agreement with
this interpretation of 3. 12 (c) of the Act.
Ur. Dabke next criticizes the .Supreme Court decision
in respect of the house which v/as bequeathed by Dulichand
(who was the sole surviving coparcener at that time) to
Ramchandra the Defendant. The Supreme Court in its judgment
had restored the decision of the District Judge v/ho took the
view that the will executed by ’D ' was valid so far as half
of his share in the house was concerned, and, therefore the
defendant was entitled to claim half the share of the house
in dispute. In this connection it may be pointed out that
S. 6 of the Hindu Succession Act 1956 does not disturb the
special rights of those v/ho are members of the Uitakshara
coparcenary or the rule of survivorship in coparcenary
property. .here, therefore a male Hindu having an interest 
in a itakshara coparcenary dies, his interest will devolve
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by survivorship upon the surviving members of the coparcenary 
and not in accordance with this Act. If however, he dies 
leaving female heirs of Class I to the Schedule or a male 
relative specified in that class who claims through such 
female relation, his interest will develop in accordance with 
the Hindu Succession Act either by testamentary Succession 
under S. 30 of the Act or by Intestate Succession under S.8.
In such cases the interest of the dedeased coparcener will be 
deemed to be such share in the property which would have been 
allotted to him, if a partition had taken place just prior to 
his death (vide Expl. 1 to the section)
Thus in view of S.6 of the Hindu Succession Act 
1956 discussed above and also in view of the Supreme Court 
decisions^^ ^2^that the adoption of a son by. the-widow 
relates back to the death of the deceased adoptive father, 
the above decision of the Supreme Court that the will executed 
by !D f was valid to the extent of half of his share in the 
house is correct and Mr. Dabkefs contentions appear to be 
mistaken.
214-An attack on Sawan Ram* s case T has also been made 
231by Paras Diwan J and an attack on both Supreme Court cases is
232made by B.N. Sampath. The arguments of these writers, as
231# (1969) 21 law Review (Punjab) pp. i-xviii.
232. B.N. Sampath: The Doctrine of Relation Back: An
unfortunate revival [19703 2 S.C.J., J., 1-10.
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in the case of Mr, Dabke, are unconvincing and my above
discussion in support of the Supreme Court cases applies to
232athe views expressed by these writers as well.
The decision of the Supreme Court in Sitabai v. Ham 
229Chandra , has been followed by the Delhi High Court in
Duni Chand v. Paras R a m ^ ^  wherein it was held that the son
adopted by the widow-becomes absorbed in the adoptive family
to which the widow belonged and becomes the son not only of
the widow but also of her deceased husband. Hence he will be
the preferential heir of her deceased husband qua the other
collaterals. Khanna C.J. observed that the true effect and
interpretation of Sections 11 and 12 of the H.A.M.A., 1936
was that when either of the spouses adopts a child, all the
ties of the child in the family of his or her birth become
completely severed and these are all replaced by those created
by the adoption in the adoptive family. In other words, the
result of adoption by either spouse is that the adoptive child
232cbecomes the child of both spouses.
232a. The various Supreme Court and other cases as well as the 
the Articles by Dabke and others have been reviewed and 
commented upon by Prof. J.M.D.Derrett in a recent article 
entitled: Adoption and Relation Back: The Position in
1971; [l97l1 73 Bom. L.R. (J) 31* Derrett observes that
relation back is still alive and that S.12, prov. (c) will 
have its effect, if we confine divesting to property^ 
which did not vest absolutely and finally in a definite 
person, e.g. a legatee under a will is such a person, 
but a surviving coparcener is not.
232b. A.I.R. 1970 Delhi 202.
232c. In his ’A Critique of Modem Hindu Law’ (Bombay, Tripathi) 
1970, pp. 137 ff* Derrett observes, and it seems rightly, 
that relation back will not occur in non-sacramental 
adoptions. This point seems to have been overlooked by 
almost all other writers on modern Hindu law.
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The English Law
The English adoptions introduced affiliation into 
the family and fictional paternity from the date of the adoption, 
hut they did not envisage the refinements which the Hindu law 
of adoption had reached. Under the Shastric Hind law, adoption 
had the effect of transferring the adopted boy from his natural 
family into the adoptive family. It severed all his ties with 
the family in which he was born and invested him with the same
rights and privileges in the family of the adopter as the
legitimate son, subject to certain exceptions. Adoption of a eon 
by a widov/ related back to the date on which the adoptive 
father died and the adopted son by a fiction of law was to be 
deemed to have been in existence, as the son of the adoptive 
father, at the time of the latter*s death.
Hone of the other systems of law gave retrospective
operation to an adoption made by a widow to the date of her 
husband's death.
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CHAPTER V I I
SUCCESSION EX PARTE MATERNA AND DETERMINATION 
OP THE ADOPTIVE MOTHER IN CERTAIN CASES
IUa- —  _, _ _
View ofjDattaka Mimamsa and Dattaka Chandrika
On this subject the author of the Dattaka-Mimamsa
lays down the following rule:
"The forefathers of the adoptive mother only 
are also the maternal grandsires of sons given 
and the rest; for the rule regarding the pater­
nal is equally applicable to the maternal 
grandsires (of adopted sons)".1
The Dattaka-Chandrika states that
"Where there may be a diversity of mothers, 
the sires of the natural mothers are first 
designated by a son, who is son to two fathers, 
at the funeral repast in honour of the maternal 
grandsires, subsequently the sires of her who 
is the adoptive mother, where the paternal sires 
are honoured there certainly are the maternal.
But the absolutely adopted son presents oblations 
to the father and to the other ancestors of his 
adoptive mother only, for he is capable of per-p 
forming the funeral rites of that mother only".
Commenting on these passages Sutherland says that
"an adopted son likewise represents the. real 
legitimate son in relationship to his adoptive 
mother whose ancestors are his natural grandsires."
Adopteefe rights of succession to maternal relations not 
recognised in early cases
¥. Macnaghten records a case where an adopted son
3 4succeeded to his adoptive mother’s brother. W. Macnaghten,
1. Datt. Him. VI, 50-52; see also pages 3 *38 *>^3 87•
2. Datt. Chandrika III, 16, 17.
3. 2 V7. Mac. N. 88.
4. I.V/'. Mac.N. 78; Taralankar 's ,Ed. , .p.. .86.......   -
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5refers to a Bengal case, G-unga Mya v Kishen Kishore^ in which 
he thinks the point was decided and adopts the rule that an
adopted son does not succeed to the relatives of the adoptive
4 5mother. In this case^ it was held that a son adopted by a
woman on whom her father's estate had devolved, will not be
entitled to such estate on the adoptive mother’s death, which
will go to her father’s brother's son in default of nearer
heirs. Their lordships of the Sudder Dewany Adawlat observed
that according to the Diiyabhaga, an adopted son has no legal
claim to the property of a bandhu (or cognate) and according
to interpretation of Manu's text, which admits adopted sons
to the right of succession collaterally, the meaning is
succession to the property of persons belonging to the same
family as the adoptive f a t h e r a s  fully appears from the
Munwartha Mooktavulee/ compiled by Kulluka Bhaijta and other
authorities. Also when an estate devolves on a childless
widow, who is held as the half body of her husband, it reverts
at her death to the heirs of her husband. So an estate which
had devolved on a daughter, who has a weaker claim should, a
fortiori, revert to the heirs of her father, quoting the
authority of Ya.jnavalkya cited in the Dayabhaga etc.
"A wife, daughter's son, both parents, brother's, 
their sons, kinsmen sprung from the same original 
stock, distant kindred, a pupil and a fellow 
student in theology; on failure of the first of 
these the next in order share the estate of him 
who has gone to heaven without leaving male 
issues”.
According to the opinion of the Pundit, the adoptive mother 
was lav/ful heir of her father’s property but her estate was 
only a life estate and on her death the estate should revert
5. [1821] Select .Reports 3 .S.D.. . 170.
3%c
to the son of her father's brother. It would appear that 
the opinion of the lundits was based on an irrelevant passage
of the layabhaga. This decision is referred to in Lorun Iloee
6 7v Be Joy Lishto and in Chinna Ramakrishna v Tinatchi Ammalf
and seems to be the basis of the rule laid down in these cases
that an adopted son cannot succeed to his adoptive maternal
grandfather's estate when there are collateral male heirs,
-hrun I'.oee v Be Joy Kishto° their Lordships
referred to two cases viz. G-unga Ilya v Kishen hi shore ^ wherein
the dictum of the pundits was accepted by only one of the
Judges of the Court but the remaining two Judges observed that
the dictum was not applicable to the case in question. In that
case the appellant (adoptive mother) was held clearly to a
right to the portion during her life-time , but it did not
appear necessary or proper in the decree to make provision
for more than the matter in dispute. The other case referred
g
to ..as Gunga Per shad Roy v Bri J esurree ' wherein the doctrine
5
m  Gunga Pya's case- was not adopted by the Court and 
referred for cp inion of the Pundit of the Sadr Court to 
the effect that bandhus or descendants of maternal grand­
father succeed an adopted son on failure of nearer or 
agnate relations (according to Yajnavalkya quoted in the 
Layabhaga) . Their Lordships in ilorun hoee v Be Joy Eishto^ 
observed that a son of some sort was essential to the eternal 
a; piness of man but according to Lanu V, 160, a woman needs
6. (166J) . Sp. PC. [B.B.] p. 121. Also referred to by
the Allahabad High Court in Sham Euar v Gya Din (See
under note 9) •
7- (1671) 7 Had. H.C.H. 245.
8. [1859] Part II S.p. 1091............. ■'........
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no mediation, she can ascend to heaven if she devoted herself 
to pious austerity after her husband's death, hence the adopted 
son adopted before or after the husband's death is adopted 
for the husbands benefit. Their Lordships further observed 
that the reason given by Macnaghten in his chapter on adoption 
why a daughter's adopted son should be excluded from inheriting 
the estate of the maternal grandfather was that the party so 
adopted "becomes the son of a person whose lineage is distinct 
from that of the maternal grandfather" . -^ n view of the above
opinion prevailing between the years 1821-1850, the Vyavastha
Q
given in the case of G-unga Pershad v 3ricjesurree does not 
directly over-rule prevailing opinion, observed their Lordships 
and also that not a text of law or single precedent could be 
quoted to support the claim,and further it seemed to their 
Lordships to be opposed to the theory of the Hindu system of 
adoption and hence they disallowed the claim in the case.
Their Lordships further observed that if the right of the 
adopted son of the daughter had been ever recognised in Hindu 
Law, some allusion to the adopted son wopldnecessarily have 
been made gust when barrenness and childless widowhood were
described as bars to their rights of inheritance.
7
In Chinna Ramakrishna v Minatchi also it was held 
that an adopted son does not succeed to the estate of his 
adoptive mother's father in preference to the son's son of 
the brother of the adoptive mother's father. Their Lordships 
observed that the effect of Macnaghten1s Hindu Law (p. 78,
3rd edition) was that the adopted sons succeed collaterally 
in the family of their adoptive father as sons but not in the
family of their adoptive mother. The Dattaka Mimamsa was in 
favour of s uch succession but the general current of Hindu
authorities was silent on the point. Their, Lordships next 
summarised the Judgment of 'a very learned Judge of Bengal 
High Court', Justice Sambonath Pandit where the point was 
most fully considered thus: (a) There was no direct text
with the exception of Dattaka Mimamsa nor any case in either 
of the Presidencies in favour of such right. (b) There was 
utter silence of lav/ in parts of it where it was expected to 
speak out on the subject - as where barrenness and childless 
widowhood are spoken of as bars to inheritance, and where the 
expression 'capable of bearing children' occurs. (c) As to 
the arguments in favour of the rights of the adopted child 
viz., (i) the principle of reciprocity founded upon a Bengal
Q
decision in 1859 (authority of which was doubtful), according 
to Justice Samboonath such reciprocal rights were not invariably 
any part of the Hindu system of succession. (ii) as to the 
argument of unfairness that the adopted child loses rights in 
the natural family the answer given is that even in the case 
of an affeer-born Aurasa son, the adopted son gets a diminished 
share. (d) Although an adopted son succeeds collaterally in 
the adoptive family, it was not decided whether he succeeds 
to the full share or proportionate share in case of existence 
of an after-born Aurasa son alsp. (e) The whole system,
according to Justice Samboonath is an anomaly and full of 
injustice and therefore there is room for the question whether 
he is qualified, as a son of the body of his adoptive mother 
would be, to inherit the estate of his maternal grandfather.
(f) There was no decision in favour or against except the one 
referred to, and, excepting two texts of the Dattaka-Mimamsa, 
the law was silent on the point. (g) Even the two texts of 
Dattaka Mimamsa were deduced by way of arguments from other
3^3
admitted legal positions than to assert positively- what the 
law on the point was, as derived from the sages of antiquity, 
or as handed down, by tradition, or established by custom.
Mutual rights of succession between adoptee and maternal 
relations recognised
8In Gunga Pershad v Bri.jesurree it was held that 
the relatives of an adoptive mother inherit the property of 
an adopted son, Just as they would have succeeded to a natural 
born son. Referring to Gungamya1s case and the bywastha of 
the Pandit, their Lordships observed that it was obvious that 
this doctrine was not conclusively adopted by the Court and 
stands there merely as a dictum of the Pandit who gave it and
cannot be said to have acquired all the authority of a recog­
nised principle of Hindu lav/ to ihich the Sudder Court had 
intended to give effect. The following was the Vyjwastha of 
the Pandit of this Court:
"In the event of a dattaka dying without leaving 
any heirs of the adoptive father or the said
adopted son, the heirs of the father of the
adoptive mother are, under the Hindu law, entitled 
to inherit the property of the said adopted son 
by right of succession. This bywastha or opinion 
is in accordance with that of the Dayabhaga, 
vivada^hangayava-, Dattaka Mimamsa and dattaka 
Chandrika etc., prevailing in Bengal District.
The first authority was a text of Yajnavalkya 
to be found in the Dayabhaga etc. - ’If a person 
dies without a son, grandson.or greatgrandson the 
property devolves on the widow, in default of 
her, on his daughter ... etc. ... on a bandhu 
i.e. descendant of the maternal grandfather'.
The second authority was a text of Vishnu to 
the same effect. The_tkir<3- authority was a 
text of the Dattaka Mimainsa' ... 'as adoptive 
father of an adopted son and his father and 
grandfather becomes father, grandfather and 
greatgrandfather of adopted son, in the same 
manner the father, grandfather and great grand­
father of adoptive mother of the said adopted 
son shall constitute his maternal grandfather, 




In Sham Kuar v Gya Din  ^ a full hemch of the Allaha­
bad High Court held that an adopted son, under the Dattaka 
Mimamsa and Mitakshara, succeeds to the property to which 
his adoptive mother succeeded as heiress of her father.
Their Lordships observed that the ^attaka Mimamsa (S. 1, 7.
22; S. 6 , 7. 6 ; S. 6 , 7. 51) and also Manufs texts show,that 
the separation of the adopted son is so complete from the 
natural father's and mother's families, that, in the absence 
of texts, it is not assuming too much to infer that affiliation 
by adoption is into both families of adoptive father and 
mother. Dattaka Mimamsa S. 5, 7. 50 declares that the fore­
fathers of the adoptive mother are also maternal grandsires 
of sons given and the rest and therefore the rule regarding 
the paternal is equally applicable to maternal gransires of 
the adopted son. Their Lordships further observed that a 
strong argument in favour of the adopted son's right of 
succession is that he has the right to perform funeral 
obsequies of the adoptive mother's f a t h e r . T h i s  right of 
pefforming obsequies indicates a right of.heirship in the 
family of the adoptive mother for according to Manu (IX, 142)
"A given son must never claim the family and estate of his 
natural father” and the reason assigned is because "the funeral 
cake follows the family and estate" and the same reason is 
given in the Dattaka Mimamsa (S. 6 , 7. 51) 11 the family and 
estate are the cause of performing the funeral repast" and 
this doctrine has been held by Sir W. Jones to be the key to 
the whole Hindu law of inheritance. As the adopted son
9- (1876) I.L.R. 1 All. 255 (R.B.).
10. Dattaka Mim. S.. 6 ,. 7.' s. 52., -55.- ;
performs by rig&t obsequies of adoptive maternal grandfather
it will follow that he does so because he is amongst the heirs.
In Horun Lloee v Becjoy Kishto^ the Pandit's opinion was that
the adopted son can inherit the property of his adoptive
maternal grandfather although the Bengal High Court held
5otherwise. In Gunga Mya's case the Pandit's dictum was 
accepted by one judge only but the majority of the Court 
expressed no opinion as the point did not arise in that case.
o
In Ganga Pershad's case their Lordships considered Gunga Mya's 
5
case^ and observed that the doctrine merely stood as dictum
of the Pundit and held otherwise.
In Teencowree v Denonath^  the right of inheritance
by the adopted son was held to be limited to the adoptive
mother's stridhan and did not extend to property inherited
from her father and paternal ancestors but this limitation
proceeded on the ground that the adopted son cannot perform
Sradh of adoptive maternal grandfather, which view, in the
9opinion of their Lordships in Sham Kuar's case, appeared to
be mistaken. It was later well settled in a number of cases
that an adopted son had all the rights of a natural-born son
in the maternal line as in the paternal line and was therefore
entitled to inherit from his adoptive mother and her father
12and their relations.
11. (1865) 5 Y/.R. 4-9.
12. Kali Komal v Uma Sunker (1883) L.R. 10 I.A., 138, (1883) 
I.L.R. 10 Cal. 232 affg. (1881) 6 Cal. 257; Dattatraya
v Gangabai (1922) 46 Bom. 541; Souhthara •. v Periaveru 
The van (1933) 50 Mad. 759 P.B., Radha Prasad v Ranee 
Rani Dossee (1906) I.L.R., 35 Cal 947 (P.R.); Venkata 
v Parthasarthy (1914) I.L.R. 37 Had. 199; 13 I.C. 166;
Jo y_. Kish ore v Panchoo (1879) 4 C.L.R. 538; Sundaramma 
v Venkata (1926) I.L.R. 49 Mad. 941; Puddo Mumari v 
Jogat Kishore (1879) I.L.R. 5 Cal. 6I5,; these, case.s .are.
■ • -discussed -subsequently...................... *
12In Uma Sunker v Kali Komal (which case was affirmed
12by the Privy Council in Kali Komal v Uma Sunker) it was 
held that succession of the adopted son to relatives of the 
adoptive mother is in the same way as a legitimate son. In 
this case the suit was brought to recover possession of 
property ^ aich the Plaintiff contended devolved on him as the 
adopted son of one Hurosoondoree Debee, the property previously 
belonged to her father and after his death to her brother.
The Defendant's denied the authority to adopt and contended 
that the adopted son could not succeed to the property of the 
adoptive mother's father and brother. The case was referred 
to the full Bench of the Calcutta High Court, wherein their 
Lordships referred to the following various authorities and 
drew the following conclusions:
(i) Dattaka IJimamsa", (VI, 50-53) wherein the adopted son is 
recognised as a substitute for the legitimate son and the 
performer of funeral repasts as in the case of a legitimate 
son.
(ii) Dattaka tlimamssT (VI, 50) which states that the adopted 
son is disconnected from his own maternal family and connected 
to adoptive mother's family.
(iii) Dattaka ChandrikaT (17? iii) which states that the adopted 
son presents oblations to adoptive mother's ancestors.
(iv) Dattaka Mimamsa (VI, 51) wherein Manu is cited 'The 
funeral cake follows the family and the estate' and the author 
of Dattaka Mimamsa argues that the estate of the maternal 
grandfather like that of the father lapses from the son given 
and acquires similar rights in the adoptive family and that 
inheritance of the estate is the cause of his obligations to
{ 3*7
perform funeral repasts.
(v) Dattaka Chandrilfa (V 22) The conflict "between the Rishis, 
some of whom declare him as "being among the six heirs to 
kinsmen and others as heir to the father only was based on 
distinction as to his qualities, good or bad.
(vi) ’Other kinsmen” in para. 24 (read with para. 22) clearly 
indicate Sapinda Kinsmen
(Vii) According to the Dayabhaga, Sec. VI, Ch. IX, para. 19 
the maternal uncle is a Sapinda kinsman of his sister’s son. 
(viii) According to Dattaka Mimamsa (IX, 3) and Dattaka 
Chandrikg- (I, 1) the word Sapinda includes kinsmen of the 
same and different family.
Adopted son’s position is similar to the natural son in the 
maternal line
13In Sur.jokant Nandi v Mohesh Chunder, following the
full bench decision of the Calcutta High Court in Uma Sunker 
14v Kali Komul their Lordships of the Calcutta High Court held
that the adopted son of one daughter shares equally with the
natural son of another daughter in the inheritance left by
his maternal grandfather. Their Lordships also observed that
no special text or books were applicable to this case and
14following the Calcutta full bench decision, Held as above.
Similarly it was held that the adopted son inherits to maternal 
15uncle,  ^and conversely, those relations inherit to the adopted
13. (1883) I.L.R. 9 Cal. 71-
14. (1880.) I.L.R. 6 Cal. 25'?.





17In Padmakumari v Court of Wards it was held that
an adopted son occupies the same position in the family of
the adopter as a natural born son, except in a few instances
which are accurately defined both in the Dattaka Chandrika
and Dattaka Mimamsa, governing authorities in the Bengal
school. Also that the adopted son of the maternal grandfather
of the deceased, though the gotra into which he was adopted was
not the same as the latter’s, was an heir nearer to him than
such maternal grandfather's nephew. In this case the objection
that although the adopted son may inherit collaterally, it
must be in the same gotra as the deceased was upheld by the
subordinate judge on the gloss on IJanu by Kulluka Bhatta. The
High Court reversed the judgment and Justice Mitter said of
the gloss in question which is found in Colebroke's Digest
(Book 5, Ch. 4, S. 1 Art. 178)
"In the original phrase 'gotra-dayada1 stands 
for 'heirs to collaterals'. 'Dayada' is equi­
valent to heirs and 'gotra' to family name.
It is said that 'gotra-dayada' means heirs of 
persons bearing the same family name. It may
........ be that this would be the meaning of the phrase
above alluded to if the letters are strictly 
adhered to. But it appears to me from the 
context that these words are intended to include 
all the collateral members of the family who 
stand in the relation of Sapinda etc. to the 
adopted son. But granting that the literal 
construction should be adhered to, does the 
text in question support the conclusion of the 
lower Court? It lays down simply that the first 
six kinds of sons are heirs to the,kinsmen sprung 
ffom the same family. It is not necessarily 
implied thereby that any one of these six des­
criptions of sons is not entitled to inherit to 
the estate of kinsmen sprung from a different 
family".
T p "n
16. (1909)/33 Som. 4-04-. (/Vnandi v Bari Suba).
17. (1882) I.L.S. 8 Cal. 302.
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His Lordship further observed that the limitation of the right
of the adopted son to succeed to his collateral relations is
contrary to the whole theory of the Hindu law of adoption.
An adopted son occupies the same position as the natural born,
except in a few specified instances, in the family of the
adopter, and no text has been produced to show that the adopted
son cannot succeed to the estate of such relatives of his
father as are sprung from a different family. The Dattaka
Chandrika (S. 5, para. 24) says
"Therefore by the same relationship of brother 
and so forth, in virtue of which the real legi­
timate son would succeed to the estate of a 
brother or other kinsmen, where such son may 
not exist, the adopted son takes the whole 
estate even".
The Doctrine of the Dayabhaga (10, viii) that the
adopted sons are not heirs of collateral relations (Sapindas)
etc., which is opposed to the text of Manu was considered by
18the Privy Council in Surabhoochunder v Haraini Debee, it was
held that the adopted son succeeds not only lineally but
collaterally to the inheritance of his relations by adoption.
17It would appear that in Fadmakumari v Court of Wards the 
adopted son's right to succeed to Bhinnagotra sapindas seems 
to be recognized by the Court on the negative ground that no 
text lays down that the adopted son cannot succeed to the 
estate of relations of the father sprung from a different 
family. Even on equitable grounds it seems perfectly justified 
that the adopted son should have a right to succeed to the 
estate of maternal and collateral relations. The adopted 
son's ties in his natural family are completely severed on
18. (18^5) 5 W.H. (P.C.) 100, 5 Knapp. P.C. 55.
adoption and equity and Justice demand that similar rights
should he given to him in the adoptive family. There does
not seem to he any reason why any distinction should he made
between a natural and adopted son because the adopted son
takes the place of the natural son in all functions temporal
and spiritual, including the right to perform the funeral
obsequies of the adoptive mother’s father etc^^ As rightly
9argued by their Lordships m  Sham Kuar v GyaJDin, and on the 
basis of Manu’s text, (IX, 142) repeated in the Dattaka 
Mimamsa (see page 352 above). The adopted son does seem to 
have the right to succeed in the adoptive mother’s family and 
to collateral relations.
Childless daughters can improve their position by adopting
19In Radha Frasad v Ranee Ivloni Das see it was held
that the adopted son holds precisely the same position as a
son born, as regards inheritance from the adoptive mother’s
relations and the status of an adopted son, unless modified
by express texts, is similar to that of a son born, as regards
the performance of periodical obsequial ceremonies and
inheritance. Their Lordships observed that in Bengal, by
adoption, a daughter attains the status of a daughter with
12a son. The cases of Puddo Kumareev Jogat Kishore and Uma
12Sunkar v Kali Komal had finally settled the. law that an 
adopted son holds precisely the same position as a son born 
as regards inheritance from the adoptive mother’s relations 
and that the status of an adopted son, unless modified by 
express texts was similar to that of a son born as regards
19. (1906) I.L.R. 33 Cal. 947.
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performance of periodical obsequial ceremonies and inheritance.
19Their Lordships in Radha Prasad v Ranee Moni y observed that 
Ranee Moni must be recognised as a daughter with a son and 
she stood in the same position under the Hindu law as her 
sister Prem Moni. Thus the institution of adoption is quite 
useful for childless daughters, for, by adopting a son they 
get all the advantages which they would have had only if they 
had Aurasa sons.
Adoptive mother preferred to adoptive father for succession 
to adopted son's property
20In Anandi v Hari Suba it has been held that under
the I.Iitakshara school of Hindu lav/ the adoptive mother is 
entitled to succeed, in preference to the adoptive father, 
to a son taken in adoption. In this case, on the death of 
the adopted son unmarried, leaving property the question that 
came up for decision before the Bombay High Court, was whether 
the adoptive father or adoptive mother was the preferential 
heir. Their Lordships observed that, according to the 
Ivlitakshara, when a son dies, leaving his parents as heirs, 
the mother succeeds to the son's estate before the father. 
Vijnaneswara puts the preference of mother on two grounds
PI
(as 7/est J. observed in Lallubhai v Hankuvarbai) : (a) that
the word pitarau is abbreviation of the conjunctive compound 
matapitarau (parents) in which the word mata comes before 
Pita (b) that the mother's propinquity was greater than the 
father's. Their Lordships observed that no doubt propinquity
20. (1909) I.L.R. 33 Bom. 404, 409; 3 I.C. 743-
21. (1876) I.L.R. 2 Bom. 388 at 439-
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does enter the reasoning of Vijnaneswara, but it does not 
on that account follow that he intended to deny the same 
propinquity to an adopted son which he allows to a natural 
born son. This case shows the fallacy o f .Vijnaneswara's 
interpretation of the word ’Sapinda1. The correct inter­
pretation of Hanu’s word 'Sapinda' would probably be with 
respect to the capacity of a person to offer and receive 
oblations. Especially in case of a Hindu adoption, it would 
seem obvious that the adoption is in the first instance for 
the benefit of the father, and the adoptive mother's affili­
ation follows as a necessary corollary. It would therefore 
appear that the adoptive father is a nearer heir than the 
adoptive mother to the property of the deceased adopted son.
Succession to son adopted in dvyamushyayana form
22In Basappa v G-urlingawa it was held that under 
the Hindu law, on the death of a son adopted in the dvyamash- 
yayana form, his adoptive mother and natural mother inherit 
equally as co-heiresses, the property left by him. Their 
Lordships observed that the dv yamushyayana form was only a 
variety of the dattaka. The right of inheritance is regulated 
by the theory of propinquity according to the Mitakshara, 
but the test of offering Pinda is not excluded according to
25the decisions of the Privy Council in Lallubhai v Cassibhai,
24Buddha Singh v Laltu Singh and Jotindra Nath Roy v Hagendra
22. Basappa v G-urlingawa (1933) I.L.R. 57 Bom. 74,.
25. (1889) I.L.R. 15 Bom. 110.
24. (1915) I.L.R. 57 All. 604 at p. 6I5 .
25Nath Roy, in the last .of which it was observed as follows
(p. 1416)
"It is, their Lordships think, a mistake to 
suppose that the doctrine of spiritual benefit 
does not enter into the scheme of inheritance 
propounded in the Mitakshara. No doubt propinquity 
±0 blood is the primary test, but the intimate 
connection between inheritance and funeral 
oblations is shown by various texts of Manu 
(see, for instance Chapter IX, verses 156 and 
142), and the Viramitrodaya brings in the 
conferring of spiritual benefit as the measure 
of propinquity, where the degree of blood 
relationship furnishes no certain guide".
22
Their Lordships in Basappa1s case referred to Kali Komul v
26 27Uma Shunkar, Radha Prasad v Ranee Mani and Dattatraya v
28Gangabai wherein it was held that the adopted son holds
precisely the same position as a son born, except in a few
specified instances, and also th Sundaramma v Venkata Subba 
29Ayyar ' wherein it was held that there is no authority for 
the view that in order to become an adoptive mother she should 
have actively participated in the adoption by actually receiving 
the hoy in adoption. In the present case the Plaintiff took 
the boy in adoption in the dvyamushyayana form and entered 
into agreement with the natural father that the boy adopted 
was to be the son of both and it therefore follows that the 
adoptive mother of the adopted son occupies the position of 
a mother. This position is supported by a text of Nanda
25. (1931) 33 Bom. L.R. 1411 at p. 1416.
26. (1885) L.R. 10 I.A. 158; S.C. 10 Cal. 252.
27. (1906) I.L.R. 53 Cal. 94-7.
28. (1922) I.L.R. 46 Bom. 541.
29. (1926) I.L.R. 49 Mad. 94-1.
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Pandit a ^
"In consequence of the superiority of the
husband, by his mere act of adoption, the
filiation of the adopted, as the son of the 
wife, is complete in the same manner as her 
property in any other thing accepted by the 
husband".
31The Dattaka Mimamsa lays down as follows:
"The forefathers of the adoptive mother only 
are also the maternal grandsires of the sons 
given, and the rest: for, the rule regarding
the paternal, is equally applicable to the 
maternal grandsires..."
In the case of the simple adopted son severance from the
natural family results from the very act of the gift of the
32
boy in adoption.
It was contended on behalf of the adoptive mother
that she should be preferred to the natural mother on the
ground that the property in suit belonged to the adoptive
family, reliance being placed on Sarkar's Hindu law of 
33adoption. ^
"The natural mother of the son adopted in the 
djyamushyayana form can be his heir. But a 
difficult question arises when such a son dies, 
after inheriting property from both the adoptive 
and the natural father, leaving behind him his 
adoptive and natural mothers. It is reasonable 
that both the mother's should inherit the res­
pective shares of the property inherited by 
the son from their respective husbands".
34In Behari Lai v Shih Lai it was held that a natural 
mother of a Hindu adopted into another branch of his family 
by the nitya dvyamushyiiyana form of adoption does not, on
30. Datt. Mim. S. 1, p}.. 22 (Stokes' Hindu Law p. 536).
31. Datt. Mim. S. 6 pi. 50 - Stokes Hindu Law p. 612.
32. Discussed in Bai Kesharba v Shivsing.ji [19323 56 Bom. 619 
and Laxmipatirao v Venkatesh (19l6) 4l Bom. 315 at pp.
330-331.
33. Second edition p. 383*
34. (1904) I.L.E. 26 All. 472.
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account of such adoption lose her right of succession to
her son in the absence of nearer heirs. In that case the
property belonging to the adoptive family was held to pass
to the natural mother in preference to a bandhu i.e. adoptive
father’s sister’s son. Reference was made to Battalia Chandrika
Sec. 2, pi. 19, where it is laid down that in the case of a
simple adopted son extinction of filial relation resulted but
in the case of the c" dvyamushyayana form, the gift is a
qualified gift and the dvyamushyayana adopted son does not
cease to have filial relation with his natural parents. It
would therefore follow, observed their Lordships, that the
natural mother retains her right of inheritance to the
dvyamushyayana adopted son. Commenting on Behari Lai’s
case,^ Mayne makes the following observations
"It was held by the Allahabad High Court that 
by virtue of the special agreement the relation­
ship of the natural mother was unaffected by 
the adoption, and therefore her right of succession. 
If she had died leaving property it follows that 
Raghunandan might have been her heir. If the 
adoptive mother had survived him, apparently 
both mothers would have been c o - h e i r e s s e s " .35
Adopted son succeeds to Stridhana of adoptive mother
36 37In Teencowree v Lenonath and G-angadhar v Hiralal
it was held that like an Aurasa son, an adopted son, in the
absence of daughters, succeeds to the stridhana of his
adoptive mother. In the former case their Lordships held
that an adopted son has all the rights and privileges of a
35- liayne’s Hindu Law, 9^h edition para. 167A, p. 231. 
36. (1865) 3 V7.R . 4-9.
37- (1916) I.L.R. 4-3 Cal. 944, 970.
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son born, and is also entitled to succeed to the stridhana 
of his mother in the absence of daughters, in like manner as 
a son born, whether there be or be not a will in his favour.
Also that a son adopted by one wife may succeed to a co-wife^s 
stridhan. In this case the texts quoted in favour of the 
adopted son’s rights were: Sutherland’s Duttaka Chandrika:
(Synop., p. 219 or p. 153 of 1834 edition); Dayakrama-Sa*T^graha 
(p.57, S.5); Layabbaga p. 82; Macnaghten’s Hindu Law, Vol. I, 
pp. 39-40 (to show that the adopted son has the same status 
as the Aurasa son).
Against the argument, the following details were 
brought to the notice of their Lordships: the case reported
128, Select Reports Vol. Ill, Gunga Mya’s case^8(wherein 
it was held that the adopted son was not entitled to succeed 
to the maternal grandfather’s estate on the death of the 
adoptive mother when the estate would go to her father’s 
heirs). This case was held by their Lordships to be inapplicable 
to the present case as in that case the property descended 
to the woman from her father as inheritance and not as 
stridhan - the reason given being that the adopted son is 
adopted into the adoptive father’s family and not into the 
adoptive mother’s family and cannot perform the Sradh of the 
maternal grandfather (which view has been held to be mistaken 
by their Lordships of the Allahabad High Court in Sham Kuar’s
rz q
case see p. 384 above) but in the case of stridhan the 
adoptive son would succeed, in the absence of a will, after 
the daughter’s son like a natural son. Their Lordships 
further observed that the Hindu law of Inheritance provides 
also that the son of a contemporary wife is entitled to
38. Gunga My a v . Kishen Kishore (1821") Select Reports 3 S.L. 170.
39. (1867) I.L.R. 1 All. 255 (F«B.) Sham Kuar v. Gya Lin.
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succeed to her stridhan.
3 7In Gangadhar v. Hiralal . it has been held that 
the adoptive and natural sons of co-wives succeed equally to 
their step-mother*s stridhan. For a discussion of this case 
refer to pages 192 - 93
Step-Mother not entitled to succeed to step-son.
In Lai a Joti lal v. Luranikower^  the question to be 
considered was, v/hether, assuming the family to be a divided 
one, a step-mother can succeed to the estate of her step-son, 
according to the law prevalent in Mithila. Their Lordships 
observed that, according to the law as current in Bengal, the 
step-mother cannot succeed to the estate of her step-son. But 
it was contended that, according to the Mitakshara, which is 
the law prevalent in Mithila, a different rule prevails.
Their Lordships quoted paragraph 3 of the Mitakshara which 
states
"Besides, the father is a common parent to other 
sons, but the mother is not so; and since her 
propinquity is consequently greatest, it is 
fit that she should take the estate in the 
first instance, conformably with the text as 
to the nearest Sapinda the inheritance belongs";
and observed that the reason given in the above-cited passage 
shows that a step-mother is not included in the word "mother".
40. (1864) W.R. (Sp. NO.) 173 (F.B.).
Strange, in M s  book on Hindu law page 144, 
refers to this paragraph, as an authority in support of 
the text "step-mothers, when they exist are excluded". !‘^
.Iso other passages of the Hitakshara preferring grandmothers 
to grandfathers for succession to the properties of grandsons 
show that step-grandmothers could not be included. For the 
above reasons, their Lordshix^s held that a step-mother 
cannot take by inheritance from her step-son.
41. See also hacnaghten's Note, 1 Select Cases, page 39? 
ITote (a), id, 42 note (a).
Adoptive mother succeeds to adopted son in preference to 
other co-wives
Conversely the adoptive mother and her relations
42
are entitled to inherit to the adopted son. In Annapurni
42
v ?QPbes it was held that a junior wife who took part in
the adoption by her husband at his selection, inherits
impartible family estate upon the death of the adopted son,
in preference to a co-wife hho was senior in marriage, but
had not been conjoined in the adoption. In this connection
their Lordships referred to the only reported decision involving
the proposition in question viz. Kasheeshuree Debia v Greesh
Chunder^  where the Court had held that on the death of a
son adopted by a Hindu as the son of one of his two wives,
the property descends, not to the other wife, but to the next
4 3
legal heir. Their Lordships in Kashishuree ’ s case referred
to a passage from Colebrooke's Hindu law Vol. Ill, p. 100 with
reference to the use of the singular Janani to denote natural
and matarah the plural of matri to denote step-mothers...
"Vachaspati Liisra expands ’on failure of him’, 
on the death of the father, 'natural mother 
(janani) she who has a son, mothers (matarah) 
step-mothers who have no male issue1: all these
shall have equal shares with the sons".
But this text, observed their Lordships did not apply to the
present case i.e., the father did adopt a son for 11T1 only
and therefore the boy is her adopted son and on her death,
his property would go by Hindu law, not to a step mother but
to the next legal heir such as a nephew is here. Similarly
42. Annapurni Nachiar v Lorbes (1899) 26 I.A. 246; (1900) 
I.L.R. 23 Mad. 1 affg. (1895) I.L.R. 18 Mad. 277; 
Anandi v Hari Suba (1909) 33 Bom. 404; Basappa v Guru- 
lingawa (1933) 57 Bom. 74.
43. Jan-July [18643 T7.R. (Sup. Vol.), 71*
// tfOQ
the passage's from Strange's Hindu Law (Vol. I, p. 87) and
Macnaghten (Vol. II, p. 62) did not assist the appellant's
case. As to the two cases cited viz., S.D.A. Select Reports
(Vol. II, p. 27, LV Aug. 1812) rules not (touching this case)
that the adopted son of a widow.succeeds to her peculiar
property and the case of S.D.A. (Rep. 30 July 1059) rules
that relatives of adoptive mother inherit property of her
adoptive son just as they would have succeeded to the natural
horn son. But in this case, observed their Lordships, it was
not the adoptive mother but the second wife that was the
i±2appellant. Hext their Lordships in Annapurni v fforbes 
referred to the texts of Manu and Ba.udhayana to the effect 
that all wives share the good effects of the son of one v/ife 
and observed that these texts were not applicable to the 
present case otherwise the natural mother and the co-wife 
would stand on an equal footing which is not the case. Their 
Lordships referred to Sir V. Macnaghten, who, when dealing 
with the case says the law is silent on the point but holds 
that the three widows being one and the same individual, the 
adopted son necessarily holds the same relation to them all, 
but, observe their Lordships, he does not Show by what process 
he arrived at the conclusion and later makes statements 
difficult to reconcile with this view i.e., he says, in case 
the husband had specified the widow to make the adoption, the 
case would be different. He further cites the opinion of a 
Pundit that only one widow can adopt.
The child becomes the child of all the three. . The 
widow adopting is called the mother and the others the step­
mothers. Their Lordships next refer to Vest & Buhler's Hindu 
Law 3rd edition 1181,. 1182 and _G,C. .Sarkar. on - 'Adoption'- - - -
(Tagore law Lectures for 1888'p. 155) who after referring to
the Bengal decision of 1864- (i.e. Kasheeshuree Debia v Greesh 
4-5Chunder  ^do not show any dissatisfaction with that decision 
hut on the contrary state the law in accordance with it.
Llanu's text (IX, 18$) declares that if of several 
wives one brings forth a male child, all shall by means of 
him be mothers of male issue and in the preceding sloka that 
if among several brothers of whole blood one have a son born 
they are all made fathers of a male child by means of that 
son. Their Lordships observe that these texts probably mean 
that all take the spiritual benefits of male issue but the law 
is clear that for the purpose of inheritance the natural 
mother and father respectively are preferred. If a man can' 
authorise one of the several widows after death, their Lord­
ships observe that it would be capricious to deny him the power 
during his lifetime. Apart from the one judicial decision in 
favour of the point there is so much reason and opinion in
its favour and so little against it. I think the judgment
4-2m  Annapurni v Forbes is very well reasoned out and I am 
inclined to agree with the opinion expressed by their Lordships 
in the case. As observed by their Lordships wven in the case 
of succession tothe natural son's property and vice versa the 
natural mother is preferred to the step-mother and similar 
should be the position with respect to succession to the 
adoptive son's property and vice versa. Also, as pointed out 
by their Lordships, Manu's text (IX, 18$) to the effect that 
if one of the wives has a male issue all the other wives shall 
by means of him be mothers of male issue, is to be explained 
with reference to the preceding sloka i.e., that if among
£-0 2_
several brothers one has a male issue, they all are made
fathers by means of such issue. As correctly observed by
42their Lordships in Annapurni v Forbes these texts of Manu 
mean that tiey share the spiritual benefits of having a male 
issue but for the purposes of inheritance the ordinary law 
of inheritance will apply.
The 'Adoptive Mother1 in case of plurality of wives
So long as a Hindu adopts while he has but one wife 
living there is no problem, but what if he adopts having more 
than one wife living, with one wife living and one dead; with 
one wife dead or with more than one wife dead? What if he 
adopts before he marries? In all of these cases will any one 
be the adoptive mother and if so who? Or will all the wives 
be adoptive mothers for the purpose of succession. Mr. K.V.V.L.
i\.) I
LTarasimhachari in his article "Adoptive mother", arrives at 
the last mentioned conclusion. He argues that Apararka, 
Brihaspati and Sumantu hold the view that the son of a co-wife 
is the only competent person to perform the funeral rites of 
all the wives of the father and says that such a son will not 
do so unless he gets their property. So, says Mr. Narasimhachari 
they must be deemed to be mothers not only for spiritual 
purposes but also for temporal purposes of succession. The 
author of Suddhiviveka gives the rights of performing the 
funeral ceremonies of the wives to the husband even when there 
is a Sapatniputra. According to Narasimhachari.this is not 
tenable. Katyayana also denies the right of the father to 
perform the obsequies of the wives when there is a co-wife's
44. [19333 2 L.T.L.J. (Journal .section): 23-to -27.
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son. From these texts Mr. Narasimhachari concludes that the 
balance of authority is in favour of the right of the co-wife’s 
son to perform the obsequies and not of the father and says 
that all this points to one conclusion that all the wives of 
the father are to be deemed the mothers of the adoptee not 
only for spiritual purposes but also for temporal purposes of 
succession. Let the natural-born son have only one maternal 
grandfather, but adoption is a fiction and a fiction is 
elastic and it cannot be equated to rigid reality, opines Mr. 
Farsimhachari and asks ’what prevents an adopted son from 
having more than one mother and thus more than one maternal 
grandfather'? He says that the answer, viz., difficulties in 
the law of inheritance is not convincing. Adoptions have been 
set aside years after their alleged performance. Father's 
alienations have been challenged by minor sons many years 
after their occurrence. In the meantime the properties might 
have changed hands. He further comments that even though these 
cause difficulties, what if? Legal principles must be followed 
to their logical end, the invincible logic of the law bears 
down deverything. Referring next to the text of Sumantu 
"All the wives of the father are mothers (matarah)”, he opines 
that this text is applicable only to the case of an adopted 
son. It is inapplicable to the case of an Aurasa son whose 
mother is a fait accompli. He says that Sastric injunction 
is significant only in so far as it lays down something new.
In the case of a natural son, the mother is known. No new 
information is required, hence this text is inapplicable to 
such a case. In the case of an adopted son, the mother is 
to be found. The text says that all the wives of the father 
are mothers. Hence the above text applies to this,case. . . . .
Narsimbachari further says that the in this text the terms
'Fitr' and 'Matr' are used, and not the terms 'Janaka' and
’Janani'. In the Sanskrit language, comments Narsimbachari,
the terms Pitp and Matr have wider import than the terms
Janaka and Janani. Since an adopted son cannot have a natural
mother (Janani), but only an adoptive mother (Matr), Sumantu,
says Narasimhachari, has used the term Matarah. 'Thus the
term Janani (or the mother that has given birth to) is
significantly absent here and the term nfataral} is advisedly
used'. The author also refers to Vaidikasarvabhauma's
Dasanirnaya wherein he also advances a similar argument while
discussing the question whether the adopted boy can legally
marry a girl of his stepmother's natural father's gotra and
concludes that he cannot, because the general term Matr is
used even there and not the term Janani, which is of restricted
import. Narasimhachari therefore concludes that the textual
law points to one conclusion that all the wives of the father
are to be deemed the mothers of the adopted boy for spiritual
as well as temporal purposes.
The textual authorities are, however, silent on the
point. The Dattaka Mimamsa contains two passages bearing on
the subject but these passages are not of much assistance in
the solution of this problem. At I , 22 a text of the Dattaka
Mimamsa reads
"... for in consequence of the superiority of 
the husband, by his mere act of adoption, the 
filiation of the adopted, as son of the wife, 
is complete in the same manner as her property 
in any other thing accepted by the husband".
Further at VI, 50 another text of the Dattaka Mimeansa reads
"In the case of substitute sons commencing with 
the dattaka their maternal grandfathers are 
merely the fathers of their respective adopting
mothers since the reasoning which applied in 
relation to the father applies also in regard 
to maternal grandfathers".
Thus it would be appear from a perusal!of these texts that
when a married man adopts, the adoptee becomes a member of
the adopter's wife's family also. But Nandapandita is silent
on the point when the adopter has many wives or is unmarried
at the time of adoption. Also a text of the Dattaka Chandrika
III, 17 is of no direct assistance on the point. The text
states that the dattaka gives Pindas to his adoptive father
and mother "The completely adopted dattaka gives pindas only
to the father, and sor. on, of his adopting father".
I do not agree with tie view of Mr. Narasimhachari
that in the case of adoption by a Hindu having more than one
wife, living or dead, all the wives will be adoptive mothers
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for the purpose of succession. At p./; . above I have given
the reasons why the adoptive mother should be preferred to
the step mothers for succession to the property of the adopted
son and vice versa. .The same reasoning would apply to the
question under discussion and only one wife can be the adoptive
mother, the others being merely step-mothers. As in the case
of several brothers, if one has a son, they all are made
fathers by means of such issue (Manu IX, 182), the same appears
to be the intention of Ivlanu IX, 183 that if one of the wives
has a male issue the other wives also become mothers of male
4-2issue. As rightly, observed in Annapurni v Forbes these texts 
of Manu only mean that they share the spiritual benefits of 
having a son and are deemed mothers only for spiritual 
purposes and not for temporal purposes of succession. The 
argument of Mr. Narasimhachari that whilst the natural son 
can have only one mother, this should not prevent an adoptive
son from having more than one mother, since adoption is a 
fiction, is unconvincing and a falacious argument. For even 
according to the S^stric law the adoptive son has no superior 
rights than the natural son. Besides it would be inequitable 
if the adopted son were allowed to succeed to maternal rela­
tions through all the step-mothers when the natural son 
cannot. Even on equitable grounds the adopted son's position 
should be the same, if not inferior to the natural son.
Adopted son entitled to succeed to relations of deceased wife 
of the adoptive father:
12In Sundaramma v Venkata, it was held that the 
adopted son of a Hindu whose only wife had died before the 
adoption becomes the son of that wife so as to inherit as 
such to the relations in her father's family. There is no 
authority for the view that to be an adoptive mother, she 
should have actively participated in the adoption by actually 
receiving the boy in adoption. A s to the principles which
govern adoption under Hindu law their Lordships referred to
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the case of Uma Sunker v Kali Komul wherein Hitter J. observed
"The theory of adoption depends upon the principle 
of complete severance of the child adopted from 
the family in which he is born both in respect 
to the paternal and maternal line, and his complete 
substitution into the adopter's family as if he 
were born in it".
This theory was upheld by the Privy Council in Nagindas v
Bachoo^
The theory is that the adopted son by a legal
4-5. (1883.) I.L.R. 6 Cal. 250.
46. '(1916) I.L.R. 40 Bom. 270, 279 (P.C.)*
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fiction becomes natural son of adoptive father and presumably
also of his wife and that the question is not complicated by
the existence of two or more wives. Their Lordships in
Sundaramma1s case^ also referred to Narasimha v Parthasarathy^
wherein their Lordships of the Privy Council observed
"Only one wife can receive the child in adoption 
so as to step into the position of being its 
adoptive mother",
and again
"to hold that a child could bear such a relation­
ship to more than one mother would be entirely 
contrary to settled lav/".
A Hindu son has to offer oblations not only to the father's
ancestors but also to his mother's ancestors and it would be
straining the legal fiction of adoption too far to hold that
the boy need have no mother at all, though the case of a
bachelor adopting would be an exceptional case. In the case
of co-wives, the wife who Joins in adoption was held to be
the adoptive mother in preference to the senior wife, which
view was upheld by the Privy Council in Annapurni Hachiar v
ZlQ
Porbes. J Wherever possible a mother should be found for the 
boy and the fact that such a mother died before the adoption 
can be no obstacle in view of the fictitious character of the 
v/hole principle of adoption. Their Lordships next referred 
to the contention that even if the adoptive father's wife is 
alive she does not become the adoptive mother unless she 
actively participates in the adoption by receiving the adopted 
boy and observed that this contention was based onthe literal
47- (1914) I.L.R. 37 Mad., 199 at 220 (P.C.).
4-8. Annapurni Nachiar v Collector of Tinnevelly (1895) I.L.R.
18 Mad. 277.
49- '(1900) I'.L.R. , '23 Mad. » 1.........................
meaning of the word 1Prathigrahiya1 meaning literally
’receiving1 and it was contended that unless she actually
received the hoy she did not become the adoptive mother.
Their Lordships observed that it was well settled that a
Iiindu could adopt without the consent of his wife or even
against her consent and in either case the adoption was valid.
Dattaka Mimamsa (I, 22) reads
"In consequence of the superiority of the husband 
by his mere act of adoption, the affiliation of 
the adoptee, as son of the wife, is complete 
in the same manner as her property in any other 
thing accepted by the husband".
In this text there was no qualification of the words ’son of
the wife'. As to the contention that it only means a son in
a tertiary sense as laid down by Sarkar Sastri in his comments
on adoption (at p. 227) i.e. not really a son for any purpose,
12their Lordships in Sundaramma v Venkata observed that apart 
from the comment of Sarkar Sastri there appears to be no 
authority for the proposition that the wife does not become 
the adoptive mother unless she actually received the boy.
Their Lordships further observed that only in very rare cases 
doest the wife receive the boy and that if this view were 
accepted the adopted son would have no mother at all. The 
text of the Dattaka Mimamsa was an authority to the contrary. 
Their Lordships referred to the article of Sir Bhashyam 
Ayyangar J . in 9 Madras Law Journal 231 wherein the learned 
author had accepted this position. If therefore the wife 
becomes the adoptive mother whether she takes part in the 
ceremony or not there can be little difficulty in pressing 
the fiction further so as to include the deceased wife of 
the adoptive father. The whole theory being a fiction, their 
Lordships observed that the impossibility of a woman becoming
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a mother after death must be explained away by the fictitious 
nature of adoption. As her consent was not necessary, the 
fact that consent cannot be obtained after her death was 
immaterial. Sarkar Sastri interprets PratyahTtryamatHa at 
(page 4-19E) of his Tagore law lectures on adoption^ But it 
should be observed that although the husband’s son is deemed 
by courtesy to be the wife’s son, yet acceptance by the wife 
is absolutely necessary to constitute the husband’s adoptee 
her legal son". At p. 200 para. 4- he expresses a contrary 
view "When the adopter is a widower, it might be said that 
his deceased wife’s ancestors will be maternal ancestors of 
the adopted son".
I am inclined to agree with the view that if a 
Hindu adopts a son, the adopted son also becomes the son of 
his deceased wife so as to inherit to the relations in her 
father’s family. Although the Smritis are silent on this 
point, under the Hindu law the identity of the wife with the 
husband for all spiritual purposes is recognised. Also as 
the adoptee loses all rights in his natural family, on equitable 
grounds, he must be given similar rights in the adoptive 
family. Por he becomes a permanent member of his adoptive 
family as in the case of a natural son and continues the line 
of his adoptive father. His relationships in the natural 
family are completely replaced by corresponding new relation­
ships which are acquired in the adoptive family. “What he 
loses in the natural family, he must, on equitable grounds 
be compensated for in his adoptive family. I therefore 
support the view that the adopted son is entitled to succeed 
to maternal relations (including relations of the deceased
wife of a Hindu adopting a son) in the adoptive family.
hiving wife preferred as the adoptive mother to the deceased 
wife
In Thirumaleshwara Bhatta v Kashimutt Ganapayya^
their Lordships pointed out that it cannot he said that a
Hindu has a right to name a non-existent deceased wife in
preference to the existing living wife as the mother of the
hoy adopted by him, so as to entitle him to succeed to the
estate of such predeceased wife's father. In this case the
lower Court's decision that the adoptive father had no right
to name a non-existent wife as the mother of the adopted boy
in preference to a living one was attacked by counsel for
Thirumaleshwar Bhatta on two lines ... the first line rested
51upon the decision that a bachelor could adopt; that a widower 
52could adopt and that a man with plurality of wives could
adopt even in opposition to their wishes and thus foist a
55son upon one or more of them. ^ The conclusion was that the
husband may adopt to suit himself and filiate the son adopted
as he chooses. The second line rested upon the already
54propounded rule in Sounthara Pandian v Periaveru^ that a 
deceased wife may be an adoptive mother, on the rule in
50 [1952] 2 M.L.J. 716.
I.L.R.
51. Gopal Anant v Harayan Ganesh (1888)/12 Bom. 529, see 
also Nagappa v Subba Sastri (1865) 2 M.H.C.R. 567.
52. Hagappa v Subba Sastri (1865) 2 M.H.C.R. 5675 and 
Sundaramma v Venkata subba Ayyar (1926) 51 M.L.J. 54-5;
I.L.R., 49 Mad. 941.
55* Annapurni Hachiar v Collector of Tinnevelly (1895) 
I.L.R. 18 Mad. 277 and Annapurni Hachiar v Forbes 
(1899) L.R. 26 I.A. 246; I.L.R. 23 Mad. 1 (P.C.).
54. (1953) 65 M.L.J. 58: I.L.R,. 56 Mad. 759, (F.B.).
53Annapurni Eachiar1 s cases^ that if there are two or more
living wives the wife associated in the adoption is the
adoptive mother, that if several wives are jointly authorised
by the husband to adopt it is the senior wife as dharmapatni
55that is the adoptive mother^ and that if the two wives are
severally authorised the junior may adopt even if the senior 
56
wife refuses. From these cases the deduction was that the
husband might freely nominate, if he chose, the adoptive
mother. Their Lordships were unable to accept the above
contentions for the following reasons. Firstly, their
Lordships observed that the correctness of Sountharapandian*s 
54-case had been doubted by very eminent jurists and in fact
was the subject matter of a reference to a full bench in
A.S. No. 85 of 1947 hy Govinda Menon and Basheer Ahmed Sayeed
J.J. This matter could not be disposed of by a full bench as
tlie parties compromised. The reference was based on Uayne' s
57Hindu Law 10th edition pages 258 and 259*
The decision was also criticised by Sir M. Venkata- 
57subba Rao. To adopt the words of Lord Truro in Egerton v
CO
Brownlow, uttered in another context, the fiction of
adoption constitutes "a very unruly horse and when once you
get astride of it you never know where it will carry you”.
59The caution enjoined in Subramanian v Somasundaram J that 
TIeven a fiction cannot be carried to illogical limits” was
55* Tiruvengalem .....•••. 1 v Butchayya (1927) 55 M.L.J. 757; 
I.L.R. 52 Mad. 373.
56. Mondakini v Adinath (1890) I.L.R. 18 Cal. 69.
57* Referred to in Sivakami1s case subsequently on pagefSo*
58. [18533 4 H.L.C. 1: 10 E.R. 359-
59. (I936) I.L.R. -59 Mad. 1064- at 1078.
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too wholesome to be ignored. Their Lordships in Thirumalesh- 
50 ’
wara1s case observed that text writers like those of Dattaka
Mimamsa should not be taken literally and verbally because in
Dattaka Mimamsa, for instance where it is stated about the
wife of the adopter becoming the mother of the adopted boy
independently of her volition, the writer was only thinking
of matters spiritual and in terms of perpetuation of the
sacred fire, Shradha etc. ’Otherwise if we do not keep in
mind this limitation’, observe their Lordships, ’there would
be a complete perversion of the laws of inheritance'. In a
series of cases it has now been held by the Courts that more
than one wife of the adopter cannot become the mother of the
boy for purposes of succession. Under Shastras the theory of
maternity arising in case of all wives of a person was based
upon the spiritual aspect, observed their Lordships. As to
the suggestion that both the deceased and the living wives
might be mothers, relying upon the text of Llanu^ Mall the
wives of one man are mothers of sons if one of them has a
son", Ramaswami J., saw this text and all. references to it in
this context as merely referable to spiritual matters, per-
/
petuation of the holy fires, Sraddha and so on. Commenting
61on the remarks of Ramaswami J., Derrett remarks that the 
observation (as to perversion of the laws of inheritance ebc.) 
is much too strong, because the result would be no more absurd 
than that which then (1955) prevailed in the case of the 
dvyamushyayana son, who undoubtedly inherited from two mothers
60. Manu (IX, 183).
61. ’Hindu law: Adoptive Mothers: Another difficult problem
for the Supreme Court” by J.D.M. Derrett C1955] S.C.J.
(J) 217. . .............................
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and two lines of maternal ancestors. In fact there is no
absence of authority for the position of multiple affiliation
of the dattaka on the maternal sides.
"The real objection to Thirumaleswara Bhatt's 
succeeding to £he relations of a deceased wife 
of his adoptive father was not that the claim 
of that deceased wife to be a mother was merely 
a spiritual claim unconnected with secular matters, 
but that there was no power in the father to 
connect a deceased wife with the adoption for 
any direct purpose, whether he were married 
or unmarried at the time of adoption",
observes Frof. ^erret^1 (at p. 227)•
VJhen the question came up for decision before the
Andhra Pradesh High Court in Kancheti Ramakrishnayya v
63Mandadi Narsayya it was held that it was the right of a 
father to take a boy in adoption. The mother may be associated 
with him in the ceremony but her consent was immaterial and 
according to Sastras no particular place is designated or 
rites prescribed to her in the ceremony of adoption. If the 
adoption therefore was to the husband and the husband himself 
took the boy in adoption during his life-time no question of 
relating back could conceivably arise. The application of the 
principle of the converse case, namely, the fiction of a 
posthumous son in the case of an adoption by a widow after 
the death of her husband, to a case of adoption by the father 
himself was incongruous, and would lead to many anomalies.
VThere a husband died and later his widow took a boy in 
adoption, fictionally it approximated to the case of a boy 
conceived during the husband's life-time but born subsequently.
62. v/ooma Daee v Gokoolanund (1877) L.R. 5 I.A. 4-0: I.L.R.
3 Cal. 587i also Nilmadub Boss v Bishamber Loss (1869)
13 M.I.A. 85; Vehan v Shib (1904) I.L.R. 26 All. 472.
63- C1954-3 2 M.L.J. (Andhra) 53: 1956 An W.R. 1120.
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If the process was reversed, it would not only lead to grave
anomalies hut also to unnatural results. The hushand cannot
even fictionally give hirth to a child conceived by the wife
during her life-time. This was carrying the fiction to an
illogical extent. It would also lead to the position of
having two dates for adoption. For succession to the estate
of the father, the date of adoption would be the actual date
of adoption by the father and for purppses of succession to
the estate of the mother the date of her death. The more
powerful reason for rejecting the contention was that the
6 zl
Supreme Court in Shrinivas v Narayan in so many terms laid 
down the limits of the fiction and it was not permissible to 
extend it. The date of the adoption unlike the case of an 
adoption by the mother after the death of her husband was the 
actual date when the adoption took place. In that view the 
adoption of the Plaintiff did not divest the estate of II.A. 
which devolved on the first defendant on the date of death 
of V.
On the further question when a person after the 
death of his two wives took a boy in adoption, which wife 
would be the adoptive mother of the adopted son and whether both 
of them could be considered as adoptive mothers and whether by 
the rule as to preference of seniority as between the wives 
the eldest wife or dharmapatni would be the adoptive mother, 
their Lordships held that it was undoubted right of the 
husband to take a boy in adoption though the son adopted 
became the son of the mother. But the husband could select 
one or other of his wives irrespective of any question of
64, [1954-] 1 M.L.J. 630 (S.C.).
seniority and give her the status of an adoptive mother. 'This 
could he done during his lifetime expressly or by necessary 
implication. By associating the selected wife with him during 
the adoption ceremony he can show his preference to her. So 
too he can authorise one or the other of his wives to take a 
boy in adoption after his life-time. If he gave power to 
adopt to all his widows, the dharmapatni or eldest of the 
widows would be designated by the Courts as the adoptive mother 
on the ground that it must have been the presumed intention 
of the deceased.
Preferential treatment was not based upon the fact 
that junior wives cannot exercise religious acts along with 
the husband but on the fact that the eldest of wives has 
preferential right to perform the said acts. Their Lordships 
noted that the eldest of the surviving widows may not be the 
eldest of the wives for it was conceivable that eldest of the 
wives might have died either before the death of the husband 
or before the date of adoption. It was therefore apparent 
that the rule of preference based on seniority and the senior 
wife's superior right to take part in religious duties could 
obviously apply only to widows or wives who were alive. Tdien 
there was competition between two or more wives or two or 
more widows, the eldest of them is preferred not on the ground 
that she is the first wife but on the ground that she is the 
eldest of competing wives. All the wives are partners and are 
eligible to take part in religious duties along with the 
husband but the eldest is preferred to others. The arbitrary 
rule of preferring dharmapatni or eldest wife irrespective of 
the fact whether she is alive or not is not supported by Sastras.
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It may be mentioned here that Uanu advocates mutual
fidelity between the husband and wife unto death and in V,
168 says that after the wife’s death, having performed her
funeral rites, he may again marry and again light the nuptial
fire. There was no basis for the argument, that the first wife
though dead, being dharmapatni had a preferential right to be
the mother of the adoptive boy in competition between her and
the surviving wife. The rule of preference cannot be applied
to wives, some of them dead and some of them alive or to
deceased wives.
Whatever might be said in the case of two wives when
the eldest dies, the second wife gets into her place and during
her life-time discharges her religious obligations. Their
63Lordships in Kancheti Ramakrishnayaya v LI. Narsayya observed 
that no question of preferential right to perform religious 
obligation would arise after the death of the first wife.
When therefore a father had not expressed his intention of 
nominating one or the other of the dead wives, the presumed 
intention was to treat the second wife as mother of the adopted 
son.
Quoting extracts from the judgment in Subramaniam v 
65Muthiah Chettiar (wherein Madhavan Hair J. was quoted in
12Sundaramma v Venkata Subba Ayyar) their Lordships observed
"It would be seen from the above extracts from 
the judgment's of the two learned judges that 
the only question they considered was whether 
the deceased wife of a person would be the mother 
of the adopted son. After having decided that 
she would be, the learned judges took it for 
granted that the adoption would relate back to 
the date of the death of the wife. They did not 
appreciate the distinction between the two
63. [19453 2 Ii.L.J. 337.
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classes of cases, namely, adoption by a wife 
to her husband after his death and adoption
by the husband after the death of his wife”.
0/L
In Shrinivas v Narayan the Supreme Court had
restated the principle that adoption by the widow relates
back to the husband's death but it. did not divest the estate
of a collateral which had devolved by inheritance prior to
his adoption. Their Lordships also referred to the learned
by Mr. Venkataraman 
article in [1948] 2 M.L.J. 17 (J) ,/the subject of the article
being the preferential right of one of the wives to take part
in religious duties along with her husband. In this article
the learned author after considering the texts of Yajnavalkya,
Katyayana, Vishnu and others summarises as follows:
M£$) Every wife married in the approved form 
is ceremonially competent and can take part in 
acts of dharma;
(ii) When there are many wives of the same class, 
other things being equal) the senior wife has 
precedence and is to be associated in acts of 
religion;
(iii) khere such a wife is dead or becomes dis­
qualified, the next senior wife should be selected, 
and
(iv) These rules regulate precedence as between 
living wives".
It would thus be seen, observed their Lordships in K . Rama-
63krishnayya v M. Narsayya that there is no basis for the 
arguments that the first wife, though dead, being a dharmapatni 
has a preferential right to be mother of the adopted boy in 
competition between her and the surviving wives. T&is rule 
cannot be applied to wives some of them dead and some of them 
alive or to deceased wives.
I am completely in agreement with the view of their 
Lordships that the living wife of the adopter is to be 
preferred as the adoptive mother to his deceased wife. This
: t-'X
view is not only sound and equitable but is clearly supported 
by the various texts of Yajnavalkya, Katyayana and Vishnu 
which are summarised at p. lf-17 above.
Modern case law on adoption by a widower and by a man haying 
several wives
Dees 1 relation back* apply to estate of deceased wife of adopter
A perusal of the earlier cases reveals a conflict
between Madras and Andhra decisions as to whether an adoption
by a widower will have the effect of making the dattaka an
heir to the deceased wife as from the time of her death, so
that estates that had vested in the meantime on account of her
having died without a son will be divested accordingly. Madras
had admitted and Andhra had denied this, but after a full
bench decision by the Madras High Court in Sivagami Achi v
66Somasundaram Chettian, Madras also, does not admit this now.
12In Sundaramma v Venkatasubba Ayyar (see p. 4;06
et seq. above) a division bench, of the Madras High Court held
that a deceased wife of the father could be the adoptive
mother. Their Lordships referred to the observation of the
Privy Council in Harasirnha v Parthasarathy^  (see page
above) and Madhavan Hair J. said (at p. 951)
"To give full effect to tie fiction of adoption 
and to assimilate the fact to an imitation of 
nature the adopted boy should have a mother...
The theory of a 'receiving mother'^7 being 
discarded, I cannot find any difficulty in
holding that the wife of the adoptive father
though she was dead at the time of adoption can 
be considered as the adoptive mother".
66. [1956] 1 M.L.J.R. 441 (F.B.); A.I.E. [1956] Mad. 523 
F.B.
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Phillips J. said (at p. 94-4)
"Wherever possible, therefore a mother should 
be found for the boy and the fact that such a 
mother died before the adoption can be no obstacle 
in view of the fictitious character of the whole 
principle, of adoption" .
0Q
According to Derrett the judges were influenced 
y
by the text of Saunaka that a dattaka should be a reflection
of an Aurasa son, ignoring the fact that the text has been
utilised by commentators only for determining which relations
of the adoptive father are incapable of being adopted. Thus
the decision, says Prof. Derrett, wasjon principle, an
innovation and unsupported by authority.
The decision was approved by a Pull Bench of the
Madras High Court in the case of Sounthara Pandian Ayyangar
69v Periaveru Thevan wherein it was laid down that the adopted 
son of a Hindu whose only wife died before adoption could 
inherit as a son of that wife from her relations in her 
father's family. Their Lordships observed that it was not 
disputed that a bachelor could adopt or that a Hindu could 
adopt without associating his.wife. But the argument put forth 
was that when a bachelor adopts, the adopted son loses rights 
in both the natural father's and natural mother's family and 
obtains only in the adoptive father's family and asked why any 
surprise should be expressed for want of an adoptive mother 
when the adoption was made by a widower. Purther in the case 
ofaa person having a number of wives but adopting in conjunction
67. Pratigrahit-rma Mat a’ ... mother who received boy into her 
hands - accoraing to the judge means in general sense 
"adoptive" (also see pp. above) .
68. "Hindu Lav/: Adoptive Mothers: Another difficult problem
for the Supreme Court" by 3J.D.M. Derrett [19553 June 
S.C.J. (J) 217. ............ .................................
69. (1955) I.L.R. 56 Mad. 759 (P.B.).
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with, one of them, it has been decided that only that particular
wife was the adoptive mother, the other wives being only step- 
70mothers. Ramesan J. (p. 7^5) exphasised that the dattaka
should be as complete ’as possible substitute for Aurasa son'
and ’if there is no difficulty in pointing to an adoptive
mother, one ought to do so unless specifically contradicted
by the Sastra'. According to Derrett there is no authority
for holding the dead wife as adoptive mother, the problem as
the Sastra leaves it is that one or all the living wives are
the adoptive mothers. The strongest argument advanced by the
appellant's counsel was based on the expression "Pratigrahitqiya-
Mat^aT" literally "receiving mother" used in Dattaka Mimamsa
VI, 50 and Dattaka Chandrika III, 17. D.M. VI, 50 (Setlur’s
translation ) reads as follows
"The forefathers of the (prathigrahitriya matKa) 
adoptive mother only are also the maternal grand- 
sires of sons given and the rest, for the rule 
regarding the paternal is equally applicable to 
the maternal grandsires (of adopted son)".
The text of Dattaka Chandrika III, 17 is as follows
"But the absolutely adopted son presents oblations 
to the father and the other ancestors of prathi­
grahitriya matha (literally receiving mother) 
only".
69Their Lordships in Sounthara Pandian’s case y observed that 
it was nowhere laid down that the wife of the adopter should 
actually receive the boy in order to validate the adoption, 
and that the Dattaka Lum'sims'a I, 22 clearly states that the 
adoption is complete by the very act of adoption by the 
husband
"If the case stands thus, then, the assent of
70. Annapurni ITachiar v Forbes (1899) I.L.R. 25 Mad. 1 (P.C.).
, I
the wife is requisite for the husband also; for 
the purpose would be the same. This, if alleged, 
is wrong, for in consequence of the superiority 
of the husband, by his mere act of adoption, 
the filiation of the adopted as the son of the 
wife is complete, in the same manner as her 
property in any other thing accepted by the 
husband”.
Their Lordships further observed that Mayne's Hindu Law, Sec.
150 mentioned texts of Vasistha, j^aunaka and Baudhayana
containing rituals of adoption according to which when an
adoption is made by the husband, it is not necessary, to give ■
validity to the adoption, that his wife or any of his wives
should be present or should take part in the adoption. In
fact, their Lordships maintain, the ^attaka Mimamsa I , 22
would seem to make the matter absolutely clear that the husband
could adopt without associating his wife with him in the act
or even against her will. If that be so the meaning to be
attached to 1 prathigrahitriya Mat^a' in D.M. VI, 50 and D.C.
Ill, 17 is not its literal meaning of 'receiving mother',
but 'adoptive mother', and that this would be made clear when,
even with reference to an adoption made by a widow to her
—  71
husband, the husband is spoken of as prathigrahit^u. It 
may be noted that the Dattaka Mimamsa does not permit adoption 
by a widow but similar expressions used in the ^attaka 
Chandrika which permits adoption by a widow, wherein the 
husband to whom the adoption is made is called Pratigrahitru. 
According to their Lordships the word Pratigrahitriya matha 
seemed only to mean "adoptive mother" and not a woman who 
actually received the boy. Their Lordships observed that no 
doubt Sarkar Sastri in his book on adoption seems to support
71. Dattaka Mimamsa VI, 49 •
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the view put forward by the learned advocate General, two
72 73other author's Bhattacharyya and Dr. Gooroodass Banerjee
hold the opposite view.
42The Privy Council decision in Annapurni's case,
observed their Lordships, supports the Respondent's contention,
wherein Best J. says (at p. 281)
"The rule enunciated in Dattaka Mimamsa VI, 50 
and Dattaka Chandrika III, 17 to the effect that 
the forefather's of the adoptive mother only 
are also the maternal grandsires of the sons 
given differentiates between the adoptive and 
natural mothers and not between an adoptive 
mother who actually joins in the ceremony of 
adoption and her co-wives".
Also Shepherd J. had observed
"It is only consistent with this theory (of 
adoption) that the wife of the adoptive father, 
if there happens to be one should also be deemed 
the mother of the boy".74
54Ramesam J.'s dictum in Sounthara Fandian's case 
"For is there any need to rely on any theory of the adoption 
relating back to Kothai Animal's lifetime", proceeds upon a 
misconception, according to Mayne. For the legal fiction of 
maternity, there must be a wife in existence at the time of 
the adoption to whom the lav; can point, as the mother. For 
the adoption is to the husband and not to her. According to
_ _ r p c
Mayne, the passage IV Dattaka Mimamsa I, 22 is conclusive
72. Bhattacharya's Hindu Law 2nd edition p. 151 (5rd edn., 
Vol. I, p. 557)•
marriage.
75• & • Banerjee: Hindu Law of / . and Stridhana at p. 571
of 5rd edition.
74. Annapurni Nachiar v Collector of Tinnevelly (1895) I.L.R.
18 Mad. 2^7, 23*7.
75* See also Vppk£vtaramanjs article "Theories of Maternal 
affiliation in adoption" in [1948] 2 M.L.J. (Journal 
section) 17. See page also.
ito show that the acquirer of the property in the son must he
a living person. T,There a man has two wives and associates
one of them in the adoption of a son, that wife is the
adoptive mother, the other being only the step-mother.
76In Kashishuree Lebia v Greesh Chunder' where the
wife so selected was the second wife of the adopter and the
adoptive mother died before the adopted son, it was held that
on his death, the eldest widow was not his heir as mother,
being only a step-mother and that the succession went to a
nephew of the husband. This decision was approved by the
Judicial Committee on an appeal from Madras. Their Lordships
of the Frivy Council observed that a man may authorise a
single one of several wives to adopt after his death so that
she would on adoption stand in the place of the natural mother.
’If he can do that, it wrould be very capricious to deny him
the power of selecting a single wife to Join with him in his
lifetime in adopting a boy, with the same effect on her
77relations with that boy.
70
In Tiruvengalem v Butchayya the Madras High Court 
held that where a Hindu died leaving two widows to both of 
whom he gave a Joint authority to adopt, an adoption made by 
them Jointly is not invalid, though the son adopted would in 
law be the son only of the senior widow who alone has the 
preferential right to adopt, the Junior widow being considered 
only as his step-mother. Their Lordships referred to a text
76. Jan.-July [1864] H.R. (Sup. Vol.), 71*
77* Annapurni Hachiar v Forbes (1900) 26 I.A. 246, 255,
23 Mad. 1, 9 affg. (1895) 18 Mad. 277-




of Eatyayana where the first and senior wife is said to be 
the fharma pathni i.e. a wife wed for purposes of performing 
religious rites and duties and the second and succeeding 
wives are spoken of as merely for the purpose of love or lust. 
Again, the Chapter treating of vivaha-saraskara, it is stated 
in the commentary that after the sacrificial fire is created 
along with one wife the wives afterwards taken do not acquire 
equal rights with the first wife in respect of oblations 
unless both the wives together again officiate in creating a 
new sacrificial fire. Their Lordships remarked that in the 
Shastras are to be found scattered about many texts which give 
prominence to and recognised the superiority of the first wife 
or the Dharmapathni. There is also a well established rule 
that when the husband dies sonless, the funeral ceremony 
should be performed only by the first and senior wife. Again, 
as in the making of Dattahomam, only one person can at a time 
perform the Homam, it cannot be performed by both or on behalf 
of both simultaneously. Hence also it is deducible that, 
though both may be present and participate in the performance 
of the Homam, it is shastrically performed only by the senior 
and deemed to have been performed only by her.
So also the Allahabad High Court has held in Raj a Ham 
79v Joti Prasad that where an authority is given to each of 
two wives primarily to adopt with the consent of the.other, 
and secondarily if that consent was not received, to adopt 
even against the m i l  of the other, and where the actual 
adoption was carried out by only one wife, and the other was 
present and approved of it, but did not take the same part in
79- I.L.R. [19433 All. 747.
Ithe ceremony as the other, the authority was not invalid.
vThere a man makes an adoption independently of both
his wives, though the Madras High Court refused to consider
80the question as not likely to happen it would seem that the
senior wife would be regarded as the adoptive mother, '.'/here
a man adopts a son in conjunction with both his wives, the
81senior wife would in lav; be the adoptive mother.
81ln Yamnabai v Jamunabai both the widows were 
present at the ceremony and it was found that the senior widow 
had taken part in the ceremony of adoption but the junior 
widow was not excluded, the Nagpur High Court held the former 
to be the adoptive mother. It has been held that whether the 
adoption takes place during the husband's lifetime or after
his death only one wife can be deemed to be the adoptive
82 83 mother, and in Venkatanarasimba v Parthasarthy their
Lordships of the Privy Council observed that "to hold that more
than one wife can receive a child in adoption would have an
effect which their Lordships state, would produce inextricable
confusion in the lav; of inheritance"........
Y/ith reference to the interpretation put by the
-—
judges in Sounthara Pandian1s case of 'pratigrahitri' as
68'adoptive' in general sense, Prof. Derrett remarks that 
the word distinctly conveys the idea of actual or constructive
80. Annapurni Nachiar v Collector of Tinnevelly (1895) I.L.R.
18 Mad., 277, 287•
• Yamnabai v Jamunabai (1929) I.L.R. Nag. 211.
82. Yamnabai v Jamunabai (1929) Nag. 211, Venkatanarasimba
v Parthasarthy (1914) I.L.R. 37 Had. 199? 23 I.C. 166; 
(15137 L.R7TI I.A. 51.
83. Venkatanarasimba v Parthasarthy (1914) I.L.R. 37 Mad. 
1997 23 I -C. 166; [I913TL'.R. 41 I .A., 5.1  ..............
f
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acceptance although the wife may benefit spiritually through 
Pindas offered by the Dattaka which is an entirely different 
matter. For spiritual benefit taken by the husband from any 
source is shared by his wife whether living or dead.
The Hindu law of Inheritance (Amendment) Act 1929 
when it declares that a sister’s son shall not include a son 
adopted by the sister’s husband after her death (Sec. 2 Proviso) 
seems to proceed on the view that where a man adopts a son 
after his wife’s death, the son adopted would on principle 
not to be her adopted son, ao as to disturb the course of 
devolution of property from ancestors or collaterals.
On
In Subramanian Chettiar v Muthiah Chettiar it was 
held that an adoption by a Hindu widower was valid and the 
adoption took effect as if the son had been adopted in the 
life-time of the deceased wife of the adoptive father. The 
adopted son divested all intermediate estates which had vested 
before his adoption subsequent to the death of the adoptive 
mother either by inheritance or by the application as in the 
present case of the custom of reverter to her parents family 
of stridhanam property of a Hattukkottai Chetti woman dying 
childless. An alleged custom that the reverter would exclude 
a son adopted after tfae death of the woman was not established 
in the case. Their Lordships referred to various cases
o c
including Sankaralingam v Veluchame wherein it was pointed 
out that it was a rule of Hindu law that the adoption dated 
back to the date of death of the father, that there was no 
reason why an adopted son should be placed in an inferior
84. C1945] 2 M.L.J. 537; I.L.R.. [19453 Mad. 658. 
85* [19433 I.L.R. Madras 5095 330 (F.B.).
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position to that of the posthumous son, and that such an 
adoption would divest an estate of inheritance already vested*
Q C
Their lordships also referred to Anant v* Shankar wherein
the judicial committee following the decision in Amarendra v 
87
San a tan Singh held that a subsequent adoption would vest 
the property in the adopted son displacing any title based 
merely on inheritance from the last surviving coparcener.
It was contended that the fiction that adoption should be 
considered to have taken place in the lifetime of the adoptive 
father should be confined to only adoptions by a Hindu widow 
after her husband's death and not to cases of adoption by a 
widower so as to make the adopted son the son of his deceased 
wife. Their Lordships observed that it was true that there 
were no authorities on this point, but that was no reason why 
this distinction should be made. Adoption itself was a fiction
and fictions play a large part in the law of adoption. Their
88Lordships referred to Sundaramma v. Venkatasubba Ayyar where 
Phillips J. made the observation quoted at p. 419 above. 
Madhavan Hair J. in the: same case observed at p. 951s
"As his adoption puts the adopted son in the 
place of a legitimate son as regards the rights 
of inheritance in the family of the adopter he 
must be considered to be the heir to any rights 
arising after the adoption from his father's 
wife's position in his adoptive family, though
86. [l943j 2 M.L.J. 599 (P.O.).
87 (1933) I.L.R. 12 Patna 642 (P.O.).
88. (1926) 51 M.L.J. 545: (1926) I.L.R. 49 Mad. 941.
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she was not alive at the time of the adoption.
To Sive full effect to the fiction of adoption 
and to assimilate the fact to an imitation of 
nature the adopted hoy, should have a mother.
I do not think it is impossible to conceive the 
deceased wife as the fictional mother of the 
adopted child”.
Yiew that the deceased wife cannot be the adoptive mother
89In Sivagami-Achi v Somasundaram a full bench of 
the Madras High Court held that an adoption by a widower 
could not make his deceased wife, even by fiction, the mother
69of the adopted boy, thus over-ruling Sountharapandian1 s case.  ^
Their Lordships of the Madras High Court observed that
according to Hindu law in the case of an adoption by a widow
there was no doubt that the adopted son should be deemed to 
have come into existence on the death of the husband. But 
where the adoption was by a widower such an act would take 
effect only from the date of the adoption. Their Lordships 
observed that an adoption was admittedly to the husband for 
the salvation of his soul and not to the wife and there was 
no reason or principle why it should date back to an earlier
date such as the death of his wife. Where a widower adopts,
the adopted boy can have no maternal relations as nothing of 
the deceased wife survives in her husband and the fiction of 
an adoptive mother was a misnomer. Further the Hindu law texts 
on the subject contemplated only a living wife who could be 
deemed to be, by a fiction, the adoptive mother of the boy 
adopted by her husband when she was alive, whether or not she 
consented to the adoption. For the legal fiction of maternity 
there must be a wife in existence at the time of the adoption
89. C1956] 1 M.L.J.R. 441 (F.B.).
to whom the law can point as the mother. According to their
Lordships the term 'Pratigrahitri Ya Mat#a' in S . VI, 50 of
Dattaka Mimamsa’, -means a ’receiving mother1, and not ’adoptive
mother’. The term adoptive mother must be taken.'in its
primary meaning of the mother who accepts a boy in adoption
and not in the figurative sense of the adopter's wife, when
the adoption is made by a widower. A person can be the mother
of the adoptee boy when she is in existence as a wife at the
date of the adoption whether or not she consents to it and
the term ’Prat^igrahitri Ya Mat^ia' , observed their Lordships,
would refer only to a living wife and not a predeceased wife.
Their Lordships remarked that the decision in Sounthrapandian's 
69case  ^was not correct. . An adoption by a widower could not 
therefore make his deceased wife, even by a fiction the mother 
of the adopted boy. Affiliation of an adopted son to a dead 
wife, remarked their Lordships, has never ^een in the contem­
plation of any of the authoritative text writers, and the 
reasoning that a mother should somehow be found for the 
adopted boy was unsound.
Their Lordships also observed that it was not open 
to a widower whose two wives already died to adopt a boy and 
nominate or designate the deceased second wife as the adoptive 
mother. For can such an adopted son divest the heirs of his 
'adoptive mother' who have already succeeded to the estate 
before his adoption took place, of her share of the property.
Their Lordships doubted the correctness of the decision in
65 84Pam Krishnayya v ITarsayya ■" and Subramaniam v Muthiah Chettair
as re not correctly decided. During the course of his judgment 
Ramaswami J., referred to the view in Mayne's Hindu Law (10th 
edition p. 258 and 259) where Ivlayne refers to Dattaka Mimamsa,
’In consequence of the superiority of the husband, by his
mere act of adoption, the filiation of the adopted as son of
the wife is complete in the same manner as her property, in
any other thing accepted by the husband’, and observed that
this passage was conclusive to shov/ that the acquirer of the
property in the son must be a living person and that the
Dattaka Mimamsa contemplates a living wife and not a dead one.
His Lordship also referred to the opinion of two eminent jurists
viz. Late Mr. S. Srinivas Ayyangar and Sir M. Venkatasubba Rao
69who were of the opinion that Sountharapandian* s case y was not
correctly decided. Sir M. Venkatasubba Bao, a retired judge
of the Madras High Court reviewing Mayne's Hindu Law 10th
edition observed as follows.
MBy way of refreshing contrast, the criticism 
of the full bench decision in Sountharapandian 
Ayyangar v Periaveru Thevan,^9 is liberal in 
outlook. That the adopted son of a widower 
becomes the son of his deceased wife is a rule 
that outrages both reason and natural feeling.
To suppose that the deceased wife is alive or 
to relate back the adoption to the moment of 
her death, as the editor rightly points out, 
is to impose a fiction upon a fiction. The 
absurdity of invoking the fiction of the.maternity 
in the case of a bachelor who first adopts and 
then marries is patent”.
One of the important reasons for doubting the correctness of
69Sountharapandiyan1 s case, ' observed tHis' Lordship,-was the 
interpretation placed on the term 'Pratigrahitri-^a Matjia" 
which, if construed as receiving mother would entail serious 
reconsideration of the conclusion in the decision. In this 
connection his Lordship referred to the views of G-.S. Sastri 
(expressed in his book on Hindu law 5th edition IV, page’.-170) 
and of the learned advocate Mr. V.V. Srinivas Ayyangar  ^
according to whom, even if a person has only one wife living, 
his taking in adoption without her participation in the actual
' f 3/
act of receiving will not constitute her the adoptive mother. 
The case was referred to the full bench for decision on the 
following points: (1) Was the decision in Sountharapandian' s
6Q
case correct. (2) If the answer to that question was in 
the affirmative, was it open to a widower whose two wives 
had already died to adopt a boy and nominate or designate 
the deceased second wife as the adoptive mother. (3) If the 
answer to the second question was also in the affirmative, 
can such an adopted son divest the heirs of his adoptive 
mother who had already succeeded to the wstate before his 
adoption took place, of her share of the property? In other
on
words was Subramaniam v Muthia Chettiar correctly decided?
The opinion of the full bench was delivered by 
Govind Menon J. His Lordship observed that in determining
69
the correctness or otherwise of Sountharapandian* s case,
the first thingto see was how far the basic texts of Hindu
Law on adoption by a widower had been founded have been
correctly interpreted. His Lordship quoted passages from
Dattaka Mimamsa 1 - 2 2  and VI - 49 and 30 and Dattaka Chandrika
III - 17 which is translated as follows:
"This being so, if now the question is raised 
whether inthis matter the husband is in need 
of the wife's permission, the answer is, no.
Lor, on account of the husband's superior impor­
tance by the very fact of his taking a boy in 
adoption, sonship in him (the boy) is achieved 
by the wife also, just as in any other thing 
taken by the husband, ownership is secured in 
the wife too. In the sense that he does obsequies
to the branch (line) of his own adoptive father
he is spoken of as swasaaka, adherer to his own 
branch (line). Because this is so it follows 
that he is to do obsequies only to his own 
adoptive father's line. Also because maternal 
ancestors of the adopted son means only the father, 
grandfather and so on of the adoptive mother 
because of the applicability of the rule about 
ancestors to the line of the mother also".
Lf- 32-
(
In the case of a person (as for a person) given 
away in adoption according to prescripts, there is the duty 
of offering oblations only to the manes of the receiving 
(adoptive) mother(s father and other ancestors". Their 
Lordships further observed thgt it was nowhere stated that 
there can be an adoption to a woman as the object of adoption 
was to save the soul of the father from the hell called 
’Put' 1, whilst in the case of a woman, if she conforms to 
the strict rules ordained by the Sastra and leads a true life, 
would enable her to attain heaven. As to the meaning of the 
expression ’PratJ&igrahithri-^a Mat^a’ their Lordships referred 
to various authorities on the subject Bhattacharyya1s Hindu 
Law Vol. I O ^ d  edition p. 357) and R.N. Sarkar’s Hindu law 
(8th edition Ch. IV, S. Ill, p. 205) wherein the learned 
author states that ’Prat^igrahithri^a Matl^a1 means the wife 
who accepts in adoption. So also Golap Chandra Sarkar in his 
Hindu Law of Adoption (2nd edition at p. 199) has not accepted 
the view that in case of adoption by a widower, the deceased 
wife's ancestors will be ancestors of the adopted son. Their 
Lordships also referred to Llayne’s Hindu Lav; (10th edition 
p. 258 and p. 259) £or the view that the Dattaka Mimamsa 
contemplates a living wife and not a dead one, and also the 
opinion of Sir Venkatasubba Rao, referred to above at page 595• 
to the same-effect. As to the meaning of the expression 
'Prat)iigrab^thr<riA Mat^a', their Lordships remarked that 
the literal meaning is receiving mother, but almost all the 
commentators and text writers have interpreted the expression 
to mean adoptive mother. Their Lordship observed that if 
seemed to them there was very little difficulty weven if the 
word was to be understood as adoptive mother. Reading Section
I, 22 and VI, 50 of Dattaka Mimamsa, it will be seen, remarked
their Lordships, that there was never in the contemplation of
the authors to bring in a deceased wife in the matter of
adoption by a widower. Further it’ is not necessary in the
case of a woman to have the fiction of an adopted son for her
salvation. Their Lordships referred to Annapurni ITachier v.
y/L
Collector of Tinnevelly, which was confirmed by the Judicial
77Committee in Annapurni Hachiar v Forbes wherein the meaning 
of I, 22 and VI, 50 in Dattaka Mimamsa and III, 17 in Dattaka 
Chandrika was considered. The view in these cases was that 
’Prathigrah k^thr'C?» translated as ’adoptive1 was intended to 
refer to a living wife and not to a deceased one. The Privy 
Council in Confirming the judgment of the High Court made no 
reference to the meaning attributed to the expression 
prathigrah^thr-c. but seemed to have taken for granted that 
it should apply only to a living or sentient being and not by 
fiction to one who is no more.
Their Lordships referred to an anonymous article 
(which seems to have been written by a very eminent lawyer
who later became judge of the Madras High Court) in [18993
9 M.L.J. of (J) portion. At p. 253 the following passage 
occurs
"The only rational principle is that though a 
son may be adopted, to a deceased male even long 
after his death by his widow under proper authority,
yet there is no such thing as an adoption to a
female either during her lifetime or after death.
She may become mother by fiction at the time of 
the adoption to her husband but no female could 
become the mother of a son adopted by or to her 
husband after her death nor could a female become 
the mother of a son adopted by her husband before 
her marriage. Ho wife could become the mother 
of a son adopted by or to her husband either 
subsequent to her death £r prior to her marriage 
and among the wives existing at the time of the 
■adoption only one of them could become his mother".
IVhile discussing the meaning of the expression 'Frathigrah^? th
r*L ' (at P* 234 in the above referred article in (1899) 9
M.L.J.) the adoptive mother is not referred to as wife of
the adoptive father but as the mother who receives the boy
in adoption and it is her ancestors only that form the.line
of maternal ancestry to the adopted son. Their Lordships
69observed that Ramesam J. in Sountharapandiyan* s case relied
upon the basic principle enunciated in Sundaramma v Venkata- 
1Psubba Ayyar ~ that every adopted son should have an adoptive 
father and an adoptive mother; that being the case if the 
adoptive father's wife is dead she should be deemed to be the 
adoptive mother, and thus translating 'prath^grah thr jc Ya 
hatha?' in Dattaka Mimamsa" Section 6, V, 50 as "adoptive 
mother". It may be observed, remarked their Lordshif>s, that 
in view of the context in which the word was used it might 
mean adoptive mother. But their Lordships opined that the 
learned judge had failed to note that the Dattaka Mimamsa 
nov/here contemplates any succession to the deceased wife of 
the adoptive father. The question for consideration was 
whether the adoption by a widower could have any such retro­
spective effect. Their Lordships observed that in the case 
of adoption by a widow there was no doubt that the adopted 
son should be deemed to have come into existence on the death 
of the husband, but where the adoption was by a widower it was 
now well settled that such an act would take effect only from
the date of the adoption. Further the decision in Veeranna v
90 91Sayamma and Herek Chand v Bijoy Chand were not taken note
90. (1929) 56 M.L.J. 4-01: I.L.R. 52 Mad. 398.
91. (1905) 2 C.L.J. 87.
of by the learned judge in the Full Bench case. Their Lord­
ships also observed that the reason that a mother should be 
somehow found for the adopted boy was unsound as iT) the case 
of adoption by a bachelor' who subsequently marries; if he 
marries more than one wife the question will be who is to be 
the adoptive mother. Their Lordships had no hesitation in 
holding that since the texts did not contemplate a deceased 
wife as a receiving mother either literally or by fiction the 
expression ’prathigrah^thr't Ya Matjia* could refer only to
a living wife.
: • op
In/Ramakrishnayya v Narsayyay the learned Chief
Justice Subba Rao of Andhra High Court on an examination of
the authorities was not inclined to agree with the correctness
6Qof the decision in bountharapandiant s case " and therefore he
held, following the decision of the Supreme Court in Shrinivas
v Narayan^  that there was no question of divesting succession
to collaterals. The other question decided by the learned
Chief Justice was who would be the adoptive mother of a boy
taken in adoption by a widowTer whose two wives had died before
the adoption and the opinion expressed was that the second wife
who was married after the death of the first wife should be
deemed to be the adoptive mother. In the case of Thirumale-
50shwara Bhatt v Ganpayya (discussed above at p.^/D), Chandra
Reddi and Ramaswami J.J. doubted the correctness of Sounthara-
pandian's case.69
Their Lordships, constituting the full bench of the
89Madras High Court in Sivafcami Achi v Somasundaram therefore
92. [1954] 2 M.L.J. (Andhra) 53* 
95* C1954] 1 M.L.J. 630 (S.C.).
£-36
arrived at the conclusion that their answer to the first
69question was that Sountharapandian' s case was not correctly 
decided and in view of that the answer to the second and 
third questions was negative also.
The position under the Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act 1936 
Section 14- of the Hindu Adoption^and Maintenance 
Act 1956 lays down the rules for determining who will be the 
adoptive mother in certain cases. If a Hindu having a wife 
living adopts a child, the wife will be deemed to be the 
adoptive mother, but where he has more than one wife and adopts 
the child with their consent, the senior wife will be the 
adoptive mother and others would be step-mothers. Where a 
widower or a bachelor adopts a child, any wife whom he sub­
sequently marries will be deemed to be the step-mother of the 
adopted child. Similarly where a widow or unmarried woman 
adopts a child any husband whom she subsequently marries will 
be deemed to be the step-father of the adopted child. The 
section is not exhaustive andpprovides for determination of 
adoptive mother and father only in certain cases. In view of 
Section 12 which lays down that the adopted child will be 
considered as child of his or her adoptive parents for all 
purposes and all the ties of the child in the family of his 
or her birth shall be deemed to be severed and replaced by 
those created by the adoption in the adoptive family, where
a widow adopts, her deceased husband would become the adoptive
94-father of the child.'' On the question where a widower adopts
94-. Sawan Ram v Kalav/anti, A.I.R. 196 7 S.C. 1761. Sitabai 
v Ram chandler A.I.R. 1970 S.C. 34-5.
whether
a child/his deceased wife would become the adoptive mother of
the child, as shown in the discussion above, in the earlier
adoption by a widower 
cases Madras had admitted and Andhra denied that/after the
death of the widower's wife will have the effect of making
the dattaka an heir to the deceased wife as from the time of
her death, so that estates that had vested in the meantime
on account of her having died without a son will be divested
accordingly. But now after the full bench decision in
8 QSivagami Achi v Somasundaaam the Madras view is in agreement 
with the Andhra view that adoption by a widov/er does not make 
his deceased wife the mother of the adopted boy.
On this controversial and difficult question the 
Smyitjjh are silent. One of the possible reasons may be that 
in the case of a man the Smritis clearly allow him to take 
to a new wife after the death of his former wife (Manu V,
168). But the question arises when the widower does not wish 
to marry again and adopts a son.
According to the Smritis the marriage tie is not 
terminated even on the death of the parties but as stated by 
Manu at V, 1^6, a faithful wife may dwell with her husband 
even after death. As Manu says "a woman is half her husband 
and completes him” (IX, 96). Manu (IX, 137) and Yajnavalkya 
(I, 78) lay down that for the continuity of the family in 
this world and the attainment of heaven in the next one must 
have sons, grandsons etc. (which presumably includes the 
adopted sons, grandsons etc.). These verses read with Manu 
V, 156 show the close affinity between the man, his wife 
(whether living or dead) and the son (natural or adopted).
In the case of an adoption by a widow/, on the 
question whether the adoption relates back to the death of
4-3?
r deceased husband, the Smritis are silent but the courts 
h we held on grounds on equity and Justice that such adoption 
does 'relate back' to the death of the deceased husband of 
ach widow for purposes of succession to his property. In 
view of the identity of the husband and wife under the Hindu 
1 . / there appears no reason why the deceased wife of a widower 
who does not remarry should not be regarded as the adoptive 
mother. But in such cases on equitable grounds, the adopted 
son should be entitled to succeed to the property of the 
deceased adoptive mother and her relatives as it stands on 
the date of his adoption ie; there appears to be no Justifica­
tion to extend the principle of relation bad: of such adopted 
so^  to the death of the deceased wife of the widower and the 
rights acquired by any persons between the date of such death 
and adoption should not be disturbed. If the right to succeed 
to his deceased adoptive mother and her relations is disallowed 
to the adopted son then on equitable grounds he should have the 
right to inherit to his natural mother and her relations which 
obviously the Hindu law does not sanction. Hence the only 
solution of this problem appears to be that he should be allowed 
rights of inheritance to his deceased adoptive mother and her 
relations, but subject to the condition that he takes the 
property as it stands at the date of his adoption.
In the case of adoption by divorced persons, the Act 
is silent. But the position would be the same as that regarding 
unmarried persons. As stated by Derrett the word 'unmarried' 
strictly includes 'divorced'.'^ So also the husband who has
95• Derrett: Introduction to Modern Hindu Law, p. 119
(1963 edition).
renounced the world or has been declared to be of unsound mind , 
will be considered to be the adoptive father when the wife exer­
cises the right to adopt a child. Where, however the husband has 
ceased to be a Hindu, the child will be entitled to be his heir, 
only if the new religion recognises an adopted child as heir. The 
Muslim law ^ o r  the Indian Succession Act^ applicable to Chris­
tians etc. do not recognise such an adopted child as heir. As to 
the position of a child adopted by a Hindu married under the Spe­
cial Marriage Act, devolution of whose estate would be governed by 
the provisions of the Indian Succession Act, 1925, although this 
Act is silent on the question of succession by adopted children, 
there seems no reason why, on equitable grounds, the adopted son 
should not be allowed to succeed and have the same rights as a na­
tural son, as provided under S.12 of the Hindu Adoption and Main­
tenance Act 1956.
English Law on the subject
The English law on the subject has already been discussed 
above in Chapter V. Section 16 (2) of the Adoption Act 1958 (cor­
responding to S.13 of the 1950 Act) clearly lays down that in any 
disposition of re§.l or personal property made whether by instru­
ment inter vivos or by will, any reference express or implied to 
the child or children of the adopter, shall be construed as, or 
as including, a reference to the adopted person and a reference 
to a person related to the adopted person in any degree shall be 
construed as a reference to the person who would be related to 
him iiL .that degree if he were the adopter's child born in law­
ful wedlock and not the child of any other person, unless the con­
trary intention appears. But as Section 17 points out it is
96. Muhammad Umar Khan v Muhammad Niaz-ud-din /1911/ 39 I.A.ig,
97. Makhin Tahn v Ma Ahma /1934/ R*72.
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necessary that in case of succession to the property of a woman
or her relatives the adoption should have been made by the
woman or she must have participated in a joint adoption with 
98her husband.
Also as would be seen from a perusal of the pro­
visions of S. 17, the law of inheritance also covers other 
relationships created by the adoption. For instance the will 
of a grandfather or uncle by adoption referring simply to 
"my grandchildren" or "my nephew and nieces" includes adopted
children. As already discussed in the various cases earlier
99e.g. in Re Gilpin, Hutchinson v Gilpin;yy Re Fletcher, Barclays 
Bank Ltd. v Ewing; in Re Marshall, Barclays Bank Ltd. v 
M a r s h a l l , i t  will be seen that the right of the adopted 
child to succeed inter vivos or by testamentary succession 
to the property of his adoptive mother's relations is recog­
nised by the English law provided the adoption was made by 
the woman either by herself or jointly with her husband.
However, unlike the Hindu law an adopted child will 
not be entitled to sicceed to the property of his adoptive 
father's wife or her relations if the latter did not participate 
jointly in the adoption made by her husband i.e. if the
98. As to adoption by two spouses see also S. 1(2) of Adoption
Act 1958 S 1(2) lays down "An adoption order may be
made on application of two spouses authorizing them 
jointly to adopt an infant; but an adoption order shall 
not in any other case be made authorizing more than one 
person to adopt an infant". S. 1(3) "An adoption order 
may be made authorizing the adoption of an infant by 
the mother or father of the infant, either alone or 
jointly with his or her spouse."
99. C1953] 2 All. E.R. 1218.
100. [ 194-9] 1 All. E.R. 732.
101. [19573 3 All. E.R. 172.
adoption was made by the husband alone even during the 
eriod of coverture. As such it follows that, again unlike 
the Hindu law, the question of a child adopted by a man 




THE RIGHT OF THE ADOPTIVE PARENTS TO DISPOSE CF THEIR 
PROPERTIES ANT THE VALIDITY OP ANTE-ADOPTION AGREEMENTS
■astric law and lav/ prior to Hindu Adoption? and Maintenance
Act 1955 ..... ~....
View that adoptions for payment of price were invalid
The question of an affiliation which does not auto­
matically give all the right of a natural-horn legitimate 
child is often evoked by adoptions which are parts of bargains, 
and we must look into the question of what bargains are valid 
and what effects valid bargains may have. Under the Hindu law 
a valid gift is one which is made by a person of sound mind 
and is not liable to resumption. And under this class the 
following seven kinds are included by Narada
"What is given as the price of goods sold or 
as remuneration (to an artizan or the like) or 
for the pleasure (of hearing bards, musicians 
or the like) or out of affection (to a daughter 
or son), or in return for a benefit, or for the 
purpose of the bride price or for the purpose 
of spiritual benefit".^
According to Mr. Sastri, a gift of a child, in return for any
benefit received from the adopter, therefore is not contrary
to Hindu law, and cannot be supposed to be equivalent to a
2 3 'sale. Kapur-' criticizes this view as incorrect and remakks
1. Narada - Smpiti, fourth topic of litigation, verse 8; 
Mitakshara on Yajnavalkya II, 176.
2. G.S. S^tri's Hindu law of adoption (1916 edn.), p. $75;
Murugappa v Nagappa (1906) I.L.R. 29 Mad. 161 relied on.
3. The law of Adoption in India and Burma: J.L. Kapur
p. 502 (1933 edition).
that such adoptions would he invalid because they would really 
be adoptions in the Krita form which are not allowed in the
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present age, the Kali Yuga.' According to Mr. Kapur the 
term gift as used in connection with a dattaka adaption is 
not the same as is signified by what is termed a 'valid gift1 
but it implies a relinquishment of a right without consider­
ation, and quotes the following passage from the Mitaks.hara~ 
in support of his point of view "Gift consists in the relin­
quishment (without consideration) of one's own right (in
5
property) and the creation of the right of another". This 
view is supported by a case reported as Eshan Kishore v Harish 
Chunder.° In this case it was held that the adoption of a son 
after payment of price is not recognised in the present (or 
Kali) Yuga, the only adoption now recognised being that of a 
dattaka or a son given. A contract as to such an adoption 
could not be enforced, for it would come within the meaning 
of Act IX of 1872, S. 23 as immoral and contrary to public 
policy. Their Lordships observed that in former days before 
the present Kali-Yuga, there were twelve descriptions of sons 
and the eighth description was the son adopted after payment 
of a price. Such an adoption is not recognised in the present 
Yuga, the Kali Yuga, the only adoption now recognised being 
that of the Dattak son or the son given who alone can take 
the place of the Aurasa son. The son given i.e. the dattaka 
sen is defined in the Dattaka Chandrik*a as follows "He is
4. Bshan v Harish (1874) 21 W.R. 381, 382.
5* Hit. Ill, Ss. 5, 8; 2 7;. Macnaghten 212 and 219? Mulla:
Hindu Law Ss 357-8 at pp. 421 and 424 (1932 Edition).
6. (1874) 21 ViT.R . 381, 382.
called a son given whom his father or mother affectionately
7
gives as a son, being alike”, alike being explained to mean, 
of the same class. Their Lordships observed that it could 
not be said, if the contract in the case were carriedout, that 
the boy had been affectionately given, as a gift implies an 
act without consideration. Their Lordships also thought that 
the principle of S. 23 of Act IX of 1872 (The Indian Contract 
Act) was applicable to this case, as this contract if it were 
capable of being carried on and were recognised by the Coprt 
would therefore involve an injury to the person and property 
of the adopted son; and again, such a contract, if permitted 
would defeat the provisions of Hindu Law and that is one of 
the restrictions laid down in S. 23 Act IX of 1872. In that 
section it is enacted that the consideration or object of an 
agreement is lawful, unless it is forbidden by law or is of 
such a nature that "if permitted it would defeat the provisions 
of any law”. It was very clear in this case observe their 
Lordships, that if the Court were to recognise a contract of 
this description, it would be defeating the provisions of 
Hindu law.
g
In Jogesh Chandra v Hrityakali Lebi where it was 
alleged that the boy who was to be adopted was really bought 
for Rs 700/- the view of the Calcutta High Court was that such 
a circumstance wou^d invalidate the adoption although they held
that he was not so bought.
9In Krishnayya v Raja of Fittapuram, Kumaraswami
7. Section 1, para. 12.
8 . (1903) I.L.R. 30 Cal. 965, 969*
9. (1928) I.L.R. 51 Mad. 893-
Sastri J., (delivering a dissenting judgment) observed that 
where an adoption is made by a widow both in fulfilment of 
her religious duties and also for getting a gain for herself, 
the adoption would be valid but the agreement for her personal 
benefit, if not within limits allowed by law, will be void.
A reversioner cannot withhold his consent from corrupt or 
improper motives. What he has to see is the interest of the 
family to which the adoption is made. The reversioner's 
refusal in this case being based on considerations of personal 
benefit was improper and could be ignored. However Odgers J. 
and Jackson J. giving the majority decision of the Court 
disagreed and setting aside the adoption held (i) that on 
the facts the agreement to execute the settlement and the 
maintenance deed was a condition precedent to tie making of the 
adoption. (2) that the motive of the widow in making the 
adoption was corrupt. (J) that the Flaintiff was entitled to 
refuse his consent on that ground and on the ground that she 
capriciously wanted to deprive him of his reversionary right. 
(4) that the Court could scan (a) whether the widow in making 
the adoption was actuated by proper or corrupt motives and 
(b) whether the reversioner's refusal to consent was proper 
or was based upon purely personal grounds. I am however 
inclined to agree with the dissenting judgment of Kumaraswami 
Sastri J. in view of the fact that by making the adoption the 
widow was serving the primary object of adoption viz. con­
ferring of spiritual as well as temporal benefits (in the form 
of continuation of family name etc.) on the family. The giving 
or receiving of a benefit is clearly a separable transaction, 
the invalidity of which should not affect the validity of 
the adoption itself.
Receipt of benefits by the widow do not raacler adoptions invalid
In the case of Vellanki v Venkata Rama‘S  their
lordships of the Privy Council observed as follows:
"Their lordships thought it would be very dangerous 
to introduce into the consideration of these cases 
of adoption nice questions as to the particular 
motives operating on the mind of the widow, and 
that all which this committee in a former case~-*- 
intended to lay down was, that there should be 
such proof of assent on the part of the Sapindas 
as should be sufficient to support' the inference 
that the adoption was made by the widow; not 
from capricious or corrupt motives, in order 
to defeat the interest of this or that Sapinda, 
hut upon a fair consideration by what may be 
called a family council, of the expediency of 
substituting an heir by adoption to the deceased
husband ... there seems to be every reason to
suppose that in the present case it must be
presumed that she acted from the proper motives 
which ought to actuate a Hindu female, and that, 
at all events, such presumption should be made 
until contrary is shown".
12In Iuahableshwar v Dungabai , with reference to 
the above mentioned observations of the Privy Council in
Vellanki v Venkata Rama, ^  their Lordships of the Bombay High
Court referred to Mayne’s opinion (Hindu Law PI. 116), wherein 
the learned author commenting on this passage thought that it 
was not quite clear whether their Lordships of the Privy 
Council were of the opinion that a widow’s motives in making 
an adoption, provided she has received the assent of the 
sapindas given bonafide to the adoption, are material. His 
view, however, is, that the Judicial Committee did not mean
to lay down that such evidence would, be material or admissible.
12To us, say their Lordships in Mahab1ehhwar v Durgabai, it
10. (1876) L.R. 4- I.A., 1.
11. I.e. the Ramnad case (1868) 12 Moo I.A. 397*
12. (1898) I.L.R. 22 Bom. 199-
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appears that their lordships feelings that how dangerous it 
would be to introduce into consideration of cases of adoption 
nice questions as to particular motives operating on the mind 
of the widow, have pointed out that the Ramnad case^ did not 
decide that such motives would be material and have not them­
selves expressed any opinion upon the question. Their guarded 
language at the end of the above quoted passage leaves the 
question absolutely open.
15In Vithoba v Bapu, which was a case of an undivided 
family, it was almost admitted that the widow's motives in 
adopting were malicious, but as she had without deceit obtained 
the consent of the head of the family to the adoption, the
adoption was upheld.
14Patel Vandravan v Patel Manilal was the case of a 
divided estate vested in the widow and where it was alleged 
that the widow's motives in making the adoption were corrupt 
and capricious. Sargent C.J. after referring to Ramnad case"^ 
and the later Privy Council case*^ and adopting Mayne1s view 
said
"Where however, the assent of Sapindas is not 
required, as in this Presidency where the family 
is divided, then there will be only the ordinary 
presumption that the widow has performed a duty 
from proper motives, and the onus lies heavily 
on him who seeks to set aside the adoption on 
the ground of corrupt motive".
The Judgment in Patel Vandravan v Patel Manilal^  establishes
that the fact of the motives being of a mixed character is not
sufficient to rebut the prdsumption. It appears also to be
clear that the widow's making terms for herself with the
13. (1891) I.L.R. 13 Bom. 110.
14. (1891) I.L.R. 13 Bom. 563.
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father of the hoy to he adopted or selecting a hoy whose
father will he likely to accede to her wishes is not sufficient
to render the adoption fraudulent or to establish that it has
heen made for a corrupt purpose or for a purpose foreign to
the real object of adoption as laid down in Ehasha Rahidat
v Indar Kunwar  ^and Chitko v Janaki. In Hahable shy/an v 
12Purgabai where a widow had adopted a son and it was found
by the Courts that unless she had heen assured by the father
and guardian of the adopted hoy that she would receive Rs 4-000,
she would not have adopted him, hut it was not found that she
had not the special benefit of her husband in view when she
made the adoption, it was held that the presumption that she
made the adoption from motives of duty was not rebutted, and
that the presumption should be allowed to prevail.
15In Bhasba Rabidat v Indar Kumwar the adoption was 
questioned on the ground that the,widow had agreed with the 
naturaljfather of the adopted son, that she should retain the 
whole estate during her life. Their Lordships of the Privy 
Council were of the opinion that this did not render the 
adoption conditional and did not affect the rights of the 
adopted son. Their Lordships stated that even if it amounted 
to a condition on which the adoption was made, the analogy, 
such as it was, presented by the equities relating to powers 
of appointment under Lnglish law, suggested that the condition
15* Bhasba Rabidat v Indar Kunwar (1889) I.L.R. 16 Cal. 556 
(F.C.) followed in Murugappa v ITagappa (1906) I.L.R.
29 Mad. 161; referred to in Mahabaleshwar v Lurgabai 
(1898) I.L.R. 22 Bom. 199; Challa feubbiah v Iattabhira-
mayya (1908) I.L.R. 51 had. 4-4-6.
16. (1874-) 11 Bom. H.C. Rep. 199*
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itself would have been void, without invalidating the adoption.
It was argued that the adoption was a fraud upon the authority
to adopt, and therefore void. This point seemed to their
lordships untenable. They remarked -
"The conduct of the senior widow is not altogether 
to be commended, but it would be extravagant to 
describe it as fraudulent, or to maintain that 
the adoption v/as not made for a correct purpose, 
or for a purpose foreign to the real object for 
which the authority to adopt was conferred ...
The ceremonies of adoption are unimpeached. The 
deed of adoption is open to no objection. The 
second deed is, admittedly inoperative. No 
conditions therefore were attached to the adoption. 
Had it been otherwise, the analogy such as it is, 
presented by the doctrines of Courts of Hquity 
in this country relating to the execution "of 
powers of appointment to which Mr. Arathoon 
appealed would rather suggest that, even in 
that case, the adoption would have been valid 
and the condition void".
15In Murugappa v Kagappa, the Madras High Court was
of the opinion that the transaction of giving and taking was
quite distinct from that of the agreement to pay. In this
case it was held that when a boy, being a fit subject for
adoption in the Dattaka form is given and accepted, with the
proper ceremonies for such adoption by persons respectively
competent to give and accept him, he acquires the status of
an adopted son. The receipt of money by the natural father
in consideration of giving his son and the payment of such by
the adoptive father, though illegal and opposed to public
policy, do not make the adoption invalid, as the gift and
acceptance of the boy was a distinct transaction clearly
separable from the illegal agreement and payment. Such
payment has not the effect of converting the adoption into
an 'affiliation by sale', a form now obsolete. The Frivy
15Council decision in Bhasba Rabidat Singh v Indar Kumwar 
was followed. Subramania Aiyar, offg. C.J. observed that the
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transaction of the gift and acceptance which effects the
change in the status of the son was clearly separable from
the agreement or payment which the law prohibits. In fact
the latter bears only on the motives of the party giving and
Vellanki v Venkata Rama^  and Mahab1eshwar v Durgabai
observed his lordship, were authorities against the question
of validity of an adoption being corplicated by enquiries
into the motives of the parties concerned. The view that
the payment in question would invalidate the adoption would
result in visiting with highly injurious consequences an
innocent third party, for persons given .in adoption are almost
invariably children incapable of protecting themselves in the
matter, and the liability to be given away, apart from their
wishes, in the exercise of parental authority recognised by
Hindu Law: And where disputes arise, as in this case, many
years after the child passes from one family to another, to
hold that the adoption itself is bad would subject him to
irreparable loss in respect of property and involve him in
other difficulties incidental to the ties he has formed as
a member of the adopter’s family. His Lordship observed that
it was abundantly clear that in communities to which the
parties belonged such payments form the rule and the contrary
the exception. And so long as these men continue to be moved
by the desire _fcr perpetuation of lineage by recourse to the
fiction of adoption, the payments will not cease and the
consequences of the stricter rule would only be that payments
would be made in secret. The view taken by the Judicial
15Committee in Bhasba Rabidat v Indar Kunwar in regard to an 
improper condition subject to which an adoption took place
was in favour of the conclusion that. the validity of the
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adoption was unaffected by the payment in question. It would 
thus seem that, even prior to the Hindu Adoptions and Mainten­
ance Act 195^ the rule was that conditional adoptions were 
valid on a consideration of the reasons discussed under the 
different cases above. I am inclined to agree with the view 
that the gift and acceptance of a boy is a transaction clearly 
distinct from the agreement of payment. It would be most 
inequitable to make innocent parties who are invariably 
children given in adoption by their parents to suffer on 
account of illegal payments given or received. The two trans­
actions are clearly separable from each other and the illegality 
of the payments do not make the adoption invalid.
Adoptions valid but illegal agreements for payment are invalid
17In Basava v Lingangattda it was held that the 
Plaintiff’s natural family having been a party to the deed 
of adoption which referred to the deed of gift executed along 
with it, the case fell under the category of conditional 
adoptions which are allowed by law. But agreements to adopt 
a son for consideration are opposed to public policy if they
IP
tend to a conflict of interests and duties of parties thereto
19and the promise to pay cannot be enforeed bn law.
Thus it has been held that agreements to pay money
l?. (1895) I.L.R. 19 Bom. 428.
18. Murugappa v ITagappa (1906) I.L.R. 29 Mad. 161, I63, 
Bshan Eishore v Harish Chandra (18<?4) 21 W.R. 581; see 
also Kalavagunta Venkata v Kalavagunta Lakshmi Nara.yana 
(1909) I.L.R. 32 Mad. CF.B.) 185; Devrayan v Iv'utturaman
(1914) I.L.R. 37 Mad. 393.
19. Murugappa v Nagappa (see under note 18); Narayan v
Gopalrao (1922; I.L.R. 46 Bom. 908.
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20 21 for adoption, - and to give annuity will be unenforceable
at law though the adoption itself will be valid. In Thuri
20othandarama v Thesu Reddiar it was held that an agreement
to pay a bribe to procure the adoption of a boy is one against
public policy and is therefore void. Spencer J. observed that
ISthe case of Devarayan Chetty v Mu t four am an Chetty was in
point. in his Lordship’s opinion it was rightly decided in
that case that the giving to a third party pecuniary interest
in a marriage taking place or, in other words "trafficking in
marriage" was opposed to public policy and was not a legal
consideration for a contract. This was in agreement with the
English law relating to marriage brocage contracts. Reading
18Kalavagunta Venkata v Kalavagunta Lakshmi Narayana and
18Murugappa v Nagapra ' his Lordship thought that no distinction 
could be made between contracts to make payments in consider­
ation of marriage and similar contracts in consideration of
18adoption. In Murugappa v ITagappa ° it was held that though
the adoption might be valid, the agreement for payment of
money was a separate transaction and illegal. His Lordship
observed that this was a transaction of a very different
nature from fair and reasonable dispositions in favour of the
22adoptive widow referred to in Visalakshi Ammal v Sivaramien.~
21In Narayan v Gopalrao it was held that the grant 
of an annuity in consideration of giving a boy in adoption 
was invalid, though the adoption was valid. Macleod C.J. 
observed that both the lower courts had found in this case
20. Thuri Rothandarama v Thesu Reddiar (1915) 26 I.e. 779*
21. Narayan v Gopal Rao (1922) I.L.R. 46 Bom. 908.
22. (1904) I.L.R. 27 Mad. 577 (F.B.).
that the promise to pay the annuity was the consideration 
for the agreement to give the boy in adoption. That would
be sufficient to invalidate the agreement and i'Hig Lordship,
he
observed that/need not consider the question whether the 
payment of the annuity, if there had been good consideration 
for it, could be enforced against the heirs of Ganpatrao.
.greements for the benefit of the adopted son are legally 
enforceable
27)In Purshottam v Rakhmabai a Hindu widow while 
adopting a boy stipulated with the natural father of the boy 
to have all the rights of management in her husband’s estate 
in herself till her death. It was held that the agreement 
was not binding upon the adopted boy inasmuch as it was not 
fair and reasonable. Where the adoptive father, by an express 
promise to settle his property upon the boy, induced the 
parents of the defendant to give him their son in adoption 
but died without having executed such settlement it was held 
that the equity to compel the heir and legal representative 
of the adoptive father specifically to perform his contract, 
survived, and the property in the hands of his widww was
bound by that contract. When the widow of the adoptive
father nearly 30 years after his death gave effect to his 
undertaking by executing a deed of gift of his property in
her hands in favour of the adopted son, it was held that such
alienation was valid as against the next heir by blood of 
the adoptive father, and he could not, on the death of the 
widow, avail himself of the plea of limitation which she had
23. (1914-) 23 i.e. 599.
waived.^ In Asita Kohun v Kirode Mohun^  it was held that 
an ante-adoption agreement executed by the adoptive father 
that if a son was afterwards born of his loins, the adopted 
son and the after born son shall share equally the estate 
of the adoptive father was binding on his heir and legal 
representative.
Ante-adoption agreements curtailing rights of the adoptee
Dispositions of property by the Dayabhaga father are valid 
against the subsequent adoptee
In cases from Bengal, where, under the Dayabhaga 
school a father has absolute powers of disposition of his 
property, it has been held that it was perfectly within the 
competency of the testator to give extra-ordinary powers to 
his widow. In Radhamonee v Jadubnarain ° the will of a 
testator authorised the widow to adopt a son and at the same 
time to retain entire control over all his property as 
"mistress" during her life-time, even to the disposing of 
some part of it by sale, and it was held that the adopted son 
was not competent to question the act of the widow quoad 
the solanama, and revive, during her life-time, a suit in 
which the Courts had fully recognised her competency to act 
as the legal representative of her husband.
So also in another case of the Sudder Dewani Adalat, 
in a suit to cancel deeds of lease and assignment by a widow,
24. Bhala v Parbhu (1878) I.L.R. 2 Bom. 67.
25. (1916) 36 I.C. 127; 20 C.W.N. 901.
26. S.D. of 1833 p. 139.
dismissed in affirmation of the judgment of the lower court,
it was held that as the widow was left "mistress" of the
property for life, the deeds could not he questioned in her 
27life-time.
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In Basantakumar v Ram Shankar" the Calcutta High
Court observed that though a Hindu testator's property may
have vested in his widow by will, that did not mean that
the adopted son, when he came to be adopted had only a spes
successionis and neither a vested nor a contingent interest.
Both under the Dayabhaga and Hitakshara schools of Hindu law,
the adoption of a son, by a widow, in whim her deceased
husband's estate had vested by bequest under a will, would
not divest her of the estate which she had obtained. It was
clear to their Lordships that, in respect of all schools of
Hindu lav;, when the disposition was by will and the adoption
was subsequently made by a widow, who had been given power
to adopt, no right of a son v/ho was subsequently adopted
could affect that portion, which was already carried away
29under the will (Krishnamarthi v IriLshnamurthi ' referred to) . 
Without creating, in favour of the adopted son, a charge on 
the income of the properties which remained vested in the 
widow, a testator can create a fixed right of future ownership 
in the properties in his favour. If a reversioner proposes 
to relinquish his interest in favour of the widow, her interest 
is not thereby enlarged, since the reversioner had nothing
27. Prosunnomoyee v Ramsoonder, 3.D. of 1859? P« 182, followed 
in Bep3.nl Benari v Brojonath (1882) 8 Cal. 357;  Bhupendr
v Amarendra (191*8) 4-3 I.A., 12; 4-3 Cal. 4-32.
28. (1932) I.L.R. 59 Cal. 859, 877.
29. (1927) I.L.R. 50 Mad. 508.
to relinquish. But the interest left by a will to a son to 
be adopted, such as in the present case, not being a mere 
spes successionis, as contemplated by S. 6(a) of the Transfer 
of Property Act, the deed of relinquishment by the adopted 
son in favour of the testator’s widow was h&ld to be operative 
both as a relinquishment and as creating an estoppel. Their 
Lordships observed that on reading the decisions on deeds of 
family settlements with care, it seemed that, if there was 
one i^rinciple -that flowed from all of them unmistakably, it 
was that the arrangement must be one concluded with the object 
of settling bona fide a dispute, arising out of conflicting 
claims to property which was either existing at the time or 
was likely to arise in the future. Even where a deed of 
settlement between a Hindu widow and her adoptive son was 
inoperative as a family arrangement binding upon the estate 
or upon persons who were not parties to it, the deed would 
bind the adopted son to the extant that he, for consideration 
which he received and presumably continued to receive under
it, created an absolute right in favour of that widow.
BOIn Bepin Behari v Bro.jo Nath a Hindu gave a power 
of adoption to his wife directing that so long as the wife 
should live she should remain in possession of all his 
properties, moveable and immoveable, ancestral as well as 
self-acquired, and it was held, following Bhapfbutti v Bholanath 
that the widow took a life interest in her deceased husband’s 
properties with remainder to the adopted son.
30. (1882) I.L.R. 8 Calcutta 557-
31. (1875) I.L.R. 1 Calc. 104.
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."itaksftiara father can dispose of impartible estate property
In cases governed by liitakshara law, under which a 
son obtains by birth a vested interest in his father's 
ancestral property, the powers of alienation of ancestral 
estate of a person who adopts a sen are curtailed as soon as 
an adoption is made except in cases of impartible property.
In Sarta.j Kuari v Deoraj Kuari, :;f~ in regard to a raj estate 
in Gorakhpur, by custom impartible and descending by primo­
geniture, the family being in other respects governed by 
T.’itakshara law, the Raja's alienatibn of part of that estate 
was alleged by his son to be invalid as against him. It was 
held that if there had been no custom of impartibility, the 
Raja's power over the estate would have been restricted by 
the law declared in Mitakshara Ch. 1, S. 1, V. 27, and the 
gift would have been void. But, there being the above custom, 
the question was how far the general law was superseded, and 
whether the right of the son to control the father's act in 
this respect was beyond the custom. It was held that in 
regard to impartible estate, the son's right at birth did not 
exist where there was no right on his part to partition, also 
the inalienability depended on custom or on the nature of 
the tenure. In this case the evidence did not establish that 
by custom the estate was inalienable.
In Sri Raja Venkat Surya v Court of l a r d s it was 
held (a) that in a Hindu adoption there is no implied contract 
with the natural father that in consideration of the gift of
32. Sartaj Euari v Deorajkuari (1888) 15 I.A., 51 (P.C.); 
1888 I.L.R. 10 Alld. 272; Sri Raja Venkat Surya v Court 
of .«'ards (1899) 26 I. I. 85~ (P.C.; ; Protap Chandra v
■Jagadish Chandra (1927) 54 I.A. 289 (P.C .).
his son, the adopter will not make a will (b) a gift by a
w i l l  to a persona designata is not vitiated by a description
o f him as aurasa son, even if shown to be false. (Panindra
Deb v Ra.jeswar Das'9  ^was distinguished). (c) An impartible
Zemindary is not inalienable by will or otherwise by virtue
only of its impartibility; and in the absence of proof of
some special family custom or tenure attaching to the Zemindary
32and having that effect, -r . Sartaj Euari1s case^ was followed
and held to be applicable to Zemindaries in the Presidency
34of adras. Also Beresf ord v Ramasubba was approved. Their 
lordships observed that by saying he had constituted the 
appellant heir to his property meant only that he had given 
him the same right of inheritance as a natural son would have. 
The argument that there was an implied contract not to make 
a will, the consideration of it being the giving of the son by 
the natural father was, observed their lordships, a novel one 
and without any authority to support it. If it were right, 
an adopted son would be in a higher position than a natural 
son and a Hindu would be unable to adopt a son without 
depriving himself of any power which he might have by law of 
alienating his propert3^, or at least of disposing of it by a 
will.
32So also in Protap Chandra v Jagadish Chandra it 
was held that the holder of an impartible Zemindari can 
alienate it by will although the family was undivided, unless 
a family custom precluding him from doing so was proved. The 
absence of any instance in which a previous holder had alienated
33- (1883) L.R . 12 Ind. A f. 72.
34. (1889) Ind. L.R . 13 Had. 197-
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the estate by will was not by itself sufficient evidence to
establish a custom. Sarta{j buari and Venkat Surya1 s cases
52 . 52were followed." The view adopted in Sartatj F.uan's casev
55v; ich altered v/hat was previously well established  ^was to
56a great extent based upon the Tipperah case"^  v/here the family 
was governed by the Dayabhaga, and on cases where the estate 
was separate property. The decisions of Judicial Committee 
mentioned above were not inconsistent with Baitjnath Ira sad 
v -;qi Bali Singh^  and earlier decisions which dealt with 
the right of succession to an impartible estate.
Bights of disposition ever self-acquired and ancestral property 
by Iiitakshara father
58In Iurshotam v Vasudev it was held that no
coparcenary is constituted between the adopter and the adopted
son in respect of former's self-acquired property, any more
than there would be between a man and his Aurasa son.
50
In lakshmi v Subramanya,  ^a Hindu on taking a son 
in adoption, executed a "settlement as to what should be 
done by my adopted son and my wife after my lifetime", 
provided that on an event, which happened, the wife should
35. See Abdul Aziz v Ap?ayasami iiaicker (1903) L.R. 31 I.A.
1, 9 and Ram Far a m  v Pertum Singh (1873) H  Bom. L.R.
397*
36. (1869) 12 boo. I.A. 523, (ITeelkisto Deb v Beerchunder Thakoor)
37- (1921) L.R. 48 I.A. 193.
38. (1871) 8 Bom. H.C.R. 196.
39• (1889) I.L.R. 12 T ad. 490 followed, in Narayariasami v
nasami (1891) I.I.R. 14 had. 172; Ganapathi Alyan v
(1 £ ' ? 7 >  i  L'R* 21  W clJL* J O *  n r  p i  v
Panliaiyalal (1927, I.L.a. 49 all. 573 discussed below.
S e e  0. 1 * 0  V  I n  ft. u p. K  V  (£• 0  v  I r\ <f*pr a. y
6  I .  H -C - f t -  C / t -C .J  2. 2. I f . .
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enjoy certain land for life in lieu of maintenance. In a suit 
by the widow of the executant against the adopted son for 
possession of the land, it was held, that the instrument was 
a will. Cn its appearing that the defendant’s natural father, 
when he gave him in adoption, tacitly submitted to the 
arrangement contained in it, it was held that the adopted son 
was bound b£ its provisions.
In Durgi v Kanhaiyalal. ' a childless Hindu, the 
owner of property which had come to him by partition with his 
adoptive father, made a will leaving everything to his wife. 
The will provided that "she should be the absolute owner of 
his entire estate, the adopted boy having no power of inter­
ference during her lifetime". The widow, in exercise of a 
power of adoption conferred on her by this will, adopted a 
son. Ihe deed of adoption stated that the adopted boy "shall 
be heir to the estate left by my husband and myself". At that 
date of adoption the widow was a minor and there were no 
indications of any intention on her part to divest herself 
of the estate. It was held that the will of the husband 
prevailed and the adopted son had no right to possession of 
the estate so long as his adoptive mother was alive. Their
Lordships followed the decision in Lakshmi v ^ubramanya^  and
59 59referred to Vinayah v Govindrav;"' Karayanasami v Hamasami,
C5 3  ^7 /1QGanapathi v *Javithri Ammal," Visalakshi v Sivaramien r and
Venkatanarasimba v Subba Rao.^~*~
59In Ganapathi Aiyan v Savithri Ammal, " Subramanian
Ayyar J. pointed out
40. (1904) I.L.R. 27 Lad. 577-
41. (1922) 1.1.R. 46 Had. 500.
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"Even if it be supposed that the rights of the 
adopted son to challenge a disposition of his 
father arise from the time of his father's death, 
his case cannot possibly be put on a higher 
footing than if he had been adopted at the moment 
of adoptive father's death. Even in that case 
the direction as to the allotment of the property 
to the Charity was an oral devise which became 
operative the moment the testator died and, as 
ex hypothesi, the adopted son's title to his 
adoptive father's estate accrued then and not 
earlier, it is difficult to see how on principle 
the defendant could be entitled to question the 
alienation. For, unlike the case where the 
adoption takes place before the will comes into 
force, the adopted son's right, according to 
the supposition, comes into existence simultane­
ously with the right of the charity. How then 
can the former derogate from the latter right?"
Zi-0In Visalakshi unmal v Sivaramien it was observed
"In cases of adoption after the death of the 
adoptive father by his widow under his authority, 
every lawful disposition of his property made 
by him, even by a will, would be binding on 
the adopted son, for the obvious reason that 
those dispositions became operative from the 
moment of the death of the testator, while the 
adoption must necessarily take place at some time 
subsequent to the death, and the rights accruing 
by virtue of such adoption are only in that part 
of the estate v/hich remains undisposed at the 
moment of the adoption".
This view was followed subsequently by the Madras High Court
in Venkatanarasimka v Subba Rao.^ The learned judges in
this case, while upholding the provisions of a will remarked
"The adoptedfcon could not, while approbating 
the provisions of the will under which his 
adoption was made, reprobate other provisions 
of the same will and repudiate the bequest to 
charity".
42In Balkrishna v Shri Uttar Narayan Bev a Hindu 
who was in possession of ancestral property, executed, when 
he took the defendant in adoption, a vyavasthapatra, with the 
consent of the natural father of the defendant whereby he
42. (1919) I.L.R. 43 Bom. 542.
directed payment of an annual sum for the purpose of lighting 
lamps in a specified temple. A dispute having arisen as to 
the validity of the grant it was held that the grant in favour 
of the temple was invalid as not having been recognised by 
custom to be appropriate at the time of the adoption or 
binding upon the adopted son in modification of the strict 
rules of Hindu law. Their Lordships observed that it would 
appear to have been established by several decisions i.e. 
Visalakshi v Sivaramien,^  etc. that agreements for reasonable 
provisions for widows ought to be upheld as valid according to 
general custom modifying the strict terms of Hindu law. But 
no authorities were quoted in favour of any other persons in 
such connection or in support of a general extension of the 
modifications so as to include, as claimed in the case, reser­
vations in favour of charities and religious endowments.
Their Lordships therefore declined to recognise the extension 
claimed and held that the grant in favour of the temple was 
invalid as not having been recognised by custom to be appro­
priate at the time of the adoption or binding upon the adopted
son in modification of strict rules of Hindu law.
4-3In Vinayak v Govindrav where a separated Hindu
made a will and subsequently adopted a son, the boy adopted
and his father being aware of the provisions of the will, in
which an adequate provision was made for the adopted son, it
was held that the subsequent adoption did not invalidate the
will. Couch C.J. observed
"It may well be that if the testator had disposed 
of his property without making sufficient pro­
vision for the son whom he was about to adopt,
4-3. (1869) 6 Bo d . H.C.R. (A.C.) 224-, 230.
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such a will would be revoked by the adoption" 
and cited a futwah of the Pundits in 6 M.I.A. at p. 320 to
the effect
"If the testator had really given his wife 
verbal instructions to adopt a son in the 
event of her not bearing male issue, her 
compliance with these instructions would of 
course invalidate the will according to the 
Hindu law, it being incompetent for the testator 
who authorised the adoption of a son to alienate 
the whole of his estate, and thereby injure the 
means of maintenance of his would-be heir".
Hayne disagrees with this view and remarks that a bequest will
be invalid, if of ancestral property but valid if of self-
acquired property. The position would also be different after
the Hindu Succession Act 1956 even with respect to the
testator's share in joint family property. For under Section
6 read with Sec. 30 of the Hindu Succession Act 1956 a Hindu
can dispose of his share, by will or otherwise, in ancestral
property. Expressing his opinion on the Fundits Futwah fquits
Couch
/C.J. observes that the view was quite consistent with the
principles of Hindu lav/ and that, under the circumstances
indicated, a Court would probably consider the will revoked
by an adaption, but in the present case the provisions of the
will may stand consistently with the adoption, for a provision
had been made in it for the maintenance of the son and that
provision was as ample and liberal as any person in the
testator's circumstances was bound to make.
4-4-In Ealgobind Prasad v Iilakuer the Patna High 
Court held that a widow holding the estate of her husband under 
his will as an absolute owner can maintain a suit for posses­
sion of a property appertaining thereto, even after adopting
44. (1945) I.I.H. 24- Pat. 717.
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a son under the authority conferred upon her by the said
will. Their Lordships relied on Krishnamurthi Ayyar v
Krishnamurthi Ayyar^^  quoting Lord Dunedin's dictum
"When a disposition is made inter vivos by one 
who has full power over property, under which 
a portion of that property is carried away, 
it is clear that no rights of a son who is sub­
sequently adopted can affect that portion which 
is disposed of. The same is true when the 
disposition is by will and the adoption is 
subsequently made by a widow who has been given
power to adopt. For the will speaks at the
death of the testator, and the property is 
carried away before the adoption takes place".
'-L'heir Lordships observed that grave injustice will be done if
after a son had been adopted many years after the death of
the testator, all alienations by the widow, assuming these
were for legal necessity, could be ignored by the adopted son.
Similarly where the adopted son comes into being as a result
of a will which gave the widow the power to adopt and the will
itself had made a disposition of the property of the testator,
it would be incongruous, observed their Lordships, to hold
that the will was good in one part and bad as to the other
part.
There is absolutely no doubt that even under the 
old Hindu law a father had a right to alienate his property
intern vivos or by will and his son, natural or adopted could
not challenge such alienations. As to alienations of joint 
family property by a sole-surviving co-parcener I have already 
expressed my opinion in Chapter VI at pages3^^-~^ 33°"^
distinguishing the case when the sole-surviving alienor is 
the father and when he is a person other than the father.
I have maintained, on reasons stated therein, that when the 
sole-surviving coparcener is the father he should have the 
right to alienate the property relying on Manu (VIII, 416
and IX, 104-) but not when he is a person other than the 
father. In the latter case, as long as the widow of a 
coparcener is alive there is always a possibility of her 
adopting a son to continue the line of her husband, for whom 
a share must be reserved, for as Yajnavalkya says (Ch. II, V, 
120) "The division among coparceners born of different fathers, 
is according to their fathers”.
iiienations by widow not for legal necessity not binding on 
the adoptee
As to the effect of alienations by the widow not 
for legal necessity, it was held in Antaji v Datta,ji~°; that 
the widow, not having higher powers than those of an ordinary 
Hindu widow who succeeds as heir to a sonless husband, could 
only make valid alienations for purposes warranted by lav;, 
is no legal necessity was shown in respect of the alienations 
in question in the case, which were made long after the disputes 
had commenced between her and her adopted son, they were not 
binding on him or on his alienee the Plaintifff who purchased 
the adopted son's rights.
In Vyasacharya v Venkubai a full bench of the 
bombay high Court held that a settlement of immovable property 
by an adopting widow in favour of her daughter to take effect 
upon the daughter attaining majority, assented to by the 
natural father of the adoptive boy at the time of the adoption,
4-5* (189b) I.L.l. 19 Horn. 36. It the adoption is made during 
the lifetime of the adoptive father, any instrument 
purporting to confer a life estate or other interest 
in the property requires registration: Firsab v G-urappa
(1914-) I.L.R. 38 Bom. 227-
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cannot be enforced by the daughter against the adopted son 
who repudiated it on attaining majority. ‘The intended gift 
was made to the sole reversioner. According to Beamon J., 
an adoption at once terminates the life estate and therefore 
all alienations merely co-ex±ensive with it. His lordship 
felt grave doubts as to whether the reasoning either in 
Chitko v Janaki10 or in Ravji v Lakshmibai^  was adequate 
to support the conclusions reached by the learned judges who 
decided those cases. Although their Lordships did appear to 
recognise that such agreements conditioning an adoption were 
not necessarily void, the furthest they could go was to say 
that the miner may ratify them on attaining majority. But 
this also implied he had the option of ratifying or not 
ratifying. Fallacy of the Plaintiff’s argument, observed 
their Lordships, in borrowing considerations from the
law of contract to use in the domain of status. ’Status, may 
of course be created by contract, but once created, v/e doubt 
whether its legal incidents, rights and obligations can be 
controlled, abrogated or restricted, by any term in the 
contract creating it.
I feel that the decision in this case was inequitable
(irrespective of the settlement) 
in so far as/the daughter's right to share in her father's
property was disallowed. As argued in my article in the All 
ilq
India Reporter ~ I think that the daughter should have been 
given a quarter or half share in the father's property, 
irrespective of the settlement, depending on whether the
47. (1387) I.L.R. 11 Bom. 381.
48. Please refer to the article "Unmarried daughter's rights 
in Father's property" by V.N. Capoor (1866) A.I.R. (J)
p p . 63 to 65.
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father’s wealth was considerable or inconsiderable according 
to the rules specifically laid down by the Smriti writers.
Agreements beyond allowing life-interest to widow held invalid
ZlQ
In Fremra.j v Rajbai, following Krishnamurthi v
hrishnamurthi, it was held that an agreement by the natural 
father of a minor boy, who is given in adoption in another 
family, which goes beyond allowing the adoptive widow to 
enjoy the property during her lifetime and curtails the full 
rights of the adoptee in the property which becomed his on 
adoption, is not valid in law. In this case an agreement was 
entered into between the natural father of the adopted boy and 
adoptive father which provided that during the life-time of 
the adoptive father and adoptive mother or either of them the 
adoptee was to provide for the maintenance of his aunt by 
adoption who had no legal claim against the property. It was 
held that the arrangement in the agreement went much beyond 
the disposition which was sanctioned by custom and curtailed 
the rights of the adoptive son in the property and that it 
was therefore not valid. The principle in such cases was 
stated by Farran J. to be that if the stipulations of an 
agreement contemporaneous with an adoption were unreasonable 
such as giving to the widow an absolube power of disposition 
over the property, they should be rejected as ultra vires of 
the father. If reasonable such as only to define and limit
51the son’s enjoyment of the property, they should be upheld."'
49. (1957) 59 Eom. I.E. 1069.
50. (1027) I.L.R. 50 Mad. 508 (P.O.).
51. Ravji v Iakshmibai (1887) I.L.R. 11 Bom. 581, 405;
Ionchanon v Binoy Krishna (1918) 44 1.0 * 558*
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In Panchanon v Einoy Krishna^  it was held that 
an ante-adoption agreement by an adoptive mother with the 
natural father of the adopted son, if it amounts only to a 
fair and reasonable arrangement for the enjoyment of her 
husband's property by the widow during her lifetime was valid 
and binding on the adopted son, especially where there was 
authority from the husband in that connection. It was also 
held that neither the adoptive mother nor the natural father 
of the adopted son had, however, any legal authority to impose 
a personal contract upon the minor adoptee and that such an 
agreement betv/een the adoptive mother and natural father was 
void unless ratified by the minor. In this case a Hindu widow 
before making an adoption made an agreement with the natural 
father of her prospective adoptive son that a certain monthly 
allowance was to be paid to her brother's son during his life­
time. It was held that the agreement being in restriction of 
the adoptive son's rights was not binding upon him.
Condition that the widow should enjoy the property during her 
life-time held valid
52As to conditional adoptions, in Chitko v Janaki, 
a Bombay case, a Hindu widow in whom had vested by inheritance 
the whole of her husband’s property, moveable and immoveable, 
agreed to accept a boy in adoption on an express agreement 
by his father that during her lifetime she should be entitled 
to such property, subject, however, to the boy's maintenance 
and education and upon the faith of such agreement adopted the 
boy, it appearing that she would not have done so at all if it
52. (1874) 11 Bom. H.C. 199 followed in Raviji v Lakshmibai 
(1887) I.I.R. 11 Bom. 581, #00.
had not been for such agreement. It was held that the 
agreement was binding upon the adopted son and that the son’s 
proprietary right was subject to the interest thereby created 
in favour of his adoptive mother. It was also held that under 
the Hindu law the power exercised by a father in giving his 
son in adoption was not only co-extensive with the power of a 
guardian, but was more like the power of an absolute proprietor.
In the leading case of Krishnamurthi Ayyar v 
53Irishnamurthi Ayyar their Lordships of the Frivy Council 
before summing up their own conclusions, reviewed the author­
ities in Bombay and Madras. Summing up the Bombay cases, 
their Lordships observed that as a question of actual decision, 
the Courts have always upheld the grant to the widow of her 
interest for life and that whether the stipulation had been 
made by the husband while still alive, or by herself, it being 
always the case that the agreement was anterior to or contem­
poraneous with the adoption itself and that the natural father 
concurred. But when the gift is to outsiders it has been held 
invalid and that whether made by the widow or the adoptive 
father himself. The reasons given have varied. Some have 
put the deviation from strict principle on custom, some on 
the view of approbate and reprobate and in one case upon the 
view that the father as guardian can bind an infant by any 
contract which is for his benefit. Summing up the Madras cases 
they observed that as regards the decisions, the general 
result has been to validate the arrangements so far as the 
provision is made for the widow, just as in Bombay, but one
53. (1927) I.L.R. 50 Mad. 508 (F.C.).
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case Jagannadha v Papamma;?Zr is the other way, and the referring
judgment of Subrahmanya Ayyar J., is also of that way of
thinking. As regards reasons, again they vary, some going on
the power of the adoptive father to do what he likes, some on
fair and reasonable arrangements and some on approbate and
reprobate. From this examination it seemed apparent to their
lordships that it was not possible to reconcile all the
decisions and still less the reasons on which they have been
based. Their Lordships therefore examined the matter on
principle and made the following observations: (i) ‘.Then a
disposition is made inter-vivos by one who has full power
over the property it is valid. (ii) If the disposition is
by will and the adoption is subsequently made by the widow
it is again valid as the property is carried away before the
adoption. (iii) consent or non-consent of natural father is
immaterial. (iv) But it is quite different when the adoption
is antecedent to the date of disposition of the property as
the rights flowing from the adoption are immediate and the
disposition being inconsistent with these rights cannot affect
them. (v) Two propositions were well settled for which no
authority need be cited (a) that the natural father loses all
power over the son, the moment he is adopted (b) that the
adopted son has in the new family the same rights as the
natural son and hence the consent or no consent of the natural
father regarding dispositions of property by the adoptive
father was immaterial and the doubt was expressed by Lord
55..acnaghten in Bhasba Rabidat Singh v Indar Funwar was
54. (1895) I.L.R. 16 Mad. 400.
55- (1889) I.L.R. 16 Cal. 556 (P .O. ) .
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unanswerable, Barran J. was misled by undue veneration for
Mr. Hayne for it seems impossible to ascribe any value to the
guardianship power of the natural father to bind the son as
to property in which he cannot have an interest until the
time when the guardianship has ceased. (vi) The doctrine
of approbate and reprobate is not applicable as the adopted
son has no election. (vii) The only permissible ground is
custom. Having regard to a consensus of judicial decisions,
54-excepting that in Jagannadha v Papamma, an arrangement made 
on the adoption of a Hindu whereby the widow of the adoptive 
father is to enjoy his property during her lifetime, or for 
a less period, that arrangement being consented to by the 
natural father before the adoption is to be regarded as valid 
by custom. But an agreement or consent by the natural father 
is not effectual in law or by custom to validate any other 
disposition, taking effect after the adoption and curtailing 
the rights of the adopted son as a co-sharer.
Consequently, a will by which a testator gave part 
of his property to his intended adoptive son, part to his 
widow for life, part to kindred and part to charity was held 
as not binding upon the adopted son, although before the 
adoption took place the natural father executed a deed by 
which he consented to the provisions of the will and gave
his son in adoption subject thereto.
56In Surendra v Kala Chand,"' a Calcutta case, a 
Hindu by his will gave his widow a life interest in a house 
and provided that on her death, their adopted son should have 
the house provided he was of good character, and. be obedient
56. (1907) 12 C..7.H. 668.
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to the widow. It was held that the conditions viz., that
the adopted son should he of good character, and he obedient
and should survive the widow was binding and not void for
vagueness. The adopted son had a contingent reversionary
interest in the house during the widow's lifetime and this
was not alienable. The Madras Courts at one time refused
57to recognise such agreements. In Lakshmana Rao v Lakshmi
57Animal" it was held that the power of a Hindu widow with 
authority from her husband to adopt, to make bonajfide alien­
ations, which would be binding on the reversioners if no 
adoption took place, was not affected or curtailed by the 
fact that it was exercised in contemplation of an adoption 
and in defeasance of the right of the son who was about to 
be adopted. The title of a son adopted by a widow under 
authority from her husband does not relate back to the death 
of the deceased. At p. 163 Turner C.J. observed that their 
lordships were disposed to think that a child taken in adoption 
cannot be bound by the assent of his natural father to terms 
imposed as a condition of the adoption and that, like other 
agreements made on behalf of minors for other than necessary 
purposes, it would lie with the minor when he came of age, 
to assent to or repudiate them. This was understood by their
Lordships to be the effect of the Judicial Committee ruling
58in Ramasami Aiyan v Vencataramaiyan  ^ in which the judgment
50
of the Bomfehy High Court in Chitko v Janakn y was noticed.
57* lakshmana Rao v lakshmi Ammal (1881) I.L.R. 4 Had. 160.
2
58. (1879) I.I.R./Mad. 91, 101; L.R. 6 I.A. 196.
59. (1874) 11 Bom. H.C.R. 199-
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Their Lordships referred to Bamundoss Looker,jea v List.
-arinee^  wherein the Sadrf; Dewani Adalut carefully examined
the authority on which the right of a son, adopted by a widow
in the exercise of a power conferred on her by her husband
came into being and the widow’s position in the interval before
the power was exercised. On appeal, the Privy Council entirely
concurred with the principle laid down in it. The Sadr
Dewani Adalut pronounced that "an authority to adopt a son
possessed by a widow does not supersede or destroy her
personal rights as widow, and that those rights continue in
force until an adoption is actually made", and held that the
property is in the widow from the date of the husband's death
until the power to adopt is exercised, and that the adoption
divests it from the widow and vests it in the adopted son.
61In Ramasami Aiyan v Venkataramaiyan the natural
father of a boy whom the widow of a deceased Hindu proposed
to adopt as a son to her husband, entered into a written
agreement with her to the effect that the boy should inherit
only a third of the property of his adoptive father. It was
held that the agreement was not void, but was at least capable
of ratification when the adopted son became of age. The case
52of Chitko v Janaki was referred to, which decided that an
agreement on the part of the father that his son's interest
shall be postponed to the life interest of the widow was valid 
and binding. In Jagannadha v Panama a, ; however, it was held 
that a Hindu who is taken in adoption by a widow, acting under
60. (1858) 7 M.I.A. 177-
61. (1879) I.L.R. 2 Mad. 91. (P.C.).
62. (1893) I.L.R. 16 Mad. 4-00.
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an authority from her husband, was not bound by an agreement 
entered into by her with the natural father at the time of
61the adoption. Their Lordships in Ramasami v Venkataramaiyan
observed that Bhasba Rabidat v Indar Kunwar^  was an authority
for holding that the agreement between a widow making an
adoption under an authority derived from her husband and the
natural father of the adopted son cannot prejudice or affect
the rights of the son which can only arise when the parental
control and authority of the natural father determines. The
64-case of Lakshmi v Subramanya relied on by the Appellant's
counsel was one of an agreement between the adoptive father
and the natural father and was not, in their Lordships opinion
63in conflict with the decision of the Privy Council quoted
above.
This view was however changed by the full bench
65decision of Madras High Court in Visalakshi v Livaramien
and brought in line with the view held by the Bombay High
65Court. Their Lordships in Visalakshi v Sivaramien referred
to and concurred with the earlier decision in Panchanon
51Lajumdar v Binoy Krishna and also referred to the case of 
Bhasba Rabidat v Indar Funwar'^ wherein the agreement was 
previous to the adoption and was not embodied in the adoption 
deed or referred to at the time of the adoption. Benson J.
said
"Then the question in each case would be whether 
the agreement in regard to the property was in 
itself a fair and reasonable one and one, which,
6p. (1889) I.L.R. 16 Cal. 556 (P.C.).
64-. (1889) I.L.R. 12 Lad. 490.
65. (1904) I.L.R. 27 Had. 577 ( F . B . ) .
taken as part of the contract for the adoption 
was for the minor’s benefit as being a condition 
on which alone the adoption would be made".
Again he says
"But it would seem that a fair and reasonable 
disposition of the property is not essentially 
repugnant to Hindu lav/ or the purposes for 
which the adoption is allowed and is nowhere 
forbidden by that law. Such dispositions are 
commonly made and are upheld by the authority 
of the caste and the consciousness of the people.
In these circumstances I think that the Courts 
ought not to refuse to recognise them as binding 
on the minor for whose benefit the adoption 
coupled with the agreement as to the disposition 
of the property was really made. It may be 
assumed that the natural father would not have 
agreed to the adoption coupled with the dis­
position of the property, unless it was for
the benefit of his son to do so nor would the
adoptive father have taken the son in adoption 
except on the condition agreed to. The adoption, 
of course, cannot be set aside and to set aside 
the conditions which was coupled with the adoption, 
while maintaining the adoption, would require 
the Justification of strong grounds of legal 
necessity or public policy".
The Patna High Court also referred to these cases
66in lani Iieshobati v Satyanarayana J and observed that in|spite
of the doubt expressed by the Frivy Council in Bhasba Rabidat's
65case which was clearly distinguishable from the other cases
referred to in Visalakshi' s case,0;; the opinion expressed in
65Visalakshi' s case, v/ould according to their Lordships, 
appear to be the correct view of the law. Their Lordships 
observed that a minor can only act through a guardian, and 
contracts entered, into by a guardian on behalf of the minor 
were binding on the minor, provided they have been properly 
entered into and were for his benefit i.e. it was a fair and 
reasonable agreement which to any reasonable man would have 
appeared to be for the benefit of the minor.
66. (1918) 47 I.C. 55-
f76
65Also following Visalakshi v Sivaramien the
67Nagpur high Court held in Chandrabhagabai v Ramchand ‘ 
that an agreement conferring a benefit on the widow at the 
expense of a minor adopted son must be a fair and reasonable 
one. Upon a proper interpretation of the documents in the 
case, their lordships found that the defendant stipulated 
for being maintained Min the same state" in which she was 
then living. It was not merely an ordinary Hindu women's 
maintenance to which she was entitled but to have a liberal 
allowance which will secure her in comfort and enable her to 
do all such religious duties which she was in the habit of 
then performing. Their lordships thought that the Plaintiff 
ought not to be given possession till the defendant's cairns
under the deed were ascertained and secured to her.
6 P>In Balwant Singh v Joti Prasad the Allahabad 
High Court has held that an agreement depriving an adopted 
son of his right to take possession of the property of his 
adoptive father is not prohibited by law. Where such an 
agreement had been entered into, for example, giving a life 
estate to the adoptive mother and the remainder to the adopted 
son, the interest of the son was not merely that of a contin-
CL-
gent collateral Hindu reversioner, hut he had^vested interest 
in the property of his adoptive father, which he was competent 
to deal with, subject only to the previous life estate. He 
was not barred by the provisions of Section 6(a) of the 
Transfer of Property Act 1882 from dealing with the property.
6 7 . (1918) 46 I.C. 850 (Nagpur).
68. (1918) I.L.R. 40 All. 692, 703; Also Visalakshi v 
Sivaramien (1904) I.L.R. 27 Had. 577 and Ivali Das 
v~Biiai ohanker (1891; I.L.R. 13 All. 391 referred to.
4-71
69Go also in Ghanti i arshad v Phan Deri y the Punjab 
Chief Court held that an agreement betv/een the adoptive 
father or mother and the natural father or mother of the 
adoptive boy by which the latter's rights were to take effect 
after the adoptive mother's death was perfectly valid. Where, 
therefore, a deed of adoption reserved to the wife of the 
adoptive father a right to his property during her lifetime it 
was held that the condition was binding on the adopted son.
When this question first came up before the Privy
nr\
Council in Ramasami Ayyan v Venkataramaiyan  ^' their Lordships
remarked
"How far the natural father can by agreement 
before the ado] tion renounce all or part of 
his son's rights, so as to bind that son when 
he comes of age, is also a question not altogether 
unattended with difficulty; although the case 
of Chitko v Janaki>- certainly decides that 
an agreement on the part of the father that his 
son's interest shall be postponed to the interest 
of the widow is valid and binding. In this 
case their lordships thin!: it enough to decide 
that the agreement of the natural father which 
has been set out was not void, but was at least 
capable of ratification when his son becomes 
of age".
The question again came up before the Privy Council in the
5 5cases of Bhasba Rabidat v Indar ICunv/ar and Krishnamurthi 
.yyar v Krishnamurthi Ayyar which has been discussed at 
pages to 4^7 and ton'll respectively. In the former 
case the adoption was questioned on the ground that the widow 
had agreed with the natural father of the adopted son, that 
she should be in possession of the whole estate during her 
lifetime. Their Lordships of the Privy Council held that the
69. (1919) 50 i.e. 115.
70. (1879' 1.i.S. 2 Lad. 91; 0 I.A. 196. Also see p .u U
above.
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adoption was duly performed and was recorded in a deed of 
adoption which made no mention of any condition, and that 
no other deed could therefore affect the adoption. In Krisha- 
murthi* s case^ their lordships held that (1) the only ground 
on which an ante-adoption agreement with the natural father 
could be sanctioned was custom (2) that an agreement giving 
a life interest in the whole property to the widow, the 
adopted son taking it on her death, would be valid; and 
(3) that
"as soon, however, as the arrangements go beyond 
that i.e. either give the widow property absolutely 
or give the property to strangers, they think 
no custom as to this has been proved to exist 
and that such arrangements are against the radical 
view of the Hindu law".
76This view w&s followed in a number of subsequent cases.
71In Seethiah v kutyalu where tv/o undivided brothers
held a joint property worth about Es 36,000 and an absolute
gift of property worth Es 1,500 was made to the widow of the
deceased brother by the surviving brother as guardian of the
minor adopted son of the deceased brother in full discharge
_ for
of the widow's claim / ‘maintenance, without the liberty of 
reclaiming an increase of maintenance at any time, it was 
held that under the circumstances it ms a perfectly reasonable 
provision which was in no way detrimental to the interest of 
the coparcenary. It was further held that, under the circum­
stances it was within the competence of the natural guardian 
to do so and not beyond his powers. If this settlement could 
be regarded as a prudent one made by the guardian after a due 
consideration of the interests of the minor it could not
71. Seethiah v Kutyalu A.I.E. 1931 ad. 106; Banarsi Das v
Sumat Iras ad. (see note 72 below).
subsequently be questioned by the minor.
72In Banarsi Das v Sumat Prasad the Allahabad High
Court held that an agreement entered into by the natural
guardian of a boy taken into adoption by a widow, under
which the widow was to remain in possession of the property
during her lifetime was valid and did not affect the validity
53of the adoption, Krishnamurthi v Krishnamurthi was relied 
on.
I am in agreement with the various decisions stated 
above to the effect that if the agreement entered into between 
the natural father and the adoptive wiaov/ is fair and reasonable 
it should be upheld and made binding on the adopted son. It 
is optional for a widow to adopt or not, but if she does 
decide to adopt she would have to sacrifice much of her own 
interests, it is therefore Justified that fair and reasobable 
agreements entered into between the natural father and the 
adoptive widow should be enforceable at law, but for which 
she might as well not have adopted.
Lgreement giving absolute estate to the widow in a portion 
of the property held valid-
73In T. Raju v Nagammal the Madras High Court held 
that an agreement by which a Hindu widow proposing to adopt 
a son stipulates with the boy's natural father for a portion 
of her husband's estate being settled upon her for her absolute 
use and enjoyment, with powers of alienation was valid and 
binding on the son on adoption if the agreement was fair,
72. A.I.R. 1956 All. 641.
73- (1929) I.L.R. 52 Mad. 128.
reasonable and beneficial to him. The case of Krishnamurthi
lyyar' " was explained and applied. The question was whether
fxhibit I the ante-adoption agreement by which the widow got
from the natural father of the boy an absolute estate in some
of the lands belonging to the deceased testator was valid and
binding on the boy on adoption. The contention of the appellant
was that though this agreement had been found to be fair,
reasonable and beneficial to the hoy, it was not binding on
the adopted boy according to the dictum in Krishnamurthi v
Krishnamurthy^which expressly prohibits an agreement
granting an absolute estate in any portion of the estate
either on the adoptive mother or on strangers, though grant
of life-estate to the widow in the whole of the deceased's
estate may be valid by custom and that all previous decisions
74-to the contrary e.g. Visalakshi v Sivaramien' must now be 
taken to have been over-ruled. However Rameson J. thought 
that the effect of their Lordships judgment in hrishnamurthi's 
case;") seemed to hmm to be as follows: (1) If an agreement
provides a gift to strangers it was void. (2) If the arrange­
ment confers advantages on the widow, it will continue to be 
valid if it was fair and beneficial as before, and invalid, 
if unfair i.e. an agreement conferring a life-estate on the 
widow will be regarded as fair and valid. If the whole 
property was given absolutely to the widow, it will be 
regarded as unfair. iis Lordship inferred from the above 
summary that if absolute interest was given to the widov/ in 
some items of property which did not amount to practically 
the whole of the property i.e. if substantial part of the
74-. (1904-) I.L.R. 27 rad. 577 (F.B.).
f s /
property v/as still left for the adopted son, the arrangement
may still he regarded as fair and beneficial and therefore
may be valid. Venkatsubba Eao J. agreed with this view and
opined that in the matter of arrangements in favour of the
widow’s the lav; had not been in the least disturbed. For
determining their validity the tests that were laid down in
74/Isalakshi v Sivaramien' must still be applied. The tests
to be applied, according to his lordship v/ere whether the
arrangement received the consent of the natural father and
whether it was a fair and reasonable one and for the minor’s
»
benefit. If these tests v/ere satisfied the courts will
uphold the arrangement, if not they will not. I agree with
the view expressed in this case that this decision follows as
53an effect of the judgment in Krishnamurthi v Krishnamurthi
according to which if the agreement confers advantages on the
widow it will continue to be valid if it is fair and reasonable.
Also the Andhra Pradesh High Court held in M.
75Furnananda v Iurnanandam that an ante-adopt.on agreement 
entered into between the natural father of the adopted son 
and the widow, v/ho was going to adopt his son, by which a 
reasonable provision for maintenance of the widow is made 
in her favour absolutely is valid and binding upon the adopted 
son. On principle, there is nothing wrong in the widow taking 
a reasonable portion of the estate absolutely for her mainten­
ance under such an agreement.
75* A .I.E. 1961 Andh. Ira. 435 (438, 439, 440).
-Giving proi erties absolutely/ to adoptive mother not permissible
In Venkat v Lachmi^  it was held that an ante-
adoption agreement which permits an arrangement between the
natural father of the adopted son and the adopting mother
relating to the manner in which the properties of the adopted
son should be enjoyed by the adoptive mother is sanctioned
only by custom and not by any principle based on the legal
incidents of adoiition or by any text of Hindu law.
An ante-adoption agreement which gives the properties
absolutely to tie adoptive mother is, as rightly observed by
53the Judicial Committee in Krishnamurthi v Krishnamurthi 
"opposed to the radical view of Hindu law".
Arrangements cutting down the rights of the adopted son.
77In p. Venkatarao v p. Venkateswararao it was held
that ante-adoption agreements should not extend to anything
other than the regulation of the rights of the widow in the
property and the sanction to it was based on custom. An
arrangement cutting down the rights of the adopted son to a
life estate was not valid. Their Lordships observed that in
53Krishnamurthi1s case, the judicial committee subjected the
conflicting decisions including a full bench decision of the
74-Hadras High Court in Visalakshi v Sivaramien'‘ to a critical 
examination. BefSre the decision of the Privy Council it was 
thought that any reasonable arrangement which was beneficial 
to the minor adopted son could be upheld and different reasons 
were given in support of that view. Their Lodships observed
76. (1964-) 2 Andh. W.K. 383* 
77- [19551 ' An. 7/.R . 783-
that though on facts, the decision in Visalakshi v Sivaramien^
could he justified even on the principles now laid down by
the Judicial Committee the learned judges in the full bench
following the view of Parran J. laid down at page 587
"The validity of the adoption, if legally made, 
is quite independent of the validity of any 
agreement as to the property... But it would 
seem that a fair and reasonable disposition 
of the property is not essentially repugnant 
to Hindu law, or the purposes for which adoption 
is allowed, and is nowhere forbidden by that 
law. Such dispositions are commonly made, and 
are upheld by the authority of the caste and 
the consciousness of the people" .
Their lordships also referred to the views of Ramesam and
1 • n-z
Venkatasubba Rao J.J. in/Raju v Hagammal (discussed above 
at pp. to l+g/) and observed that there was the sound reason
in support of that decision, namely, validity of such arrange­
ments founded on custom.
In this case, however, under the arrangement the 
rights of the adopted son were cut down to the life-estate 
and it cannot be justified on the ground of any custom and 
no such custom was ever put forward or proved in the present 
case. Their Lordships observed that the arrangement could 
not be brought within any of the principles enunciated in 
xr±shnamurthi1s caseyy and must be held to be invalid. If 
an adopted son executes an agreement of the following purport, 
that his mother is to remain in possession of the property 
during her life-time, and he is to inherit after her only on 
the following conditions; That should any serious differences
occur between his mother and himself he is to lose all his
78
rights and his adoption to be held void. The question which
no
came up for decision in List. Tara Munee v Lev Harayan ’ was
78. (1824) 5 S.L. 518 followed in Mt. Bhugobutty v Chowdhry
F/note conta. on next page
whether such a document, on the occurrence of such differences 
conferred any legal right on the mother. The Fandit of the 
Court answered that it does confer such right he cause the 
proprietor of any possessions may dispose of them as he
pleases.
no
In Vithal laxman v Yamutai one L died leaving
him surviving his widow G and the Ilaintiff (daughter's
daughter). On April 22, 1911, G adopted the defendant. Cn
the same day that the adoption deed was executed the defendant
passed an agreement to G, by which he agreed to pay Rs 5000
to the Plaintiff when she afitained majority. 'The Flaintiff,
on attaining majority filed a suit to recover the amount of
Rs 5000. It was held, dismissing the suit that the document
did not. constitute a trust in the Flaintiff's favour and
therefore she was not entitled to sue on the agreement. It
was also held that the document did not constitute a family
arrangement as the Plaintiff being a daughter's daughter had
no right in the family property. It was held further that
the defendant would be bound by the agreement made by him cn
adoption, as being a major at the time, and if the suit had
been brought by the person with whom the agreement had been
made, the suit would succeed. The case of Pandurang v 
79Yarmadabai  ^was followed.
80In hi tar Sain v Data Ram wdiere a Jain widow
Footnote 78 contd. from previous rjage
(1871) 1:1.R.
Bholanath/15 V/.R. 65; Kashibai v Patya (1916)/l40 Bom.
668; Pandurang v Narmadabai (1952) I.L.R. 56 Bom. 595;
Vithal Laxman v Yamutai (1954) 58 Bom. 254; hittar Sain
v Datta Ram l.I.RT 1926 .-ill. 7; Krislmay7/a v v aharaja 
of Pithapur. (.1955)- 69-h.L.J. 588 I .e.
79. (1952) 54 Bom. L.R. 1209; (1952) I.L.R. 56 Bom. 5 9 5 - ^  ^/so 
P. l?)L.CLb0\Je •
80. A.I.R. (1926) All. 7.
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adopted an adult person as son to her husband, and where as
a condition to the adoption, the adopted son who was a pauper
and who by adoption would get a vast property, agreed to pay
certain sums to the adoptive widow's brothers, which were
comparatively very small, it was held by Lujjherji J (Lindsey
J. dissenting that the agreement was binding on the adopted
son- contract Act S. 23) that the agreement was supported by
81valid consideration and was binding on the adopted son.
According to Lindsey J; who dissented, to allow an arrangement
ox this nature to be carried out would be to allow the Hindu
widow to do indirectly what Hindu law forbids her to do
directly, and no such arrangement could be enforced. The
invalidity of such conditions, says Lindsey J., cannot be
cured by showing that the adopted son, a person of full age,
assented to them. The invalidity arose out of the inherent
disability of the widow under the Hindu law to give away
portions of her husband's estate and an attempt to impose
conditions which would lead indirectly to sich alienations
being made was absolutely void as being ultra vires.
82In Subramania v Sankara Velayudam ' it was held
that an arrangement between the adoptive and natural father
disposing of former's family property in violation of the rule
53in Krishnamurthi1s case was not voidable in the ordinary 
sense of the term but was void against the adopted son. But 
such an arrangement was capable of validation by the adopted 
son by his own ratification after he came of age. Such a
81. Kashibai Ramchandra v Tatya fenee (1Q16) I.L.R. 40 Bom.
66>8 followed.
82. ' (1932) I.L.R.’ 55 Mad. 408.
4f(>
ratification need not necessarily be accompanied by all the
ingredients of a valid contract and need not be made between
the adopted son and the party benefitted by the invalid
disposition. Their Lordships further observed that an act
amounting to an election by the adopted son to hold it good,
sufficient according to the doctrine enunciated by the Frivy
85Council in Rangasami v Nachiappa Gounden, - followed and
84-applied in Ramakobtayya v Virara&havayya' ' was sufficient
for that purpose. According to the Frivy Council decision 
Rangasami g*
in/i v I'Tachiappa C-ounden ' an invalid disposition by
the adoptive father at the time of adoption and in consideration
of it may become binding on the adopted ©n if he subsequently
ratifies them.°^ The adopted son could renounce all rights
in his adoptive family after adoption, but this did not destroy
his status as an adopted son, nor restore him to the position
and
he had abandoned in his natural family/upon his renunciation
86the next heir will succeed. As observed by their Lordships
86in lakshmappa v Ramava', an invalid adoption works nothing.
It leaves the alleged adoptee precisely in the same position 
which he occupied before the ceremony, no matter, how formally 
it may have been celebrated.
on
In Llahadu Ganu v Baya.ji Sidu the Flaintiff was 
adopted in 1880 by one fK* widow of Ganu. In June 1885 be
85- (1918) I.L.R. 4-2 Mad. 525 (F.C.).
84-. (1928) I.L.R. 52 Mad. 556 (F.B.).
85- See also Ramasami v geneataramaiyan (1879) 6 I.A., 196,
208; Kalidas v Bi,iai Shankar (1891) I.L.R. 15 All. 591;
Landurang v ITarmadabai (1952) 56 Bom. 595, 599-4-00.
86. Lakshmarpg. v Ramava ,(18.75) ■ 12 -Bo . -H.C-.A.G. - 564-, 588 .
87- (1895) I.L.R. 19 Bom. 259*
executed a document which recited that he and ’ET had not 
been on amicable terms and. that his ado; tion had been cancelled 
and that she adopted another son def. To. 1 and in consider­
ation of Es 200 paid by *F’ to him he delivered back to her 
the rights which he obtained by virtue of the adoption and 
heirship. It was held that the Plaintiff could not renounce 
his status as adopted son, although he might give up his 
right of inheritance, and that whatever estate became vested 
in ' by the release came to the Plaintiff on her death
either as adopted son of Ganu or as heir of 'K'. It was also
held that the defendant’s subsequent adoption was invalid and 
that nothing would pass to him by force of such adoption.
GO
In Bhoopati Hath v B a s ant a Eum ar e e ’ the Plaintiff
was given in adoption to a certain ’ E ’ . On being ill-treated
by his adoptive mother, the Plaintiff’s natural mother took 
him back and ’E' executed a deed cancelling the adoption and 
later by a deed of settlement gave all properties for per­
formance of Durga and Lakshmi Fuqas. It was held that the 
I laintiff was entitled to a declaration that he was the validly 
ado ted son of ’K ' and was his sole heir according to law.
The prayer for Shebaitship by the Plaintiff was left open for 
future litigation if the Flaintiff chose to bring one when 
the occasion arose.
89
In nakshminarayana v Sundaramayya the Madras High 
Court held that a bona fide family settlement by the adoptive 
mother acted upon for a considerable time was held binding on 
the adopted son (Contract Act (1872) . 2(d)).
88. (1936) I.L.R. 63 Cal..1098.
89. A.I.E. 1950 Mad. 601 (603).
90In Venkat Rao v Venkatash war Eg.c ,' following 
Erishnamurthi v Erishnamurthi- v the Andhra Pradesh High Court 
held that an ante-adoption agreement between the adoptive 
and natural fathers of an adopted son curtailing the right 
of disposition of property of such son is invalid and not
binding. ’The Bombay High Court has held in Punjabrao v
91 53
...■eshrao" again relying on Krishnamurthi v Erishnamurthi
that an agreement bet ween a widow and the adopted son
that the latter would be an exclusive owner of only 1/3 share
of the adoptive father's estate and the remaining share would
belong to the widow was binding on him in the absence of proof
by him that the agreement was unfair, unreasonable and not
beneficial to him.
In the case of arrangements cutting down the rights
of the adopted son, if such arrangements were agreed to by an
adult adopted son or were subsequently ratified by him on
attaining majority, I do not see any reason why such arranme-
ments should not be upheld, UfotesS' cl 'h/d. ^
Ohtoiiri-ed \p w f-rcL-xd ( , U y i c l u £
cikz Y i  ll-t  ^& L y y x ^ i k o d s ,
Effect of ante-adoption alienations irrespective of agreement.
Adopted son bound by lawful alienations by widow before his 
adoption
92It had been held in Bamundoss v Lt. Tarinee and 
other cases following it that the rights of the adopted son
90. A.I.E. 1936 Andhra 1 (9).
91. A.I.E. 1962 Bom. 173 (182).
92. (1858) 7 Ivi.I.A. 169, followed in LI pro Hara.yan v Bala.ji
(1895) I.L.R. 19 Bom. 809 Yaifly&natha v Savithri (1918)'
■ I.L.R, 4-1 ’ Mad. , 75, P . B. at p. 91 •
marise only from the date of the adoption in the sense that he
is hound by such acts of the widow as would bind the heirs of
the husband after her. Barran J. in Ivloro i'Tarayan v Bula.ji 
92Baghunath sets out the position of the adopted son as
follows
"Now an adopted son claims from and through 
his adoptive father. His adoption, however, 
does not relate back to the death of his 
adoptive father (Bamundoss Hukherjee v list.
Tarinee) .-^ He comes in bound by such acts of 
the widow as would bind the natural heirs of 
the husband after her and entitled to set aside 
(in the absence at all events of stipulations 
to the contrary) such unauthorised alienations 
of the widow as they succeeding upon her death 
would be entitled to set aside. The only 
difference between him and other full heirs 
of the husband for the purpose I am considering 
seems to be that rights spring into existence at 
the moment of his adoption and displace the 
rights of the widow, while the rights of other 
revetsioners await the determination of the 
widow’s estate by her death".
92In Vaidyanatha v Havi bhri a Hindu widow alienated
certain properties for a purpose not binding on the inheritance
and thereafter adopted a son. It was held by a full bench
of the Madras High Court that the alienation was not binding
on the adopted son and that he could sue during the life-time
of the widow to set aside the alienation and recover properties
so alienated, his cause of action arising from the time of
his adoption. ICumaraswami Sastriyar J. observed that it was
then settled that the adopted son had all the rights of a
natural son in his adoptive father's estate and that the
position of the adopted son was clearly and accurately set
92out by Narran J. , in Moro Ha ray an v Bala;ji Raghunath 
(passage from which has been quoted above).. • ; ,
The Sudder Biwany Court has held that according to Hindu law, 
a boy adopted by a widow with the permission of her late . . .
fhusband had ail the rights of a posthumous son, so that a
sale made by her to his prejudice, of her late husband's
property even before the adoption, will not be valid unless
93made under circumstances of inevitable necessity.' In 
another case the Sadir ? Diwanj' ^ ^-k^held by a majority 
under the circumstances of the case, the special appellant 
was bound by the deed of compromise, entered into by his mother 
with the tenants of the estate, as his guardian, which com­
promise was acquiesced in by him since he reached his majority, 
until he can show that with respect to the circumstances under 
which, and to the then capabilities of the tenants regarding
which the compromise was made, that such compromise was
9 h
clearly and unraistakeably to his detriment.'"
95
In Ramkrishna v Tripurabai where a Hindu widow, 
who had inherited her husband's property, adopted a son, it 
was held that the adoption had the effect of divesting her of 
the property and putting an end to her estate as heir of her 
husband. Their Lordships observed that.the adoption had the 
same effect as her death with this difference that after the 
adoption she has a right of maintenance against the adopted 
son during the rest of her life. But the right of maintenance 
so long as it was not a charge on the estate or any portion of 
it, did not confer on her any right to the estate or entitle 
her to transfer it by way of sale or mortgage. Thus if a 
widow, before the adoption severs a portion of the inheritance 
therefrom and transfers it to a stranger without any proper
93* Ranee Eishenmunee v Raja Oodwunt (1824) 3 S.D. 304.
94. Ranee Doorgasoondree v Goureepersand S.D. of 1830, 170.
95.. (.1909). I.L.R.- 33- Bom. 88........ '* . ....... . ' ’ ‘
A?/
or necessary purposes binding the estate absolutely, according 
to Eindu law, the transfer must cease to have any effect after 
the adoption, since it could only operate during the time that
the estate was represented by her as heir and the result of
96the adoption is to terminate that estate."
Q7
In Lakshin an Rau v lakshmi Ammal" it was held that
the property was in the widow from the date of the husband’s
death until the power to adopt was exercised, and the adoption
divests it from the widow and vests it in the adopted son.
fheir Lordships referred to the pronouncement by the Sadar
98Dewani Adalut in Bamundoss Hookerflea v Hst. Tarinee" that
"an authority to adopt a son possessed by a widow 
does not supersede or destroy her personal rights 
as v/idow, and that those rights continue in force 
until an adoption is actually made”.
■Ihus such acts of the widow’s as are authorised and would be
effective against the reversioners would bind the adopted son,
and such acts as are unauthorised and • beyond her legal
powers could be set aside by the adopted son or by any other
successor to the estate.
AlienationA with consent of reversioners binding
QQ
In Ra,j Eristo v Kishoree Mohun"" it was held that 
an adoptd son was not actually precluded from ever questioning 
the acts done by his mother during his minority or before his
96. Lakshman v Radhabai (1887) I.L.R. 11 Bom. 609 and Moro 
v Balaji (1895) I.L.R. 19 Bom. 809 followed; Sreeramulu 
v bnistamina (1902) 26 Mad. 143 not followed.
97- (1881) I.L.R. 4 Mad. 160, 164.
98. (1858) 7 M . I . A .  177*
99* (1883) Vol. Ill, 77.R. 14.
adoption, in the same manner as any other reversioner might 
question such acts. Yet a sale by a widow with the consent 
of all legal heirs at the time existing, and ratified by 
decrees of Courts was binding on reversioners as well as on 
the adopted son, adopted long after the sale. Their Lordships 
fortified their opinion by referring to the Frivy Council view 
in a Madras case reported in Y.R. of April 1865 wherein it 
was observed that "it is obvious that there would be the 
greatest possible inconvenience in holding that the succeeding 
heirs were not bound by a decree fairly and properly obtained 
against the widow". So also in Bajrangi Singh v II an okarnika ^ ^ 
the Frivy Council held that a Hindu widow in possession of her 
husband's estate as his heir had power, apart from legal 
necessity to alienate the estate, with the concurrence of 
the reversionary heirs, so as to bind the persons who were 
the next reversioners when the succession opens out on her 
death and this principle had been admitted by all the High 
Courts in India. Their Lordships observed that ordinarily 
the consent of the whole body of persons constituting the next 
reversioners should be obtained, although there may be cases 
in wrhich special circumstances may render the strict enforcement 
of this rule impossible. It was immaterial whether the con­
currence of the reversioner's v/as given at the time the 
alienation was made or whether the transaction was subsequently 
ratified.
In Hanaro G-owda v Irgowd.a~*~^  certain property
100. la.irangi ingh v Manoka&nika (1908) I.L.R. 30 All. 1,
a.c.;T
101. (1924) I.L. :. 48 Bom. 654. This was a pre-Anant ,v, , .
. . .Sh anker case.- In Anant ■ v Shank, er it was laid down that 
the ”rights of the ad oLted son date back to the deceased 
ado-ted father's death. (A .1.3. 194-5 F.C. 196).
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inherited by a Hindu widow from her husband was mortgaged
by her with possession in Kay 1900. Six months later she
sold it to her son-in-law, the defendant for Rs 1500; Rs 1200
of which were to be paid by the latter to the mortgagee in
satisfaction of the mortgage. The balance of Rs 300 remained
in fact unpaid. The widow adopted the Plaintiff and died
shortly after in 190?. The defendant paid off the mortgage
and obtained possession of the property in tlarch 1908. 'The
Plaintiff sued in Dec. 1919 to recover possession of the
property. It was held that the suit was not barred under
art. 91 of the Indian limitation Act 1908, inasmuch as it was
not essential for the Plaintiff to set aside the sale. Shah,
Ag. C.J. observed
"It may be taken as established ... that in 
the case of a reversioner it is not essential 
for him to set aside any alienation by the
widow ... It is true that the case of an
adopted son, with which we are concerned now, 
stands on a different footing in this sense 
that the rights of the adopted son come into 
existence as soon as he is adopted by the widow,
and the rights of the widow as the heir of her
husband come to an end on adoption, while, in 
the case of a reversioner, his rights come into 
existence on the death of the widow. Subject 
to that important difference, there is nd 
essential difference between the position of 
the adopted son seeking to enforce his rights 
with reference to the property alienated by 
the widow before the adoption and that of a 
reversioner seeking to enforce his rights with 
regard to property alienated by the widow before 
her death".
Their Lordships referred to and relied on Loro Tara,pan v
°2 95Talajiy and Ramakrishna v Tripurabai. ^
It was further held that the suit was not barred
. nd er ,r%. 144-, inasmuch as adverse possession of the equity
of redemption by the defendant did not commence till Larch
1908, when he paid off the mortgage and took possession of
the'property,'there having been no overt act on his pare prior
kto that date to show that he was in possession of the equity 
of redemption. It was therefore held that the Plaintiff was 
entitled to recover possession of the property in payment to 
the defendant of the amount spent by the latter in paying 
off the mortgage.
Property surrendered to reversioners by the widow
102In Teshwanta v untu, the Plaint property belonged 
to one B, who died leaving a widow J and two daughters C and 
G. C married A (def. No. 1). She died in 1915* In 1920 J 
and G, the next reversioners joined in passing a deed of gift 
of the property, the entire estate left by B, in favour of A.
In 1926 there was a dispute between A and J the widow and the 
latter adopted the Plaintiff who subsequently sued to set 
aside the alienation in favour of A. It was held, dismissing 
the suit, that the transaction was a valid surrender as the 
gift amounted in effect to two transactions, a surrender by 
the widow J to bhe next reversioner G and a deed of gift by 
G to A (defendant No. 1).
105In Babanna v Channappa it was held that a surrender 
or release by a Hindu widow of the whole of her estate and 
interest in the property of her deceased husband to a person 
or persons entitled in reversion operated to defeat a sub­
sequently adopted son, because the widow had voluntarily 
operated her own death and thereby accelerated the interest 
of the reversioners. Burther that any arrangement made by the
102. (1954) I.L.R. 58 Bom. 521. 
105. A.I.R. 1947 Bom. 140.
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widow inter se with regard to the widow*s estate cannot bind 
anyone who subsequently became entitled to the whole 
reversionary ownership except when the arrangement was properly 
limited to providing for a widow’s maintenance.
In Ram Nana v. Dhondi Murari^ ^  a Hindu widow had 
surrendered her husband’s estate to her daughter who was the 
next reversioner and who agreed to maintain the widow as long 
as she lived. The daughter having died first, the widow 
adopted the plaintiff to recover possession of the property 
from the daughter’s husband, it was held that the Plaintiff 
was not entitled to question the surrender and that the 
surrender was valid. Macleod C.J. observed that surrender 
of the life-estate to the next reversioner gave a title to 
him which v/as not dependant on the continuance - of the life- 
estate but resulted from its extinction and could not be
questioned by the subsequently adopted son. Cramp J. observed
’’...The effect of the surrender bynthe widow 
y/as that the then reversioner took an absolute 
estate, and as the surrender was an act which 
is by Hindu Law within the competence of the 
widow it is not easy to see any ground on which 
the adopted son can challenge it”.
The case of Rama Nana v. Dhondi Murari^^was referred
to by the Bombay High Court in a later case, Shantaram v.
105Keru Krishna wherein their Lordships observed that the 
principle of Hindu law enunciated in Rama Nana’s case^^ that 
a valid surrender made by a Hindu widow of her husband's 
estate to the next reversioners cannot be defeated by a 
subsequent adoption of a son to her husband was not affected by
104. (1923) I.L.R. 47 Bom. 678.
105. (1948) 50 Bom. L.R. 283. See also article by S. Venkata- 
Raman: Theory of Relation Back in Adoption and Prior
Surrender (1949) 1 M.L.J. 131 where the learned author 
observes that the surrenderee from the widow has no equity
in his favour, the transaction being not one for consideration 
Where the property is with the surrenderee himself there 
seems to be no reason why the subsequently adopted son 
cannot reach the same.
496
1
the decision of the Privy Council in Anant v. Shankar so as 
to give the adopted son the right of challenging the surrender 
made by the widow.
In Mhalu Shidappa v. Shankar Dadu **^ 6a a Hindu widow 
made a gift of the whole of her deceased husband’s estate to 
a stranger. After some months the then next reversioner gave 
consent to the transaction on receiving consideration for the 
same. The widow then adopted a son who challenged the gift.
It was held by G-ajendra- gadkar J. that the gift could not be 
upheld as a valid surrender. His lordship observed that the 
consent of the next reversioner to an alienation made by a 
Hindu widow does not by itself make the transaction valid; it 
merely raises a presumption that it is valid and such presumption 
can be rebutted by the actual reversioner by proving that the 
transaction was not justified. A surrender by a widow amounts 
to her civil death and the natural consequence is that the 
property looks for its next heir. The distinction between a 
surrender (and consequent devolution of property) and an 
alienation is real and substantial. Where it is an alienation 
or transfer of property so-called, consent of reversioners is 
relevant and may raise a presumption about the validity of the 
transfer. Y/here the transfer results from a surrender, it 
only follows the surrender and cannot be validated by subsequent 
consent because in such a case there is no surrender at all.
106. (1943) 70 I.A. 232, jj944] I.L.R. Bom. 116.
106a fi953] I.L.R. Bom. 1231.
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So also a full bench of the Bombay High Court in
Bahubali Vas ant v. G-undappa have upheld the adoptee's right
to divest the surrenderee, over-ruling Ham Hana v. Dhondi
Murari^^, Ye shy ant a v. Antu1^  and other cases in that line
10Sup to and including Shantaram v. Keru Krishna . Chagla C.J. 
observed (at p* 505) that the adopted son would be able to 
displace any title which arises by reason of inheritance and 
this is exactly what happens when the widow surrenders - she 
merely accelerates the inheritance of the next reversioner, or, 
with that reversioner's renunciation, the next but one (p.507).
However, in Ramchandra v. Taibai' ^ 0 it was held that 
where a Hindu widow wh6 had executed a deed of surrender in 
favour of the next male reversioner with the assent of the 
tv/o intervening female heirs, subsequently adopts a son, the 
adopted son can get back the property provided it is in the 
hands of the surrenderee. If part of the properties had 
been transferred to an alienee and the remaining properties 
had devolved upon the heirs of the surrenderee by succession 
the adopted son cannot get back these properties.
The decision in Ramchandra v. Taibai^ ^ 0 has been 
criticized by Prof. J.D.M. Derrett in an article entitled
106b. (1954) 56 Bom. L.R* 501, P.B«;[l954l -A.I.R. Bom.451> P*B.
106c. A.I.E. 1955 N.U.C. (Bombay) 5895.
.
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"Two Difficult Bombay Cases in Hindu Law." Derrett observes 
that the principle upon which an adopted son is permitted to 
divest a surrenderee from his widowed adoptive mother is that 
his rights relate back to the moment of his father's death 
and he takes as his father's fictionally surviving coparcener.
The widow does not have the power to surrender, that is to say, 
accelerate the succession of the next heir, while by a fiction 
an heir superior to herself is in existence. The dattak's right 
to avoid a surrender is on a par with his right to avoid an 
improper alienation. Until this decision in Bombay it had never 
been suggested that the success of his suit depended upon the 
answer to the question whether the alienee or surrenderee had 
alienated the property or had died leaving it to an heir or 
legatee.
I06d. 6956l 58 Bom. L.R.J. 97 at pp. 102 ff. Also see article
by Derrett entitled "Renunciation: An Essay in Anglo-Hindu 
Law." 0963 67 Bom. L.R. (J) 167, wherein Derrett observes 
that wherever a father renounces and sons are subsequently 
born to him the latter should be able to obtain the portion 
of the Joint family property to which their birthright 
entitles them, notwithstanding their father's separation by 
viftUe^of his -renunciation*. provided- that he-renounced in 
circumstances which do not secure their welfare. Derrett 
has differed from the full bench decision of Andhra Pradesh 
High Court in Anjaneyulu v. Ramayya [1963 A.I.R. An.P. 177 
P.B. Izhere it yras held that sons of the renouncing father 
conceived as well as born posterior to the renunciation are 
disentitled to claim a birthright in the grandfather's 
property. I agree with the views of Prof. Derrett 
mentioned above, for, the paramount consideration should be 
given to safeguarding the interests of unborn children.
See also Athilinga v. Ramaswami 0949 A.I.R. Mad. 28 for 
the view that an after-born son can claim re-opening of 
Partition. Also refer to Ramayya v. Venkanra.ju Q954l A.I.R. 
Mad. 864, Shiva.iirao v. Vasantrao 09O£j 33 Bom. 267 and 
Kusum Kumari v. Das ar at ha 092| A.I.R. Cal. 487 for the 
views of various courts on release deeds. The adopted son 
is thus entitled to divest. An aspect of this question was 
considered in Natvarlal v. Dadubhai (19543 A*I.R* S.C* 61 
and the matter is more fully dealt with in Kalishankar v. 
Dhirendra 0954| A.I.R. S.C. 505 which may be referred to. 
Support for the proposition contended here is also obtained 
from Subbareddi v. Govindareddi D955! A.I.R. Andhra 49;
S. Ambalagaran v. Heelamegan 0*956! A.I.^R. Mad. 160 Mhalu 
Shidappa v. Shankar wherein Gajendragaaj^%ar held that not 
merely the alleged surrenderee but also his alienees.were . . 
. divested and also the full bench'division in Bahubali v.
Gundappa. ^
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Derrett observes that once it becomes known that the surrenderee 
only has to sell the property in order to be secure, the' 
traditional method of protecting the reversioners by bringing 
the widow and her often collusive surrenderee or surrenderees 
to court will be effectively cut off and the hard work of a 
century1s case law will be frustrated.
The adoptee*s right to divest the surrenderee was laid 
down in a full bench decision of the Bombay High Court Bahubali
A A/'T.
v. Gundappa and this full bench decision was binding upon 
the division bench and had not been disturbed by Ramchandra v. 
Balaii106e# j-fc j_s a matter of common sense, observes Derrett, 
that if the surrenderee has no title, because he had no right 
to inherit, his transferees can have no title (or only a 
voidable title), and his heirs or legatees can be in no better 
position. They are in precisely the same case as the alienees 
or heirs or legatees from a transferee from a widow without 
legal necessity or otherwise contrary to the powers of a woman 
holding subject to the well-known limited estate. Nor is the 
position merely a matter of common sense, since the Supreme 
Court in Shrinivas v. Parayan distinguished divesting of a 
collateral who had inherited from another collateral of the 
adoptive father from divesting of an alienee from a widow 
precisely on the ground that the alienee could satisfy himself 
whether the alienation would be binding upon an adopted s o n . ^ ^  
Now under the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 there can be 
no surrenders after 17 June, 1956, except in respect of property 
within the Hindu Succession Act, S.14 (2).1^ ^ “
106e. A.I.R. 1955 Bom. 291 (P.B.). Por a discussion of this 
case see Pages 310 et seq.
106f. A.I.R. 1954 S.C. 379 - Also see discussion of this case on
Pages 275 to-276.............................
106g. See J.D.M. Derrett: Introduction to Modern Hindu Law (1963) 
Paras. 189 and 696.
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I am inclined to agree with the decisions in the cases 
of Mhalu Shidanpa'*^aand Bahubali Vasant^ ^ a n d  with the 
observations of Prof. Derrett mentioned above, for, as long as 
the widow is alive and capable of adopting a son, it is 
necessary to protect the interests of the would-be adopted son 
who sacrifices his rights in his natural family and has to 
look only to his adoptive father*s property for his means of 
subsistence and for making his life*s career. Assuch it would 
be unjustified if the adopted son is not allowed to challenge 
alienations not for legal necessity or for the benefit of the 
estate made by the widow between the dates of the adoptive 
father’s death and of his adoption, and also if he is denied the 
right to challenge the property surrendered by the widow to the 
reversioners, for the adopted son has better rights than the 
reversioners or the widow and his rights, relate back to the 
death of his adoptive father.
So also in Mah.alinga.yya v. Sangayya^ ^ 1 it was held 
that when in a Hindu Joint family, a Joint brother renounces 
his interest in the Joint family property, the person renouncing 
severs his connection with the family but such renunciation, 
apart from extinguishing the interest of the renouncing member, 
leaves the coparcenary itself intact. If a boy is adopted by 
the widow of another non-renouncing brother, he is entitled 
to claim his share in the entire family property. The decision 
in this case could hardly be dissented to by anyone, for when
106h. A.I.R. 1945 Bombay 397.
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a coparcener renounces his interests in coparcenary property he 
merely foregoes his interest in the property,thereby enhancing 
the shares of the other non-renouncing coparceners by equal 
amounts and hence when the widow of a non-renouncing coparcener 
adopts a boy he is entitled to claim his adoptive father's 
share in the entire coparcenary property.
Alienations by sole surviving coparcener (gather) are valid
107In Basawantappa v. Mallappa it was held that 
under the Hindu law, the interest of an adopted son in the family 
property arose from the date of his adoption and accordingly 
he cannot challenge any alienation, even if invalid, effected 
prior to his adoption. Their lordships quoted from Mayne’s 
Hindu law (9th edn. para. 197) to the effect that " till he 
was adopted it might happen that he never would be adopted, 
and when he was adopted, his fictitious birth into his new 
family could not be ante-dated." Also at para. 198 Mayne 
says: ..............................................................
"it would be intolerable that he (such coparcener)
107. (1939) I.L.R. Bom. 245, 252-253.
bOZ.
should he prevented from dealing with his own, 
(interests; on account of a contingency which 
may never happen. When the contingency has 
happened, it would he most inequitable that 
the purchaser should he deprived of rights 
which he obtained from one who, at the time, 
was perfectly competent to grant them".
These passages from Wayne were also referred to by their
108j.ordships in Udhao v Ehaskar ' wherein a will by the last
surviving coparcener was upheld. In this case it was held
that an adoption by a widow who had been given the power to
adopt will not affect a wrill previously made 'by the husband
and that the adopted son will not be entitled to claim the
properties which were bequeathed under the will. The case of
Wrishnamurthi v Krishnamurthi was followed and Amarendra
109v Sanatan " relied on.
In Bhimatj i v Hannmantrao, following Veer anna v 
layamma^ ^  it was held that the last surviving male member of 
a joint Hindu family was the full owner of all the family 
properties inspite of an unexercised power of adoption 
possessed by the widow of a deceased member; and such survivor 
can alienate all or any of the family properties absolutely 
without the son adopted after the alienation being able to 
question the same. The theory that, on an adoption, the 
adopted son’s rights to property ordinarily relate back to 
the date of his adoptive father's death, does not apply to 
such a case. Their Lordships also referred to Ramchandra v
108. I.L.R. (1946) Nag. 425-
109. (1933) 60 I.A. 242.
110. A.I.R. (1950) Bom. 271.
111. I.L.R. (1929) 52 Had. 398.
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112Shankar wherein Lokur J. observed
"It follows, therefore, that the adopted son 
is entitled to recover his adoptive father's 
share in the family property, subject of course 
to any lawful alienations that might have taken 
place prior to his adoption".
This observation of Lokur J. was also referred to in Vithalbhai
•14 7 111
v. Shivabhai« wherein the decisions in Veeranna's,
5 3 108Krishnamurthi's and Udhao1s cases , (referred to above)
were followed. In this case one G who was the sole surviving
coparcener executed a will by which his wife was to take
possession of the properties after his death and maintain
herself from the income of the properties. After her death
the properties were to go to his two sisters as owners. The
sisters were to redeem properties mortgaged by G. If, however,
a child was born to the wife, it was to be the owner of the
properties. It was held that the two sisters took vested
interest in the properties on the death of G, which was liable
to be divested by the birth of a child to the widov/. The son
adopted by the widov/ after G's death could not question the
disposition of family properties lawfully made by G prior to
his adoption, as being the sole surviving coparcener he v/as
competent to dispose of the properties by a will. A similar
114view was expressed in Narayan v. Padmanabh which is 
discussed at Page 328 above.
112. A.I.E. (1945) Vol. 32 Bom. 229 (P.B.).
113. A.I.E. 1950 Bom. 289.
114. A.I.E. (1950) Bom. 319*
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115In Lai Bahadur v. Ambika Prasad the Judicial
11
Committee held, following Bri.i Rarain v. Mangal Prasad, 
that the sale of part of the family property for discharge of 
mortgages executed by the Plaintiff’s grandfather, not being 
for immoral consideration, were antecedent debts to discharge 
which joint family property could validly be sold*
117In Sri Ea.ia Venkat Surya v • Court of Yfards the 
judicial Committee held that in a Hindu adoption there is no 
implied contract with the natural father that in consideration 
of the gift of his son, the adopter will not make a will* For
a discussion of this case pages 113 to H 5may be referred to.
118In Rani Chhatra Kumari v* Prince Mohan Bikram Shah 
their Lordships of the Privy Council held that if the 
adoptive father contracts with the natural father that in 
consideration of the son being given in adoption, he would 
devise to the adopted son all his properties absolutely and 
then leaves a will under which no properties are left to the 
adopted son but they are left to the testator’s widow; the 
adopted son could not be the owner of the properties merely 
by virtue of the contract but if his natural father had
115. (1925) 52 I.A., 443 (J.C.).
116. (1923) L.R. 51* I.A. 129 ( which explained Ram Chandra
v. BhuT) Singh 11917) L.R. 44 I.A. 126.
117. (1899) 26 I.A., 83 (P.O.).
118. (1931) 58 I.A. 279; (1931) 35 C.W.H. 953, 961 (P.O.).
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obtained a decree against the adoptive father’s estate, the 
adopted son might conceivably have had some remedy against the 
natural father, but he could hardly claim the properties 
from the adoptive father. I think the welfare of the adopted 
child should be a paramount consideration with the Courts in 
dediding whether to allow or disallow such alienations. I 
have already expressed my views on this topic at page 328 
(note 180 ) and at page 127 which may be referred to.
Gift before adoption is valid
1 I Q
The case of Kalyansundaram v. Karuppa  ^before the
Judicial Committee was a case of gift before adoption. A
Hindu executed a deed of gift of part of his immoveable
property and delivered it to the donee. On the following day
he adopted a son. Three days later he registered the deed.
It was held that the gift was valid against the adopted son.
On delivery of the deed to the donee there was acceptance of
the transfer within S.122 of the Transfer of Property Act
1882 and thereupon the gift became effectual subject to its
registration as required by S. 123. Their Lordships approved
the full bench decision of the Bombay High Court in Atmaram 
120v. Yam an wherein it was held
"Where the donor of immoveable property has
119. (1927) 54 I.A. 89.
120. (1925) I.I.E. 49 Bom. 388 (E.B.).
handed over to the donee an instrument of gift 
duly executed and attested, and the gift has been 
accepted by the donee, the donor has no power 
to revoke the gift prior to the registration 
of the instrument".
.lienatidns by sole surviving coparcener (other than the 
adoptive father).
121In naxmibai v Neshavrao the defendant No. l's 
adoptive father died in 1928 leaving him, surviving his 
adopted son (def. No. 1), his two widows (def. Nos. 2 and 3) 
and two other widows of his predeceased undivided brothers 
(defs. 4 and 5)* Prior to his death and before def. No. l's 
adoption he had executed a document in the nature of a testa­
mentary disposition which provided that his wife (def. 2) 
should bring up the adopted son and should manage the property 
till her death in her independant rights and that in case of 
dispute between her and the adojjted son on the latter attaining 
majority, she should take half of the net income and the 
adorned son should take the other half. Shortly after the 
execution of the document he himself adopted defendant ITo. 1 
and executed in his favour a deed of adoption making him 
absolute owner of his entire property and reciting • that his 
wife should manage the property in terms of the will. Disputes 
then arose between def. No. 2 and def. No. 1 which led to a 
suit which ultimately ended in favour of the former wherein it 
was held that she was entitled to the management of the estate 
in terms of the will. In 1935 > a widov; of a predeceased 
brother (def. No. 3) adopted the Flaintiff as a son to her 
deceased husband and in 1937 he brought a suit in order to
121. [194-1]. Bom.. 306.
7recover by partition his one-half share in the suit property. 
Defendants 1 and 2 contended that as the property had been 
disposed of by will before the Plaintiff’s adoption, the 
Ilaintiff could not assert any claim thereto and that at any 
rate he coulc. not claim any relief against defendant Ho. 2 
during her life-time. It was held (1) that the family would 
continue to be joint so long as any widow remained in it with 
power to adopt. (2) that it did not seem right that an 
arrangement, which regulated the rights of defendant ho. 2 
vis-a-vis defendant ho. 1 should affect the other coparceners 
in the joint family acquiring that status by birth or adoption.
The case of I rishnamurthy v ICrishnamurthy was
referred to. (p) that accordingly the rights or claims of 
the Plaintiff who was subsequently adopted in the family and 
who v/as not a party to the arrangement would not be affected 
by it.
122However, in 3ah pond a v Anna the Bombay High 
Court held that under the Hindu law, alienation of joint 
family property by the sole surviving coparcener cannot be 
challenged by a subsequently adopted son to a predeceased 
coparcener in the family by the widov/ of the said coparcener. 
The power of the sole surviving coparcener to treat the 
property as his absolute property and to deal with it as such 
was not fettered by the contingency of an adoption being made 
by a widov/ inthe family. In this case one B died leaving two 
sons R and IT. R died in 1921 leaving his widow . N died 
in 1929 leaving a son A and his widow S0. A died 2 years 
later; he was then unmarried and a minor. His mother who
1-22. /| /•/?- 1 9 6 $ B f r A/.g, 7 t u  ■C.ocie. h  c iu c u ^ e d
cl -€ tcilC fip'izoM- •
5  o ?
succeeded to the joint family property adopted the defendant
in 194-1 as son to her deceased husband. In 1945 the defendant
alienated some joint family properties. About two months
thereafter Sn the widow of R adopted the Plaintiff and the
latter filed a suit challenging the alienation’s made by the
defendant. It was held that the principle of relation back
that an adopted son’s rights to property ordinarily relate
back to the date of the adoptive father's death, did not apply
to alienation^ made by the sole surviving coparcener’s of
joint family prior to the date of adoption and that therefore
the alienation^ made by the defendant could not be challenged
by the Plaintiff. The Bombay High Court was inclined to be
conservative and to see no reason to follow Krishnamurthi v 
125
Dhruwaraj further than necessary.
I am mnable to agree with the decision of the Bombay
122high Court in . Bahgonda v Anna wherein alienations by a 
sole surviving coparcener (other than the adoptive father) 
have been held valid and binding on a subsequently adopted
son. This decision is clearly contrary to ihe Supreme Court
125
decision in Krishnamurthi v Dhruwaraj and to Yaj;navalkya 
(Ch. II, V, 120 quoted at page  ^ . Besides it is extremely
unjust on the adopted son who sacrifices his interests in his 
natural family, and whose adoptive father being dead, has to 
rely mainly on his deceased adoptive father's property for 
subsistence and to build up his future career. I  have 
maintained a similar view in the discussion on this tonic 
in Chapter "VI and also on page / of this Chapter which may 
be referred to.
123. A.I.R. 19*62 S.C. 59•
The Law under the Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act 1956.
Section 15 of the Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance 
Act 1^56 provides that unless there is an agreement to the 
contrary an adoption does not deprive the adoptive father or 
other of the power to dispose of his or her property inter 
vivos or by will. The section therefore deals with (i) power 
to dispose of their property by the parents and (ii) with ante- 
adoption agreements.
(i) Power to dispose of property by the parents
As regards the power to dispose of their property, 
it will depend upon whether the property was separate or 
coparcenary property of the adoptive parent and so also will 
depend the right of the adopted child with respect to it.
Under the law prior to recent enactments, which has been 
dealt with above, under the Bayabhaga school the father had 
the power to dispose of all the joint family property by 
transfer inter vivos or by will. So also could a person 
governed by the Mitakshara, so far as his separate property 
was concerned, subject to any ante-adoption agreements to the 
contrary. But he could not do so in respect of his coparcenary 
property nor could he alienate his share in the joint family 
property by means of a will. But if he (i.e. the father) 
were a sole surviving coparcener and alienated the property 
before the adoption of the child then such an alienation would
5fo
124 /i n“be valid. As under the prior Hindu law/so far as males
were concerned, so also under the present law, a Hindu by
adopting does not deprive himself of the power he had to
dispose of his separate property by gift or will; as in respect
of such property the adopted son does not in any way stand
in a better position than the natural son. Also the will of
a Hindu disposing of his separate property is not revoked
by the subsequent adoption of a son by him.
As regards alienation of coparcenary property by
the adoptive father, if it is alienated before the adoption
is made, it will be binding on the adopted son, adopted after
124the date of alienation. Also in the case of Bombay and
I'.adras where a coparcener can dispose of his coparcenary 
interest for value, it will be valid and binding on the 
adopted son. So also a father can make a transfer by will 
only to the extent of his interest in coparcenary property 
under S. 30 of the Hindu Succession Act 1956 and such a 
disposition will be binding on the adopted son. As already 
discussed above, where the last male owner makes a valid
124. Veeranna v Sayamma A.I.R. 1929 l ad. 296; I.L.R. 52 Had. 
398; Babagonda v Anna (1966) 69 Bom. L.R. 523* However 
if the sole surviving coparcener were a person other 
than the adoptive father it has been laid down by 
the Supreme Court in Krishnamurthi v Dhruwara.j (A.I.R. 
1962 S.C. 59 at p. 61) that a coparcenary continues 
to subsist as long as there is in existence a widow 
of a coparcener capable of bringing a son into existence 
by adoption, and if the widow made an adoption, the 
rights of the adopted son are the same as if he had 
been in existence at the time when his adoptive father 
died and that his title as coparcener prevails as 
against the title of any person claiming as heir to 
the last coparcener.
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bequest of his property and a son is adopted by his widow 
after his death, the adopted son is bound by the disposition
p o
in the will. "’ Apart from the above mentioned powers of 
alienation, the power of the father to make alienations of 
coparcenary property will be restricted by the law relating 
to alienations of joint family property.
(ii) Ante-adoption agreements curtailing the rights of the 
adopted son.
If the adopted son is a major at the time of
adoption he can consent to a limitation of his rights in the
1 PR "1 PR
property of the adoptive parents. In Kashibai v Tatya
their lordships of the Bombay High Court observed that there
appeared to be no particular authority in which the legal
position of such adopted son is formally considered but in
74Visalakshi1s case, Sri Subramania Ayyar, officiating C.U.
and Benson J. in making a reference to the full bench expressed
':he following opinion upon the point.
"Except where the person given in adoption is 
of full age and assents to the conditions and 
agreements between the parties giving and 
receiving a case which would be very rare, and 
in which such assent would preclude any question 
like the present being raised, the transaction 
would take place without any reference to the 
adopted son's will and consent".
125In this case " the adopted son who was of full age, having 
deliberately accepted the family arrangement and its advantages, 
their Lordships observed, must be held to it.
Under the prior law, where the adopted son was a 
minor, an agreement to the effect that the widow was to enjoy 
her husband's property during her lifetime or for a less
1-23• •kashibai v fatya' (1916)' I.t.’R. 40 Bom. 668.
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126period was held to be valid.  ^ If the arrangement went 
beyond this i.e., either gave the widow the property absolutely 
or to strangers then such an arrangement, in the absence of 
custor to that effect was invalid. Subsequently the Madras 
High Court held that the rule would not apply where a portion
127
only of the property is settled on the adoptive widow absolutely. 
An arrangement going beyond the above limit was not void, it
128could be ratified by the adopted son on his attaining majority!^ ?
128In Gopal Das v Sri Thakurji the Privy Council held that 
stipulations made by the adoptive mother to the effect that 
she should retain all her rights in her husband's property 
may be assumed to be invalid as against a minor adoptive son, 
but that the latter could, when he comes of age assent to any 
stipulation made by the adoptive mother or make any new 
bargains with her. Now, under the provisions of the Hindu 
Succession Act 1956, a widow has absolute rights in the 
property devolving on her and under proviso (c) to Sec. 12, 
an adopted son would not divest any person of any estate 
vested in any person before the adoption. The question 
remains, whether adoption now is generically like adoption 
before, and that it is against the spirit of Hindu law to 
allow as an adoption a transaction where either the boy/girl 
or his/her guardian agree to "half-a-loaf".
However in respect of the Joint family law to the
of
extent to which it has not been affected by the provisions/the
126. Erishnamurthi v Kri shnamurthi A.I.R. 1927 P.O. 159*
127. T. Ra.ju v Nagammal A.I.R. 1928 Mad. 1289,
128. Ram as ami v V e nk a t ar am a i y an (1879) I.I-.R. 2 Mad. 91; 
Gopal 'as v Sri Thai ur.ji (194-5) 41 ,A.L.J. 292 (P.O.)..
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Hindu Succession Act 1956> the old law and decisions stand.
English Law on the subject.
Under the English law the parent or parents (adopting 
Jointly) do not lose any right in respect of disposition of 
their properties as a result of the adoption. There is in 
English law, no counterpart to the Hindu Joint family system 
v:he.rein a son acquires an equal right with his father in the 
Joint family property from the moment of his birth or adoption 
and as such can set aside his father's unlawful alienations 
of Joint family property.
Also whilst under the Hindu system, adoptions are 
the result of private arrangements between the adoptive 
parents and the natural parents or guardians of the child, 
under the English lav; adoptions are as a result of Court 
orders which are made after following a rigorous procedure 
to ascertain that the adoi:tion is for the benefit of the child. 
Under the English law the adoption becomes final the moment 
an Adoption order is made by the Court, before making which
the Court has to satisfy itself that no money has exchanged
of Adoption Act 1958) 
hands (S. 7(1 Usually the natural and adoptive parents
never seem to come together or to know each other, hence the
possibilities of money exchanging hands in an English adoption
is extremely remote. Also as a consequence of 3. 7(1)(c) of
the Adoption Act 1958 the parties in an adoption where money
changed hands would be liable for prosecution.
It would therefore appear that on this topic the
English and the Hindu laws stand on entirely different footings
and an adoption under the English law in no way affects the
rights of the adoptive parents to deal with their properties
as they like.
CHAPTEH IX
EFFECTS Off ADOPTION IN FORMS OTHER THAN THE DATTAKA
Before the Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act,
1956, adoptions in forms other than the Lattaka were also 
recognised* These were the Kritrima, the LvylSmushyay ana * 
the customary adoptions in the Punjab and the Illstom adoption 
of a son-in-law in Madras and Andhra. The effects of adoption 
under these forms were as follows:
i
Effects of Adoption in the Kritrima form:
Kritrima adoption recognised in the Sastras
The Kritrima son is described by Manu as follows:
f,He is considered as a son made (or adopted) 
whom a man takes as his own son, the boy being 
equal in class with filial virtues, acquainted 
with the merit (of performing obsequies to his . 
adopter) and with (the) sin (of omitting them”•
The Mitakshara defines him thus
"The son made (Kritrima) is one adopted by the 
person himself, who is desirous of male issue; 
being enticed by the show of money and land, 
and being an orphan without father and mother: 
for, if they be living, he is subject to their 
control"•
The I) at taka M imams a says that in the present Kaliyuga only
two kinds of sons are recognised viz., the Aurasa and the son
5 4given and the term 'son given' is inclusive- of the son made.
1. Also refer to Mayne's Hindu Law (11th edn.) pp. 278-280;
Grupte: Hindu Law in British India (2nd ed.) pp. 942, 1029-1052 
Kan~s!6; History of Lharmastra, Vol. Ill (1946; p.660; Berrett* 
Introduction to Modem Hindu Law (1963) paras. 146, 186,200, 
and Kapur's Hindu Law of Adoption in India and Burma,
(1933) P. 620-29.
1a Manu IX 169.
2. Mit. XI, 17.
!
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Conditions for the validity of a Kritrima adoption
15
Gokkul v Mst. Janki, their Lordships of the
Patna High Court observed no ceremonies were necessary to
the validity of a Kritrima adoption. A person could therefore
adopt in this form without any religious ceremonies and
independant of his wife and vice versa, the only requisite
being the consent of both the parties. The consent of the
adoptee, when he was 'sui Juris' was absolutely necessary for
the validity of the adoption, but if he was a minor the adoption
could be made if he had attained years of discretion and his
parents consented to the adoption. This kind of adoption
could as such be made by either a man or a woman, or jointly
by both the husband and wife, but when it was made by a Y/oman
to
it was made to herself and not/the husband and no consent of 
the husband was at all necessary.
Rights of Kritrima son in the adoptive family are liable to 
frustration
In Kanhaya lal v Suga Kuer^ (where a person was 
adopted as a Karta Putra) it was held that such adoptee does 
not take the estate of his adoptive father by virtue of his 
original contract with him. In such a case the only contract 
between the parties v/as as to sonship and the adopted son v/as, 
therefore, liable to be frustrated by an act of the adoptive 
father or by the subsequent birth of a natural born son.
TThere a natural-born son was in existence he was entitled to 
exclude every other kind of son from sharing with him in the
OcO
5 . A.I.E. 1955 Pat. 487.
6 . (1925) I.I.E. 4 Pat., 824, 834.
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7estate of the father.' The Kritrima son did not lose his
o
rights in his natural family. Their Lordships of the Patna
High Court in Kanhaya lal1s case^ observed that the Karta
Putra system was an extension of the Kritrima form of adoption.
There was no doubt, according to their Lordships, that the
system of Karta Putra was an invention of the Mithila Brahmins.
Under this system a person on adoption did not lose his status
in his natural family, though he acquired the status as son of
his adoptive father. Ho ceremonies or sacrifices were necessary
to the validity of this particular form of adoption. All that
was necessary was the consent of the adoptee which involved
the adoptee being an adult. The following passage in Colebrooke's
Digest^ was quoted as stating the position in this particular
form of adoption
"Sons are thus adopted in Mithila, the practice 
of adopting sons given by their parents v/as there 
abolished by Sridatta and Pratihasta, although 
the latter had himself been adopted in this manner. 
Their motive v/as, lest, a child already registered 
in one family, being again registered in another, 
a confusion of families and names should thence 
ensue. A son adopted in the form so briefly 
noticed in the present section, does not lose 
his claim to his own family, nor assume the 
surnafae of his adoptive father: he merely per­
forms obsequies, and takes the inheritance".
The reason for this particular form of adoption in Mithila
is also explained by Macnaghten as follows
7. Kullam Singh v Kirpa Singh (1795) 1 Sel. Rep.H, Mussam 
Sutputtee v Indranund Jha (1816) 2 Sel. Rep. 222; and 
Ooman Put v Kunhia Singh (1822) 2 Sel. Rep. 192-referred 
to
8. Sastri’s H.L. of Adoption (1916 edn.) 4-4-7•
9. Bk. V. , Ch. IV, Sec. 10 cited in G.S. Sastri’s Adoption 
2nd Edition (1916) p. 4-47*
10. Macnaghten1 s Hindu Lav/, Vol. I, 95-100............   . . .
"But according to the doctrine of Yachaspati, 
whose authority is recognised in Mithila, a 
woman cannot, even with the previously obtained 
sanction of her husband, adopt a son after his 
death, in the dattaka form, and to this prohibi­
tory rule may be traced the origin of the practice 
of adopting in the Kritrima form, which is there 
prevalent. This form requires no ceremonies to 
complete it, and is instantaneously perfected 
by the offer of the adopting, and the consent 
of the adopted party. It is natural for every 
man to expect an heir, so long as he has life 
and health, and hence it is usual for persons, 
when attacked by illness, and not before, to 
give authority to their wives to adopt. But 
in Mithila, where this authority would be unavail­
able, the adoption is performed by the husband 
himself; and recourse is naturally had to that 
form of adoption which is most easy of performance, 
and therefore less likely to be frustrated by 
the impending dissolution of the party desirous 
of adopting".
Their Lordships of the Patna High Court in Kanhaya
lal* s case,^ observed, that the rights of the adopted son
would seem to depend on the contract between him and his
adoptive father, and the question was what was that contract.
Counsel for Appellant relied upon a decision in Kullan Singh
v Kirpa Singh. ^  In answer to a question put by the Court
in that case the Pandit thus described the ceremony of.......
adoption in this particular form:
"Let the person (intending to adopt) first consult 
a Brahmin, and having discovered a propitious 
moment, let him, in the presence of the Brahmin, 
and of some friends or relatives, place something 
in the hands of the person to be adopted, and 
say to him 'be thou my adopted son; my goods 
and effects shall become thy property': the
person adopted will reply, 'I agree to become 
thyy son'." The Counsel for Appellant relied 
upon the fact that it was part of the contract 
that the adoptive father says: "my goods and
effects shall become thy property".
According to their Lordships opinion the passage upon which
Counsel for the Appellant relied upon did not establish that
1-1; (1795) 1 Sel. Rep. 11.
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succession to the estate of the adoptive father was inherent ,
in the status of a Karta putra. Also it seemed to his
Lordship (Das J.) that this was not a very correct way to
describe the ceremonies. Their Lordships in Kanhaya Lai1s
case^ next referred to List. Sutputee v Indranund^ and Ooman
Putt v Kunhia^ (mentioned above) wherein the ceremony is thus
described: "The prescribed form for adopting a Kritrima son
is as follows. In an auspicious hour let him bathe, and also
cause the person whom he wishes to adopt to be bathed, let
him present something at his pleasure, and say 'Be you my
son', and let the son answer, 'I am become your son'. Then
let him, according to custom, give a suit of clothes to the
son. These are the legal conditions of adoption^and then
7
it is said in List. Sutputtee v Indramundy "the adopted son
will inherit the property of his adoptive father, even although
the latter have a widow". This is accepted by Ivlayne as the
ceremony in the Kritrima form of adoption. He says as folows:
"At an auspicious time, the adopter of a son
......... having bathed addressing the person to be adopted,
who has also bathed, and to whom he has given 
some acceptable chattel, says 'Be my. son1. He 
replies: 'I am become thy son'. The giving of
some chattel to him arises merely from custom.
It is not necessary to the adoption. The consent 
of both parties is the only requisite: and a
set form of speech is not essential".12
Therefore it seemed to his Lordship in Kanhaya Lai's case^
that it cannot be urged that the Plaintiff took the estate
of the adoptive father by virtue of his original contract
with him.
The mext question was whether he was stLtitled to 




question different Smriti writers had laid down different
rules, hut their lordships were concerned in the case with
the rule in the Mithila school. After quoting various Smriti
writers, Vachaspati Misra, who is of paramount authority in
Mithila, says as follows:
’’Manu and other legislators have said that, not­
withstanding other kinds of sons, the legitimate 
son alone receives the whole estate of his father, 
hut they have also declared that the other sons 
are sharers of the estate. To remove this con­
tradiction it must he understood that, if the 
legitimate son he virtuous, he shall receive 
the whole estate without giving a share to the 
others, hut if he he void of good qualities, and 
others possess them, they are entitled to have 
their respective shares, as has heen stated 
ahove".
In the opinion of las J. this was conclusive of the rights
of the parties in the litigation.
As to the contention that to entitle the natural 
son to succeed, he must show he is virtuous, in this case 
the question did not arise as the natural son died soon after 
hirth. If this particular form of adoption was the same as 
the Kritrima form, this passage in the Yivada Chintamani . . 
(Tagore’s edition, p. 287) was conclusive of the rights of 
the parties. If it was not the same as the Kritrima form, 
as las J. was inclined to think, the rule laid down by 
Vachaspati Misra must still apply since he had made it clear
that where a natural born son was in existence, he was entitled
to exclude every other kind of son from sharing with him in 
the estate of his father.
13In Mst. leepoo v Gowree Shunker  ^it was held that 
according to Hindu law, the Kritrima son or, as is vulgarly
1 3 . (1824-) 3 S.D. 410.
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called, a Karta son, retained the right of succession and 
of presenting the funeral cake, both in the family of his 
natural and of his own adopting father. Their Lordships 
referred to Roodradharopadhyaya cited in the Su4dhi Yiveka
h
as an authority on the point
"Such son (alluding to the Kritrima) offers 
the funeral cake to the person who adopts him, 
hut the office of presenting the funeral cake 
to his own father and other relations still 
continues nevertheless".
It would appear from a perusal of the Smriti texts 
that the authors of the Srnritis are silent as to the effects 
of adoption of the Kritrima son in the natural and adoptive 
families. But according to the views of ancient writers 
mentioned above and custom, the Kritrima son retains his 
right to offer funeral oblations and to inherit to his natural 
father and other relations. In view of this fact it seems 
equitable that if the adoptive father has an Aurasa son the 
latter should be entitled to exclude the Kritrima from sharing 
with him in the estate of his father.
Kritrima adoption by wife does not make the adoptee the son 
of her husband
In Sreenarain v Bhya Hha^  it was held that a person
being adopted by the wife did not thereby become the adopted
son of the husband and vice versa. Their Lordships observed
that it was not stated in any law tract nor was it according
to the usage in Llithila that a person adopted by a wife with
or without the husband's permission became the adopted son
of her husband. The adopted son of a widow succeeds to her
14. (1012) 2 S.D. 29, 54.
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stridhan but not to the property of her husband, i'he Pandit 
of the Court gave the folloy/ing exposition of the law on the 
point
"If a man appoint another his adopted son that 
person, so adopted, stands in the relation to 
him of a son, and offers up his funeral oblations, 
and is heir to his estate, but the person, so 
appointed, does not become the adopted son of 
the adopter's wife, nor ®es he offer funeral 
oblations to her, nor ducceed to her property.
If a woman appointed an adopted son, he stands 
in the relation to her of a son, offers to her 
funeral oblations, and is heir to her estate; 
but he does not become the adopted son of her 
husband, nor offer to him funeral oblations, 
nor succeed to his property. If a husband and 
wife Jointly appoint an adopted son, he stands 
in the relation of son to both, and is heir to 
the estate of both. If the husband appoint one 
person, and the wife another, adopted son, they 
stand in the relation of a son to each of them 
respectively, and do not perform the ceremony 
of offering funeral oblations, nor succeed to 
the estate of the husband and wife Jointly; 
such is the usage of Mithila".
15In Collector of Tirhoot v Huropershad I.lohunt ^ it
was held that under the Eindu law current in Iiithila, a Hindu
widow has the power to adopt a son in the Kritrima form with
or without her husband's consent, but such a son would not
by virtue of such adoption, lose his position in his own
family, nor would he succeed to the property left by the
husband of his adoptive mother, but would be considered her
son and entitled to succeed to her only. Macnaghten, speaking
of the Kritrima form of adoption, remarks in Vol I, p. 76 of
his Hindu law thus:
"Another peculiarity of this species of adoption 
is that a person adopted in this form by the 
widow does not thereby become the adopted son
15. (1867) 7 W.R. 500 referred to in Mela Singh v Gurdas 
(1922) I.I.E. 5 lah. 562 (E.B.).
jof the husband, even though the adoption should 
have been permitted by the husband” ,
and again at p. 100-101, he says
”But it does not appear that the prohibition 
in mithila which prevails against her receiving 
a son in adoption according to the Pattaka form, 
even with the previous sanction of her husband, 
he being dead, extends to her receiving a boy 
in adoption according to the Kritrima form, - 
and the son so adopted will perform her obsequies 
and succeed to her peculiar property though not 
to that of her deceased husband”.
It may be observed here how in the respect of
succession to the adopter's property, the effects of an
adoption in the Kritrima form by the husband or wife is
similar to the effect of an adoption by a husband or wife
under the English lav/. Eor according to Section 17 of the
Adoption Act 1958, unless the adoption is made by two spouses
jointly, the adoptee is considered as the child of the person
who actually adopts it, and the adopted child's rights of
inheritance arise only through such adoptin g parent, which
is akin to an adoption in the Kritrima form mentioned above;
and unlike an adoption in the Dattaka form where the adoption
by the widow makes the child the adopted child of her deceased
husband also, his adoption 'relating back' to the death of
the deceased adoptive father for purposes of succession to
his property.
Kpitrima son inherits adopter's property to the exclusion of 
his wife
   1 1g
In Smt. Sabitri v Mrs. E.A. Savi their Lordships 
of the Patna High Court quoted from the Pandit of the Sudder
16. A.I.R. 1933 Pat. 506, 394-5.
I J5~2 3
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14Bewanny Adawlut's exposition in Sreenarain v Bhya Jha
(quoted above at p. $2.1 ) and observed that the husband can.
ddopt in this form without any religious ceremonies and
independent of the wife and vice versa, and the Kritrima son
adopted by the husband takes his property as heir to the
exclusion of the wife. A son adopted in thedattaka form -
17a form which was not yet obsolete in Mithila ' also excluded 
the wife, but unlike the Kritrima son he became a member of 
the adopter's family and thus incurred obligation to the 
adoptive father's wife. The Mithila husband's power to adopt 
a Kritrima son to himself and thus prevent his wife from
t
succeeding to his property, observed their Lordships, goes far
to show that her interest in his property is even v/eaker than
under the Mitakshara.
16This case was referred to by their Lordships of
18the Patna High Court on Gokhul v Lit. Janki, wherein their 
Lordships observed that no ceremonies were necessary to the 
validity of a Kritrima adoption. A person, therefore, could 
adopt in this form without any religious ceremonies and inde­
pendant of his wife and vice versa, the only requisite being 
the consent of both the parties. The consent of the adoptee,
when he was ' sui Juris' v;as .absolutely necessary for the
validity of the adoption, but if he was a minor, the adoption
could be made if he had attained years of discretion and his
parents consented to the adoption. This kind of adoption could 
be made by either a man or a woman, or jointly by both the 
husband and wife, but when it was made by a v/oman, it was made
17. See Chandreshwar Prasad v Bisheswar Partap (1926) I.L.R.
. . t ive. .777. ............ •......................................
18. A.I.R. 1955 Pat. 48?.
: stt. if.
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to herself and not to her husband and no consent of the husband
was at all necessary. Their Lordships observed that by his
adoption the adoptee became the son of the adopter, and he was
not entitled to claim any relationship, or any right of
succession to any one other than the adopter in the new
family. The ’Karta-putra1 inherited his adoptive father1s
properties as his heir, if there be no natural son, to the
exclusion of his wife and at the same time he did not lose
his rights of inheritance in his natural family. In such a
case the only contract between the parties was as to sonship
and the adopted son was, therefore, liable to be frustrated
by an act of the adoptive father, or by the subsequent birth
of a natural-born son. Where a natural-born son was in
existence he was entitled to exclude every other kind of son
iq
from sharing whith him in the estate of his father. '
Kritrima relationship confined to contracting parties.
When the sons of a certain person, who had been 
adopted as a Kritrima son, sought to set aside certain alien-
i
ations of self-acquired property which the adoptive father
had made, on the double ground that as grandsons they had an
interest in that property and that the alienations a were for
20improper purposes, it was held that as the alienations were 
proved to be for legitimate purposes and the relationships 
established by the Kritrima form of adoption were fonfined 
to the contracting parties and did not extend beyond them on
19- Smt. Sabitri v list. Savr, A.I.R. 1953 Fat. 306 (see note 
1$ above) and Kanhaya lal-v Suga Kuer (1925) I.L.R. 4- 
Pat. 824 (see note 6 above) referred to.
20’. Jus want v Pop lee Chund (1882) 25 K.R. 255-
j 5“
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either side, the Plaintiffs in this case had no right to set 
aside the alienation's which the adoptive father of their 
father had made. Their Lordships observed that under the 
Hindu law as laid down in Macnaghten Vol. I, p. 76 and also 
in a previous decision of the Court in Vol. 8 of the weekly 
Reporter the relation of the Kritrima son extended to the 
contracting parties only, and the son so adopted will not be 
considered the grandson of his adoptive father's father, nor 
will the son of the adopted son be considered the grandson 
of the latter's adopting father. It was also clear to their 
Lordships that under the Hindu law the Kritrima son does not 
inherit collaterally.
Kritrima son does not succeed collaterally
21So also in List. Shib Koeree v Joogun Singh it was 
held that a son adopted in the Kritrima form in the I.Iithila 
province, does not become a member of the adopting family so 
far as collateral heirship was concerned, the relationship of 
the Kritrima for the purposes of inheritance extending to the 
contracting parties only. A Kritrima adopted son, when adopted 
by a widow with or without the authority of her husband, cannot 
in any case succeed to more than his adoptive mother's property, 
and has no claim to that of collateral's. Macnaghten in his 
work on Hindu lav/ (Chapter VI on Adoption, Wilson's Edition 
p. 79) says:
In Mithila where the 'Kritrima' form of adoption 
prevails, there is no sort of restriction except 
as to tribe, but he (i.e. the adopted son) as 
well as his issue continues after the adoption 
to be considered a member of his natural family
21. (1867) 8 V/.R. 155.
and takes the inheritance both of his own family 
and of his adopting father” (vide also 3 Select 
Reports 307)*
Again
"Another peculiarity of this species (i.e. the 
'Kritrima') of adoption by a widow, is that 
the person so adopted does not become the adopted 
son of the husband, even though the adoption 
should have been permitted by him",
and again
"The relation of 'Kritrima' son extends to the 
contracting parties only, the son so adopted 
will not be considered the grandson of the adoptive 
father's father, nor will the son of the adopted 
be considered the grandson of his adopting father.
He does not inherit collaterally".
In Sutherland's synopsis of the I) at taka M imams a and
Dattaka Chandrika, we find as a gloss on Sec. YI, 67, Sec. II,
18-19 of these works, the following:
"The 'Dattaka' adopted son ceases to have any 
claim on the family or estate. This rule would 
not apply to the 'Kritrima' adopted son, who 
would necessarily be the son of two fathers".
Again
"The adopted son (Dattaka that is) inherits not 
only of his adoptive father, but likewise lineally 
and collaterally of the near and distant kinsmen 
of that person. This rule would not apply to 
the 'Kritrima' son as usually adopted in the 
Mithila country".
And this amongst other things distinguishes him from the son
given etc. And again■(Note 18, page 228) the 'Kritrima' son
as usually affiliated in the Mithila country, would indeed
take the estate of his adoptive father, but continues a
member of the family of his natural father, and is not
regarded as prolonging the line of his adopter". A.t .
(Note 21, page 229), it is stated,
"in the Dvaita Nirnaya, VsTchaspati Misra declares 
that no relation obtains between the Kritrima 
adopted son and the father of the adopter, from 
........ which it is- inferred that such adopted son'could
not inherit of that person and a fortiori from 
the collateral kinsman of the adopter. The same 
inference in fact results from the Kritrima son 
in question not being considered a member of 
his adopter’s family".
In Colebrooke’s translation of the Mitakshara", thet
following note is found (see Mitakshara", p. 355)
"The son adopted in the form adopted in this 
section i.e., the Kritima, does not lose his 
claim to his own family, or take the surname 
of his adoptive father".
This view was taken by the Sudder Court in the case of
Sreenarain v Bhya Jha~^ where it was held that the person
adopted by the wife as her son, does not become the adopted
son of her husband, or succeed to his property, though the
adoption should have been permitted by the husband; but as
her son, he will succeed to her property. So also in Collector 
ISof Tirhoot case ^ it was held that the Kritrima son, adopted 
by the widow does not lose his position, in his own family nor 
does he succeed to the property of the adoptive mother’s 
husband but is entitled to succeed to her only. In Strange's 
Hindoo law, Vol. II, p. 283? a "Kritima" adoption is spoken 
of in the following terms "Kritima, the son made. In point0
of ceremonial, it is the same with that of the Dattaka, 
omitting the sacrifice or burnt offering which is not performed 
at it. Succeeding partially to the adoptive rights, his 
connection with his natural family by which he has never in 
fact been more than tacitly relinquished remains to the son 
made in full force. And this amongst other things distinguishes 
him from the son given. Initiation into the family of the 
adopter is not practised where alone this form of adoption is 
at this day, generally speaking, in use, namely in the Mithila 
country whatever might be its effect if performed.in .assimi- . .
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lating it more to that of the son given especially in the 
event of its not having previously taken place in the natural 
family of the adopted. In Mithila also the widow is as of 
right at liberty to adopt without special authority for the 
purpose, the adopted in this case succeeding to her exclusive 
property only; not to that of her deceased husband, to vhom 
he is not considered in any way related".
21Their Lordships in Shib Koeree's case, observed 
that there was, thus, a strong current of authority for the 
dictum that a Kritrima adopted son, when adopted by a widow 
with or without the authority of her husband, cannot in any 
case succeed to more than his adoptive mother's property, and 
had no claim to that of collaterals. The Kritrima adoption 
has peculiar effects flowing from customary lav/. As the 
Kritrima adoption is the result of a contract between the 
parties, the rights of succession of the Kritrima son are 
limited to the property of his adopter. Also as such a son 
does not lose his position in his natural family including 
his rights of inheritance in that family, there seems to be 
nothing unfair in not giving him any rights in the property 
of a person other than his adopter in the adoptive family or 
in denying him rights to succeed collaterally in the adoptive 
family. It would be interesting to observe how the peculiar 
effects of the Kritrima adoption are in many respects similar 
to the effects of adoption in some of the modern States e.g. 
Massachusetts and Virgin Islands of the U.S.A., Tasmania,
Hew Zealand etc. discussed above in Chapter III (pages 
n •)j I.e. the adopted child inherits from the adoptive 
parent but not from the adopters relatives.
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Customary adoptions in the Punjab
The effects of adoption under the Punjab Customary 
Law have been discussed in Chapter II, pages 86 to 87 ; Chapter 
III, pages 137 to 138 , and Chapter V, pages 214 to 224 which 
may be referred to.
Customary adoptions in Southern India
Rights of adoptee are governed by custom
Prior to the Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act 
1956 several customary adoptions were recognised in Southern 
India. These were the adoptions according to the Aliyasanthana, 
the IIarumakatthayam or the LTambudri schools. In G-opinath v 
Santhamma their Lordships of the Madras High Court held that 
the object of an adoption according to the Aliyasanthana 
school of Hindu law was secular and not religious. But the 
religious motive was not totally excluded. The object being 
to perpetuate the tarwad, females were oft Jen taken in adoption. 
Though such adoption resembled the Kritrima form it did not 
mean that all the incidents of a Kritrima adoption were 
attached to an adoption in an Aliyasanthana family. The law 
applicable to an adoption in an Aliyasanthana family was 
essentially customary, whether an adopted person in an 
Aliyasanthana family lost his right of inheritance in the 
natural family could be decided only/the evidence of custom. 0 
Being a customary form of adoption its incidents and legal 
effects on the rights to property could be decided according 
to the custom prevailing in particular families governed by 
such systems of law. The concept of adoption was one derived 
under the Hindu law and the effect of adoption was that the 
adopted son occupied the same position in the adoptive family 
as a natural born son. The normal rule in every case of
Zz. (1956) 2 li.L.J. 38.
2S3- Mayne’s Hindu Law and Usage, 11th edition p. 980;





adoption, whether sahctioped by law or by custom, or usage,
was that it effected a severance of the adoptee from the
family of his birth. Their Lordships observed that if there
was any custom contrary to this rule it was for those who
relied on such custom to establish it. Their Lordships
relied on the following observations of a bench of the Kadras
High Court in Secretary of State for India v Santaraja Shetty^ "^
"Adoption in the case of persons governed by 
the Aliyasanthana law is very different from 
adoption in the case of persons governed by 
the Hindu law; in the former, the main, if not 
the only object of adoption is to nominate a 
person to succeed to the property. There is 
an absence of religious motive which must accompany 
a valid adoption governed by the.Hindu law.
Hence it seems to us that in the case of jjersons 
governed by the Aliyasanthana law adoption is but 
slightly different from the nomination of a 
successor".
Also Illadhavan Hair J. in Seetha Heithyar v Kelu Iienon^ ~^ 
observed
"Hhen the text-writers say that the form of 
adoption resembles the Kritrima form I think 
what they purport to emphasise mainly is this, 
that the adoption is based purely on secular 
motives and that it. has no religious significance, 
and nothing more. As I have said, the law 
applicable to the case being esdentially a 
customary law, the question can be decided only 
by having recourse to evidence as to custom in 
the absnnce of texts or express decisions of 
this Court".
2^ .Their Lordships in Gopinath1s case ■ observed that the likening 
of adoption under the Aliyasantana system to that of Kritrima 
adoption did not mean that all the incident's of Kritrima 
adoption were attached to the customary adoption among those 
who were governed by the Aliyasanthana system and that the
21*.. (1913) 25 K.L.J. 411 at 422. 
$S: (1939) 2 K.L.J. 697-......
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adoptee retains the rights to his property in the natural
family. As observed by Madhaven Nair J. (see above), adoption
being based on customary law, whether the adoptee retained his
rights in the natural family has to be proved.
22Gopinath1s case has been discussed by Derrett in
an article entitled ’’Adoption in Aliyasanthana law. An
26Illustration of the relation between custom and Law,”
wherein the learned author disagrees with the learned Judge’s
view that such adoptee loses rights in the natural family.
Derrett observes that on examining the various subsidiary sons
catalogued by Manu and others the only one who is specifically
debarred from taking his natural father’s property is the 
27dattaka, and the mention of the dattaka in this way clearly 
shows that the other secondary sons were not cut off for the 
purposes of inheritance from their natural families. Further 
Derrett observes that adoptions in Malabar are clearly not 
dattaka adoptions at all. They are based on ancient pre-Aryan 
customs and quotes a number of instances of effects of customary 
adoptions in S. India, Ceylon and Jaffna and opines that these 
and other instances lead to the inevitable conclusion that there 
was no basis for the learned Judge’s presumption that all 
undocumented adoptions must prima facie be of the 'complete 
transfer* type.
I am, however, inclined to agree with their lordships’ 
decision as being more in consonance with equity and justicd.
For in the case of Aliyasanthana and Marumakhathayam adoptions 
the adoptee becomes a member of a new larwad and acquires full 
rights therein and it would be but equitable that he should be 
deemed to have renounced his rights in the old larwad.
26. /l956j2 M.L.J. J. 97 ff. See also Machingal v. M. Kelu
A.I.R. 1939 Mad. 564. ..............................
27'. ' Manu IX, '142'.
533
Severance from natural family - Marumakhathayam Law
no
In Lekshmi v. Naravani their lordships observed
that the very notion of adoption, both under the Hindu law
and the Marumakhathayam laws that the adopted was completely
severed from his original family and became a member of the
adoptive family and that under the Marumakhathayam law there
was no such thing as a person being a member of the larwad
and not a member of it at the same time. If a person was a
member of the Tarwad he was entitled to partake in all the
rights which the members of the Tarwad had, including the
right to succeed to the separate properties of another member
who had left no heir to such properties.
It will be seen from a perusal of the above cases
that in case of the customary adoptions in Southern India,
unlike the Kritrima adoptions or the customary adoptions under
the Punjab law, such an adoption like the Dattaka adoption
has the effect of complete severance of the adoptee from the 
op
natural family to the'adopter's family and such an adoptee
is entitled to partake in all the rights which a member has
including the right to succeed to the separate property of 
28another member.
28. A.I.R. 1955 N.U.C. (Trav-Co.) 3482. Also a similar 
opinion was expressed in Velayudhan v. Nilakantham 
A.I.R. N.U.C. CTrav-C) 1lbl. See also Y.N. Subramanya 
Iyer; Hindu Law, 1952, 393.
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Nambudris governed by Hindu law as modified by custom
As to adoption among Nambudri Brahmins, in Vasudevan
pq
v. The Secretary of State for India.  ^ the last male member
of the illam died about 1859? leaving defendant No. 1 and her
mother the sole surviving member of the illam. Defendant
No.1 had been previously married to a member of another illam
by a sarvasvadanam marriage, but her husband died without
issue. In 1872, defendant No.1 and her mother appointed
defendant No.2 an adult member of a third illam, to be
manager and heir of their illam and raise up issue for it.
In a suit by the Secretary of State to declare a right of
escheat of the property of the Nambudri illam, it was held
by the Madras High Court that the Nambudri Brahmins were
governed by Hindu lav/, as modified by special customs adopted
30by them since their settlement in Malabar^ and that there 
was sufficient evidence of a custom that a Nambudri widow 
could adopt or appoint an heir in order to perpetuate her 
illam in the absence of 'dayadies* with ten or three days 
pollution, and the appointment of defendant No.2 was valid 
against the Crown.
In Neelkantan v. Velayudhan 5lhe Supreme Court has held 
that in a Sarvasvadanam marriage the daughter retains all the 
rights in the family properties in spite of her marriage, in the 
same way as a son does and if there was an agreement to that
29. (1888) I.I.E. 11 Mad. 157.
30. Ihandavan v. Valliamma (1892) I.I.E. 15 Mad. 336;
Chemnautha v. Palakuzhu (1902) I.l.R. 25 Mad. 662 (wherein 
Vasudevan v. Secretary of State of India at note 29 above 
was referred to).
31. A.I.R. 1958 S.C. 832 .
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effect the son-in-law will also become a member of the family.
In Hambudri custom the appointment of the daughter herself
as Putrika was not used. Only the arrangement with the
bridegroom was made whereby the issue would be, as it were,
•52adoptive issue of the appointing father of the bride' •
Adoption of the Resident Son-in-law and the Illatom.
The ’adoption* of the son-in-law, known as the 
Illatom in Madras and Andhra Pradesh, the Sarvasvadanam in Kerala 
and the Gharjamai in Punjab, Bihar, Western India and Bengal is 
another form of customary ’adoption1.
The Patna High Court laid down^that there were two 
most important elements of fact which were necessary to 
constitute the status of a Ghar-damad which were first, that 
there must be the definite intention on the part of the parties
32. Also see article by J.D.M. Derrett entitled ’’Sarvasvadanam 
Marriage and the rights of children born of it.”
[1967] K.L.T., J, 63-66.
33. Naika Uraon v. Butna Uraon (1930) I*L.R. 9 Pat. 683«
t£at tg.at status should he acquired, and secondly, that the
person adopted as a ghardamad should, in the same way as a
Hindu who is adopted as a son, definitely forego his'title
to succeed to any property of his natural father.
In the Punjab where the usage of Khana-damad is
recognised; the purpose is to benefit the daughter and her
male issue. It was observed in ITanda Singh v Kheta^
"The custom of Ehana-damad is designed to benefit 
the daughter and her issue. List. Raman the 
daughter died many years ago and Kharku her husband 
succeeded to the property for life on the equivalent 
of a widow's estate. List. Eaman left no issue, 
male or female, and on Kharku's death it appears 
to us obvious that the property must revert by 
inheritance to her own blood relations. Kharku 
was not her 'heir' by law or custom for anything 
beyond a life estate, and it is clear that if he 
were not her full heir, the sons of Kharku by 
another woman can have no right to succeed to 
their step mother's property".
7r
So also it was remarked in Sazal Ahmad v Pitta
"A Khana-damad certainly does not rank as an 
adopted son; if he did, he would succeed to 
the whole estate and his sons by any wife would 
succeed after his death, no matter whether their 
mother was daughter of their father's adoptive 
father or not, whereas it is beyond.dispute that 
if a Khana-damad had no sons by that wife who 
was daughter of the man who made him a khana-damad 
he certainly could not pass on the estate to his 
sons by another wife. But to assume that because 
a khana-damad does not rank as an adopted son 
he can take nothing except what is expressly 
gifted to him is wrong".
As observed in Eattigan's Digest the Khana damad 
is an institution whereby a sonless man associates with him 
in his life-time his son-in-law, who resides with him,
33- Naika Uraon v Butna Uraon (1950) I.L.R. 9 Pat. 685* 
5$-. (1915) P.R. Ho. 55 p. 209.
56*. (1910) 216 P.L.E. p. 660 quoted in Rattigan's Digest 
(Thirteenth Edition) at p. 4-51.
537
cultivates for him, and eventually succeeds to him for a life-
interest, acting as a means of transmitting the estate to the
36original proprietor's son. Neither the Khana damad nor his
descendants are precluded from claiming a share in ancestral
property of own family, merely by reason of his having succeeded
37his father-in-law.
In the Smritis which lay down the different kinds 
of sons including the various kinds of adopted sons, the 
adoption of the son-in-lav; is nowhere mentioned. It is 
therefore doubtful if the affiliation of the resident son-in-law 
can be considered as an 'adoption' under the strict Smriti law. 
According to the various customary laws e.g. in Punjab, Bihar 
etc. such an affiliation is recognised although the effects 
differ under the various customs as mentioned above.
The Illstom adoption - specific agreement necessary
The custom of taking an Illston son-in-law is
prevalent among the Kamma, Kapus and the Reddi castes in South
* 2 0
India. In Sidda Reddi v. Subbamma their Lordships of the 
Mysore High Court observed that the practice of Illstom was
36. Notes on Punjab Custom by Ellis, 1921 Edition p. 90 
quoted in Rattigan's Digest (13th edn.) p. 451.
37. Rattigan's Digest (13th edn.) p. 457 referring to C.A. 
1064 of 1877; C.A. 141 of 1878; 68 P.R. 1878 i.e.
(1878) P.R. No. 68.
38. (1932) 10 Mys. L.J. 352; Yatrapu Subba Rao v. Pamireddi 
Mahalakshmamma A.I.R. (1930) Mad. 883 referred to.
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a departure from the ordinary Hindu law and accordingly it
lay upon the party claiming to over-ride the provisions of
Hindu law to strictly substantiate his claim and more so
since it could not generally be done by reference to settled
rules of law, as in the case of an ordinary adoption, the
practice of Illstom being of late occurrence and confined to
certain castes. The taking of a son-in -lav/, in Illstom,
especially when the father-in-law had no son, could be done
without theexecution of any document or performance of any
ceremony but it could not be inferred that every son-in-law
who became an inmate of his father-in-law's house, thereby
acquired the status of Illston son-in-law. To constitute a
person an Illstom a specific agreement was necessary. By an
Illstom adoption, it did not follow that in every case the
adopted son took the place of a natural son in every respect.
What his rights should be in regard to the properties of his
father-in-law was a matter of agreement between the parties
38and had to be set up and proved in each case.
39In Gadiyam Narayudu v. Mallavarapu Venkamma, the
Madras High Court observed:
"It 4s hot sufficient to constitute,.a,.person , 
an Iliatbm that he lives iii his father-in-law's 
house, assists his widow after her husband's death 
and is employed by her to pay the Sirkar Khist.
To constitute a person an Illatom, a specific
agreement is necessary".
In Hagi Reddi v. Nan.jundappa^  it was held that the 
Plaintiff having performed his part of marrying the daughter 
and thereafter having been treated as an Illatom son-in-law,
it must be inferred that there was an agreement on the basis
of which the Illatom affiliation was carried out.
39i (1890) 13 Ind. cases 866.
40. A.I.li. 1940 Mad. 761.
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Also the Madras High Court has held in Venkayalapathi
A  *1
v. Negandla that when a boy has been taken into a family on 
the understanding that he would be married to a daughter and 
given the status of an Illatom son-in-law the arrangement may 
be completed by the solemnisation of the marriage even after 
the death of the f at her-in-lav/.
Existence of Illatom no bar to dattaka adoption
A O
In 3J. Krishnamma v. Kamepalli Venkatasubbavva
their lordships of the Privy Council observed that there was
no analogy between adoption proper, the object of which was
primarily religious, and Illatom affiliation, the object of
which was secular only, and the rules of Hindu law did not
apply to the latter, which was regulated solely by custom.
An Illatom son was not a coparcener of the natural born son
or adopted son, though they could live together like an
undivided family. Special custom obtaining in each case or
family could alone sanction the status of an Illatom son and
4.3it must be affirmatively proved as any other disputed fact. ^
An Illatom affiliation was valid even though the affiliator
had a son or an undivided brother living. Where a person had !
several daughters, it was held that he could take an.Illatom, -
son even where he was not hopeless of having male issue
45In Chenchamma v. Subbaya ^it was held that a person 
could adopt a dattaka son though he had affiliated an Illatom; 
and that although an Illatom son-in-law and a son adopted into
41. (1911) 11 I.C. 25.
42. (1919) 51 I.e. 1 (P.O.)
43« Hanumantamrna v. Rami Reddi (1881) I.I.E. 4 Mad. 272.
44. Hanumantamma v. Rami Reddi (1881) I.I.E. 4 Mad. 272.
the same family may live in commensality, neither they nor 
their descendants could, in the absence of proof of custom, 
be treated as Hindu coparcener’s having the right of sur­
vivorship .
lies in natural family not severed
)\
In Ramakrishna v Subbakka' one H, a Hindu who had 
admittedly been taken an illatom into the family of his father- 
in-law, died, leaving property which he had acquired by virtue 
of his illatom marriage. He was succeeded by his son, who 
died without issue, leaving only a sister surviving him. In 
a suit by a brother of N who was the managing member of his 
family, to recover the property from the sister of the last 
holder, it was held that the Plaintiff was prima facie entitled 
to recover, notwithstanding the admission, and that it was for 
the defendant to establish any special circumstance to rebut 
his claim. Their Lordships referred to the decision in S . 
Ealarami v S . I era Reddi4? wherein it had been held that a 
person who was taken as an illatom into another family did 
not thereby lose his right of inheritance in his natural 
family. Under the custom if illatom which prevailed among 
the Reddis or Pedda Kapu caste of ITellore, the illatom son- 
in-law did not thereby lose his rights of succession to the 
estate of his natural father’s divided brother. The tie of 
relationship between him and his natural brother was not 
severed as was when there was an adoption under Hindu law.
4'S~ (1886) I.L.R. 9 Mad. 114.
46. (1889) I.L.R. 12 Mad. 443.
47. (1882) I.L.R. 6 Had. 267.
In Challa Papi Reddi v Challa goti Reddi^ it was 
observed that the circumstance of being taken as an illatom 
constituted a mode whereby the person taken acquired property 
and if that circumstance was not in consistent with the 
person affected still remaining a member of his own family, 
Shephard J. thought, he could not see why it should affect 
the rules which would ordinarily govern the devolution of his 
property on his death. His lordship observed that it may seem 
hard that a member of the family into which the illatom son- 
in-law was taken should be ousted from the property originally 
belonging to that family in favour of one who belonged to 
another family, which was a necessarj^ consequence of the 
alienation in favour of the illatom son-in-law.
Illatom son-in-law not a coparcener in affiliater's famil.y
In Maila Reddi v Fadamma- the father, since 
deceased, of the second defendant took into his family an 
illatom son-in-law, who died, leaving a son. After the death 
of his son, one of his two daughters (who were his only children) 
sued to recover a l/4th share of the property left by the 
second defendant's father. It was held that the Flaintiff 
was entitled to recover, in the absence of proof of a custom 
by which the rights of the Flaintiff's father should have
passed by survivorship to the second defendant.
50In Panda Fatya v Panda Venkamma it was held that 
a person had been taken as an illatom son-in-law must be
48'. (1871) 7 M.H.C.R. 25-
(1894) I.L.R. 17 Lad. 48.
50. (1915) '29 I.'C. 54.
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proved by very reliable evidence. Their Lordships observed
that it was very easy for men who were married into a family
to set up a claim to a share of the family property on the
footing that they had been taken as illatom son-in-law, but
such contentions required to be proved by very reliable .
were
evidence, as they were claims, which / very easy to set
un and which apparently there was a great temptation to set
V,
up. This case was referred to with ai^proval in/Subbarao v 
5 ILlahalakshmamma where their Lordships of Madras High Court 
observed that the legal incidentss of an illatom adoption had 
not been judicially settled nor were they of universal appli­
cation, they had to be proved in each case by evidence and 
held that an illatom relationship to a father-in-law’s brother
was very unusual and that on the evidence in the case the
V.
relationship was not established. Their Lordships in/Subbarao
51
v Hahalakshmamma1 also referred to the following observation
of Holloway J. in Challa Papi v Challa Koti'
"The power of complete disposition as against 
both a widow- and daughters has, rightly or
wrongly been upheld, and there would be great
difficulty in saying that the son-in-law so 
affiliated could be in a better position ...
There is nothing illegal in saying that the 
person so affiliated shall inherit all of which 
the affiliator died possessed but that he does 
not and cannot stand in the same position as 
one who became a joint tenant at the instant 
of birth".
q 2,
In Sitanna v Viranna  ^ it was held by the Privy 
Council that the fact that the alleged illatom son-in-law 
never troubled about his share in the property of his own
family and went on living jointly with Tiruppayya (the after
5). (1951) I.L.H. 54 Had. 27.
A.I.R. 1954 F.C. 105, 107b.
I 54-3
i
born natural son of bis father-in-law), attending to the 
cultivation while the latter attended to his duties as village 
LIunsif, coupled with the widow's statements, suggested that 
he enjoyed the status of an illatom son-in-law during 
Tiruppayyatelifetime and that it: was only to be expected that 
he should claim a share after Tiruppayya's death. The illatom 
custom among Reddis and Kammas of Liadras Presidency was 
based on the necessity of having men in the family to look 
after the cultivation.
q
In A. Venkatappadu v II. Atchayyamiaa  ^ referred to
5k-
the judgment of Yaradachariar J. in Huthala Reddiar v Sankarappa 
wherein the learned judge applying the principles laid down 
in earlier cases held that apart from the proof of custom, 
the descendants of an illatom son-in-law could not claim 
rights of collateral inheritance in preference to reversioners 
of the last male holders of an estate. An illatom son-in-law 
was therefore entitled to the same share as the son or an 
adopted son, but he did not take by survivorship. In the
. . . . . - g  2
present case the Plaintiff's husband entered into an 
arrangement for consideration by which on his death the 
properties which he got or to which he was entitled as the 
illatom son-in-law passed to the defendants. Their Lordships 
held that the Plaintiff had no claim to maintenance as against 
the defendants and. that by reason of the terms of the settlement 
deed, on the death of defendant.'l had no claim on the property. 
Since the illatom son-in-law and the son 7/ere not coparceners
53« A.I.R. 194-5 Had. 172. 
5^ . [1954] R.L.J. 706.
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and. did not take by survivorship the Plaintiff (widow) was 
not entitled to claim maintenance against the son’s heirs'^.
I am, however, inclined to observe that, in this case the 
equitable interpretation of the agreement would have been to 
read it as the heirs (whosever they may be) taking, subject to 
the rights of maintenance of those entitled to claim it from 
the said property.
Rights of the Illotom
56In P. Lakshmi v. L. Lakshmi the Supreme Court held 
that in Andhra an Illatom son-in-law was a boy incorporated 
into the family with a view to give a daughter in marriage 
and was customarily recognised as an heir in the absence of 
a natural born son. Summarizing briefly (1) the rights and 
status of the Illatom son-in-law depend on custom obtaining
c n
among particular communities. (2) He takes an equal share
fro
with the natural born son. (3) If there is a custom to that 
effect, he can demand partition.^ (4) He has a right to deal
with the property he acquires as an Illatom son-in-law as he
55. Sivada Balarami Reddi v. Sivada Pera Reddi (1882) I.L.R.
6 Had. 267; Chenchamma v. Subbaya (1886) I.L.R. 9 Had.114 
and Maila Reddi v. Padmamma (1894) I.L.R. 17 Mad. 48.
56. A.I.R. 1957 S.C. 314; Also in IT ar as s a w  a v. Ramachandrayya 
A.I.R. 1956 An p. 209*
57# Refer to cases under note 55 above,
58. Ramkrishna v. Subbakka (1889) I.L.R. 12 Mad. 443; Narasimha 
v. Veerabhadra (1893) I.L.R. 17 Mad. 287; Challa Papi 
Reddi v. Challa Koti Reddi (1871) 7 M.H.C. 25.
59. Chinna Obayya v. Sura Reddi (1897) I.L.R. 21 Mad. 226.
5'4-5~
80likes, and his sons have no right by birth therein. -
(5) Among the Reddis of Vellore, it has been held that an
illatom son-in-law does not lose his rights of succession in
his natural family^ and vice versa the members of his natural
6 2^family do not lose their rights of succession to him.
(6) There is no right of survivorship between him and the
adopted or natural born son of his fat her-in-la?/, in the
-i , 63absence oi a custom.
According to Prof. Derrett, the illatom is entitled
to succeed even after the passing of the Hindu Succession and
the Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Acts. He observes
’Since by custom the illatom is entitled to a./ 
inherit on intestacy from his father-in-law, - 
though not from the latter*s relations, it would 
seem that here is a right by virtue of the son- 
in-lav: relationship established upon a footing 
independent of both sonship as understood in 
the Hindu Lav: of succession, and of adoption 
as understood both under the modern Hindu law 
and the Anglo Hindu Lav: of adoption. he must 
turn to the overriding section of the Hindu 
Succession Act this time, v/hen we find that, 
as before, laws are saved which deal with 
matters for which no provision is made in the 
H.S.A. and which are not themselves inconsistent
....... with anything in the Upon this view,
accordingly the illatom is still entitled to 
succeed".
6p. Challa Papi Reddi v Challa ICoti Reddi (1671) 7 M.H.C.R. 25.
61. Sivada Balarami Reddi v Sivada Pera Reddi (1882) I.L.R. .
6 Had. 267 •
6.X. Ramkrishna v Subbaka (1889) I.L.R. 12 Had. 443 •
6 3. Chenchamma v Subbaya (1886) I.L.R. 9 Had. 114; Hal la 
Reddi v Padmamma (18940 I.L.R. 17 Mad. 48.
6 Hindu Succession Act, S. 4.
666 Introd. to Modern Hindu law: J.D.M. Derrett (1963)
p. 134.
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I agree with this view and it would appear on the above
reasoning that the Illatom is still entitled to succeed, and that
similar would be the position of the gharjamai and 
sarvasvadanam son-in-lav/. So also it would seem that under S.8 
of the H.S.A. the statutory heirs and the Illatom (counting as
Co
a son) must be called to succession together
A perusal of the rights of the Kritrima son and the
resident son-in-law in Punjab discussed above would show the
close similarity with those of the Illatom son-in -law of
Southern India. But whilst the Illatom son-in-law has a
right to deal with the property he acquires as an Illatom as
he likes, the Illatom constituting a mode whereby the person
taken acquires property and on his death the property passes
48to his heirs in his natural family, under the Punjab 
customary lav/, if the resident son-in-law dies issueless or 
remarries after the death of his wife (whose father had taken 
him as the resident son-in-law), such property reverts to 
his father-in-law. In view of what I have said above (at 
page 5 37 ) I thihk the latter is a more equitable rule.
The Dvyamushyayana
The term Dvyamushyayana has a two-fold meaning. The 
Mitakshara uses this term in the sense of the 'Kshetraja' or a 
son raised on another's wife. It is also understood to mean 
a son who is adopted as a son of two fathers by an agreement, 
express or implied. As to the effect of adoption of a son in 
the Dvyamushyayana form the Privy Council held that the effect 
by the Hindu law of an adoption in the Dvyamushyayna form was
nob to extinguish the adopted son of his lineage to his natural 
father, or to bar him of his right of inheritance in his
bb —father’s estate. The ceremonies rjrescribed in the Dvyamush­
yayana form of adoption were the same as in the case of an 
absolutely adopted son or a Shudha Dattaka. The only addition 
7/as of an undertaking or stipulation that the child should
67belong to both the giver and the adopter.
Special agreement necessary
In 77ooma Daee v Gokoolanund the Calcutta High 
Court observed that to constitute a Dvyamushyayana there must 
be a special agreement between the two fathers to that effect 
or the relation must result from some of the other circumstances 
indicated by 3r W. Macnaghten at p. 71 of his Principles and 
Precedents. And he there states the consequence to be different 
from those of an ordinary adoption, inasmuch as the children 
of adopted sons would revert to their natural family. Hence 
the adoptive father fails by such adoption to perpetuate his 
own line of male succession, a circumstance which renders 
the consent of divided brothers to such adoption more improbable 
In Beharilal v Shib Lall the Allahabad High Court 
held that the natural mother of a Hindu adopted into another 
branch of his family by the Hitya dvyamushyayana form of 
adoption,did not, /on account of such adoption, lose her right
bb. ITilmaahub Doss v Bishuraber Doss (1869) lp 111.I.A. 85 (P.O.)
67. hrishna v larameshri (19C1) I.L.R. 25 Bom. 537*
(1878) I.L.R. 5 Cal. 587*
(1904) I.L.R. 26 All 472.
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of succession to her son in the absence of nearer heirs.
:tn adoption in the absolute dvyamushyayana form depended 
upon and had its efficacy in the stipulation entered into at 
the time of the adoption between the natural father and the 
adopted father and did not depend upon the performance of any 
initiatory ceremony by the natural father. In this case there 
was evidence of an agreement between the natural father and 
the adoptive father that 'R' should remain the son of both 
though all ceremonies including Sradh was performed by the 
adoptive father.
— . -on
The Dattaka Limamsa describes two forms of
Dvyamushyayana viz., the Nitya - under stipulation and the
Anitya where the ceremony up to tonsure is performed by the
natural father and the adoptive father is connected with the
ceremony of investiture etc. - in which case he succeeds only
in the adoptive family. The double relationship proceeds from
the special agreement between the adoptive and the natural
father at the time of the adoption in which case the adopted
son inherits both the estates and performs obsequies of both
’fathers'. Adoption in the absolute form depends upon the
stipulation between the two father's is the view of Macnaghten
in his Hindu law Vol. I, p. 71* Sir Thomas Strange in his
Hindu Law Vol. II, p. 173 observes
"... Nptya datta ... the adoption is from the 
same gotra before or after tonsure or from 
different gotra before tonsure. In the Anitya 
form different gotra after tonsure in the natural 
family. Performance of tonsure is the cause of 
the temporary nature of the latter species of 
adoption".
70. D.H. Art. 41, S. 6.
lurther the adoption in the Anitya form was of a temporary 
character, lasting for the life-time of such adopted son and 
the natural children of the son adopted in the Anitya form 
remained in the natural family of their father. As stated 
in a later case in Easappa v Gur1ingawa the Anitya dvyamush-
   rp t
yayana is now obsolete.(
Their Lordships in Eehari lal1s case observed
that it is by gift that the relation of sonship with his
natural family is severed as appears from Art. 19, Sec. 2 of
the Dattaka Chandrika which explains the text of Manu. It
k>°l
seemed to their Lordships in Beharilal1s case that in the 
case of the absolute Dvyamushyayana form it is a qualified 
gift. As in this case the gift was a qualified gift hence 
the natural mother did not lose her right of succession to 
her son adopted into another branch of his family by the 
ITitya dvyamushyayana form, in the absence of nearer heirs.
The Dvyamushyayana inherits in both families and vice versa
7kIn Kantawa v Sangangowda a boy was adopted according 
to the dvyamushyayana form. On the death of the boy, the 
adoptive mother and the natural mother were held by the Bombay 
High Court to take jointly and equally as co-heiresses. If 
the adoptive mother, after the inheritance had passed in this 
way adopted another son, the natural mother was held not 
divested of the property inherited, especially/ when her
7 1 - (1935) I.L.R. 37 Bom. 74* Also see Llaynes Hindu Law 
(9th Ed.)Paia. 173 at p. 241.
7k. A.I.R. 1942 Bom. 143*
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consent was not obtained for the adoption. Broomfield J. 
observed that a son adopted in the dvyamushyayana; form 
inherited in both families.
So also, as has been held in Basappa v Gurlingawa^
both families inherit to him. As to the question what happens
if the adoptive mother, after inheritance had passed in this
way adopted another son, Broomfield J., in Kantawa v Sangang- 
*72owda, disagreeing from the trial judge observed: (a) A 
mother succeeding to her son took a limited estate like a 
widow succeeding to her husband. (b) If there were two or 
more co-widows, an adoption by one divested the estate of 
both. (c) If a mother who had succeeded as heir to her son 
adopted a son to her husband, her own estate was divested.
His Lordship observed that so far the learned trial judge was 
right. The learned trial judge, however, seemed to think 
that it followed from these propositions, which were not 
necessarily connected, that if two mother's - the adoptive 
and the natural, had inherited the estate of their son, a 
subsequent adoption by one of them divested the estate of 
both. Broomfield J. remarks that the trial judge made a 
somewhat dogmatic assertion that what applied to co-widow's 
must necessarily apply to co-mothers, if that expression may 
be used. But he gave no reason for it except a somewhat 
vague reference to "other considerations and general principles 
of Hindu Law". The trial judge took the view that the 
coparcenary established was revived by the adoption but 
Broomfield J., found difficulty in understanding what in the
7 2>f,V (1933) I.L.R. 57 Bom. 74.
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circumstances could be meant by reviving the coparcenary 
estate. In any case the doctrine of revival seemed to him 
to be contrary to the decision of the full bench in Balu 
Sakharam v. Lahoo^  The contention on behalf of the respondent 
that the rules laid down by the full bench in the case did 
not apply because the facts here were not the same, was not 
accepted by the Court. Broomfield J. observed that the full 
bench was laying down principles and not merely disposing of
the particular case out of which the reference arose.
75In Ganuatrao v. Balkrishna . a person adopted his 
brother’s only son, then a married man, in the dvyamushyayana 
form. The respondents were the sons of the adoptee born 
after his adoption. The adoptee pre-deceased his adoptive, 
father and on the latter1s death a dispute relating to the 
succession to his estate arose. The respondents, claiming 
title to the estate as grandsons of the deceased, applied to 
obtain a succession certificate when the appellant, a son 
of another brother of the deceased, contended that the 
respondents belonged to the natural family of the adoptee 
and so they could not inherit in the family of the adopter of 
their father. It was held that the respondents were the 
grandsons of the deceased and entitled to succeed to his 
property.
74. (1937) 39 Bom. I.E. 382.
75. ft942j I.I.E. Bom. 340.
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As to the origin of adoption in the dvyamushyayana
form, Kane observes as follows:
”Ya;j. II. 127 and Band. Dh. S. II. 2, 21 provide that 
a K shetraja is the son of both the begetter and of the
husband of the wife on whom the son is procreated.
Therefore such a son is called nitya dvyamushyayana 
(because he is always the son of two fathers). When the 
Kshetraja_became obsolete and forbidden, the only 
dvyamushyayana was an only son taken in adoption with a 
stipulation as described above.... It is now held that 
every adoption is presumed to be in the simple (Kevala)
form, unless a stipulation that the boy will be the son
of both is proved (when it will be a dvyamushyayana 
adoption)
As the dvyamushyayana adoption results from 
stipulation between the natural and adoptive fathers that he 
is to be a sop to both the fathers, he therefore inherits both 
the estates and performs the obsequies of both fathers.
On the question of inheritance by the dvyamushyayana
77in the natural and adoptive families, the Dattaka Chandrika 
lays down the following rule,
’The son given, who is a dvyamushyayana, if both 
his adoptive and natural fathers have no other male issue, 
takes the whole estate of both. One adopted, where legitimate 
issue (of the adopter) existed does not participate (in the 
estate of the adopter), but a legitimate son being born (to 
the natural father) subsequent to adoption, the adopted son 
(in question) takes half tho share which is prescribed by 
lav/ for an adopted son, exclusively related to his adoptive 
father (where legitimate issue may be subsequently born to 
that person)*, i.e., he would take half of one-third, one 
fourth or one-fifth which he would have taken according to 
the different provinces had he been adopted in the Dattaka
76. Kane: History of Dharamsastra, Vol. Ill pp. 686-687.
77. V 35-34.
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form by the adoptive father. In his natural family in such a
case he takes half the share of an Aurasa son. But according 
— — 78
to the Vyavahara Mayukha , when legitimate sons are born in
both the families, the dvyamushyayana takes his usual share
in the adoptive family only. On the point when only one of
the families has Aurasa sons the Mayukha is silent.
79In G. Narsi Reddi v. R. Rami Reddi , the Andhra Pradesh
High Court has held that the dvyamushyayana form of adoption had
long become obsolete in Madras on the East Coast and therefore
an adoption in that form is not now valid. Their lordships
observed that the dvyamushyayana form of adoption was never
recognised by the Mitakshara. The ancient texts or source books
of Hindu lav; did not recognise the dvyamushyayana now recognised
in parts of Bombay State and the State of Uttar Pradesh. Their
Lordships further observed that this form of adoption seems to
have been a contribution or gloss of commentators who came much
after Vijnanesvara and that the only dvyamushyayana (son of two
fathers) spoken of in Mitakshara is the Kshetraja, i.e. the son
begotten by a person on the wife of another person, and this
species of son is now obsolete in Hindu law.
In this connection it may be noted that there is no
mention of the 'dvyamushyayana' in the various kinds of sons
80
enumerated in $he Smritis. Further, according to Hanu the
Gotra (= family name) and the Riktha (= wealth) of the adopted
son ceases in the natural family. Thus it would appear that not
only the Smritis are silent on the subject of the dvyamushyay ana'
80but the text of Manu mentioned above would seem to tilt the 
balance against such adoptions.
79. (1964) 1 An. \7.R. 261.
80. Manu IX, 142.
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As explained below, the dvyamushyayana adoption is 
now abolished under the Hindu Adoption and Maintenance Act, 
1956.
The position under the Hindu Adoption and Maintenance Act. 1956 
Section 5 of the Hindu Adoption and Maintenance Act 
specifically lays down that all adoptions made after the
H53~
commencement of the Act shall be made in accordance with the 
provisions of the Act and any adoption made after the pro­
mulgation of the Act in contravention of the said provisions 
will be void. Sub section (ii) of S. 5 mentions the conse­
quences of a void adoption. Adoption under the Act is either 
valid or void, it is never voidable. A void adoption has 110 
legal effect from the very beginning. It amounts to no 
adoption at all having taken place. The sub-section (ii) of 
S. 5 lays down further that a person whose adoption is void 
does not lose the right to share in the property of the family 
of his birth and he is not entitled to inherit or even to be 
maintained out of the estate of the 'adoptive family'.
Thus in view of Section 5 discussed above and 
Section 12 (which lays down that in the case of an adopted 
child its ties in the natural family are completely severed 
and replaced by those in the adoptive family) of the Hindu 
Adoption and Maintenance Act 1956, the various kinds of 
adopted sons recognised under the old law including the 
Kritrima, the Dvyamushyayana etc. are abolished under the 
Act and any adoption to be legally valid has to be made in 
accordance with the provisions of the Act.
But as rightly observed by Prof. Derrett, the 
illatom is still entitled to succeed even after the passing 
of the Hindu Succession Act, the reasons for arriving at this 
conclusion have been mentioned above at pages $4-5to
The position under English Law
The different kinds of sons or adopted sons is a 
peculiar feature of the Hindu system and has no counterpart 
in the English law. Adoption under the English law is effected
55£
by a procedure laid down by Statute and becomes legal (i.e. 
has all the legal incidents of adoption) as soon as a Court 
order is made. Thus contractual or customary adoptions or 
the ’Dvyamushyayana' (the son of two fathers) etc. have no 
counterpart under the English law.
The effect of an adoption under English law, is in 
some ways a mixture of the effects of adoption under the 
Dattaka and ICritrima adoptions. As in the Dattaka Adoption, 
adoption under English law completely severs the adoptee's 
ties in his natural family and replaces these with corres­
ponding ties in the adoptive family (except as to the
81devolution of entails and estates accompanying a title).
But as in the case :bf ICritrima adoption, under the English 
law also, unless the adoption is made by two spouses jointly, 
the adoptee is considered as the child of the person who 
actually adopts it with ail the incidents of inheritance to 
or through such person, which is not the case in Dattaka 
adoption wherein adoption by the husband or the widow makes 
him the child of both spouses.
It may be interesting to note that even in some 
modern States like Erance and Uraguay, two different types 
of adoption are recognised (which are discussed at pp. )£^-to 
I £$* above). In some states such as Massachusetts and Virgin 
Islands of the U.S.A., Tasmania and Hew Zealand, like the 
ICritrima adoptee, the adoptive children inherit from the 
adoptive parent but do not inherit from relatives of the
81. Refer to the respective provisions discussed in Chapters 
2 to 4 above.
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* 4 -  82 adopters.
It would thus he seen that the ancient Hindu law
provided a comprehensive method for affiliation of sons
83and has been rightly praised by Derrett.
The debatable point now is whether it is better to
have different methods of affiliating a son with different
rights flowing from each mode, or to have one stereo-typed
standard form and avoid the confusion arising from the
varying effects of the different adoptions. The answer to
this question is possibly found in the doctrine of Kalivar.jya
i 84i.e., practices prohibited in the present KaljJage. Kane
85refers to a passage of Brihaspati quoted by Apararka ’where
82. See pp. 162 and 166 above.
83. Adoption in Hindu Lav/,by J.D.M. Derrett. (Zeitschrift ftlr 
Vergle ...), 1957, pp. 34-36. Refer to p. 41 of this 
thesis•
84. Kane: History of Dharmasastra, Vol. Ill, p. 926 and
Vol. II, p. 603n. 1418. Also Batuknath Bhattacharya:
’The Kalivarjas’.
85. Apararka p. 97.
ITdflic nd the numerous secondary sons are said to be 
impossible owing to the decadence of spiritual power among 
men of the Dvapara and Eali^ ;es . Apararka p. 739 and the 
Dattaka Mimamsa quote a passage of Saunaka to the effect 
that sons other than the Aurasa or dattaka are not allowed 
in the Kali Age' • The Dattaka ...imamsa" is also to the same 
effect but says that the term 'son given' is inclusive of
og
the son made. ' I agree with the view that in the present 
times it is better to have a simple standard form of adoption 
i.e. the Dattaka rather than a number of different forms 
of affiliating sons having varying effects which are likely 
to cause a great deal of confusion.
86. Datt. him. 1, 65.
ch ap te r X ----------
CONCLUSION-----------
1. Are the "effects" provided in the Hindu Adoptions and 
Maintenance Act 1956 (as at present worked) a departure 
from the Anp:lo-Hindu position?
is
The first question to be considered now/as to the
true effect of Sections 12 and 14 of the Hindu Adoptions and
Maintenance Act 1956. Section 12 of the Act runs thus:
An adopted child shall be deemed to be the 
child of his or her adoptive father or mother 
for all purposes with effect from the date of 
the adoption and from such date all the ties 
of the child in the family of his or her 
birth shall be deemed to be severed and replaced 
by those created by the adoption in the adoptive 
family:
Provided that -
(a) the child cannot marry any person whom 
he or she could not have married if he 
or she had continued in the family of 
his or her birth;
(b) any property which rested in the adopted 
child before the adoption shall continue 
to vest in such person subject to the 
obligations, if any, attaching to the 
ownership of such property, including 
the obligation to maintain relatives
in the family of his or her birth;
(c) the adopted child shall not divest any 
person of any estate which vested in 
him or her before the adoption.
Thus the section mentions four consequences which
follow an adoption made under the Act. These consequences
and the question as to whether they are a departure from
the Anglo-Hindu position are considered below:
(i) Child for all purposes: The section confers on the
adoptee the same rights and privileges in the family.of .the
5 6 0
adopter as the legitimate natural son, except in the case 
of marriage. By the use of the words "for all purposes" 
no distinction between a natural and adopted son is made 
except as mentioned in the provisos to the section. Under 
the prior Hindu law the adopted son also had generally the 
same rights as a natural son, except in a case of competition 
between an adopted son^ and a subsequently born natural son, 
in which case the adopted son got a reduced share on partition, 
his share being different according to the different schools. 
Thus on partition between an adopted son and an after born 
natural son, in Bengal he took one-third of the adoptive 
father's estate, in Benares he took one-fourth and in Bombay 
and Madras he took one-fifth of the estate. This was the 
practice which the Courts had built up relying upon the 
different constructions which the various authorities placed
on Vasigljha's text " .hen a son has been adopted; if a legi-
be
timate son/afterwards born, the given son takes a fourth
2 _ 5share", and of a text of Katyayana. According to some
authorities the adopted son is entitled to a quarter share,
according to others a third share. There is also a difference
of opinion as to whether the fourth or third shares are with
reference to the adoptive fathers estate or to the share
1. Bor a discussion of this topic refer to Chapter IV of 
the thesis.
2. Vasisifha XV, 8, 9; hit. 1, XI, 2d.
3. Refer to Chapter IV pages 146 to 147*
4. Mitakshara 1, 11, 21 and 25; Bat. him. X 1; Vyavahara
Mayukha p. 60, I.-andlik’s edition.
5. Bayabhaga X, 5; Batt. Chand. V, I6-I7.
taken by the after-horn natural son.' If the estate was 
impartible the natural son alone succeeded to it. Among 
Sudras, in Madras and Bengal, an adopted son shared equally 
with an after-horn natural son hut in Bombay he took only 
one-fifth. But the Act specifically lays down that now 
there will he no distinction between an adopted or natural 
son and now he will he entitled to an equal share. It would 
appear that the Smriti lav/ giving the natural son greater 
rights in competition with the other sons seems to he based 
on the ground that the natural son is superior to the other 
kinds of sons and therefore deserves greater rights in the 
father's property as compared to the other kinds of sons.
Under the prior law an adopted son was entitled to 
re-open partition etc. on the 'principle of relation hack1. 
Section 14 of the Act which deals with the relationship of 
the adopted child with the spouse of the adopter, is silent 
on the adoptee's relation with the deceased spouse of the 
adopter. The Supreme Court has recently decided in the
n g
cases of Sawan Ram v Kalawanti and Sitabai v Ram Chandra
that on a correct interpretation of the various provisions
of the Act especially Sections 5 and 12, the deceased husband
of a widow who adopts becomes the adoptive father of the
adopted child i.e. that the principle of relation hack still
stands. The Smritis are silent on the point, hut on equitable
9and other considerations discussed above," I am inclined
6. Bor a fuller discussion refer to Chapter IV.
7- A.I.E. 19&7 S.C. 1761.
8. A.I.E. 1970 S.C. 543.
9 . See pages } 2 Z
to support the Supreme Court's view-point. For the adoptive 
son does confer temporal benefit and possibly spiritual 
benefit also on his deceased adoptive father in continuing 
the family name and discharging all the duties which a 
natural son would otherwise have discharged. Besides he 
sacrifices all his rights in his natural father's family.
It would therefore be fair and equitable that he should be 
given rights in his deceased adoptive father's property.
(ii) Proviso (a): Blodd-relationship for the purpose of
marriage continues with the family of birth
As under the prior law, so also under the present 
.ct, the adopted child cannot marry a maiden whom he could 
not have married on account of prohibitions in his family of 
birth i.e. the Sapinda relations and those relations in the 
I rohibited degree of relationship mentioned in Section 5 of 
the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 ? cannot be taken in marriage.
In addition the prohibitions in respect of marriage will 
operate in the adoptive father's family also. This seems 
to be a wholesome provision.
(iii) Proviso (b). Non-divesture of Property
This proviso lays down that an adoptee, on his or 
her adoption will not be divested of any property which might 
have vested in him or her before the adoption. Under the 
prior lav/, according to the Dayabk^iga law, adoption did not 
divest any property which had vested in the adopted son by 
inheritance, gift etc. As regards cases governed by the
itakshara* school there was a difference of opinion between 
•the various courts.' According to the text of M&nu the
5^3
adopted sen is not to take his father's property into the 
adoptive family, whether it is already vested in him or not, 
i.e. the bo. given in adoption gives up the natural family 
and everything connected wit it and takes his place in the 
adoptive family as if he had been born in it, with the result 
that on adoption the property vested in him would be divested 
and devolve upon the next heir in the family of his birth.
Thus where property had vested in a person as the heir of 
his father and he is subsequently adopted into another family 
he would lose his right in the property, in view of the fact 
that it is 'the estate of his natural father'.^0 But in a 
later Bombay case it was held that a person does not, on 
adoption, lose the share which he had already obtained on 
partition from his natural father and brothers in the family 
of his b i r t h o n  the ground that the share so obtained 
cannot be said to be the estate of his natural father within 
the meaning of the text of I anu, because the share obtained 
on partition becomes one's separate property. But where the 
boy adopted was a coparcener in the joint family, he was 
divested of his right in the coparcenary property.
The Madras High Court had held that an adoption 
did not divest any property which had vested in the adopted 
son previous to the adoption. Thus where coparcenary property 
had already vested in a person as the sole surviving coparcener 
and he is subsequently adopted into another family, he did* a. TEtlH&ol
I.L.E.
10. Dattatrar/a Sakharam v Govind Sambha.ji (1916)/40 Bom.
4-29 •
I.L.R.
11. ¥. ahab 1 e shwar -. -.ray an v Sub ram any a (1923)/4-7 Bom., 54-2.
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12not lose his right in that property. the Calcutta High 
Court has held, distinguishing in effect the Bombay cases, 
that under the Bayabhaga law, a person who is given away
13in adoption is not divested of the inheritance vested m  him. 
This view has been accepted by the legislators in enacting 
_roviso (b) to this section. Thus the rule under the Mitak- 
shara was that by virtue of an adoption, his civil death 
occurs in the natural family and his interest in the Ivlitak- 
shara coparcenary which is always fluid i.e. subject to 
alteration by births and deaths in the family, and not vested 
until partition takes place, passes on to the other coparceners 
by survivorship. But if he was the sole surviving coparcener, 
the estate is deemed to be vested in him and he carries it 
with him to his adoptive family. It is difficult to see how 
any other solution could have been practical. So also, in so 
far as his separate property is concerned, the adopted child 
always carries it with him to his family of adoption.
’Subject to Obligations1: The proviso lays down that while
the adopted child shall not be divested of any property which 
might have vested in him prior to his adoption, the adopted 
child continues to hold the property 'subject to the obligations 
if any' attached to its ownership. Such obligation includes 
the obligation to maintain relatives in the family of his or 
her birth. as to the relatives or dependants who are entitled
_____________________________ o ______________________________________
12. Venkat 1 arsimha v Rangayya (1906) I.L.R. 29 Mad. 4-37•
13. Shyamcharan v hpicharan (1929) 56 Cal. 1135; 
v Oebendra ITaik (194-8) 52 C a l. 7.1-7. 771*
to maintenance, these are dealt with in Sec. 21 of the Hindu 
adoptions and Maintenance Act 1956, together with any others 
who are entitled by reason of the operation of Joint family 
law, e.g. the widows of a predeceased coparcener who died 
prior to 1956, or even a predeceased coparcener's concubine.^
(iv) Frcviso (c)... Hon-divesture by adoptee
This topic has been discussed under recent leading
cases in Chapter VI. The Smyiti law is silent on the question
whether, when an adoption is made by a widow, the adoption
relates back to the death of her deceased husband, so as to
make him the adoptive father of the child adopted by the
widow for purposes of succession to his property. The Privy
15Council in the leading case of Anant v Shankar held that
when an adoption was made by the widow, such adoption 'related
back' to the death of her deceased husband and that the
adopted son could divest the father's property vested in
other heirs and also question alienations made in excess of
her powers by the widow and other heirs between the death
of the deceased adoptive father and the adoption of the son
by the widow. This legal proposition was disapproved of and
16modified by the Supreme Court in Shrinivas v Narayan wherein 
it was laid down that the relation-back theory applied only 
with respect to the property (separate or share in Joint 
family property) of the deceased adoptive father but when 
succession to the properties of a person other than the
14. This somewhat complex topic is outside our present scope 
but is fully explained in A. Hajagopal v A. Sitharam-
smiDh u A.l'.R. 1965 S.C. 1970.
• 1-5. I1-9440 I iL-.R. - Bom. 116 (P.O.).
adoptive father was irvolved, the principle applicable was 
not the rule of relation back but the rule that inheritance 
once vested could not be divested.
the Hindu Adoption and Maintenance Act 1956 is 
silent about the relationship of the adopted child with the 
deceased spouse of the adopter. But the Supreme Court has
n o
held in Sawan Ram v Kalawanti and Sitabai v Ram Chandra
that the relation back theory has not been abolished by the
let. Their Lordships of the Supreme Court observed in Sawan 
n
Ram v Kalawanti that by Clause (c) of the proviso to Section 
12 of the Act viz. 'the adopted child shall not divest any
person of estate which vested in him or her before the
adoption1, the Act had narrowed down the rights of an adopted 
child as compared with the rights of a child born posthumously 
and that this restriction on the rights of the adopted child 
cannot lead to any inference that a child adopted by a widow 
will not be deemed to be the adopted son of the deceased 
husband.
Also in view of Sections 5 and 12 their Lordships
n q
in the two Supreme Court cases'’ ~ held that the deceased 
husband of the widow becomes the adoptive father of the 
ado ted child i.e. that the principle of relation back stands. 
These decisions have been criticised by Hr. Dabke and others 
which are discussed in the latter part of Chapter VI.
As already mentioned above, I think that the Supreme 
Court decisions upholding the 'relation back' theory are 
correct. For Section 4- of the Act in effect lays down that
in respect of any matter for which no provision is made in
the ict, the old law stands. Also it seems equitable that
the child adojted by the widow be given rights in his
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deceased father's property, as such child does confer benefits, 
temporal and spiritual on the deceased adoptive father i.e., 
in continuing the family name and discharging all the functions 
which a natural son would have discharged including the 
performance of f'Sraddh<£.' etc. Besides the ado; ted child 
sacrifices all his rights and benefits in his natural family 
(which can seldom be calculated or visualised accurately at 
tie time of his adoption) and is therefore entitled to get 
similar rights in the adoptive family which obviously includes 
the most important right to succeed to the property of his 
deceased adoptive father.
The suggestion, which learned writers and even 
Ramamurti, J.,(in Arumugha v Valliamimal A.I.R. 1969 Mad. 72) 
have made, viz. that the adoptee should rest content with 
whatever his adopting mother gives or bequeathes to him, is 
unrealistic. Widows inherit, on an intestacy, only a fraction 
of the estate in competition with the mother, the daughter, 
a predeceased son's daughter and some other descendents; and 
in India women are mostly confined to the home, are seldom 
great earners, and invest what little they have in unproductive 
Jewellery.
In order to clarify the meaning of Section 12(c),
I would suggest that Section 12(c) be suitably amended
engrafting an exception to the rule laid down therein and
incorporating the law enunciated by the Supreme Court in
17hrishnamurthy v DhruwaYa,j i.e. that so long as the widow 
in the family existed and was capable of adopting a son who
17. Bee Chapter VI page 3J3 above.
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becomes a coparcener, the fact that a person inherited the 
property of his father (or father's father) absolutely did 
not change the character of the property from coparcenary 
property to self-acquired property of such person. I have 
incorporated this suggestion under the subsequent title 
"specific recommendations for the Adoption Code".
2• Is the current law "Hindu" in any significant sense?
As mentioned at the beginning of this thesis the
^ 18primary sources of 'true' Hindu law are the Sruti; and Smyitis,
which have been compiled on the basis of the revelation of
the divine law to the holy rishis. The function of these
authorities, according to the Hindu theologians, is to impart
knowledge which could not be obtained from other sources i.e.,
19on the 'Adrista' principle, discussed above, ' and any rule 
of law which goes against the injunctions laid down by the 
' Yuti and Smritis is, according to the ; imamsakas, to be 
rejected. It is only where the Smritis are silent that the 
correct law could be deduced by the application of equitable 
considerations.
In some instances the provisions of the Hindu 
Adoptions and Maintenance Act 1956 are directly opposed to 
the Smriti injunctions. For instance, a text of Vasistha 
specifically provides "Han formed of virile seed and utergine 
blood is an effect whereof the mother and the father are the 
cause: the mother and the father have the power to give, to
18. See p. 27 et seq., of Chapter I.
19. See pp. 6 b to 69 of Chapter II.
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20sell, (and) to abandon him", but Section 9 of the Act allows 
even the guardian of a child to give the child away in 
adoption.
Also the Smpitis lav down that in competition with
a legitimate son born to the adopting father after adoption,
the ado ted son takes a reduced share as compared to the'
21share of the after-born Aurasa son, possibly because the 
Aurasa legitimate son is obviously superior to the other 
kinds of sons, but S. 12 of the Act gives the adopted son 
equal rights with an after-born Aurasa son.
Again while the divine Rishis emphasize that a 
rule opposed to the Smritis should be disregarded, Section 
5(1) of the Hindu Adoption and maintenance Act 1956 lays 
down "Ho adoption shall be made after the commencement of 
this Act by or to a Hindu except in accordance with the 
provisions contained in this Chapter, and any adoption made 
in contravention of the said provision shall be void" , and 
also Section 4- layd down "Save as otherwise expressly provided 
in this Act, - (a) any text, rule or interpretation of Hindu 
law or any custom or usage as part of that law in force 
immediately before the commencement of this Act shall cease 
to have effect with respect to any matter for which provision 
is made in this Act; (b) any other law in force immediately 
before the commencement of this Act shall cease to apply to 
Hindus in so far as it is inconsistent with any of the
20. See Kapur's Hindu Law of Adoption p. 64$.
21. See translation of Vasistha's text on p. 6h4, Kapur's 
Hindu Law of Adoption to the effect "After his (the 
adopted son's) adoption if a real legitimate son is 
born, then the dattaka is a participator, in .a fourth.
share".
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provisions contained in this Act".
On several other points, however, on which the 
Smritis are silent the provisions of the Act seem to he quite 
e q u i t a b l e  and sound in settling disputed questions of law 
i.e. on the question whether the adoption of daughters is 
valid and on the capacity of a widow to adopt without the 
husband's specific permission, I am inclined to agree with 
the deductions arrived at by the framers of the Act on these 
points for reasons already discussed by me on pages 69 to 
and pages zifS- ft.
The Courts in India have interpreted the provisions
of the Act as an amendment and a continuation of Hindu law,
22for example in Bawan Ram v Kalawanti“ and recently in
25Sitabai v Ramchandra the Supreme Court have held that the 
'relation back' theory of prior Hindu law still holds good 
on the correct interpretation of Sections 5 and 12 of the 
let, even though Section 14 of the Act is silent on the 
relationship of the adopted child with the deceased spouse 
of the adopter. Also Section 4 of the Act lays down in effect 
that on the points on which provisions of the Act are silent, 
the old Hindu law stands. In other words, though the lav; 
under the Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act 1956 cannot 
be described as 'truly' Hindu, it may however be still said 
to be Hindu law in many significant senses. lie should be on 
firmer ground if we were able to ascertain precisely what 
role was played by royal regulation in the practical adminis­
tration of the Hindu law prior to the British period. Since
22. ,.I.R. 1967 B.C. 176i.
25. a.t:r; 1970 s.c: '543.
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this subject is as yet not sufficiently worked out, and is 
subject to academic conjecture, I am bound to leave the 
question at this point. But I may be permitted to comment 
that there is no evidence that 'Hindu' means 'consistent with 
the dhamasastra' or ever meant that. The relationship 
between the dharmasastra and custom was always more complex, 
and retained within the concept of 'Hinduness' many elements 
unrecognised in the sastra.^
3. In what respects does it differ from the corresponding 
English lav/? In what respects is it nearer to English 
law than to some foreign systems?
This question has already been dealt with under
different heads in the various Chapters of this thesis and
is briefly summarised below.
As rightly observed by Derrett no other system
better resembles the Hindu law of adoption, in so far as
the effects of the Institution are concerned, than the English
law; and
"although, curiously, both an English judge 
and a bench of Indian judges agreed indepen­
dently that adoption in India (i.e., amongst 
Hindus) and adoption in England were poles 
apart, yet the similarities, judged comparatively, 
are more striking than the differences, however 
important the latter may be".25
Considering first the differences between the two 
systems of lav/, they differ first in the object of adoption.
24. Derrett, Religion, Law and the State in India (London,
1968), ChV 6."
25* Derrett: Conflict of Lav/s: Adoption and a difficult
Bombay decision, (1956) 58 Bom. L.R., 35 et seq.
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Under the Hindu system the object of adoption is two-fold 
viz., a temporal one for the continuity of the family in 
this world and the other a spiritual one for the attainment 
of heaven, as, according to the Sastras one cannot attain
26heaven unless he has a son (which includes an adopted son). 
Under the English lav/, the governing consideration of an 
adoption is the welfare and happiness of the adopted child, 
and, as an English authority on adoption has said Man
27
adoption brings the homeless child to the childless home1'.
In both systems the mutual temporal benefit to the adopter 
and ador:tee seems to be a common object although in the 
English law the primary consideration is the welfare of the 
child. Also the element of spiritual benefit as a consider­
ation for the adoption is absent is the English law, although 
this is an important motive for adoption among the Hindus.
(Ch. I).
There are also other differences e.g., under the 
Smriti law the adopted son got a smaller share in the adoptive 
father's property in competition with an after-born natural 
son. Under the present English lav/ he gets equal rights with 
the natural sons v/ith the exception that Section 16(3) of the 
Adoption Act 1958 expressly excludes the devolution of 
entails and estates accompanying a title as well as the title 
itself on the adopted son. Under the Hindu Adoptions and 
Maintenance Act, however, the adopted son now shares equally 
with the after born natural son (as under the English lav/) .
26. Tor a discussion of this refer to Ch. I, pages If to y . 




; Also under the Hindu Law there is no restriction in respect
of devolution of titles and entails and estates accompanying
it as the adopted child is considered as a ’child for all
purposes”, (Chapters III and IV) just like a natural son.
Under the old Hindu Law an adoption by a husband,
made the adoptee the son of his wife but under the Hindu
Adoption Statute the consent of the wife, if living, is 
i 27a
I essential. Also under the Hindu Law an adoption by a widow
j makes the adoptee a son of his deceased adoptive father from
22 2^the date of the latter's death. 9 Under the English law,
| for the adoptee to become the child of both the spouses,
• 28 | joint adoption by the two spouses is essential. Again
under Hindu law the adopted son acquires vested interests
I in the joint family property equal to the interest of his
adoptive father and the Latter*s right to dispose of such
; property is restricted on his adopting the child. Under the
English law, adoption does not restrict the right of the
adopter to dispose of his property.
Also the ’relation back* theory discussed in
Chapter VI is peculiar to Hindu law and has no counterpart
under the English law.
The English and Hindu law however agree in several
very important aspects. Thus an adoption has the effect
(with certain minor exceptions mentioned above) of completely
severing the adopted child from the natural family and
completely substituting him in the adoptive family. The
adoption also creates prohibited degrees of consanguity
27a. See also article by G-.V. Uarasimham: Adoption by a male
Hindu; (1962) 2 S.C.J., J,, 74 and also (1962) 2 I/I.L.J. 56.
28. See Sec. 1(2), (3) and Sec. 13(2), (3) of the Adoption 
Act, 1958.
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between the adopter and the adoptee for purposes of marriage
under both systems.
Also the adopted child inherits not only the
properties of the adoptive parents but the property of their
collateral relations as well, in the same manner as a
29natural child of the adopter would be entitled to. In 
the case of many other countries the laws of inheritance are 
not as strictly logical as could be seen from a perusal of 
the discussion in Chapter III pages l6l to 167-
4-. Is there any lesson to be learnt from (a) the Hindu and
(b) the English law of adoption for those who would draft 
a new family law for India?
The Vedas declare "’Whatever Manu says is medicine
7)0for mankind". The Smriti law has been the chief guiding 
factor in India on the law of adoption since pre-historic 
times and has most successfully stood the test of time over 
the p:ast several thousands of years. The provisions of the 
Smriti law relating to adoptions are, in theory and practice, 
equally for the benefit of the adoptive father as well as 
for the adopted child.
Adoption under the English law is treated as one 
of the best alternatives for improving the lot of the deprived 
child, though undoubtedly it confers benefit and brings 
happiness to the childless family as well.
In India only the Hindus can adopt and communities 
other than Hindus such as the Christians, Parsis, Muslims
29. See Chapter V pages 22if to 2 M  .
30. Taittiriya Samhita (II, 2.40 .2,) referred to in Kane:




etc. cannot make a valid legal adoption because of the general
absence of a lav/, statutory or otherwise, recognising adoptions
among these communities. The institution of adoption would
undoubtedly be a panacea for several thousands of families
belonging to alL communities who may be in distress on account
of childlessness, and legal recognition of this institution
for all communities in India, would, I am sure, undoubtedly
be welcomed and taken advantage of, by the families in distress.
Although initially there could possibly be some opposition by
members of some communities who may themselves not be in the
distress of childlessness and who may not be able to com-
but
prehend the usefulness of the institutionj/once the law stood 
enacted, I have absolutely no doubt that these very persons 
if in distress on account of childlessness would take advantage 
of the lav/ and in due c ourse the provisions of the code would 
prove to be a boon to many families.
It must also be remembered that the modern trend 
is opposed to the institution of polygamy and in favour of 
monogamy. Monogamy is the rule amongst Christians, Parsis 
and Hindus (by the recent Hindu law of Marriage 1955 which 
abolished Polygamy in 1955)* Among the Muslims in India, 
although polygamy still prevails, the reforms in favour of 
monogamy in other Islamic countries including Pakistan could 
well be a pointer to a hope that in the not too distant 
future the Muslim law in India may also be reformed in favour 
of monogamy. ith the abolition of Polygamy, childless 
families will become less uncommon and the need for the 
institution of adoption will increasingly be felt among the 
communities where adoption is not yet legally recognised.
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The English law has, by the recent enactments, 
unconsciously been brought into the closest analogy with 
the Hindu lav/ of adoption, and resembles it, especially in 
so far as the effects of the institution are concerned. As
the Smriti law has stood the test of time in India for several*
thousands of years, I would suggest that the future adoption 
code should have its roots in the Smriti law. Where 
modifications are necessary, or on points on which the Smritis 
are silent, the provisions of English law which are based on 
considerations of equity and the welfare of the child could 
be adopted with any suitable modifications that may be 
necessary to suit Indian conditions.
5. Specific recommendations for the Adoption Code.
The provisions of the Smritis are authoritative, 
equitable and sound and have been the basis of the Law of 
Adoption in India since time immemorial. As such the Adoption 
Code should have its roots in the Smriti law of adoption, with 
necessary modifications as suggested above in the last paragraph.
At present, adoption is a legally valid institution 
only among the Hindus in India, who regard it as an institution 
for securing spiritual as v/ell as temporal benefit and the 
popular form of adoption is the "Lattaka” form. Among the 
Hindus adoption is not only for secular benefit but to fulfil 
the religious direction that a sonless person is likely to 
lose heaven unless he secures a substitute son by adoption.
Among the communities other than Hindus e.g., the Christians,
57 7
Parsis, L'uslims etc. adoption, with its necessary legal
consequences is unknown*
the communities in India embodying the dattaka adoption or 
modified dattaka adoption (which could include the adoption 
ol forsaken and other children as suggested below), if 
circumstances and practicability so demand, i.e. if certain 
sections of the people wish to adopt only for secular purposes 
or for the welfare of forsaken children etc., then in the 
early experimental stages we may have two kinds of adoptions 
recognised in India viz., ’the Dattaka adoption' and ’the 
secular adoption', with very slight differences in their 
effects as suggested below. As the differences between the 
effects would not be much, once all the communities in India 
became used to adoption.a single Uniform Code of adoption, 
making use of the result of a sufficiently long experience 
of adoption by the various communities, could be drafted, 
as the Dattaka adoption has its roots and owes its origin 
and sanction to the Smriti law, it should obviously be 
governed by Smriti law7. But there are many points on which 
the Smriti law is silent and on such points India can.well 
borrow provisions from elsewhere, e.g. the English law. As 
already pointed out by me at pages to above, though the 
Smritis are silent on adoption of daughters, the Puranic 
instances quoted by me and the fact that adoption of daughters 
confers a spiritual benefit on the adopter i.e. the benefit 
which could be derived from such adopted daughter's son, I 
am entirely in agreement with the provisions of the Hindu 
Adoptions Act recognising adoption of daughters. Also on
Although I would prefer a uniform Code for all
account of reasons state 2
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I also agree with the provisions of the Act wherein a widow 
can adopt without the husband's specific permission.
As bo the provision of Section 9 of the Act allowing 
the guardian of a child to give in adoption this provision
appears, on the fact of it, to be opposed to Vasistha's
20text wherein Vasi^tha directs that only the natural parents
and none others have the power to give in adoption (i.e. in
the Dattaka adoption). It is true that only the parents of
the child have the best interests of their children at heart
and by allowing the guardian of a child to give in adoption,
whose aim may rather be to get rid of the child rather than
for his welfare, such adoptions could turn out to be against
the interests of the child. However since the Act abolishes
the other forms of adoption and 'the Dattaka form' of adoption
as envisaged by the Act appears to be a more comprehensive
form than the 'technical Dattaka', I think that forsaken
children and orphans in extreme distress, may be allowed to
be adopted provided a competent court, after very carefully
scrutinizing the circumstances of the child and after being
absolutely convinced that the adoption would be for the
benefit and welfare of the child, makes the order. However
in case two kinds of adoption i.e. the Dattaka and the secular
form of adoptions, as suggested below are adopted, then
provision could be made for adoption of orphans, forsaken
children etc. (provided a competent Court considers the
adoption to be in the best interests of the child) in the
secular form of adoption rather than the Dattaka form in
20view of the text of Vasi^tha mentioned above.
As to whether other than childless couples should
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adopt, I think the criterion laid down by lanu that adoption
a he resorted to in case of 'distress' should he adopted.
Jo that if a child he in distress (e.g. in the case of
forsaken and other children) and a couple even though not
childless adopts it, then such an adoption should he upheld,
and in such cases it should he provided that a Court order
would he necessary, and a competent Court would make the
order only if the adoption is for the benefit and welfare
of the child. In this case also the adoption may have to
he in the secular form as suggested above.
The story of Sunahsepa in the Aitareya Brahman^ta
(33) shows that this adoption by Yisvamitra, when the former
was in distress, was regarded as valid even though Yisvamitra
31had a hundred and one sons of his own living at that time.-' 
Sunahsepa became a great Yedic sage and composed several 
Vedic to eras and is referred to therein as 'Sunahsepa, the# a. /
son of Yisvamitra'. home such kind of provision (enabling a 
man with a son to adopt a son) may he necessary in view of 
the abolition of the 1 ritrima and other forms of adoption by 
the Act.
The Act is silent on the question whether, when an 
adoption is made by a widow, the adoption 'relates back' to
31. See Kane: History of Iharmasastra (1946) Vol. Ill,
p. 66J.
Sunahsepa was sold by his natural father to be used 
as a* substitute for a sacrifice tottie gods. '.Then 
later the gods released him, Sunahsepa refused to
go back to his natural father but*willingly became 
the ado; ted son of Visvamitra when the latter offered 
to adopt him. (This appears to have been an adoption
of a type classified in Smriti as swayamdatta not
dattaka).
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the death of his adoptive father entitling him to claim
the deceased adoptive father's property and displacing
the inferior heirs who might have inherited the property
in the meanwhile. I have already discussed this topic in
Chapter VI and elsewhere and also referred to the recent
22 23Supreme Court decisions ’ v affirming that relation hack
still stands. As already explained I thirk the doctrine
is
of'relation hack1/an equitable doctrine; for the adopted 
son sacrifices everything in his natural family and does 
confer benefit on his deceased adoptive father by continuing 
his line, and discharging all the functions which a natural 
son would have discharged. Also usually the only substantial 
property which an adopted child could claim is that of the
deceased adoptive father's, and considering the sacrifices
he makes and the benefits he confers, I think that a provision 
specifically recognising the 'relation back', of the son 
ado ted by a widow, to the death of his adoptive father should 
be clearly incorporated.
Also as a consequence of this, the proviso in 
Section 12(c) would have to be suitably amended to avoid any 
confusion and ambiguity i.e., an exception to the rule in 
Section 12(c) could be laid down to the effect that, so 
long as the widow of the family existed and was capable of
adopting a child, such adoption would be deemed to 'relate
back' to the death of the deceased father thus making such 
deceased father the adoptive father of the adopted child for 
the purposes of inheritance to such deceased father's property.
As for the 'Secular Adoptions', provision should 
be made allowing the member of any community in India viz., 
Christian, Parsi, _ uslii' or even Hindu etc. , to adopt
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according to this form.
Such adoptions should he effected only by means of 
a proper Court order, which the proper Court should pass 
after satisfying itself that the adoption is in the best 
interests of and for the welfare and benefit of the adopted 
child. In this respect the procedures followed in English 
adoptions with necessary modifications to suit Indian conditions 
could be followed,. A suggestion for 'an Adoption of Children 
Bill' has been drafted by Mr. Dhurandhar, formerly Legal 
Remembrancer of Bombay State and prepared by Ideher K. Master, 
a ember of the Indian Federation of 7/omen Lawyers Conference 
for the Indian Conference of Social fork, Bombay. The draft 
is useful as a step in the direction of codification of the 
law of adoption for the benefit of all communities in India.
In case of secular adoptions, many of the equitable 
provisions of English law could be borrowed, for apart from 
the provisions in English law being equitable and in the 
interests of children, the English lav/ of adoption is closest 
jc the Hindu law of adoption especially in its effects. Thus 
as under the English law, the adoptee under this form of 
adoption will be deemed to be the adopted child of the adopting 
parent only and entitled to inherit the property of such 
parent and his or her relations. But in case of joint 
adoptions (which should be permissible only when the adoption 
is by the two spouses) the adopter would become the child of 
both the parents with the usual effects of having the right 
to inherit to their properties and those of their relations 
as in the case of a natural son. In this type of adoption
multiple adoptions may be permitted on the ground of distress 
of 'the child' e’tc. , as suggested above, when a competent
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Court is satisfied that such adoptions would he in the interest 
of the child. Also I agree with the provisions in the Hindu 
Adoptions and Laintenance Act in creating prohibited relation­
ships for purposes of marriage in the adoptive family as if 
such child were a natural son and also maintaining the 
prohibited relationships in the natural family. This is a 
wholesome provision. As to the provision whether there 
should be 21 years difference of age when the adopter and 
adoptee are of different sexes I think this may be modified 
by adding a proviso permitting such adoptions when the age 
difference is less than 21 years, if permission is granted 
by a competent Court, which may grant or refuse permission 
considering the circumstances and merits of the individual 
cases. For in the past widows in their teens have adopted 
sons which have worked most successfully. A case may well 
arise when a ?/idow of 18 years has an opportunity to adopt 
a new born baby, which opportunity she may lose on account 
of this provision and in such and similar circumstances the 
Court should allow the adoption.
So also the adoption should have the effect of 
completely severing the adopted child from the natural faMly 
and creating similar ties in the adoptive family with rights 
of succession in the adoptive family including the right to 
succeed to the relations of the adopting parent, provided 
that the adopted son would not be entitled to marry prohibited 
relations in either families. In other words the effects in 
the 'secular adoption' would be similar to the Dattaka and 
English adoptions except that the adoption would not 'relate
back' to the death of the adopter's spouseas the adoption
37a.tfe t<x£1 ^ v -ko- c k 1 c ,u r ^e n - sec c r* e n f u ( adcptcois
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would be only to the parent or parents actually adopting 
and except for some other minor differences i.e. allowing 
adoptions of orphans and multiple adoptions in the case of 
children in distress etc. Also the provision in English law 
(Section 16(3) of adoption Act 1958) expressly excluding the 
devolution of entails and estates accompanying a title as 
well the title itself on the adopted son need not be adopted 
as it is inequitable and against the interests of the adopted 
child. However entails do not exist in India. 'Titles as 
such are more or less insignificant now that the privy 
purses are or may be abolished. The detailed provisions 
relating to the Adoption Code could be drafted by the Ministry 
of lav;, Legislative Dept., in consultation with the State 
Government.
Meher K. Master in a paper for the Indian Federation 
of 'omen Lawyers Conference at Bangalore (1st to 2nd June 
1968) on "The Indian Adoption of Children Act in the making”,
observes (at p. 3)
"In recent years there has been a growing 
demand for a general lav; of adoption in India.
The basis of this demand lies imbedded in 
the Constitution itself. Thus Clause (f) 
of article 39 of the Constitution requires 
the state to direct its policy towards securing 
that childhood and youth are protected against 
exploitation and against moral and material 
abandonment".
I fully endorse these views and consider that the time is now 
ripe for enacting an Adoption Code on the lines which I have 
suggested above.
! c uk . -
The substance of my recommendation is that there
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should be, for a period, a two-fold legal institution of 
Adoption, one based upon the Sastra ahd available only to 
Hindus, and another of a purely secular kind, available to 
all persons subject to Indian law in this regard. It would 
not be necessary to tamper with customary law, to the extent 
that that has survived the legislation of 1956 which we have 
already discussed exhaustively. The merit of this 
recommendation would, I should submit, be that, v/ithout 
discarding any advantage of the traditional law, it would 
confirm and extend the utilitarian aspects of Adoption where these 
are. needed. A two-tier system of marriage and divorce is already 
in existence in India. The Special Marriage Act of 1954 
provides a purely secualr system of marriage and divorce 
and this has been extended to persons marrying abroad, under 
the Foreign Marriage Act of 1969• Alongside this secular 
marriage there is the Hindu marriage confirmed by the Hindu 
Marriage Act of 1955 subject to certain modifications of a 
secular appearance. The possibility of a further amendment 
of Indian law, whereby all personal laws of marriage might 
be merged in a common religious system, while all communities 
might be held to have married within the scope of a common 
secular system unles they register themselves under the 
religious system, has been suggested by Derrett. The 
discussion of this proposal is not within my scope.
Derrett, in his Critique of Modern Hindu Law, (Bombay,
3 tl~
Tripathi, 1970) does not recommend the enactment of a 
secular adoption law, but he points out that the fears which 
learned authors had shown, that the introduction of new
31b. Para. / Also see Paras 1 7 Lf- to ^ 6"and the Chapter on 
Adoption (pp. f 2 2. to/^V)*
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elements into the Hindu adoption la?/ in 1956 would create 
hopeless anomalies unless ’relation hack' were held to h a w  
been totally abolished by that statute, were not justified, 
since the new law has created a series of secular effects 
alongside the ’sacramental’ effects of an orthodox Hindu 
adoption, both co-existing as effeats under the name of 
Hindu adoption law. I should submit that this indirectly 
supports my contention that an avowedly non-sacramental 
adoption law for all Indians is desirable. It would tend 
to make the intellectual position much clearer, and would 
avoid the confusion from which Hindus in India will otherwise 
suffer.
32. The judiciary realise that the Hindu public do not 
understand the new lav/s. More or less technical 
failures occur, and unsuccessful litigants’ predicament 
is sympathetically considered when it comes to an 
order for costs. See per Heshmukh, J., at Govindram 
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